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guide, and being misdirected by an impressed native guide picked up on the way. The advance during the day had been without contact with the enemy. The 4th Cav., Hawthorne's Battery, and the North Dakotas, with the wagon train went into camp about four miles back toward Novaliches, the men and animals being almost completely exhausted by hauling the transportation over sun-scorched divides, and through swampy valleys and rocky gullies.

THE COLUMN REACHES SAN JOSE. Early on the morning of the 24th, the command, now separated into two parts, through the failure of the wagon train to reach the river before going into camp the night before, was in motion. The 22d Inf. advanced to, and occupied San Jose without opposition, being accompanied by Scott's platoon. The 3d Inf. occupied the approaches to the ford and the adjacent thickets to guard the transportation. The remainder of the command, with wagon train, resumed the advance toward the river. The same condition, or worse, if possible, continued to impede the progress of the wagon train as on the day previous. Capt. Gale,


Photo by Darcey.

BRIDGE AT BAGBAG RIVER, SHOWING SPAN CUT OUT BY INSURGENTS. with his dismounted squadron of the 4th Cav., furnished the advance guard and convoy of the train, and with his entire command rendered valuable aid as engineers in assisting to prepare the roads, building bridges, etc. Lieut. Hawthorne, with his mountain battery detached, and even Maj. Penrose, Lieut. Kemp of the Medical Corps, with their hospital squad, and Chinamen, lent a willing hand to overcome what frequently appeared insurmountable obstacles to further progress. But of the North Dakotas, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, Gen. Lawton expresses special appreciation. They exchanged their well performed duties of advance guard of the day before, for the laborious one of rear guard of the two days necessary to reach Norzagaray. This regiment had orders to leave nothing behind, and literally carried transportation over bad places and put squads of men in the shafts to replace worn-out and dead bulls. Every service, even to the use of pick and shovel was performed, from the Colonel down to the private, with the same commendable earnestness that has given this regiment its reputation for cheerful and effective accomplishment of any task set them. As rapidly as the troops came in, they occupied the deserted huts of the town, (San Jose) and remained all night. The wagon train came in during the night, men and animals completely exhausted, many carabao having died, the men taking their places and hauling the carts along.

During the afternoon 2d Lieut. C. H. Boyd, 4th Cav., reported Troop I, of that regiment, for duty with the expedition. He had come with his troop, which was mounted on native ponies, from the vicinity of Norzagaray, to which point a provisional brigade, composed of seven companies of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and eight of the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf., and a section (one gun) of the Utah Light Artillery, under command of Col. Owen Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. had been accompanied by Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V., from Bocaue, with a view to joining the expedition. Lieut. Boyd reported that, while with Col. Summers' command, the enemy had been encountered and had made a stubborn resistance, but had been driven back through Norzagaray and across the river, just east of that town, without serious cuasalty

Lieut. Boyd and his troop returned at once to Norzagaray. The march was resumed at the usual hour, on the morning of the 25th instant, for Norzagaray, with Troop L, 4th Cav., as escort, and advanced with headquarters, without waiting for the remainder of the command, arriving at Norzagaray about 12:30 P. M., without incident.


While on the march, dense smoke was observed, rising from the valley in the direction of Angat. It was found, on arrival at Norzagaray, that Maj. Eastwick's Battalion, of the Oregons, and Capt. Masterman's, of the Minnesotas, with the Utah gun, had that morning routed the enemy from, and occupied the town of Angat, some four miles northwest of Norzagaray, and that during the engagement a portion of the town had been burned. During the engagement at Angat about 200 men of those left behind at Norzagaray, while swimming in the river, were surprised by a heavy fire from the enemy on the opposite bank. The mounted troop was watering at the same time, but fortunately not a man was hit. The enemy, in small force, were entrenched across the river from Norzagaray and scattered through the bamboo. During the afternoon they kept up a desultory and annoying fire upon the town, the bullets striking the church in which a hospital had been established. No casualties resulted, as the firing was at long range and not intelligently directed. The transportatior. made but little progress as the road, over which our route lay, did not improve until Norzagaray was sighted. The train camped some distance back, toward San Jose, and, advancing next morning, was directed to continue to Angat and go into camp at that place, which the 3d and 22d Inf. and the 1st North Dakotas, accompanied by Hawthorne's Mountain Battery, occupied the same day.



The mounted troop was sent on a reconnoissance along the west bank of the river and about two miles west of Angat, at Marunco, encountered the enemy in force reported to be about 500—200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, 3d Art., Acting Judge-Advocate. At the same time the cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons, under Maj. Eastwick, forded the river, just above Norzagaray, and successfully dispersed the insurgent forces from the thickets, along the river bank from east to west. Maj. Eastwick reported an insurgent loss of five killed and several wounded. The following report will explain Gen. Lawton's view of the situation at this time.



In the Field, Norzagarary, Luzon, April 26, 1899. To the Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

Sir-Your messages of 9:30 and 9:35, 25th inst., reached me this A. M. The command with transportation has not yet reached this point. I hope to get it all up this evening. The mounted troops were sent this A. M., on a reconnoissance west along the bank of the river to look at roads and fords. Two miles west of Angat, the enemy was encountered in force, reported to be about 500—200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer who accompanied the cavalry. At the same time cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons forded the river opposite this place and drove the enemy from the country opposite; they were plainly seen from this point scattering, some fifty moved up the river in southeast direction, others moved toward the main body. Our troops occupied high ground and moved down river opposite Angat. As soon as my command arrives will cross Col. Summers' command and move by both flanks down river and endeavor to throw flanks around the enemy and destroy some of them. Concerning your message of 9:30, there seems to be no direct road from this place to Quingua. The only route for wagons is via Baliuag to Bocaue. I will be prepared to follow instructions contained in message of 9:35 as soon as my column has arrived with transportation, and I have drawn the enemy from this vicinity. I desire, however, to submit the following suggestions:

From the best information I can obtain, I learn that there were at this place and at Angat about 1000 men. They were reported to have plenty of ammunition and expended it freely at long range, mostly Remington, but very little food. Gen. "Punta" Pantelon Garcia, commanding a few local troops, but mostly troops driven from Malabon about March 25th or 26th. The action of the enemy indicates that they are disintegrating, as small detachments have been wandering in different directions over the country and there seems to be little organization. They have been well cut off from the east and south and the mountains in the up-river country, and the main force have been pushed north and west. I feel sure we are on their extreme left and can double them up. Our problem is transportation. Buffalo carts are out of the question for even ordinary marching except over smooth, hard roads, for rapid moving over rolling country they are impracticable. The conditions of marching are such that the soldier is taxed to his utmost capacity of endurance to carry his rifle, ammunition and blanket roll, without being yoked to a cart to haul the supplies as we have been obliged to do, and are doing at this moment. A number of our bulls have died, I cannot ascertain how many, but ten or more, and the men pull along the carts. These bulls have died from exhaustion and not from disease. The fourmule teams have done very well, with help over bad places and on the hills, but the two-horse and mule teams could not pull more than the empty wagons. I have therefore no spare transportation even after the reduction of weight after the consumption of rations; we have, however, traveled over a rough country with no road. I hope when I get my transportation in to replace dead bulls with others found in the country, to re-adjust and arrange it so that it can continue over good roads and make short marches each day. The fifty pack mules will give us very little material assistance, as they will not carry one day's rations for the whole command, and I must still rely on the bull teams. I can, however, give the pack train to the squadron of cavalry, including the mounted troops, and it will carry ten days' rations for the whole squadron, and I can use them for flank or rapid movements as they will be strong enough to maintain themselves anywhere.

My suggestion then is to let me move west down the river by both banks to or near Baliuag, where I should be met by a supply train with ten days' rations. Then let me move north along the road through San Ildefonso to San Miguel, and let MacArthur move over the road to the west of the swamp along the river. I can keep my cavalry squadron on iry right flank, and in communicating distance, and thus the whole country between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande on the west will be covered. I believe the movement would disintegrate the insurgent army in that section, and I gather from information received that the roads suggested are very good. The signal officer has reported it impossible to maintain the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. He has sent out twice or oftener each day to repair it, but it is as often cut, and the last time a long section was removed, and he did not have wire enough along to repair it. I suggest that it be taken up from Manila and toward Novaliches, and I will send out and take up from this end as far as possible, and then that a line be laid out to me with supply train, if it be sent.

I do not believe I will be much in advance of MacArthur, if my suggestion is approved; at any rate I feel that I have force enough for any emergency. A reply by return of this escort will reach me before I can be ready to move.

Very respectfully,


Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.


As there was no other means of communication Gen. Lawton was obliged to send this by courier. No one had been over the route from Norzagaray to Bocaue since Col. Summers' advance, and therefore the security of this route to small parties was problematical.

Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V., was selected for this duty, which he unhesitatingly performed, accompanied only by his personal orderly.

With the exception of Troop I, 4th Cav., all the troops left Norzagaray for Angat on the morning of the 27th, Col. Summers' command continuing two miles further down the river to and occupying the town of Marunco. Much trouble was experienced with the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. Information was received from Corps Headquarters, that the line would be taken up from Manila to Novaliches, and the remainder would be abandoned unless the command could recover it from the north. This was afterwards done by Capt. F. A. Perkins, U. S. V., Signal Corps, escorted by Troop I, 4:h Cav.

From an insurgent officer captured by Maj. Eastwick's Battalion, of the 2d Oregons, on the 26th, it was learned that the San Jose and Novaliches insurgents did not obey orders from Aguinaldo, but acted separately; and that the insurgent forces were falling back to San Miguel where Aguinaldo was supposed to be. It was also learned from the same source, that if the soldiers of the insurgent army knew of the treatment they would receive from the Americans, many would desert and come into our lines, and that the officers, particularly, feared maltreatment by Americans.

At 9 A. M., the commanding officers of regiments, battalions and separate organizations were called together at headquarters, and were advised regarding treatment of the property and persons of non-combatants, the purpose of the expedition, and what was contemplated for the future. Two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent back to Norzagaray to re-inforce Troop I, 4th Cav., the insurgents having attempted to re-occupy the town.

Information was received from headquarters, that the fifty pack mules loaded with ammunition, and the additional four-mule teams, hauling rations, would leave Bocaue the morning of the 29th, and request was made that they be sent via Angat to join the command. Instructions were received on the 29th, after the first battle of San Rafael, to remain at Angat until supplies arrived.

GALLANT BEHAVIOR OF WILLIAM H. YOUNG. At daybreak, on the 29th, the 1st North Dakotas, 3d U. S. Inf. and Scott's platoon, moved down the south bank of the river toward San Rafael. At the same time Col. Summers' command, to which was added Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery, moved down the north bank of the river in the same direction. About noon Col. Treumann's command developed a force of the enemy, afterwards estimated at 400, which they drove on down the river. Here an incident took


Photo Sy Darcey. place which Gen. Lawton says he shall not soon forget, in that it made him acquainted with that splendid and gallant man and scout, William H. Young. He, in citizen's clothing, was noticed walking well in front of the right flankers of the advance point. Gen. Lawton ordered him in, intending to reprimand and send hiin to the rear. Something in the man's bearing and appearance made the General change his mind, and he directed him to go to the front and bring in a citizen that the General might get definite information about the location of San Rafael. He cheerfully complied, and in less than five minutes Gen. Lawton heard three shots and Young appeared as cool and collected as ever, bearing a rifle and haversack with eighty-six rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood. He had. run into an insurgent outpost of eight men, and had alone killed one and driven the others off. His action prevented a surprise to our advance guard which was soon under a rapid and hot fire.

THE COMMAND OCCUPIES SAN RAFAEL. Col. Summers' command occupied San Rafael without opposition. Our casualties: 2d Lieut. C. C. Todd, 3d Inf., slight gun-shot wound, right thigh, and two enlisted men, 3d Inf., and one enlisted man, 1st North Dakotas, wounded, the latter severely. One insurgent is known to have been killed. Scott's platoon of

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