to goods such as the article shipped is alleged to be.' The representations must however be such as to deceive the carrier. If they are obviously incorrect his liability still remains and he cannot relieve himself from it by setting up misrepresentations, unless they respect matters which are latent in their character." A person omitting without fraud to state fully the contents of a package may be precluded from recovering the value of articles omitted, but his right to recover for the articles enumerated is not affected.3 § 21. Bank bills are not properly included in the phrase "goods, freight, etc.," when used in connection with transportation. It was so held in a case where the bills were shipped in a valise which was packed in a large box with a number of articles of no special value and the carrier was not informed that there was money in the box. Where a package containing "a wreath" was shipped and the wreath was partly made of glass and the glass was found to be broken on the arrival at destination, it was held that the carrier was not liable, as he was not properly informed of the fragile character of the property by its description." Again, a shipper delivered property for transportation as a bundle of bedding and upon a loss claimed that it contained valuable clothing, etc. It was here held that the failure to disclose the real contents of the bundle released the carrier from all liability except as to what might properly be termed "bedding." It was claimed by a carrier company that the shipper of a valuable cow should have described her to the agent as being with calf as she was thus rendered more liable to injury. It was held that the failure to give such information did not release the carrier from liability for negligence causing injury to the animal.7 § 22. The word "package" as used in bills of lading is defined by the Supreme Court of Alabama to be a small parcel or bundle whose appearance gives no adequate information. of its contents. A hogshead of tobacco or a bale of cotton,1 or corn in bulk' would therefore all be improperly described by the term "package." Pistols are considered freight. The fact that articles of greater value were packed in the same box with them does not change their character and will not relieve the carrier from liability for their loss if these more valuable goods be not lost.3 23. The second way in which a misdescription by the shipper may injuriously affect the carrier is by leading him to carry for a less compensation than that to which he would properly be entitled. Thus where goods really "double first class" were shipped as "first class" with a view of escaping payment of the proper rate of freight, the carrier was held entitled to charge the "double first class" rate on discovering the intentional misdescription of the goods by the shipper. Certain goods were described by the shipper in the bill as "hardware." During the transit the goods were discovered to be "sewing machines" for the carriage of which a higher rate of freight was due. It was held that when the true character of the goods was discovered the railroad agent had the right to bill them truly and charge the increased freight." § 24. A misdescription of the goods by the carrier is not binding on the shipper, and the carrier cannot in such a case shield himself behind the strict letter of the recital in his bill where he receipts generally but with a knowledge of the contents. In the well-known case of Harmon v. The New York and Erie Railroad Company the facts were that the agent of the carrier company signed a receipt for a lot of furniture and among the different articles specified was "one cradle" which had carpet wrapped around it, was bound with çords and con い tained a valise with wearing apparel in it. The agent was informed, when the shipment was made, of what the cradle contained. The court held in a suit for damages for the loss of the contents that the company was bound to carry not only the "cradle" but also the goods then in it. In another case, marble in slabs sawed from blocks was receipted for as "unwrought marble, in boxes." Evidence was introduced on the one hand to prove that such marble was classed by several railroads and dealers generally as "unwrought." On the other hand proof was offered to show that there was no uniform rule on this subject and that the agent who made the classification for the carrying railroad company in this case intended to class such marble as "wrought;" that his predecessors had done so and that the receipt for this marble was by mistake and contrary to the rules of the company. It was here held that the jury were properly charged that. the terms "wrought" and "unwrought," as applied to the marble in question, are of doubtful signification and that it was competent for the plaintiff to show what meaning is given to them by custom and usage and if the jury believed that the generally prevailing usage among manufacturers, dealers, and carriers, is to class and consider marble in slabs as "unwrought," then the defendant can claim freight upon it only as of that class.1 § 25. Where the bill of lading receipts for a specific quantity or a specific weight of goods, it is prima facie evidence that the carrier received the quantity or weight named. Such an acknowledgment is not, however, conclusively bindings as between the original parties, namely, as between the shipper and carrier, or as between the carrier and a consignee who has made no advances on the faith of the bill and who therefore stands on the same footing as the shipper.* 1 Bancroft v. Peters, 4 Mich. 619. 2 McLean v. Fleming, 25 L. T. N. S. 317; 2 L. R. H. L. Sc. App., 128; Hall v. G. T. R. Co., 34 Up. Can. B. 517; Shatzell v. Hart, 2 Marshall (Ky.), 191. 3 Steamboat Wisconsin v. Young, 3 Green (Iowa), 268; Meyer v. Peck, 28 N. Y. 590; Abbe v. Eaton, 51 N. Y. 411; Kirkman v. Bowman, 8 Robinson (La.), 246; Erb v. Keokuk Packet Co., 43 Mo. 53; The J. B. Brown, 1 Bissell, 76; Goodrich v. Norris, Abbotts Adm. 196. Berkeley v. Watling, 7 Adolp. & Ellis, 29; Sutton v. Kettell, 1 Sprague, § 26. Notwithstanding his receipt for a specific quantity or weight of goods, the carrier may show that he, in fact, received a less quantity or weight. If he prove that he has delivered, or is willing to deliver, all that he received for transportation, he cannot be held liable for the difference between the actual amount and that for which he improperly gave his receipt.1 Especially does the rule apply to a case where the bill is signed for an amount in excess of the true one, by reason of the fraud of the shipper or of his agent.2 § 27. The master of a ship in England, notwithstanding the bills of lading Act, may show that the cargo actually received by him differs in weight from that signed for in the bill of lading, at all events where the weight mentioned in the bill is mere matter of measurement.3 An action was brought by the owners of a vessel against the owner of a cargo of wheat for freight withheld because of a difference between the number of bushels of wheat expressed in the bill of lading and that delivered to the consignee. The grain was delivered to the carrier from a warehouse and the defendant gave up the warehouse receipts. on receiving the plaintiffs' bill of lading. The bill being open to explanation between the original parties, it was held that the fact that the shipper surrendered his warehouse receipts for the full amount named in the bill does not preclude the carrier from showing the mistake in regard to the quantity of wheat receipted for by him. Coal was shipped for the port of B., consigned to a railroad company having its terminus there, and to be transported by the latter to W. The bill of lading stated the number of tons and the freight per ton. The railroad company paid the freight to the master of the vessel and transported all the coal received, 309; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 287; The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325; Hall v. Mayo, 7 Allen (89 Mass.), 454; Ryder v. Hall, ib. 456. Strong v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 15 2 Bates v. Todd, 1 Moody & Rob- 3 Blanchet v. Powell's Colliery Co., 9 L. R. Exch. 74; 43 L. J. Exch. 50; 22 W. R. 490; 30 L. T. N. S. 28. L. R. & Ft. S. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 32 Arkansas, 669; Kirkman v. Bowman, 8 Robinson (La.), 246; Hall v. Mayo, 7 Allen (89 Mass.), 454; Dean v. King, 22 Ohio State, 119; Man- 4 Glass v. Goldsmith, 22 Wisconsin, chester v. Milne, 1 Abbott Bros., 115; 488. 2 to W. On being weighed there after delivery, it was found to fall short several tons from the amount stated in the bill. It was the custom of the railroad company, known to the parties for whom the coal was transported, not to weigh the coal thus delivered but to depend on the bill of lading, but in the present case the agents of the railroad company could, with ordinary care, have observed a deficiency. It was here held in an action for freight by the railroad company, that it was not liable for the deficiency in the number of tons of coal, nor to a deduction from its charges of any of the freight paid the master.1 28. A contrary doctrine would seem to obtain in the state of Georgia. A railroad company was sued for the loss of certain potatoes. The car was loaded by the plaintiff. A receipt was given on the plaintiff's measure for 9600 lbs. and freight accordingly charged by weight. On arrival, it was found that they had fallen off in weight. Here it was held that, the company's agent having receipted for the potatoes by weight and having taken freight for 9600 lbs., the company was bound thereby.2 29. As the carrier is not estopped by his receipt for a specific quantity from showing a different amount, so is the shipper or consignee not to be prejudiced by the statement of quantity. A carrier undertook, by bill of lading, to carry a carload of oats stated therein to weigh 20,000 lbs. Finding afterwards that there were really 23,667 lbs., the excess was taken out and the rest forwarded to consignees, who had, in fact, paid for and owned the whole quantity. It was held that even if the shipper did wrongfully inform the company as to the weight of the oats, it could not affect the consignee's title nor justify the carrier in converting the oats to his own use, even if the consignees knew that they were underbilled and intended to take them without paying freight on the excess unless it was demanded.3 1 Naugatuck R. R. Co. v. Beardsley Scythe Co., 33 Conn. 218. 2 Central R. R. and Banking Co. v. Anderson, 58 Georgia, 393. 3 Wiggin v. B. & A. R. R. Co., 120 Mass. 201. |