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his expedition left San Francisco a number of the members of the different regiments were in hospitals, some afflicted with measles, and about dozen of these men by stealth escaped from the hospital, and secreted themselves on shipboard, and were not found until far out at sea.


Gen. Wesley Merritt arrived at Manila on July 25th. He at once assumed command, and on August 1st issued the order, already quoted, organizing the brigades of his army. On the 6th day of August, Aguinaldo, as President of the Revolutionary government, addressed a note to the Powers, asking their recognition of his government. In this he did not consult any representative of the United States, nor had he the concurrence or consent of any such representative. It was a plain, unequivocal act, indicating a determination to no longer act in concert with the United States. He said in his note: “The revolution has about 9000 prisoners of war, and a regularly organized army of 30,000 men, and they are now besieging Manila, the capital."

On the 12th of August, 1898, the protocol between Spain and the United States was made, and among other recitals it provided: “That the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.” The issue was thus plainly drawn. Aguinaldo demanded the recognition of his government. The United States decided that the status of the Philippines should be settled between them and Spain by a treaty yet to be made.


Ante-dating these events, a gradual antagonism between the personnel of the two armies had grown up.

An indistinct, undefined color-line had been drawn between the armies. At first the Filipino sought fraternity, but his overtures fell on barren ground, and he was taught that there could be no social affinity between him and the Americans When once the breach began, it was but a step to

Before and during the engagement which ended in the capture of Manila, animosities between the Americans and Filipinos became very manifest. During the advince, Aguinaldo was

GUNS IN THE ARSENAL AT MANILA. ordered out of his trenches, then to cease firing, and at a time during the advance, a part of the two commands stood opposed to each other at the "fire" command. At the surrender the Filipinos were not allowed to participate, and,


open insults,

with the exception of their commanding officers, were excluded from the city while bearing arms.

Some time before this Aguinaldo's headquarters were at Bacoor, in close proximity to the American land and naval forces. It was to free himself from this supposed dangerous proximity that he removed his headquarters to a place three miles north of Manila. To this Gen. Otis demurred, and Aguinaldo, paying no heed, on the 13th of September he was ordered peremptorily by Gen. Otis to evacuate by the afternoon of the 15th. On the 14th Aguinaldo, in consequence, moved his force to Malolos, where he established his headquarters and that of the Provisional government, making Malolos its capital. At this time, as stated, his forces, in part, were distributed as follows: At Caloocan, 3000 men; his cannon were pointed towards Binondo; at Pasig, 400; south of Malate, 1200, and at Pasai, Pandacan, Paco and Santa Ana, about 500 each.

During this time, and up to the signing of the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, the insurgents claim that they had so conducted their carepaign that the Spanish soldiery had been practically driven out of the Philippines, with the exception of Manila and its suburbs, and there was no civil control outside of this limit for the Spanish government to transfer to the United States.

On August 9th the following general order was issued by Gen. Merritt: GENERAL, ORDERS, }



MANILA BAY, P. I., August 9, 1898. In view of the extraordinary conditions under which this army is operating, the commanding general desires to acquaint the officers and men composing it with the expectations which he entertains as to their conduct. You are assembled upon foreign soil, situated within the western confines of a vast ocean separating you from your native land. You have come, not as despoilers and oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong, free government, whose purposes are beneficent, and which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish rule.

It is, therefore, the intention of this order to appeal directly to your pride in your position as representatives of a high civilization in the hope and with the firm conviction that you will so conduct yourselves in your relations with the inhabitants of these islands as to convince them of the lofty nature of the mission which you have conie to execute.

It is not believed that any acts of pillage, rapine or violence will be committed by soldiers or others in the employ of the United States, but should there be persons with this command who prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts will be considered not only as crimes against the sufferers, but as direct insult to the United States flag, and they will be punished on the spot with the maximum penalties known to military law. By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.


It was a vigilant command during the six weeks intervening between the landing of the first expedition and the fall of Manila, and during this interim both the officers and rank and file, without murmur, endured the hardships and vicissitudes of campaign life in the trenches. The rainy season was at its height, and the downpour was almost incessant. Life in camp, aside from the exposures on duty, was almost intolerable. Resort was had to every device to provide some comfort in tent life, but to little avail. The ground was in an overflow, and the continued tramping to and fro made a mixture of mud which rendered passage almost impossible. To cook, eat and sleep, to live, to endure, put to the test all their fortitude. The work of the soldiers consisted, aside from the duties in camp, in doing service in the trenches, sometimes to fight, always under the enemy's aim and always in mud and rain. Usually the trench filled with water as it was dug, and often the upthrown dirt washed down as fast as placed. The trenches were held and the work there done in relays, the relays serving for twenty-four hours.


It was to make more effective our own operations that a request was made of the insurgents to vacate their trenches, giving place to the Americans. This caused much parleying, the matter being referred to Aguinaldo, who then had his

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headquarters eleven miles inland, and whose consent was obtained, the condition being that the transaction should be put in written form. Our troops occupied this insurgent trench the next morning. Express instructions were given by Gen. Merritt in this negotiation that no force should be used or threatened. This removed the whole insurgent force from the line desired to be occupied by the Americans. This was not the first instance in which the insurgents hesitated to comply with the requests of the American commanders. Soon after the arrival of the first troops, land transportation facilities were badly needed by the Americans. All of these facilities were in the hands of the insurgents, who refused to allow their use by the Americans upon any consideration. Gen. Anderson thereupon seized such animals and means as he required, but in all instances paid far more than their worth. The treatment of the Spanish prisoners at Cavite by the insurgents was so barbarous that our general in command interfered and called the attention of the insurgent officers to the starving condition of their prisoners, and asked that they be accorded more humane treatment. This being refused, the prisoners were suitably furnished by our army.


AMERICANS OCCUPY FILIPINO TRENCHES. The trench vacated by the Filipinos was occupied by one battalion 18th Regulars, one battalion 1st Colorado Inf. and four guns, two from each of the Utah Batteries. Owing to defects in profile and location, it was determined to remove the trench to a new location, which would better command the Spanish position and could be better strengthened and extended so as to cover the whole line of the Spanish trenches. Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy surveyed the ground and determined upon the location and character of the trench, and it was placed under his direction. The construction of this trench went on for two days and nights, and during this time the change of occupants had apparently not been noticed by the Spaniards. The first day, the 18th Inf. and Colorado Inf. were relieved by two battalions of California Inf., and on the next morning, being July 31st, the two California battalions were relieved by two battalions of the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers, one of the Nebraska Volunteers and by 200 of the 3d Regular Artillery as infantry. During this day there was occasional picket firing. The trench at this time had been built to and from the Capuchin chapel, a total distance of about 300 yards, extending from the beach to the Calle Real, and was nearly completed. It had a height averaging about seven feet.

A wide hall runs through the center of the Capuchin chapel, east and west. The trench began just north of the chapel door, which opened into this hall-way and thence direct to the road. Connecting on the west corner of the building, the trench extended to the beach, connecting the trench with this corner. The earth was piled high against the iron-barred window. Near the beach, the trench inclined forward a short space, and thence a few yards across to a wrecked cais

During the day there had been slight desultory firing by the Spaniards, but not sufficient to materially interfere with the construction of the trench. It was seen, however, that the Spaniards had become extremely watchful of the work going on. The insurgents in the trenches had a habit, prior to this, of a “hit-ormiss” fashion of firing, as the spirit caught them. One or several would elevate their guns and blaze away, without any aim and no special object. The Spaniards

seemed to have a like faculty of random
firing, but seemingly always firing high.
As a result, the insurgents in the
trenches were not in danger, but our
troops occupying positions in their rear
were exposed. Gen. Merritt had re-
quested Aguinaldo to stop this firing
and, after much persuasion, they

The particular danger to our troops occupying these trenches, in consequence
of the Spanish high firing, was not so much in the trench as in going to and from
it. It is indisputable that had our troops in the trenches paid no heed to this firing,



it would have been an accident if any loss of life had occurred prior to August 13th, and even then there would have been no loss had th program, as arranged, been strictly followed. It was Admiral Dewey's desire and plan to effect the capture of Manila without the loss of a single man. But our soldiers could not resist the temptation, although against orders, to now and then take a shot. It was always the case, if they kept quiet behind the trenches, that the Spaniards would fire a few shots or volleys and then subside.


On the night of July 31st, however, the tension reached a climax, and there occurred between the forces what is known as the “ Battle in the Rain."

It was one of those typical tropical night storms in which there was a raging wind and a furious downpour, and, in the darkness, objects were not discernible beyond your reach. In the rush and roar of the storm you could neither see nor hear. It was


CONVENT OF GUADALUPE BEFORE DESTRUCTION. certainly a reckless enthusiasm which could drive our soldiers out on such a night against orders and at the hazard of their lives. Exactly what occurred when the conflict was at its height would be difficult to learn. At the time it was supposed and believed, and the order of the command so stated, that the Spaniards had left their trenches and attempted to turn our right flank. It is now conceded this was not so, and the Spaniards, after their surrender of Manila, said they never left their trenches. The Spanish trench was much longer than our own, and their left extended far eastward of our right.

The 10th Pennsylvanians were the chief sufferers. They might have been in error in supposing the enemy were turning their flank, but there can now be no doubt as to their own position and actions in the affair. While conflicting statements are made in official reports and by those not participating, the narration given in the Tenth Pennsylvania Regimental History in the Pennsylvania edition of this volume puts the question at rest. It says: “On the morning of July 31st it fell to the lot of the 10th Pennsylvania Inf. to be detailed for outpost duty for the next twenty-four hours. Col. Hawkins and the entire command was at or near this advanced line, except Company B, which was posted on guard on a

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