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admitted that many do deny it, and offer what they deem t sufficient reasons for this denial. Under these circumstances, then, it becomes our duty to meet these reasons or arguments, not by pronouncing them absurdities at the outset, because this will not satisfy those who advance them, but by patiently and candidly examining them, and pointing out their irrelevancy, or want of consistency or force, or whatever may be their peculiar weakness. It is our design to meet in this spirit some of the objections to the being of an Intelligent First Cause of all things; or, perhaps with more propriety it might be said, some of the arguments offered by way of showing that there is no evidence which necessarily proves the existence of such a Supreme Intelligence. Having done this, we shall bring forward some of the evidences which go to establish this fact, as we think, beyond question.

2. Much has been said about the laws of Nature,— they have been a favorite theme upon which some have delighted to expatiate in all the luxury of metaphysical philosophy, and their harmony, regularity, power and efficiency have been extolled in terms of rapturous praise. These laws, it is affirmed, are sufficient, and more than sufficient, for the production of all the wonderful and mighty effects which we behold around us, and which we call the works of God. But while we much admire the poetry and beauty of these descriptions of Nature, we have some doubt of the propriety of deifying her laws, and we cannot but call in question that philosophy which ascribes to them Omnipotence, Omniscience, and an universal and ever active benevolence;

for such are the principles which we see in operation in the mighty machinery of the universe. This must be admitted by the worshipper of reason, and the child of science: he cannot, he will not deny that less than almighty power and unlimited wisdom could control and direct the ten thousand times ten thousand worlds which the discoveries of astronomy have unveiled to our view; -he must admit this, whether he ascribe the power and wisdom to a God or to the laws of Nature. But here us pause a moment, and ask the objector what he means by the laws of Nature, because unless we have a clear and definite conception of this particular, all our labor will be misspent.

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3. What then does he mean by Nature? The earth, the solar system, the universe of systems, suns, and planets? From the manner in which the expression is used we should judge this to be its signification, and it is presumed that the correctness of this will not be disputed. But we must be permitted to say to the objector here, that he assumes the very question in debate. It is for him to show how these systems, suns, &c., came to exist in the first place. Does he still affirm that they were produced by the operation of the laws of Nature? but these are Nature itself, and it is for the existence of this Nature that we wish him to account. Let us look at this a little more closely. We ask how the earth, for example, with its regularity of form and motion, and all its beauty of scenery and variety of animal life, came into being? We are told that it was the effect of the laws of earth; but this does not answer the question,-earth could have had no laws until it was

earth. To talk therefore about the laws of earth, before the existence of earth, is unphilosophical, and involves a contradiction in language. It is only necessary to make the application of this argument to nature, and the difficulty of the objector will at once be made manifest. The inquiry is, how Nature, by which he means the universe of worlds, with all their connections and influences, came to exist? The reply is, It is the result of the laws of Nature.

But Nature could have had no laws until it had an existence, and it is this existence which the unbeliever is called upon to explain, and for which he is required to assign a cause. Until this is done it is all in vain to talk about the laws of Nature, because that is a point in the discussion which we have not yet reached; we must account for the thing itself, before we make its laws the ground for argument.

4. As there has been much indefinite and even loose reasoning concerning this particular, it will not be thought out of place perhaps to extend our remarks a little. No man who wishes to arrive at truth, will indulge in the use of any terms without a clear and distinct meaning being attached to them, at least in his own. mind. No single circumstance has done more to retard the progress of science and knowledge, and to perpetuate the dominion of error, than the repetition of words and phrases, with which those who employ them have connected no definite ideas. It cannot be expected that we should enable others to understand us, if we do not understand ourselves, and have no just and welldefined conceptions of what we mean to convey by the terms we use. If the premises of our positions are not

clear and intelligible to our own minds, it cannot be supposed that the conclusions drawn from them will be intelligible to the minds of others. Notwithstanding, however, this is so important a point, there is reason to believe that the expression "laws of Nature," is in the mouths of a vast proportion of those who use it, a phrase without meaning, a phrase by which they do not themselves know what they intend to signify. This appears from the assertion so often made, and which has been noticed, that the laws of Nature are adequate to the production of Nature itself. It must be evident to every one who will reflect a moment, that nothing can be more inconsistent than to suppose the natural causes which we see in operation around us, formed our world in all its beauty and harmony. So far from this, they are the result of that formation, and could not have existed had not that formation existed before them. Hence the assigning the laws of Nature as the producing cause of the universe, is reversing the order of things, and making that the cause which is only an effect, or rather it is making an effect its own cause, which is certainly illogical and at war, length and breadth, with all true philosophy. Let it be fixed in the mind then that the laws of Nature could not have had a being until after the construction of Nature, that they arise from the combination of things, from their several positions, and mutual relations to each other; in one word, that they are the streams and not the fountains, the offspring and not the parent of creation. Let these facts be kept in the van of argument, and the objector required to meet them

fairly, and it will be found that he is thrown back again to his starting place.

5. For the purpose of showing more clearly the bearing of the above reasoning we will produce an example by way of illustration. Take the case of water, the constituents of which are hydrogen and oxygen, in the proportion of one part by weight of hydrogen to 7 1-2 parts of oxygen, and two parts by bulk of hydrogen to one of oxygen. The inquiry is, How came these gases to combine in these definite proportions so as to form water? It must be remembered that there can be no laws of water until it is made; "but oxygen and hydrogen," says a judicious writer, "no more tend to form water, nor of themselves could form it, than any other of the numerous things which also consist of them. Neither oxygen nor hydrogen could, or ever would move itself in that exact proportion, and so unite with the other as to form water. To suppose them able to separate themselves from their several elementary accumulations in the precise quantities necessary to form the aqueous fluid, and to agree together to combine in these quantities only, and in firm and lasting union, is to give to each of them a mind, a thought, a foresight, a plan, a will, a resolution, and a spontaneous self-motive for this special purpose, which would make every particle of each an intelligent, thinking, and choosing being. This idea would be preposterous." * "As soon as water was

* Cicero sneers at the Stoic, for supposing that "the world was a wise creature, and had a mind, which, by its own agency, constructed its frame, and still moves and governs it." Cic. Lucul. p. 92.