"Austria keeps up an army of 467,000 men, which costs her 336,000,000f.; France an army of 573,000 men, which costs 688,000 000f.; Prussia an army of 214,000 men, which costs her 156,000,000f.; England an army of 300,000 men, which costs 677,000,000f.; and Russia an army of 1,000,000 of men, which costs 529,000,000f. That is, out of the total budget of each of those states, an expenditure of 37 per cent. in Austria, or more than a third; 33 per cent. in France, 30 in Prussia, 39 in England, and 42 in Russia. Let us also mention Italy, where 329,000,000f. are expended in keeping up a force of 314,000 men; Turkey, weighed down by an army of 424,000; Denmark and Sweden, the first with 50,000, and the second with 67,000 men, by which their budgets are increased to 37 and 40 per cent. respectively. The other secondary states follow in an analagous proportion."

In maintaining a state of armed neutrality, Europe thus spends about 3,500,000,000 francs, and compels nearly four millions of men to a life of worse than uselessness. Against this vast reckoning, which represents the cost of an unmixed evil, Napoleonism can never It is true that France, under the show a fractional compensation. present ruler, has partially opened her ports to British commerce, but myriads of years must elapse ere we can obtain commensurate returns for the vast debt of past wars.

In addition to this lavish expenditure of men and money upon the formation of engines for the mutual destruction of their owners, and which constitutes one of the chief positive ills which Napoleonism has wrought upon Europe, there are other more negative effects produced; and these are continually at work, and are scarcely less injurious to the body politic than a state of actual warfare. Alluding to these latent or secondary effects, M. Legoyt thus argues:

"Let us for a moment suppose that, by an understanding with the great powers, a disarming in proportion of one-half was effected. Immediately 1,907,924 men of from twenty to thirty-five years of age, constituting the flower of the population of that age, are restored to labours of peace, and at once a saving of 1,600,000,000f. effected in the totality of European budgets. With that sum Europe might add annually to the railways at present existing 10,000 kilometres (6,250 miles), at the rate of 150,000f. the kilometre; she could, in a single year, complete ber entire network; she might establish in every commune, and even in each section of the communes, a primary school. These great improvements once realized, she might, if she decided on maintaining the same sum in her budget, apply it to the The annual interest of the different progressive reduction of her public debt. states being about 2,333,000,000f., and that interest capitalized at the average rate of four per cent., representing a capital of 57,500,000,000f., it might be paid off (not calculating the compound interest) in about thirty-six years. If, on the contrary, the countries interested preferred applying the 1,600,000,000f. thus economized to the reduction or suppression of the taxes which weigh most heavily on the production or consumption of articles of necessity, what an alleviation to the people it would be, and what a stimulus would it give to business! We have said that about 1,907,924 men, all in the prime of life, would be restored to the arts of peace. There would be also, in that happy event, an efficacious source of prosperity for Europe. In fact, calculating the average daily wages of these 2,000,000 working men at 2f. each, and supposing that those wages represent a fifth of the value produced, this army of peace, henceforth enrolled under the banner of labour,

would create a daily value of 20,000,000f., and an annual one of 7,500,000,000f. This is not all; a considerable amount of capital, now employed in the fabrication of the objects necessary for the equipment and arming of those 2,000,000 men, would become disposable, and might be applied to other branches, incomparably more useful, of the national industry. Lastly, the keeping at home of 2,000,000 young men would have the certain effect of bringing about, at least temporarily, a notable reduction in the rates of labour, and of giving an impetus to production in all its forms. Setting economical considerations aside for a moment, we will signalize the advantage to the country of maintaining the taste and habit of labour in a considerable number of adults, who are now condemned by a garrison life to idleness and its fatal consequences. We may also mention the interest for order and public morality of preserving the family bonds which are more or less broken by the absence for six or seven years of those 2,000,000 sons who are annually taken from their homes by the recruitment."

Turning from the material to the moral results of Napoleonism, we find the ruin, havoc, and misery to be scarcely less conspicuous. Beneficent objects, beyond the pale of France, found no favour with Napoleon I. All his acts and objects were tainted with a narrow selfishness. His egotism always stood in the way of his policy; and thus, his vanity impelling him in one direction, and the true interests of his country inspiring him to take a different course, we find that all his glorious victories proved fruitless in results, and that the end of his adventurous career saw his country a desert and himself an exile. And in the few instances in which it is alleged by his partisans that he voluntarily merged his own interests in those of France, even here his conduct was at least equivocal in its disinterestedness, for, in aggrandizing France, he added to his own fame. All his personal and moral influence was given to the furtherance of those schemes for universal domination in which he so signally failed. He had no time, even if he had the inclination, for peace, or for reaping the solid fruits of his victories. When not engaged in acts of fresh aggression, he was employed in consolidating the military possession of those unwilling countries he had ostensibly conquered. But again and again the flame of revolt was kindled, again to be quenched in blood; until at last Europe grew disgusted with these repeated and senseless butcheries, and resolved to expel the disturber of Europe. And thus the restless life of this ambitious charlatan was passed in vain strivings after more than mortal powers could achieve. And let us ask, Öf what benefit to France, much less to Europe, are all the tragic victories of which Napolean can boast? Who, or what country, has been rendered the better, the wiser, or the stronger, by these impotent attempts to coerce the will of Europe? Paris, perhaps, has been rendered so much the richer by possessing sundry ill-gotten treasures of art; and in the Louvre, hung up for show, are the cast-off clothes of the "great general,' -a fitting legacy to France. And when at last this arch-usurper had been safely caged at St. Helena, and Europe had found time calmly to survey her position, was then the extent of the desolation fully known? Even England,

wearied with twenty years of war, during which she had borne the brunt of the battle, was threatened with internal dissension which might have eclipsed the ills of the contest she had just successfully ended; while Europe generally had collapsed into utter weakness, bankrupt in men and money. And now, in 1815, was perpetrated that gigantic fraud, the Treaty of Vienna,-fit result of Napoleon's example. The part which England played, however unwillingly, in adjusting this treaty, must ever be a matter of deep regret. By this infamous arrangement the dismemberment of Hungary was confirmed, the denationalization of Poland was legalized, and Austria's title to Italy acknowledged. These are the unoffending countries which fell victims to appease the wrath of Russia and Germany, who had suffered most from the inroads of Napoleonism. At the time when we assented to this unjust retaliation on the part of our allies, it was felt in England that the question of right involved in this act of spoliation must one day be tried before a fairer tribunal; and so it has proved, for after forty years the rights of the suppressed nationalities have become the theme of serious discussion, and threaten to be the cause of new convulsions in Europe. If England had not meekly compromised the matter by accepting (to her) the lesser evil, all these threatened complications might have been prevented; but exhausted by the efforts she had put forth to crush Napoleon's power, and craving for rest and peace, she reluctantly acquiesced in the measures proposed by her former allies, as the basis for the settlement of European affairs. And thus, to Napoleonism, as the first cause, Poland and Hungary owe their loss of nationality.

The example of Napoleonism has been most pernicious on the despotic governments of Europe, and has had a proportionate, if less injurious effect upon the more wise and liberal rulers. During more than forty years of peace those unfortunate countries have scarcely advanced in civil and religious liberty. The same blind reliance is now felt, as during the last century, by the governing powers in barbaric brute force and coercion, instead of trusting to the intelligent attachment of the peoples. And the reason is obvious. Those autocrats whose sole power is force, seeing in Napoleon, who was the elect of the people, the bitter fruits of the Gallic doctrines of universal liberty and equality in the subject, resolved that the granting of too much liberty to this subject should not be the rock on which they would split. Hence it followed that every movement on the part of the people to obtain an accession of individual and social liberty was considered by the jealous Government to manifest symptoms of incipient revolution, and was accordingly suppressed with military rigour and promptitude. For half a century, therefore, through fear of the extension of the Napoleonic theories, the advance of civilization in Europe has been arrested.

The diminution in number, and the deterioration in stamina, of the population of Europe, form the grounds of another indictment

against Napoleonism. In France herself, the physical decrepitude and sparseness of population produced by the havoc of war is especially conspicuous. It has required forty years of cessation from war to raise the population of France to the number it formerly included, while the disparity of ratio between the sexes will require ages to correct. In the meantime, a weak, puny, and diseased race is the penalty which France must continue to pay for past glory. And the injury in this respect which Napoleonism has inflicted upon Europe generally is scarcely less serious, and forms one of the greatest calamities of the war.

But the amount of injury, moral and material, which Napoleonism imposed upon Europe can be correctly measured only by comparing the actual with the possible, i. e., by contrasting the amount of harm actually wrought by Napoleon with the amount of good which might reasonably be expected to follow from the administration of a temperate and responsible government. Napoleonism was not only an evil in itself, but it also stood in the way of a possible good. During the despotic sway of this ambitious potentate Europe was fast driven back to barbarism; the arts of peace were forgotten, industry flagged, literature and learning languished, civilization halted in its march, liberty was banished; and now, although an age has passed since these acts were perpetrated, Europe is only lifting her face out of the dust. Will the policy of the present Napoleon prove well or ill for the interests of Europe?

E. S. J.

Politics.

WAS SLAVERY THE REAL CAUSE OF THE
AMERICAN WAR?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-I.

FEW questions have excited the people of England of late years so much as those arising out of the gigantic struggle carried on by our neighbours on the other side of the Atlantic. Not only have the brains of that portion of the community termed thoughtful people been set in motion, but the whole country has been stirred up from its very depths; and about a year ago nothing was in such demand as lectures on, and expositions of, the constitution of the States and the rights of secession. Everywhere the most unbounded enthusiasm and wildest spirit of partisanship developed itself. So great, in fact, was the excitement, that some have laughingly inquired if there was as much stir about it in America as there was in England. That we should have held such uproarious meetings

was foolish, but that we should think upon it is both natural and right; for even the most thoughtless, who gives the question only a moment's consideration, cannot but be struck with the thought that some of the dearest ties of humanity are involved in it. That Englishmen above all others should reflect upon the question is natural, nay, imperative; for, of one tongue, origin, and religion, the two nations ever have and ever must stand side by side in the march of progress and civilization. And we on this side of the Atlantic have greater facilities for the consideration of the subject. Just as a man standing on the brow of a hill takes in the whole sweep of country before him, whilst one in the valley sees but those objects nearest to him; so do we in Britain obtain a view of the wide outstretch of events, while the natives of the States see only the near and the stirring.

Let us, then, from our far-viewing standpoint, sweep our eye over the subject. And what was its origin? Was it slavery? To this we should emphatically say, Yes; for this hydra-headed monster has protruded his horrid form from every measure passed in the Southern or seceding states. He ratified their constitution; he rules in their senate-house, and vetoes or approves every measure introduced to their legislative bodies. If it was not slavery, what then? Was it tariffs? This plea seems ridiculous when we find that "one small brain" originated the whole, and that Mr. Maury invented it as a special conscience-calmer for Englishmen. Was it for independence? Independence is a sweet term. It brings to our mind glowing pictures of national prosperity and happiness; but when we find that independence is a large bag containing worse composi tions than even Pandora's box, a large cloak to cover and legalize the exercise of the worst passions of human nature, and tighten the chains of the oppressed, then we reject with scorn the plea of independence. What, was then, the cause? Again we would repeat that it was slavery; that the Southern states rebelled to resist the growing abolitionism of the North, and to protect their dear" domestic institution."

We shall attempt to prove our position from (1) a short glance at the abolition party; (2) natural facts and precedents; (3) the Southern constitution and ordinances of secession; (4) the oratory and the press of the South; and (5) from the men who have joined the ranks of secession.

(1) A glance at the history of the abolition party. At the revolt of the colonies from England, nearly all the states (Massachusetts being, indeed, the only exception) were slaveholding. The New Englanders, however, saw the absurdity of revolting from oppressive taxation, while they held under them men to whom they denied even the right to be taxed; and they washed their robes from the taint. But abolitionism was not a power in those days; it was only a little cloud, less than a man's hand, but big with the fate of a mighty nation. It had no majority; the slaveholders occupied all the avenues of power-the bench, the forum, and the ministerial and ambassadorial