large a force, and the audacity with which he confronted and defied McClellan's army on the 15th and 16th, and then fought it on the 17th with the small force he had.

"Sharpsburg was no defeat to our arms, though our army was retired to the south bank of the Potomac from prudential considerations.

"Some persons have been disposed to regard this campaign into Maryland as a failure, but such was not the case. It is true that we had failed to raise Maryland, but it was from no disaster to our arms.

"In a military point of view, however, the whole campaign, of which the movement into Maryland was an integral part, had been a grand success, though all was not accomplished which our fond hopes caused us to expect. When General Lee assumed command of the army at Richmond, a besieging army of immense size and resources was in sight of the spires of the Confederate capital-all Northern Virginia was in possession of the enemy-the Valley overrun, except when Jackson's vigorous and rapid blows sent the marauders staggering to the banks of the Potomac for a brief interval; and Northwestern Virginia, including the Kanawha Valley, was subjugated and in the firm grasp of the enemy. By General Lee's bold strategy and rapid and heavy blows, the capital had been relieved; the besieging army driven out of the State; the enemy's capital threatened; his country invaded; Northern Virginia and the Valley cleared of the enemy; the enemy's troops from Northwestern Virginia and the Kanawha Valley had been drawn thence for the defense of his own capital; a Confederate force had penetrated to Charleston, Kanawha; our whole army was supplied with the improved fire-arm in the place of the old smoothbore musket; much of our inferior field-artillery replaced by the enemy's improved guns; and, in addition to our very large captures of prisoners and the munitions of war else where, the direct result of the march across the Potomac was the capture of eleven thousand prisoners, seventy-three pieces

of artillery, and thirteen thousand stand of excellent smallarms, and immense stores at Harper's Ferry. And, at the close of the campaign, the Confederate commander stood proudly defiant on the extreme northern border of the Con federacy, while his opponent had had 'his base' removed to the northern bank of the Potomac, at a point more than one hundred and seventy-five miles from the Confederate capital, in a straight line. In addition, the immense army of McClellan had been so crippled, that it was not able to resume the offensive for six weeks. Such had been the moral effect upon the enemy, that the Confederate capital was never again seriously endangered, until the power of the Confederacy had been so broken in other quarters, and its available territory so reduced in dimensions, that the enemy could concentrate his immense resources against the capital.

"All this had been the result of that plan of operations, of which the invasion of Maryland formed an important part. Look at the means placed at the command of General Lee, and the immense numbers and resources brought against him, and then say if the results accomplished by him were not marvelous? If his Government had been able to furnish him with men and means, at all commensurate with his achievements and his conceptions, he would, in September, 1862, have dictated the terms of peace in the capital of the enemy. But all the wonderful powers of the mechanic arts and physical science, backed by unlimited resources of men and money, still continued to operate against him.

"A certified statement from McClellan's morning report of the 30th of September, contained in the document from which I have already quoted, showed, in the Army of the Potomac, a grand total of one hundred and seventy-three thousand seven hundred and forty-five present for duty on that day, of which seventy-three thousand six hundred and one were in the defenses of Washington, and one hundred thousand one hundred and forty-four with him in the field; and a similar statement showed, on the 20th of October, a

grand total of two hundred and seven thousand and thirtysix present for duty on that day, of which seventy-three thousand five hundred and ninety-three were in the defenses of Washington, and one hundred and thirty-three thousand four hundred and forty-three with McClellan in the field.

"At the close of October, according to the official returns now on file at the Archive Office' in Washington, the whole Confederate force for duty in the department of Northern Virginia amounted to sixty-seven thousand eight hundred and five. A considerable portion of this force was not with General Lee in the field.

"At the close of October, McClellan commenced a new movement with his immense army, across the Potomac, east of the Blue Ridge, while General Lee was yet in the Valley. As this movement was developed, Longstreet's corps and the cavalry under Stuart were promptly moved to intercept it, Jackson's corps being left in the Valley. McClellan was soon superseded in the command by Burnside, and, when the latter turned his steps toward the heights opposite Fredericksburg, Jackson was ordered to rejoin the rest of the army. In the mean time, Burnside's attempt to approach Richmond on the new line had been checkmated, and he soon found himself confronted on the Rappahannock by the whole of General Lee's army. That army had to be stretched out, for some thirty miles, up and down the river, to watch the different crossings. The enemy began his movement to cross at and near Fredericksburg, on the morning of the 11th of December, and the crossing was resisted and delayed for many hours, but, owing to the peculiar character of the country immediately on the south bank, and the advantage the enemy had in his commanding position on the north bank, whence the wide plains on the south bank, and the town of Fredericksburg, were completely commanded and swept by an immense armament of heavy artillery, that crossing could not be prevented. Our army was rapidly concentrated, and took its position on the heights and range of hills in rear of the

town and the plains below; and, when the heavy columns of the enemy advanced to the assault on the 13th, first on our right, near Hamilton's crossing, and then on our left, in rear of Fredericksburg, they were hurled back with immense slaughter, to the cover of the artillery on the opposite heights, and every renewal of the assault met the same fate. In this battle, we stood entirely on the defensive, except once, when the enemy penetrated an interval in our line near the right flank, and three of my brigades advanced, driving and pursuing the enemy into the plains below, until he reached the protection of his artillery and the main line. Burnside's loss was so heavy, and his troops were so worsted in the assaults which had been made, that his principal officers protested against a renewal of the attack, and on the night of the 15th he recrossed to the north bank.

"In this battle, he had all of McClellan's army, except the Twelfth Corps, which was eight or ten thousand strong, and had been left at Harper's Ferry, and in lieu of that he had a much larger corps, the Third, from the defenses of Washington. In his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, he says he had one hundred thousand men across the river, and he was doubtful which had the superiority of numbers. In reply to a question as to the causes of the failure of the attack, he frankly said:

"It was found to be impossible to get the men up to the works. The enemy's fire was too hot for them.'

"Our whole force present was not much more than half that of the enemy, which crossed over to the south side of the river. This signal victory, in which the enemy's loss was very heavy, and ours comparatively light, closed the operations for the year 1862.

"Some newspaper critics and fireside generals were not satisfied with the results of this victory, and thought Burnside's army ought to have been destroyed before it went back; and there were some absurd stories about propositions alleged to have been made by General Jackson, for driving

the enemy into the river. That great soldier did begin a forward movement, about sunset, which I was to have led, but, just as my men were moving off, he countermanded the movement, because the enemy opened such a terrific artillery fire from the Stafford Heights and from behind the heavy embankments on the road leading through the bottoms on the south side of the river, that it was apparent that nothing could have lived in the passage across the plain of about a mile in width, over which we would have had to advance, to reach the enemy massed in that road. According to the statements of himself and officers, before the committee on the conduct of the war, Franklin, who commanded the enemy's left, had, confronting our right, from fifty-five to sixty thousand men, of whom only about twenty thousand had been under fire. The bulk of that force was along the Bowling Green road, running parallel to the river through the middle of the bottoms, and behind the very compact and thick embankments on each side of that road. He had taken over with him one hundred and sixteen pieces of artillery, and there were sixty-one pieces on the north bank, some of which were of very large calibre, so posted as to cover the bridges on that flank, and sweep the plain in his front. Some of these were also crossed over to him, and General Hunt, Burnside's chief of artillery, says fifty or sixty more pieces could have been spared from their right, if necessary. The attempt to drive this force into the river would have, therefore, insured our destruction.

"Franklin had eight divisions with him, while at Fredericksburg, confronting our left, were ten divisions, fully as strong, certainly, as Franklin's eight, and there were quite as many guns on that flank. It is true the enemy's loss there had been double that in front of our right, but he still had a large number of troops on that flank which had not been engaged. The character of the ground in front of our position, on that flank, was such that our troops could not be moved. down the rugged slopes of the hills in any order of battle,