formed, the properties and the laws of water would begin. They could not have any anterior existence. They are not in the oxygen; they are not in the hydrogen. They could not be before water was. This is a clear and decided example, how the laws of Nature and the properties of things arise from creation, and subse quent to it, and never form or produce it; for the same reasoning is applicable to every substance of Nature, and to all its laws and agencies." * 6. The preceding argument, is, we think, irresistible. The unbeliever may indeed say that the combination of the oxygen and hydrogen so as to form water was owing entirely to their affinity for each other; but in saying this, he abandons the original position, and destroys his own argument. If it was the affinity for each other of its materials and their consequent combination, which formed water, then it was not produced by the laws of water; and hence in the application the unbeliever admits that the world or universe in its present state was not produced by the laws of Nature, but was owing to the tendency or affinity of the substances of which it is composed. We have done, then, with that doctrine which teaches that Nature is the effect of the laws of Nature. The argument is now placed upon a new ground, but not a less difficult one for the objector. He affirms that water is the result of the affinity which oxygen and hydrogen have for each other, and which causes them to unite in its formation. But does he not perceive that this only removes the difficulty one step * Turner's Sacred History of the World, v. ii. p. 277-8. backward without solving it? The inquiry now is, How came oxygen and hydrogen to exist? or, if we make a direct use of this illustration again, we ask, If the universe as it is now, was the effect of the mutual affinity of its materials, how came these materials into being? It will be seen that such an answer is no explanation of the phenomena;-the existence of these materials is still to be accounted for, and the task of explanation on this point will be found no more easy than on the other. If the unbeliever can tell us how these came to exist at the first, he will have accomplished something,―otherwise he is yet in the dark. SECTION II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS FOUNDED ON THE ASSERTED 1. To relieve himself from the difficulty of the preceding argument, the unbeliever will probably resort to the old assertion, that matter is eternal. We know of but one argument that has ever been advanced to prove the eternity of matter, and that is grounded upon another assertion, that it is indestructible. But here likewise we call for proof. If in reply to this call it be said that we cannot destroy a single particle of any body, nor annihilate so much as one atom, it is readily granted. But what then? Does it follow from this that matter is indestructible? We cannot do a great many things which can nevertheless be done. Because we cannot destroy a single grain or atom, it is by no means certain, therefore, that it cannot be destroyed. We cannot create a single atom; and the abstract argument drawn from this fact, has the same force against the existence of matter, as the one just named has against its de struction. 2. However, be this as it may, we regard the point as having but very little bearing upon the question at issue. Suppose we grant that matter is eternal, or that the materials of which the universe is composed have existed from eternity; what advantage does the unbeliever derive from this admission? Certainly none whatever; his course is involved in the same darkness as before. A moment's consideration will show this. Does the eternity of matter explain all the wonderful phenomena of the world around us? Does it account for the order and harmony of the solar system-for the regular and exact revolutions of the planets-for the complicate, yet nicely balanced influences by which for ages they have been kept in play without once deviating from their path? Does it account for the ten thousand forms of animal and vegetable organization which are found on the surface of our globe? Does it account for the existence of that wonderful creature, man; and solve the mystery of mind?* Not one of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, not one of these problems is solved by the eternity of matter. 3. It is repeated, therefore, that if we grant the unbe * Suppose any parcel or lump of matter eternal, and at rest-how came it to move? It is impossible that it should have added motion to itself. This must have been given it by some other power. But suppose motion eternal too; yet matter, unthinking matter and motion, could never produce thought. If so, why is it not the case now? why do we not see the mud of the street, when set in motion by the waggon wheel, bringing forth mind, forming itself into an intelligent being? If simple matter and motion have ever produced thought, there is no reason why they should not in this age. Or if, as certain philosophers affirm, thought is the effect of organization, which is in turn the production of the elements, why do not the elements fall into such productions now? If they ever did in any age or country bring forth the organization in question, it is a weighty inquiry, which the philosophical sceptic is desired to answer,-why have they not continued from that time to the present to bring forth such organization? liever all for which he contends in this respect, it does not lighten the burthen of his difficulties, nor aid him one step in his progress. He has still to account for the wisdom and intelligence every where visible in the natural world; he has still to explain the design and contrivance which appear in every department of the universe that has come within our observation, and to inform us how dead unconscious matter could think, reason, determine, and adopt the stupendous plan, for plan it is, call it by what name he may, according to which the affairs of that universe were at first carried into operation, and have ever since been directed. All this labor, even if we allow that matter is eternal, is yet before the unbeliever, and we call upon him to come forth to the task, and show us how these things can be, and remove the difficulties still in his way. 4. But the great mistake in this argument remains to be noticed, and it is one which seems to us unfortunate for him who adopts this method of reasoning, to prove "there is no God." Why does the sceptic refuse to believe the world was created? Because this would presuppose a God. And why does he deny the existence of a God? The reply is, that he cannot conceive of an uncreated self-existent being. And does he deny the existence of every thing he cannot conceive or compre hend? Does he understand the nature of mind? Does he know why or how he thinks? Does he comprehend the process by which the acorn becomes an oak→ by which the nourishment it draws from earth is changed to wood? We venture to say, No. But does he, therefore, refuse to believe that mind exists, or that |