Road.

His front lay between impassable swamps, and back of this, to the Pasai Road, the brigade occupied invulnerable positions. The Astor Battery was on the right, one Utah gun in an insurgent emplacement on the Cingalon Road, the 13th Minnesota on the right, and the 23d Regulars on the left.

THE FLEET TAKES POSITION.

Having thus located the land forces at the time of the attack, we must now take up the matters pertaining to the fleet, which was to join in a joint attack on the Spanish positions at Manila on the 13th. In the preparations for this attack, Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt acted in concert. At this time there was a large fleet of foreign war-ships in Manila Bay, composed of four English, five German, two Frenchman, and a Japanese. Admiral Dewey wanted the place occupied by them in which to maneuver, and they moved out of the way. Every precaution was taken by the fleet for bombardment as though it actually might

occur.

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SURRENDER.

For some time before this, negotiations had been going on to effect a surrender without the loss of property or life. In this the Spanish held to their tradition of requiring defeat before surrender. They had, too, been watching and hoping for Camara's fleet and the Pelayo, and the 3000 men which the fleet was said to be convoying from Spain; but when Camara turned back, the last hope of holding the Philippines by force vanished; consequently, they were inclined to consider terms of surrender. The Belgian consul, M. Andre, had been for some time occupying a Belgian craft in the bay, and put forth his good offices as an intermediary between Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Augustin, looking to a pacific capitulation. The Spanish authorities, however, held out for honor, and it required no little strategy to perfect the plan of mimic battle without it verging into the real. The American commander would not permit this if the play should go so far as to imperil the life of a single man. Still, if Spanish pride could be assuaged and no evil follow, it would be far better than to incur the loss of life and property which was sure to follow should a general engagement be precipitated. Augustin became so convinced of the folly of resistance that he was prepared to surrender without further show, and even, as is stated, hoisted the white flag. It was pulled down, however, and subsequently he was called to Madrid, and Fermin Jaudenes made Captain-General, which position he held when the "ultimatum" was made to him,

as before stated, on August 7th. When the final demand was made for surrender, the Captain-General got twentyfour hours' time, but after a conference, refused to surrender without an attack. In the meantime the Belgian consul was busy, and his trips were frequent between the fleet and the Captain-General's office. During this time the fleet had cleared for action and was ready at a moment to commence the attack. Gen. Merritt, at the time it was arranged the attack

should be made, came on board the Olympia and stated that the American forces were not in position sufficiently eastward to protect the city from the incoming insurgents at the time of surrender, so a little time was taken to accomplish this.

ALLEGED ARRANGEMENT FOR A SHAM BATTLE.

By the 12th of August, the full details of the coming "battle" were arranged between Admiral Dewey, Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Jaudenes. In this, on the part of the American forces, such display was to be made as would satisfy an observer that further resistance on the part of the Spaniards would not only be futile, but ground for censure by all non-combatants; when this point was reached the white flag of surrender was to be hung out from the Spanish fort, when further assault should cease. So definite were the details as to this, that the maneuver of the fleet was specified, the time when the attack should begin, where it should be made, its continuance and character; that the Spaniards should fire no shots in return, the exact time when the flag of surrender should be raised, the proceedings pertaining to this and the place and disposition of the American and Spanish forces after this, until the American occupation was made complete, so as to prevent looting and destruction, and ward off the insurgents from the city. All the principal officers in both commands were fully apprised, and specific instructions given so that no mistakes be made or loss of life occur. Pursuing this plan, the American fleet was put as fully in readiness as when it first went into the engagement in Manila Bay.

THE FLEET BEGINS THE ATTACK.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th, the fleet commenced to maneuver into position for the attack, and within one-half hour the Olympia was in position for shelling Fort Malate, followed by the Raleigh and Petrel, the Callao and the little Barcelo closer in shore; and back of these was Gen. Merritt and staff on a

transport, and the Kwonghai with the Oregon troops. The Boston, Charleston and Baltimore were on the port quarter of the Olympia. The McCulloch was on the starboard quarter, while the Monterey moved up close in shore, where her twelve-inch muzzles stood grinning at the heavy Krupp batteries at the Luneta; and on the north the Concord lay at the mouth of the Pasig. The threatening array would

have amply justified the Spanish surrender without a shot, but the play went on, with the head of the army and escort in the rear, waiting for the white flag and the peals of victory, which should call him from his seclusion to receive the capitulation of the city as per arrangement.

The Olympia opened fire at 9:30 in the morning on the old Fort Malate; her shells falling short, the Raleigh and Petrel took it up. The shots improved, the Olympia changed position, and then did more effective work, as did the others. In the meantime, the remnants of the Spanish forces that had been about the fortifications had withdrawn

toward the city. The firing continued till 10:30, when the order to cease firing was given to the fleet, and the surrender signals shown to the Spanish fort. There not being an immediate answer, the fleet was ordered to close up. Every captain in the fleet, it is stated, was watching for the white flag. Capt. Lamberton was on the afterbridge of the Olympia with

the Admiral and said: "I don't see that white flag yet over that red roof." They were to raise the flag on the southwest corner. The Admiral said it had been there for some time, and by close observation all discovered it, raised at the appointed place. The Spanish signaled back and asked a conference, and negotiations forthwith were begun and completed as per agreement.

During all this time not a shot was fired from a Spanish gun, and the Spaniards remained within the walled city.

GEN. MERRITT ORDERS AN ATTACK.

Turning now to the land forces, it should be noted that on the afternoon of Friday Gen. Merritt had issued this general order:

"A combined land and naval attack will be made on the enemy's works to-morrow, the 13th inst., at noon.

Our lines will make no

"It will consist of a naval and artillery attack. advance, but will hold the trenches, the infantry covering the artillery.

"The 1st Brigade will hold the right of the line, and, operating on the ManilaPasai Road, have for its immediate objective the Spanish block-house No. 14 and adjoining trenches.

"The 2d Brigade will hold the left of the line, operating along the beach and the trenches adjoining.

"The 1st Brigade will put eight battalions in the firing line, and hold three in reserve. The 2d Brigade will put three battalions in the firing line, and hold eight in reserve. The reserves of both brigades will be held in column of battalions in the open field to the west of Camino Real and 500 rods south of the intersection of the Camino Real and the road to Pasai. The reserves will be under the general direction of the division commander, whose position will be on the Camino Real near the reserves.

"The men will take one day's cooked rations, canteens filled with water, and a minimum of 100 rounds of ammunition for the Springfield rifle and 150 for the Krag-Jorgensen. The reserve ammunition will be held with the reserves.

"Brigade commanders will distribute necessary entrenching tools among the several organizations.

"The general hospital will remain in camp. Ambulance stations will be established on the beach in the rear of the left, one at Pasai, in the rear of the right, and one on the Camino Real, near the reserves.

"All positions should be taken up by 9 A. M., the 13th inst., except the reserves, which will take position at 11 A. M. Our line will not advance except

under orders of the commanding general in the field."

This order, however, was not fully observed, as shown by the following: All instructions to division and brigade commands were of the nature that precluded a determined assault, although the men were equipped for a long, hard struggle. Besides his gun and accouterments, each man carried 200 rounds of ammunition, two days' rations of meat and hard bread, and mess kit, The front

rank filled their canteens with coffee and the rear rank with water. Distributions of spades and axes were made to the companies, so that each set of fours had an entrenching tool. A hatchet and ax was provided for each section and one pick for each platoon. The sergeants were provided with a wire cutter. Strict instructions

as to fire, so that waste of ammunition and time should be avoided, and for the movements of regiments, had been given. If an assault was ordered, it was to have been made by successive battalions in extended order, each regiment covering a battalion front and the distance between the battalions to be about 200 yards. The whole command were intact and silent for some time, while the bombardment from the fleet of Fort Malate was going on, its effects being in plain view of most of the command. Then the Utah Battery opened fire at 1000 yards' range, aiming just below the crest of the parapet of the fort, as directed. The shots were very effective. A six-inch shell from the Olympia now pierced through the three-foot wall of the fort and exploded in the magazine, wrecking it completely.

THE ALLEGED PEACEFUL PROGRAM MISCARRIES.

In the morning, just before the attack, Gen. Merritt sent instructions to Gen. Greene to send forward one regiment as soon as the bombardment had produced any effect, and without waiting for the signal given on the fleet to surrender, he now ordered the Colorados to advance. The advance was made through an open field in front of the trench, and partly along the beach in the water. Upon this advance the Spaniards opened fire from the woods and trenches back of the fort. It is claimed that had the advance not been made there would not have been a

single rifle shot fired that day. The program was that the advance should not be made till after the surrender signal was given. The Spaniards, therefore, not knowing of this late order, could not understand this advance, and opened fire. The Colorados continued their ad

vance, wading up the beach and entered the now vacant fort, Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy of the Colorados being in command. The Spanish flag was hauled down and the Stars and Stripes ran up in its stead. The exhibition brought a round of hurrahs from the troops. Here the colorbearer of the Colorados was killed.

Gen. MacArthur was shut off from the view of the fleet, but seeing the flag raised on the fort, he ordered the attack on block-house No. 14. The two batteries, Astor and Utah, quickly made this a ruin. The 13th Minnesota rushed in and captured part of the forces there and in the trenches. The command pressed on to block-house No. 13, which took fire, a great quantity of small cartridges therein exploding. The whole front of the column now moved rapidly onward, the 13th Minnesota being in advance, and with them the Astor Battery, dragging their guns by hand and pushing on along the Cingalon Road, and the 23d Inf., pressing forward on the road which parallels this west. All through this locality a hot fire was being poured into the ranks. The locality was such that a view of the signal of surrender could not be seen, and the Americans continued advancing and firing by volleys. At Cingalon cross-road was a strong position held by the enemy, and from this a galling fire was being poured into our advance, also an enfilading fire from a block-house about 200 yards east. Capt. Sawtelle, of Gen. MacArthur's staff, reconnoitered the position while the troops were massing for assault, and, with Lieut. March of the Astor Battery, then led the charge against this position with detachments from both the battery and the 13th Minnesota, they volunteering for the purpose. The artillerymen, leaving their guns and charging with revolvers, the Spaniards were quickly driven from their positions.

It is difficult to reconcile all this with the theory that the program was entered into which should provide for the surrender of Manila without loss of life, unless it be that some of the subordinate commands were not apprised of the arrangement and that the Spaniards resisted under a misapprehension. They were on the alert to hold positions against the insurgents, and as the insurgents were known to occupy advanced positions here, they might have mistaken our advance for that of the insurgents.

This ended the fighting of MacArthur's Brigade, which had instructions, after this place had been secured, to move westward and eastward and occupy the approaches to the city from Paco, locating the forces at the bridges near Paco, and also in the suburbs of Ermita and Malate. Greene's instructions were, if no great resistance was met in the advance, to go on through Malate and Ermita, and thence move the columns around the city walls and occupy the suburbs east