Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899. [Vol. 26. CLARA FREY DONALD, Respondent, v. WILLIAM FORGER et al., Appellants. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899.) Guaranty - Promise that an employee shall" inherit” money. The fact that, in an inartificial instrument by which a father and his family "pledge" an employee $500 within thirty days after the father's death, use is made of the word "inherit ", instead of the word "pay", does not make the beneficiary a legatee nor make the agree ment one which must be enforced against the estate of the father, since deceased, and the surviving guarantors are personally liable thereon to the employee. APPEAL by the defendants from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, ninth district, rendered in favor of the plaintiff upon a trial had before the court without a jury. The nature of the action and the material facts are stated in the opinion. Benjamin Baker, for appellants. Hart & Hopkins, for respondent. GIEGERICH, J. This action was founded upon a certain writing, the exact wording of which was as follows: "This Indenture, with the approval of myself and my family, is to acknowledge that Clara Donald (nee Frey) is now in my employ for the past six years and 3 months and has fulfilled her duties to my entire satisfaction. 66 Should my death occur soon or at any time and the said Clara Donald (nee Frey) is still in my employ, then my wife Wilhelmina Schwarz (nee Bremer), my daughter Elizabeth Forger (nee Schwarz), and my son-in-law William Forger, will pledge themselves according to agreement that Clara Donald (nee Frey) shall inherit Five hundred dollars ($500.00) in legal tender of my money inside of thirty days after my death. "For which the said Clara Donald (nee Frey) pledges herself not to leave my wife suddenly, but to assist her in all business Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899. transactions for a weekly salary, the same as the last she had before my death, to the best of her ability and knowledge for three months after my death if my wife so desires. "Should the said Clara Donald (nee Frey) still be in my employ three years after the above date, and she then wishes to marry, I will pay her personally the above sum instead of an inheritance about eight days after her marriage. "In agreement to the above, we herewith affix our signatures. ELIZABETH FORGER, (Signed.) "MANNA SCHWARZ, gb. BRAMER, "WILLIAM FORGER, "E. F. SCHWARZ. "NEW YORK, May the 25th, 1896 (eighteen ninety-six)." The defendants, while admitting the plaintiff's performance of the agreement, assail the recovery upon the ground that they were not individually bound by the contract, and that the claim, therefore, is one which should be determined in an action against the estate of the late E. F. Schwarz, who has since the execution of said instrument departed this life. Stripped of its attempted legal embellishments, the writing quoted merely embodied a promise by the defendants that the plaintiff should receive $500 within thirty days after Schwarz's death, there being an express guaranty of payment from the estate within that time. This payment was not made, and for the resulting liability of the guarantors the judgment was properly rendered. The word "inherit," if used in the instrument in a strictly legal sense was utterly meaningless, since the expression, when confined to the definition as accepted in law, is applicable only to a right of possession as vested in a lineal heir. 1 Bouv. Law Dict. (Rawle's Rev.) 1037; Standard Dict., adverb. Surely, the plaintiff's transformation could not be effected by means of this paper, nor could the parties thereto have intended to have made her a legatee, inasmuch as they by their own convention had no such power vested in them, even though they "pledged" themselves by all the important words in their vocabulary. Construing the contract with a view to the natural understanding of the parties, it is evident that the plaintiff was to receive the sum stated as a recognized claim against the estate, and that the defendants bound themselves individually for its payment within thirty days after it became due. Consideration for the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899. defendants' promise is found in the plaintiff's performance of her part of the agreement in reliance upon its good faith, and, the condition of the guaranty having arisen, viz., the death of Schwarz, the plaintiff's performance, and nonpayment by the estate, though solvent, the action was maintainable. For these reasons the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. BEEKMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE, J., concur. CHARLES J. HOBKIRK, Respondent, v. SAMUEL GREEN, Appellant. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899.) Principal and agent — Ratification. Ratification of the alleged unauthorized acts of an agent can be implied from the fact that the principal accepted the benefits of the transaction. APPEAL by the defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, second district, rendered in favor of the plaintiff upon a trial, had before the court, without a jury. The nature of the action and the material facts are stated in the opinion. Max Cohen, for appellant. P. Q. Eckerson, for respondent. GIEGERICH, J. This action was brought to recover one-half of the agreed price of one improved Ryder engine and fittings which plaintiff placed in the premises No. 208 West Sixty-seventh street, Borough of Manhattan. The defendant was the owner of the adjoining house, known as number 210, and it is claimed that one Millard F. Sparr, who accepted in writing plaintiff's proposal to furnish such engine, was his agent in the transaction. The apparatus was erected for the purpose of pumping water into both houses, the owners of which, according to plaintiff's contention, were to bear equally the expenses attending its erection. The proprietor of the adjoining house has paid his share, but Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899. the defendant has refused to pay his. The latter, while insisting that Sparr was not authorized to order the pump, nevertheless, expressed his willingness, while on the stand, to pay such share, provided the owner of the adjoining property would sign an agreement acknowledging his right to joint ownership therein. Certainly, the defendant cannot impose such a condition to the payment of a claim, if it be a just one. The dispute between the owners of the lands in question relative to their title to the pump has obviously no bearing whatever upon the questions involved in the present controversy. Recurring, therefore, to the authority of Sparr to act for the defendant in the premises, I think the proofs relating thereto were sufficient to fairly justify the inference that such agency had been established, and that after the defendant had been informed of the completion of the work he promised to pay plaintiff his proportionate share of the expenses. Apart from this, it appears from the undisputed evidence that the defendant after being fully apprised of all the acts of Sparr in the matter, permitted the attachments connecting his premises with said engine to remain, and continued to derive the benefits and advantages resulting therefrom until the sale by him of said premises, together with his right and interest in said engine and fittings the sum to be paid therefor having been reserved in the hands of the purchaser. Under these circumstances the defendant by accepting such benefit impliedly ratified the alleged unauthorized acts of Sparr. Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563; Bliven v. Lydecker, 130 id. 102; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 1196. The exceptions to the admission and exclusion of evidence were, to my mind, without merit. For these reasons the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. BEEKMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE, J. concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899. [Vol. 26. CHARLES A. WATSON, as Receiver of the Property of MARY HEWSEY, Appellant, v. D. EDMOND DEALY et al., Respondents. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, January, 1899.) Appellate Term -- Reversal on the facts for injustice done. Where the burden of proof, in an action in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, between a receiver of the property of a judgment debtor and her chattel mortgagee, does not tend to show that an additional instrument of even date, making the chattel mortgage due and payable on demand, was executed at its date nor until a few days before the trial the Appellate Term will exercise its power of reversing on the facts where injustice has been done and will set aside a judgment rendered below in favor of the chattel mortgagee. APPEAL by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, eleventh district, rendered in favor of the defendant Hoefgen, upon a trial had before the court without a jury. At the close of the case, judgment was rendered against the defendant Dealy by his consent. The nature of the action and the material facts are stated in the opinion. Robert J. Mahon, for appellant. William H. Johnston, for respondent. GIEGERICH, J. The plaintiff was appointed the receiver of the property of one Mary S. Hewsey, by an order made the 19th day of May, 1898, in an action in the City Court of New York, wherein one Robert J. Mahon was judgment creditor and said Mary S. Hewsey was debtor. His bond, as such receiver, having been approved on May 26, 1898, he brought this action to recover possession of certain chattels alleged to be the property of said judgment debtor. The defendant Hoefgen claimed title thereto under a chattel mortgage made by said judgment debtor to her to secure the payment of the sum of $1,500, bearing date the 14th day of February, 1898, and the following writing which she testified was |