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1. Overflowed lands. Act Cong. Sept. 28, 1850, chapter 84, 9 Stat. 519.

Construction. Conveyance by state. Grant to states.
Under the Act of Congress Sept. 28, A. F., 1850, chapter 84, 9 Stat.

519, 7 Fed. Stat. Ann. 399, granting to the several states in which
such lands were situated the swamp and overflowed lands re-
maining unsold, etc., the issuance of a patent from the general
government was unnecessary in order to perfect the title of the
state, for title vested immediately upon the passage of the act
and became completed upon the identification of the lands. Hen-
derson v. Blair, 640.

2. Public lands. Grants to states. Conveyance by state. Construction.
Under Laws of Mississippi, Called Session 1852, page 57, which

designates certain named persons as commissioners to select
and sell the swamp and overflowed land situated in the county
of Monroe for the purpose of reclaiming swamp lands, etc., as
amended by its Laws of 1854, page 550, which provided that the
commissioners appointed by the Act of October 20th, A. D. 1852,
should report to the board of police of Monroe county the num-
ber of acres selected by them, etc., and that such board should
appoint a swamp land commissioner, invested with full power
to sell the land and apply the proceeds to special purposes and
expressly divested the state of its title, and vested the title to
such lands in the county it was not necessary for the secretary
of state to issue a patent to such commissioners in order to vest
the title in the county, and such title was not subject to impair-
ment by Constitution 1868, article 8, section 6, establishing a
common school fund, consisting of the proceeds of lands granted
to the state by he United States,

nds known as swamp
lands or the act of 1877 (Laws 1877, chapter 14), revising, amend-
ing, and consolidating the various Acts relating to swamp lands.

3. Same.
The swamp lands in such case having become vested in the county

a patent to an individual from the state commissioner was void.

1. Levee taxes. Property subject to taxation.
Where swamp and overflowed lands are sold for levee taxes before

the state parted with the title acquired from the federal govern-
ment, the sale was void, the land in such case not being subject
to taxation. Partee v. Vance, 215.


2. Delinquent taxes. Cost of collection. Tax sales. Code 1871, sections

1697 and 1699.
Under Rev. Code 1871, section 1697, so providing, the tax collector

was required after the first day of December to advertise all de
linquent lands for sale on the first Monday of January, following,
on which day, if the taxes remain unpaid and no sufficient per-
sonal property can be found, the collector is required to sell so
much of the land as is necessary to pay the taxes, costs, etc., and
under section 1699, so providing, the collector is allowed an ad-
ditional five per cent compensation, on all taxes collected by him
after December first to be collected from the delinquent taxpayer.
Under these two sections the tax collector was entitled to such
additional five per cent for the collection of delinquent taxes after
December first whether such taxes were collected by distress or
by a sale of the lands of the delinquent taxpayer and it was proper
to add such additional charge to the amount of taxes for which the
delinquent lands were sold. Bauer v. Lillle, 351.

3. Tax sales. Validity. Revised Code 1857, chapter 3, articles 36, 39

and 45.
In this state it is well settled that the requirements of the law pro-

viding for sale of property for failure to pay taxes must be strictly
complied with and a party relying on a tax title must show the
validity of the tax title under which he claims. Dunbar v. Lumber
Co., 623.

4. Same.
Under Revised Code 1857, chapter 3, articles 36, 39 and 45 so pro-

viding, it was necessary for the tax collector to execute a deed
to the state, which should remain on file for two years from the
date of sale unless sooner redeemed, and then be recorded and trans-
mitted to the auditor, and a party relying upon such tax deed must
show that this was done. The list of land sold to the state is not
sufficient to meet the proof required. Ib.


Suit for nondelivery. Question for jury. Punitive damages.

Where a telegram was delivered to a telegraph company's agent

by the sender and was not forwarded to and delivered to the
sendee in a reasonable time and there was a failure by some agent
of the telegraph company to properly transmit the telegram and
by reason of this failure the sendee sustained actual damages,


it was the province of the jury to decide whether the telegraph
company's conduct in the matter was so grossly careless as to
indicate a total disregard of the sender's rights and entitle him to
punitive damages. Telegraph Co. v. Christian, 845.




1. Quieting title. Cloud. Bill. Title deraigned. Code 1906, sections

550 and 551.
A bill in chancery filed by the owner of real estate to cancel a con-

veyance for the sale of certain timber land, as a cloud upon his
title comes within the provisions of Code 1906, sections 550-551,
and complainant must set forth in his bill the deraignment of
his title and a mere statement that he is the owner of the land

is not sufficient. Eastman v. Lumber Co., 313.
2. Death of defendant. Substitution. Answer. Decree pro confesso.
Where in a suit in chancery involving the title to real estate the

defendant dies after filing an answer, and the suit is revived against
his widow who was the sole legatee of the property, she was en-
titled to the benefit of all pleadings and proceedings prior to the
time when she was made a party to the suit, and in such case a

decree pro confesso against her was error. Randall v. Saucier, 412.
3. Taxation. Tax sales. Validity. Revised Code 1857, chapter 3,

articles 36, 39 and 45.
In this state it is well settled that the requirements of the law pro-

viding for sale of property for failure to pay taxes must be strictly
complied with and a party relying on a tax title must show the
validity of the tax title under which he claims. Dunbar v. Lumber
Co., 623.

4. Infants. Removal of disabilities. Extent. Equitable estoppel. Con-

veyance. Disaffirmance. Contracts. Ratification.
Where an infant's disabilities of minority were partially removed,

the decree reciting that her disabilities “are removed to this
extent and no further, that is to say, that she may sell and exe-
cute a good and valid binding conveyance," etc., and the decree
further ordered that the sale be for cash or, if not for cash, then
the purchaser should execute a deed of trust to secure the unpaid


purchase money, and the proceeds of the sale should be turned
over to her guardian, and the property was sold to her brother
who executed a deed of trust to secure the purchase money. After-
wards, before she came of age, she executed written authority to
the trustee of this trust deed to cancel same, reciting that “same
having been fully paid," and the trustee thereupon cancelled
the trust deed, and her guardian charged herself with the amount,
her account showing it had been paid, though in fact it had not
been paid, and afterwards her brother executed a deed of trust
on the property to another party to secure a note given by him
and the third party assigned the note to a bank, and five years
after the minor became of age she sought to cancel her deed and
the trust deed given by her brother as a cloud upon her title or hat
the property be sold to satisfy the trust deed given her. Held
that plaintiff is not entitled to have her deed to her brother can-
celled, nor is she entitled to have the trust deed executed by her
brother and held by the bank cancelled, but she is entitled to a
prior lien on the property, and to have the deed of trust executed
to her by her brother to secure the purchase money of the land fore-
closed, and the proceeds of the sale of the land applied so far as
may be necessary to the payment of the amount due her by her
brother on this purchase money. Watson v. Peebles, 725.


1. Official notes. Filing transcript. Penalties. Code 1906, section 4793.
A court stenographer is required to transcribe his official notes,

and file the transcript thereof in the court, within the time pre-
scribed, and his failure to do this renders him liable for the penalty

provided in Code 1906, section 4793. Johnson v. Ward, 464.
2. Same.
But where on the trial of a case a part of the testimony was taken

by the regular court stenographer who was taken sick and a sten-
ographer was temporarily appointed who finished the taking of
the testimony and who afterwards failed and refused to file a
transcript of the part he had taken under the advice of counsel
that he could not file a part of the record. In such case the statu-
tory penalty should not be imposed. Ib.

1. Estoppel. Persons affected. Persons estopped. Trust deed. Bene-

Where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to be-

lieve the existence of a certain state of facts and thereby induces



him to act on that behalf, so as to alter his condition, the former
is precluded from averring against the latter a state of things

different from that represented. Crisler v. Whadley, 755.
2. Estoppel. Deed of trust. Beneficiary.
Where a beneficiary is estopped a trustee is likewise estopped in a

suit for the recovery of personal property under the terms of the
deed of trust. Ib.

3. Following trust property.
Whenever a trustee has been guilty of a breach of trust, and has

transferred the property, by sale or otherwise, to any third per-
son the cestui que trust has full and perfect right to follow such
property into the hands of such third person unless he stands
in the position of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice,
and if the trustee has invested the trust property, or its proceeds,
in any other property into which it can be distinctly traced, the
cestui que trust has his election, either to follow the same into the
new investment, or to hold the trustee personally liable for the
breach of trust. Bank v. McPherson, 852.


See Sales.


Criminal law. Right to reopen case.

It was error not to allow the state in a criminal case to reopen the

case and prove venue after both the sstate and the defendantbad
rested. State v. Martin, 165.


1. Peremptory instruction. Verdict of jury.

Where a peremptory instruction is granted it is not necessary for
the jury to retire and actually find the verdict directed, but the
court should simply render judgment as if upon verdict found.

Hairston v. Montgomery, 364.
2. Criminal law. Right of appeal by state. Code 1906, section 40.
From the action of the court instructing a verdict for the defend-

ant in a criminal case because the evidence did not support the
charge, no appeal lies. In such case Code 1906, section 40, au-

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