Frossard's Preparations. Advance of the Prussians. The two next days were spent in vain imaginings about the movements of the enemy. The news of the defeat of Weissenberg arrived on the evening of August 4th. It showed the rapidity of the Prussian movements. The Crown Prince had crossed the Lauter, when would Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles cross the Saar? Both generals were on the road, and expected to reach the French frontier about August 6th. Frossard was certain to be attacked first. After the battle of August 2nd he had occupied, with a portion of his forces, the heights evacuated by the Prussians on that day, the Exercier Platz, the Nussberg, the Galgenberg, the Winterberg. Knowing that he was in an exposed position, he suggested to the Emperor that he should retire to the plateau, which extends from Forbach to Saargemünd, occupying Forbach, and Napoleon gave his consent, the movement to be carried out on the following day, August 6th. But as the day proceeded he became aware of the approach of the enemy, and, fearing to be surrounded, began the operation at once. He was not, however, completely established at Forbach till long after nightfall. The country which formed the battlefield was well known to Frossard, as he had completely examined it in 1867. It was composed of a number of wooded hills which surrounded the village of Spicheren. The railway from Saarbrück to Metz ran along a ravine, which reached first Stieringen and then Forbach. Frossard was in command of three divisions. The first he placed in the valley near Stieringen, protecting the high road, the railway and the town of Forbach, where heavy stores had been collected. The second, at Spicheren, guarded the country up to the Saar and beyond; the third was held in reserve. The headquarters had been established at Forbach. On the morning of August 6th the Prussian scouts began to make their appearance. They occupied the suburb of St. Jean, on the other side of the river, and then the Exercier Platz, and the Galgenberg, which had been evacuated by the French. From their view of the Valley of Forbach and the heights of Spicheren, it appeared as if the French were contemplating a retreat. Kameke obtained leave from Zastrow to cross the river, and to follow the French closely, in accordance with the Prussian traditional practice of pushing forward. He crossed the stream at 11 by bridges which had not been destroyed, and after a short hesitation determined to attack the enemy. The battle began by an artillery duel, which was soon followed by the advance of the Prussian columns. A severe struggle raged WHY THE FRENCH WERE DEFEATED in the woods around Stieringen. Le François, a distinguished German general, was killed. The Germans were not very successful; they had attempted too much, and, if they were broken, had the Saar at their backs. It is a maxim of war never to fight with a river in your rear. A Napoleon or a Marlborough would have seized the opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat, but Frossard was neither. Bazaine, whose name became afterwards so notorious, was equally incompetent, and failed to send the reinforcements which Frossard so earnestly requested. But the assistance, which the French were vainly expecting from Metz, came to the Prussians from Saarbrück. Goeben, Zastrow and Alvensleben arrived one after the other, about 3 in the afternoon, ready to take their proper places without delay or confusion. The Prussians continued the battle with forces constantly renewed, and were eventually able to occupy the woods of Stieringen. About 5 the French gained a slight advantage, but, as the French sun sank, the German generals were filled with hope and Frossard Retreat. with despair. The three fatal bridges which had not been destroyed poured ever fresh masses against the doomed French. At last the final blow was given by the arrival of the 3rd German division, which had marched to the sound of the cannon. They were stubbornly resisted by a small body of French under Dulac, but at half-past seven Frossard was obliged to inform Bazaine of his intention to retreat. When the roll was called next morning the French had lost 2,000 killed and wounded, and 2,000 prisoners, but had saved their standards and guns. Throughout the night the steady tramp of retreating hosts was heard in the woods, and another province of France lay at the feet of the enemy. What were the faults and what the mischances that led Frossard Differences French to his fate? At midday Metmas had been sent by Bazaine in Between the direction of Forbach, but the order gave no indication that a battle was in progress, or that Frossard needed help. At 3 Metmas was within five or six miles of the battlefield, but stopped where he was and did nothing. An order from Bazaine at 4 gave no explanation, but a dispatch sent by Frossard with an earnest demand for assistance unfortunately went astray, and Metmas remained quietly in his place. At 7.30 he received an appeal from Frossard urging him to move, but did not reach Forbach till 9.30, when it was too late. Castigny behaved better. He did march to the sound of the guns, but, having reached what he considered a fine position, halted, and waited on events. The cannonade having ceased, he retired to Puttelange, but no sooner had he got there than Bazaine's Incompetence. Prussian the firing began again with a terrible din. It was then 5, but he began to march. Two hours later he met some fugitives from the battlefield, who told him that all was lost, so that he retired. Montauban heard the cannon, but paused for orders from Bazaine. At 3 he received orders to assist Frossard, but he hastened slowly, and it was not until nightfall that he was within two miles of Forbach, and announced to Frossard that he was at his disposal. Then it was too late, for the battle was over. On August 7th the confused mass of fugitives came together at Puttelange in a terrible state of disorder and despair. Frossard's troops had lost everything; they could not make soup, or provide shelter. They had the impression that, had they been properly led, victory might have been secured. As for Frossard, when he had superiority of numbers he had displayed lack of insight and resolution. Bazaine had shown both incompetence and selfishness, and evidently did not care about a battle which he did not consider his own. The issue of this battle exemplified the fundamental difference Superiority. between the Prussians and the French. The victory was won by the rapid concentration on the field of numbers of troops belonging to a great variety of corps and divisions. The achievements of the Prussian army on August 6th could not have been accomplished, unless every officer had been zealous to hurry forward with energy and self-abandonment on hearing the voice of the cannon; if he had not done so it might have been a day of defeat instead of victory. Although the chief command in the battle was changed four times, being held successively by Kameke, Stülpnagel, Goeben and Zastrow, there was the most perfect unity in the conduct of the engagement, testifying alike to the absence of personal jealousy and to uniformity of tactical system. CHAPTER VIII SEDAN ABOUT noon on August 6th a rumour was current in Paris that The News the Prussian army was defeated. The Marseillaise was sung in Paris. in the streets, and some decorations were exhibited. But the illusion did not last long. Just before midnight a report was received by the Empress from the Emperor, saying: "We are in full retreat; we must rise to the occasion; we must declare a state of siege and prepare for the defence of the capital. I have no news of MacMahon." The Cabinet was immediately summoned and met the Empress at the Tuileries. It was resolved to collect all available troops and defend Paris. The Ministers separated as dawn was breaking on Sunday morning. Early in the day the worst was known; the north-eastern gate of France was open to the invading enemy. At 9 Paris heard of the catastrophe, and determination to make a brave resistance was coupled with demands for the deposition of the Emperor and the punishment of the generals who had betrayed their country. The spirit of 1792 was not dead. Resigns the At Metz the first idea was to concentrate the third and fourth Napoleon corps and the Guard at St. Avold and attack the enemy in flank. A train was prepared to carry the Emperor into the heart of his troops. Napoleon was already in his carriage when he heard that the railway station of Borney was in possession of the enemy, and the line of retreat of the defeated army was not known. He therefore returned to the prefecture, and Leboeuf proceeded to St. Avold alone, where he found Bazaine and Bourbaki, with whom he discussed many plans. One of these contemplated withdrawal to Châlons, leaving Alsace, Lorraine, and a large portion of Champagne at the mercy of the enemy. The resignation of his military command by the Emperor was also mooted, and it was proposed he should resume the reins of government. Napoleon, however, refused to leave his soldiers. On August 8th the indecision continued, but it ended by the army retiring to the neighbourhood of Metz. Next day Napoleon transferred the command of the army to Bazaine, although he did not entirely surrender control of it. Montauban to Paris. Bazaine's ment. Retirement French Bazaine's In Paris the Chambers had been summoned to meet on August 11th, but they met on August 9th. Ollivier and Gramont showed a determined spirit, but were violently attacked. The deposition of the Emperor was called for and the institution of a provisional government. The excitement grew, and the Deputies nearly came to blows. At last a vote was passed inviting the Cabinet to resign. Montauban, Count of Palikao, in command at Lyons, was summoned by the Empress to Paris, and made Minister of War. Ollivier and his colleagues immediately surrendered their posts, and Montauban found himself at the head not only of the army but the Government as well. He appeared before the Chambers on August 10th. When the members called upon him to speak louder, he said: "Pardon me, twenty-five years ago I received a bullet in my breast, and it is still there." A new Ministry was constructed, Latour d'Auvergne becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new Ministers did not occupy the Treasury Bench, but were dispersed throughout the House among the ordinary members. Leboeuf was deposed, and Bazaine was given command of the Army of the Rhine, great, but misplaced confidence being reposed in him. Bazaine represented to the Emperor that both Canrobert and MacMahon were senior to himself, but the Emperor replied that his appointment was demanded by public opinion. This was followed, as we have said, by the Emperor's resignation of the command of the army. It was now determined to withdraw the whole army behind the Meuse in the direction of Châlons and Paris. The discussions on this point lasted a week, and the retreat did not begin till August 14th. It was desirable that the Emperor should return to Paris, but he would not undertake the journey till he knew that his army was safely out of Metz. The war now enters into a new phase. MacMahon retired into the interior of France, followed by the third Prussian army. He halted in the plains of Champagne, oscillating between Paris and Metz. As he proceeded in a half-hearted and indecisive manner he suffered the defeat which destroyed him. At Metz the Prussians were endeavouring to cross the Moselle and throw themselves on the rear of the retreating enemy, and the French were endeavouring to liberate themselves from the net which entangled them and organise the defence of their country in the centre of France. In order to attain their purpose, the Germans had to alter Hesitancy. their direction, turning themselves round gradually, and using the First Army, which remained at Metz, as a pivot. They had to move, first to the south and then to the west of the city. The |