line. The distance from headquarters northward towards the Spanish line to the entrenchments occupied by the insurgents was one mile and a half, these extended from the beach to the Calle Real Road, the length of the trench being three hun

the line was advanced by the Americans from fifty to one hundred and fifty yards, and a new line constructed, extending from the beach to a highway westward, and thence to a swamp seven hundred yards. It was built for enfilading, and to cover approaches from the north. The left rested on the bay, and the right was covered by an impassable swamp.

POSITION OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS.

At the time of the advance on Manila, Gen. Greene's Brigade held this line of entrenchments with his reserve within supporting distance. Two hundred and fifty yards north on the Calle Real Road, is the intersection of the highway to Pasai, the distance being 700 yards. At Pasai, the road turns at right angles and extending northward, forms the Cingalon Road. Along this road were the trenches held and covered by MacArthur's Brigade, at the time of the advance, the first of which is 700 yards from Pasai. The trench here extends west 300 yards and 100 yards east from the road. The west approach is covered by a swamp, and the left by a trench held by Greene's Brigade. All along this highway were a number of short earthworks extending northward a distance of 650 yards to another main trench 200 yards long. Here was a strong barricade built for enfilading. This was north and east of Greene's last trench, and in advance of it 350 yards, and 300 yards south of block-house No. 14, occupied by the Spanish force. In front of this was a strong outpost about 60 yards distant. Here began the insurgent trenches, extending northeast 350 yards. Their left had for support the American line and their right an impassable swamp. These were strong earthworks and would be effective in making an assault on the strong Spanish position which was supported by the block-houses. It was these trenches which our forces wished to occupy before making the advance on Manila. Our operations prior to this advance taking Camp Dewey as a base, covered three-quarters of a mile east and west, and two

and a half miles north and south. The west was protected by the bay and the east by an impassable swamp, and the whole was covered by the guns of the fleet.

EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS.

The position of the American commanders, previous to the arrival of a military force sufficient to make them masters of the situation, was very trying. There were large foreign interests in Manila, and the well known temporary lack of power on the part of the Americans to give due protection to non-combatants and their property from the possible excesses of the Filipinos was a legitimate cause of anxiety to the governments whose citizens were in Manila. The result was a speedy gathering of British, French, Japanese and German war-ships to observe events, and afford such protection to their own citizens and other non-combatants as the exigencies of the case might require.

MISCONDUCT OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL.

The number of German ships, however, was unnecessarily large. There were five in all, two of which were armored and outclassed any ship of Dewey's fleet; and considering their number and size the German squadron in Manila Bay

CRAVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN PACO CEMETERY.

almost constituted what is called a "naval demonstration," a term which is used to describe a naval force sufficient in strength to control an existing situation, and which is very seldom displayed under such circumstances, except for the purpose of a warning against some possible action. The actions of the German squadron were very peculiar. The rules of naval etiquette in a blockaded port, or in the presence of belligerents, are very closely drawn and perfectly understood by all naval commanders. It was the constant practice of the ships of the German squadron to strain these rules to the utmost, and in some cases they certainly overstepped them. There was a studied discourtesy, which could apparently have no object except to irritate the Americans and engage them in a controversy. As naval commanders are always presumed to be acting in pursuance of instructions, it was difficult for Admiral Dewey to interpret the actions of the German admiral except upon the supposition that he desired to provoke a contest which would serve as an excuse for Germany's intervention in affairs in the Philippines. Admiral Dewey endured these petty annoyances with such patience as he might, *Mr. Stickney's account of this matter has already been given, (see page 16) but it seems proper to make the narrative complete in this place,

until, what he deemed a sufficient occasion arising, he is said to have sent, in connection with a protest against an improper action, a request to Admiral Von Diederich to be informed "Whether Germany and the United States were at peace or at war, in order that he might take measures accordingly," with the added notification that "If Admiral Von Diederich wanted a fight he could have it right now." No official report of any such message has been published, but unquestionably some message was sent which relieved the situation, for there was no more trouble from that source. What instructions Admiral Von Diederich may have had, or what designs, if any, the German government may have had, is not likely to be known, but so far as we can now see, whatever trouble there was grew out of the fact that the German commander was an impertinent and foolish man. At any rate he was quietly recalled by his government.

RUMORED COMING OF CAMARA'S FLEET.

In addition to this cause of anxiety, and the strain of managing the Filipinos, there was a very possible danger from a Spanish fleet. The battle-ships of the American navy were all in the Atlantic, while Spain had at home a good number of formidable vessels, from which a squadron, far more powerful than that of Dewey, might easily be fitted out, and reach Manila, by way of the Suez Canal long before any American battle-ship, even if it could be spared from the Atlantic, could reach there. In anticipation of this, and as the only thing possible to be done, the monitors Monterey and Monadnock, then lying in San Francisco, were fitted out for the Philippines, and the Monterey was promptly got off. As a matter of fact, as is well known, a squadron, including the battle-ship Pelayo, was made up in the Mediterranean, and despatched eastward under Admiral Camara. Dewey knew this, and also that the Monterey had sailed to his assistance. The anxiety and strain which grew out of this situation is well described in the following language of Gen. F. V. Greene:

"We had been thirty days without news from the outer world. The Boston brought us the latest information by way of Hongkong, which was dated July 2d, and consisted of a few brief telegrams, to the effect that Admiral Camara's fleet had passed

through the Suez Canal, was coaling in the Red Sea, and as soon as this was completed would continue its voyage to Manila; and that Gen. Merritt had sailed from San Francisco in the steamer Newport on June 28th.

"These telegrams

CAPTURED SPANISH GUNS.

showed that a most interesting race was in progress on two sides of the globe, each of the contestants with about 7000 nautical miles to go. Camara was coming east, and Merritt was coming west; and the monitor Monterey, which

we had left coaling at Honolulu, and the arrival of which was of such vital importance to Dewey, was also coming west, all having the same objectiveManila Bay. As we steamed down the coast of Luzon, I spent several hours figuring on a time table to see who would come in first. Allowing the Monterey six knots, Camara's fleet ten knots, and the Newport twelve knots, I figured out that Camara would reach Manila July 26th, Merritt July 28th, and the Monterey August 4th. Would Camara come straight to Manila? Would he sail east to intercept Merritt? Would his arrival be delayed beyond August 4th? Would he come at all?

"I handed the time table to Admiral Dewey, and he spent most of the night and the following day studying over it. On the morning of the third day (July 19) he came to the China in his barge, and asked me to go ashore with him to see Gen. Anderson,

of his expedition, was racks at Cavite. The vinced that if Camara age he would reach Monterey. Having no mand, he was outThe safety of the army such an enormous ica, depended upon tact. He therefore nation, in case news less than a week that back, to take his fleet the north of Luzon, eastward until he met Monadnock, which then he would return fleet. He felt reasonwould be gone not 10th, and he asked

who, with 2500 men

quartered in the barAdmiral was concontinued his voy

Manila before the battle-ship in his comclassed by the Pelayo. and the transports, at distance from Amerkeeping his fleet incame to the determiwas not received in Camara had turned and the transports to and then to cruise the Monterey and the was following her; and destroy Camara's ably confident that he longer than August Gen. Anderson, who

was the senior officer, what he would do. The latter promptly replied that he would take thirty days' rations, march into the hills about twenty miles east of Cavite, entrench and await the return of the fleet. My opinion was asked, and I fully concurred in the wisdom of the departure of the fleet, and the propriety of taking the troops inland to await its return.

"If Camara's nerve had held out, the result would have been a very interesting campaign in the Philippines. Merritt arrived three days ahead of schedule time, and the Monterey arrived on the very day calculated, but Camara did not come at all. Definite information that Camara had turned back reached the Admiral on July 22d, just as it was becoming necessary to take steps to carry the above plan into operation."

Such is the fortune of war. Conceding the arrival of Camara with the Pelayo and his fleet as expected, the destruction of the transport fleet, with Gen. Merritt,

MAJOR GENERALS IN THE EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

1. WESLEY MERRITT, first Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; resigned, August 26, 1898, to go as Peace Commissioner to Paris. 2. ELWELL S. OTIS, present Governor-General, Philippine Islands, succeeding General Merritt. 3. THOMAS N. ANDERSON, commanding First Division, resigned, March 18, 1899. 4. ARTHUR MACARTHUR, commanding Second Division. 5. H. W. LAWTON, commanding First Division, succeeding General Anderson. 6. HENRY C. MERRIAM, commanding Dept. of California, relieved, January 19, 1899.