the same subject-matter that is referred to in section 165 of our Constitution, said: "If one not a party to the record, but directly and pecuniarily interested in the result of the cause, would be such a party thereto as to disqualify one of his kinsmen from being a juror, he would also be such a party as to disqualify his kinsman from presiding as a judge." In Arkansas a lawyer engaged in the trial of a cause suggested to the court that R. C. Bullock, one of the attorneys in the case, was interested in the trial of said cause, and his fee depended upon the rendition of a judgment in favor of his client; that said R. C. Bullock was related to the judge presiding at the trial, and for this reason he asked the judge to decline to preside at the trial. The judge seemed to be very sensitive where he considered his judicial dignity was involved, and fined the lawyer for contempt. The lawyer appealed to the Supreme Court of the state. The Constitution of the state of Arkansas provides that "no judge or justice. shall preside in the trial of a case in the finding of which he may be interested, or where either of the parties shall be connected with him by consanguinity or affinity." Const. Art. 7, Sec. 20. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, construing this provision of the Constitution, said: "While the Constitution speaks of a party to a cause, we are of the opinion that, both upon sound reason and according to the weight of authority, the word should not be construed in a technical and restricted sense to mean a party to the record, but it should be held to mean any one who is pecuniarily interested directly in the result of the suit, although not a party to the record and not necessarily bound by the judgment. Any other construction totally disregards the spirit and defeats the purpose of the constitutional prohibition, for if a judge may be influenced at all in his judgment by the fact that a person who is directly interested in the result of the suit is related to him, the potency of the influence is not lessened by the absence of the related party from the record." The court overruled the chancellor in adjudging petitioner to be in contempt, because the motion suggested legal ground for disqualification of the chancellor. Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S. W. 143, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 619, 15 Ann. Cas. 531. As before said, some of the other states place a more technical and restricted construction upon the meaning of the word "party" and the case of Allison v. Railroad, 129 N. C. 336, 40 S. E. 91, is quoted by many of the courts as authority for the proposition that a judge is not disqualified because of the relationship of an attorney who is interested in the suit, when the fee of such lawyer depends upon the result of the suit. We think a careful reading of this case will demonstrate that there is no statutory or constitutional prohibition in the state of North Carolina, and for this reason the North Carolina court has adhered to the common law rule, which only disqualified judges because of some interest of their own in the result of the suit to be tried. We are convinced that the broad and liberal rule of construction is the soundest and wisest rule, and, adopting this rule as our guide, we conclude that the circuit judge was disqualified to preside at the trial of this case. If the numerical weight of authority rested with the narrow view, we would unhesitatingly follow the lead of those courts adopting the broad and liberal construction of statutes and constitutions similar in language to our own Constitution. In the absence of precedent, we would feel constrained to create a precedent in harmony with our views. Every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, who must possess the disinterestedness of a total stranger to the interests of the parties involved in the litigation, whether that interest is revealed by an inspection of the record or developed by evidence aliunde the record. The real parties in interest furnish the reason for the judge to recuse himself when it becomes known that they are related to the judge, although they may not be parties eo nomine. Was the suggestion made in time by appellant? The facts were called to the attention of the court by the motion for a new trial, and while the case was still within his control. It was also admitted that appellant's attorney did not know of the interests of appellee's attorneys in the litigation until after the trial. We think the point was made in time. Since the disqualification of the judge may be waived by the consent of the parties and of the judge, his judgment was not void per se, but simply voidable. It follows, therefore, that the disqualification of the trial judge must be seasonably suggested; that is to say, whenever a knowledge of his disqualification comes to the complaining interest, should such party "sit down upon the stool of do nothing," he will be held to have waived the disqualification of the judge and to have consented to his presiding in the cause. In some jurisdictions it is held that the statute disqualifying the judge deprives him of all jurisdiction, and for this reason his acts are absolutely void. These decisions are usually based on the peculiar language of the statutes construed, and which, as a general proposition, in their very terms disqualify the judge when his own interest, or the interests of a relative, may be affected by the decisions of the judge, and for this reason his judgment is entirely incapable of being made good, even by express consent. It will be noted that our Constitution provides that the disqualification may be waived by consent, and it is our opinion that consent will be conclusively presumed after the case has gone to final judgment, unless it affirmatively appears that the suggestion of the disqualification of the judge was made at some time before final judgment. A very exhaustive and interesting collation of the authorities touching the void and voidable judgments of disqualified judges may be found in the notes to the New Hampshire case of Moses v. Julian, reported in 84 Am. Dec. 14. And for the reasons given above, the case is reversed and remanded. Reversed and remanded. ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR. Cook, J., delivered the opinion of the court. In response to the suggestion of error, we desire to say that we entertain no doubt as to the soundness of our views, expressed in the opinion heretofore rendered, touching the disqualification of the trial judge. We recede from the rule of pleading laid down by us in the opinion, and now say that the statute of limitations must be specially pleaded, and the trial court was correct in so ruling. The rules of this court, adopted January 4, 1910 (54 South, v.), have no application to the practice or procedure in other courts, and this is manifested by the language employed in the rules adopted. This court has no authority to prescribe rules for the government of trial courts, and has never attempted to usurp such power. The order heretofore entered, reversing and remanding this cause, is affirmed. Affirmed. 102 Miss.] Brief for appellant. A. E. GRAYSON v. T. J. HARRIS ET AL. [58 South. 775, 59 South. 1.] JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. Lien. Supersedeas. Code 1906, Sec. 90. Where a judgment is obtained in a justice of the peace court and real estate of the defendant levied upon and the defendant thereafter removes the case to the circuit court by certiorar as provided for under Code 1906, section 90, which operates as a supersedeas, the lien of such judgment acquired by the levy is not destroyed thereby but only stayed and may be enforced when the certiorari is dismissed. APPEAL from the chancery court of Jones county. Suit by T. J. Harris and others against A. E. Grayson. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendant appeals. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court. Hardy & Arnold, for appellant. All we see in this case is one question the answer to which in the affirmative will result in the affirmance of the action of the court below; in the negative, a reversal of the decree below. This question is simply this: "When a levy of an execution is made on lands, does the granting of a writ of certiorari act as a release of the lien of the levy, or does it simply suspend the action under the writ until the certiorari is disposed of?" If it is a release, then the appellant has no case here; if it is a mere suspension of the matter until the writ is disposed of, then the court below is wrong and the decree must be reversed. As we see it, this is the only real question presented by this record. Now in our judgment Sec. 90, Code 1906, providing for the issuance of these writs of certiorari does not |