NATIONALITY OF FOREIGN FIRM.

83

course of liquidation he purchased $10,000 of New Orleans city bonds, paying for them in Confederate money.

The case was at first dismissed, on the ground of V.'s disloyalty, and that the character of V.'s acts was imputable to complainant.

A rehearing was granted, when it was satisfactorily shown that J. L. & Co., the firm in behalf of which the complainant claimed. judgment, was a different firm from that between the complainant and V., though bearing the same name; that the account between V. and the complainant had never been closed, that L. had never authorized or ratified the purchase of the bonds by V., but considered it a personal affair of the latter, and that the price of the bonds had not been placed on the books of the firm to the account of profit and loss. Judgment was thereupon entered for the complainant.1

Allusion has already been made to the suit brought in the English courts by insurance companies to recover of the firm of Rodocanachi Sons & Co. the proceeds of the judgment obtained by them in this court for loss of goods which the companies had insured on a valued policy.2 This claim, when presented, raised a question as to the nationality of the firm under a state of facts as follows:

1 See Schreiber v. United States, Rep. 109, where the court (JEWELL, J.), after reciting the facts in this case, remark :

"Between that case and the present there are no differences. Levois was a nonresident alien, as are the petitioners in the case now under consideration."

RAYNER, J., dissenting (as previously stated) in Schreiber v. United States upon this language of the court, comments as follows: "Levois v. United States is by no means an adjudication of this question. That was the case of a representative, a surviving partner of a businsss firm which did for many years, and does yet, carry on a mercantile enterprise in New Orleans, on American soil and under American protection. I admit that, with me, Levois did barely escape the fatal objection of being an unnaturalized foreigner who has continuously resided in a foreign land. But the award was not to him in his individual character, it was to him as the member of a firm that had invested their money in our country. That business firm was consequently entitled to the protection of the Government, and his right as surviving partner to recover the assets of the firm, and settle up its affairs, is recognized by the general municipal law of the land. Just as, in awarding to an insurance company the amount of its losses over its gains, we do not inquire whether any member of the company may or may not be an unnaturalized foreigner, non-resident in this country. It is to the corporation, as a corporation, we make the award; because it is the corporation as a corporation that is entitled to the benefit of our law and the protection of our Government. And so in regard to a business firm. It was to Levois as surviving partner of a firm entitled to the benefit of our laws and the protection of our Government that we made the award.” 2 Ante, p. 61 et seq.

The principal house of Rodocanachi Sons & Co. was located, at the time of the loss, at Leghorn, Italy. It had branches in London, Marseilles, and Odessa. The firm bought goods through their agents in New York, which were laden on the "Lamplighter" and the "Brilliant," both of which vessels were destroyed by the " Alabama." The bill of lading of the tobacco shipped on the " Lamplighter" was to the order of Messrs. Rodocanachi Sons & Co., London. They indorsed it, after actual loss, but before the news had reached London, to Rodocanachi Sons & Co., of Leghorn. Two of the firm lived in London, one of whom was a naturalized British subject; the other was not naturalized till 1868.

Counsel for the complainants argued that because one of the firm happened to be a naturalized British subject at the time the loss occurred, the firm was not thereby prevented from recovering the full value of the cargoes. That partner upon settlement will not receive more than one twelfth of what the firm recovers. Individual partners are required to make individual claims, as a convenient rule of court, not because by act of Congress a firm may not be considered a person, and bring their claim in solido. His certificate of naturalization excepted "any rights and capacities of a natural-born British subject out of and beyond the dominions of the British Crown and the limits thereof." He had no right to the protection of the British government as to any property "out of and beyond the dominions of the British Crown," and in that is distinguished from a native-born British subject. He can fairly be considered as a foreigner of some other nation than Great Britain.1

While the nationality of a corporation is that of the sovereignty which creates it, and that of a firm is the nationality of its individual partners, still, where a firm has a main house in one country, with branches in other countries, the analogy between a corporation and a partnership is complete, and the country where the main house is situated gives the firm the impress of its nationality. The goods destroyed were Italian property, the domicile of the firm being in

*

1 Aslan's Case, App. Rep, British Commissioners on Naturalization, 1869, p. 76; Foreign Office Circular, January 8, 1851; Cockburn on Nationality, pp. 115, 116; United States For. Rel., 1873, part 2, p. 1350; Sophocles Theologo's Case, ibid., p. 1351; Schreiber v. United States (No. 740); 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66; 10 & 11 Vict., c. 83; Worth v. United States (No. 91).

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BRITISH SUBJECTS NOT NATURALIZED.

85

Italy. The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231; Ang. and Ames on Corp. § 108; Regina v. Arnaud, 9 Q. B. 806.

The requirement that a person must be entitled to the protection of the United States is satisfied by a firm's being so entitled, even though a partner might not be.

Judgment was rendered for the complainants in the full amount claimed.

The complainant, who was a fireman on board the steamer "Electric Spark," filed his petition for loss of personal effects and of wages resulting from the capture of that vessel on the 10th July, 1864. It appeared from the testimony that complainant was born in Ireland in 1820, and came to this country in 1847. He lived in the city of New York, and sailed out of that port" on vessels under the flag and register of the United States, since 1859." It further appeared that in 1857 he declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States; as a matter of fact, however, he was not naturalized until 1865.

Mr. James Lowndes, his counsel, called the attention of the court to Rev. St. sect. 2174, extending certain privileges of protection to seamen, being foreigners, who declare their intention of becoming citizens of the United States.

The counsel in behalf of the United States contended that this provision of law was a re-enactment of section nine of the act of June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. at Large, 268), and not having been in force at the date of the loss, it had no application to this case.

The court, following the ruling in Gordon v. United States,1 dismissed the petition.2

L. and M. were partners doing business in the city of New York, under the firm name of L. & M. They filed a petition for value of certain wheat alleged to have been destroyed October 23, 1862, on board the “Lafayette." The prayer of the petition was for a judgment for one half the amount of the loss to L. and the other half to M. L., it appears, was by birth a citizen of the United States; but M. was born in Ireland and came to this country in 1860 and ever since resided in the city of New York. M. was naturalized in 1872. Upon demurrer it was held that M. was not entitled to recover. Subsequently the court entered judgment in

1 Ante, p. 74.

2 Hutchinson v. United States (No. 1797) Rep. 16.

3 Rep. 40.

86

CLAIMS ADMISSIBLE UNDER ACT OF 1882.

favor of L. for a sum which appears to be one half of the entire loss.1

It ought to be stated, before taking leave of this branch of the subject, that in several claims of aliens, where judgment was entered for loss of personal effects and wages, the complainants were sailors on board American ships, making a voyage under the American flag for the first time.2

WHAT CLAIMS ADMISSIBLE.

SECTION 5. That the first class shall be for claims directly resulting from damage done on the high seas by Confederate cruisers during the late rebellion, including vessels and cargoes attacked on the high seas, although the loss or damage occurred within four miles of the shore, excluding claims which have been proved pursuant to section eleven of said chapter four hundred and fifty-nine. The second class shall be for claims for the payment of premiums for war risks, whether paid to corporations, agents, or individuals, after the sailing of any Confederate cruiser.

It does not fall within the province of this work, nor indeed would it be proper to seek in any way to anticipate the decisions that the court will in all probability be called upon to render in construing the meaning of doubtful passages in the act of 1882. But it is an eminently useful and fit task to explore the statute with a view to pointing out the purpose, as generally understood, of those who enacted it, and to comment upon such plain and undisputed features as may arrest our attention. Avoiding inquiries of a purely speculative character, therefore, let us see the extent of the jurisdiction conferred upon the newly established court, the points of resemblance and of divergence, as compared with the limits to which the jurisdiction of its predecessor was confined.

1 Lord v. United States (No. 233) Rep. 16. See United States v. Rurns, 12 Wall. 246. Cf. Schreiner v. United States, 6 Ct. of Cl. 359.

2 See remarks of Jewell, J., in Schreiber v. United States, Rep. 111.

TWO CLASSES UNDER ACT OF 1882.

87

One or two verbal changes, though of little moment, may not altogether be overlooked, but may be dismissed from view after a simple mention of their existence.

The senior judge is now designated as "the presiding justice" (act of 1882, sect. 2); whereas the opening section of the former act provides that "the President shall designate, by appointment, one of said judges to be presiding judge of the court."

The "Alabama" and her sister ships are termed, in the act of 1874, the "so-called insurgent cruisers." At this later day Congress, adopting the expression used in the award itself, styles the vessels "Confederate cruisers."

It so happens that the earlier act does not direct the court in terms to "enter judgments." It provides that the judges shall "decide questions" (section two), "determine and award" upon claims (section seven), " adjudicate" (section nine), " decide upon the amount and validity of claims" (section eleven), and "allow" claims (section twelve). The word "judgment" does not appear till we reach section thirteen, where it is enacted that an allowance of interest "shall not be included in or added to the amount for which judgment may be rendered" on the claim. The word is repeated in following sections.

Section 5, however, of the act just passed, expressly says that it shall be the duty of the court "to enter judgments for the amount allowed therefor in two classes." No word or term is anywhere in the act employed as equivalent to or as a substitute for the word “judgment.”

THE TWO CLASSES.

The claimants who, from time to time, appeared before Congress, asking to be allowed to share in the distribution of the Geneva award fund, naturally divided themselves into four classes, namely:

1. Sufferers whose property was actually destroyed by the “Alabama" or "Florida" (or their tenders), or by the "Shenandoah" after she left Melbourne, February 18, 1865. Great Britain having been held responsible for the acts of these vessels, they became popularly known as the "inculpated cruiser" claimants.

2. Persons who suffered similar losses growing out of the acts of vessels, on account of which the United States sought to have Great