was among the probabilities. Among the certainties would have been the Spanish occupation of all the fortifications from Corregidor to Manila, the American forces, twenty miles inland, the insurgents driven out of every fortified place in and about Manila, and this powerful Pelayo and the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay under the protection and support of the heavy guns on the fortified. walls of Manila. But none of these things happened.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK.

On the arrival of the second expedition Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene deliberated on the plan of attack, Greene having brought information to Anderson from Gen. Merritt that, if he was certain of

success, he might make the attack before his

(Merritt's) arrival; otherwise, to await

his coming. Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene had under con

sideration two plans of attack.

One, to make San Pedro Macati the base, and the other to proceed direct against the Spanish position on the Manila Bay side. In this there were two considerations. From the San Pedro Macati base, the eastern and less fortified part of the city could be easily reached. On the east, the insurgents already held the city water-works, and effectually blockaded the city from all egress into the interior. But to attack from the San Pedro Macati base involved the great difficulty of hauling the artillery by hand to the place, and moving the army so that it would practically be detached from the present base, while the San Pedro Macati base would be out of effective range of the fleet, and without its support. Gen. Anderson, according to Gen. Greene, favored the San Pedro Macati base, while he favored the bay side attack.

In any case, it was considered that the attack should be

postponed until the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and he, upon his arrival, ordered the attack on the Greene plan. At that time, the reputed strength of the Spanish force was 10,000 men, but Gen. Greene says that at the time of the surrender it was found to be 13,000.

Opposed to this force was that of the insurgent forces which, while not allowed to co-operate with the Americans in their aggressive movements, still held strong defensive positions against the Spaniards. Gen. Anderson was the ranking officer prior to the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and the American forces being formed into a division, Gen. Anderson was placed in command, and upon the arrival of Gen. MacArthur with the third expedition, the whole command was divided into two brigades, Gen, MacArthur being assigned to the command of the 1st Brigade and Gen, Greene to the 2d Brigade.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

The formation of the force into brigades and the assignment of the different regimental and other organizations for the brigades was made by Gen, Merritt, by general order, August 1st, as follows:

GENERAL Orders, Į
No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS Department of the PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY Corps.

MANILA BAY, P. I., August 1, 1898.

I. The United States forces assembled at Cavite, Camp Dewey and in transports off Cavite are hereby organized as the 2d Division of the 8th Army Corps, composed of two brigades. Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the division:

The brigades are organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE—Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., commanding: 23d U. S. Inf., two battalions; 14th U. S. Inf., one battalion; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf.; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Inf., one battalion; Astor Battery.

SECOND BRIGADE-Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V., commanding: 18th U. S. Inf., two battalions; battalion four-foot batteries, 3d U. S. Art.; Company A, Battalion U. S. Engineers; 1st California Volunteer Inf.; 1st Colorado Volunteer Inf.; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf.; Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Art.; Light Battery B, Utah Volunteer Art.

II. The 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, now at Cavite, will remain at that place on their present duties, the commanding officers reporting direct to division commander.

III. The Signal Detachment will remain at Cavite, and will report to the chief signal officer at these headquarters.

By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

THE NATURE OF THE GROUND COVERED BY OUR ARMY.

The first expedition under Gen. Anderson, had arrived in the bay on June. 30, 1898, and landed next day at Cavite. This city and fortifications are on a narrow neck which connects with the main peninsula. This neck is a mile long to a point where it is so narrow that only a single wagonway connects with the peninsula. This road always overflows at high tide. The large peninsula to

which this neck connects, is five miles long to a point where it connects with the mainland, and here there is only room for a single wagonway, and during the rainy season this roadway is quite impassable. In the interior, and north and east of the Cavite peninsula, and extending

to within a short distance of where Camp Dewey was afterwards located, the country is composed largely of swamps and rough, uneven ground, through which many small streams flow, which have their sources in the innumerable swamps, the larger ones taking their rise in the mountain range, which lies inland near the Lake Laguna de Bombon, and thence flowing westward and emptying into Manila Bay. Over this whole region was a rank tropical vegetation. Luckily this district, at the time of the first debarkation, had been cleared of the Spaniards by the insurgents, and thus all possibility of opposition in landing prevented. There is practically but one wagon road through this region from Cavite northward towards Manila, to a place where Camp Dewey was subsequently established, and this, most of the year in an almost impassable condition. The distance is about twenty miles. The Spaniards on their official maps, designate their public travel ways as "roads," "bridle paths" and "paths." The first is something of an improved way, the streams bridged or supposed to be so, and the road-beds thrown up much after the manner of our Western country roads, and averaging about twenty-five feet in width. The "bridle path" is a way over which a carabao may haul a sled. The "path" is suitable only for travel by foot or on horseback. From the roads, notably that which leads from Cavite to Manila, there are many of these bridle paths and paths leading back into the interior. This interior, after leaving the plain south and east of Manila, over which the campaign was made, consists of foothills merging into a mountain range, the highest peaks of which are from 5000 to 7000 feet, and this range extends from the southwest border of Lake Laguna de Bombon to the Pasig River, making a circuit much in the form of a half moon. It became at once evident to Gen. Anderson that Cavite could not, for the reason stated, be made a base of operations in an active campaign against Manila, and, luckily again, to enable him to establish his base as he desired, the insurgents had driven the Spaniards out of the locality which he wished to occupy. That is to say, at the time of the arrival of the first expedition, the insurgents occupied San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite Viejo, Imus, Bacoor, Las Pinas, Paranaque and Malibay. After a further reconnaissance, Gen. Anderson selected as a new base of operations in the active campaign a plot of ground near Paranaque. The plan of his campaign had for its objective, first, the capture of the entrenchments and strongholds of the Spanish positions south and eastward

of the walled city, many of which, owing to the obstacles shutting them from view of the fleet and other causes, could not be bombarded successfully by the fleet, and second, the capture of the walled city.

DIFFICULTIES IN LANDING TROOPS.

Debarkation when once begun on the part of the troops, was pushed with vigor, although under unpropitious conditions. The rainy season was on.

outlying riggers and towed from one position to another. Without any material mishaps the expedition was thus landed at Cavite, as were likewise the second and third expeditions, the only troops which took part in the campaign of Manila.

THE HEALTH OF THE COMMAND.

Few can realize the conditions at the time that the first expedition cast anchor in Manila Bay. With the best that could be done, it was impossible, in the hurried departure from the States, and the many hindrances unavoidable in securing transports, to properly equip and supply the troops. As a consequence, the members of the first expedition endured many discomforts which were largely avoided in the subsequent expeditions. The germs of disease, which soon after landing became widespread and alarming, were undoubtedly fostered on board the transports. The 2d Oregon were the worst sufferers. It was reported that within thirty days after debarkation, not more than one-half of the regiment was fit for camp duties. There was much complaint on shipboard of improper food supply and clothing, and shoes were not up to the standard. Hygienic conditions aboard ship were doubtless neglected. The change from civil to military life brings new and untried conditions, which usually put to the test the best physical conditions. Add to this climatic change, improper diet and bad sanitation, and many break down under the strain. As the transport and supply service became better organized, and the troops got under better discipline, these conditions gradually disappeared.

The most prevalent disease, especially in the second expedition, was measles. Gen. Greene, accounting for this, says that there was a great strife among the regiments at San Francisco to be the first in taking transports; that at the time