What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa

Front Cover
Yale University Press, 2005 M06 11 - 340 pages
This “riveting account of one of history’s greatest blunders” chronicles Russia’s tragic mishandling of Nazi Germany’s invasion during WWII (William L. O’Neill, The New Leader).
 
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa was launched against Russia. Within days, the invading army had taken hundreds of thousands of Soviet captives while the Luftwaffe bombed a number of Russian cities, including Minsk. Though accurate intelligence about the plan had been available to Stalin before the attack, he chose not to heed the warning.
 
In What Stalin Knew, historian and former chief of the CIA’s Soviet division David E. Murphy illuminates many of the enigmas surrounding the catastrophic invasion, offering keen insights into Stalin’s thinking and the reasons for his fatal error of judgment. A story of successful misinformation campaigns, and a leader more paranoid about threats from within his regime than from an aggressive neighbor, this authoritative history sheds essential new light on the most consequential event in the Eastern Front of World War II.
 
“If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22—comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here—its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . . Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider’s grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used—or not.” —Niall Ferguson, The New York Times Book Review
 
“A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment . . . Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented.” —Henry A. Kissinger
 

Contents

Background
1
Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov
7
CHAPTER 3 Proskurov Sets Stalin Straight
14
CHAPTER 4 Soviet Borders Move Westward
29
Proskurov Made a Scapegoat
47
CHAPTER 6 Soviet Military Intelligence Residencies in Western Europe
62
CHAPTER 7 Soviet Military Intelligence Residencies in Eastern Europe
71
CHAPTER 8 Who Were You Dr Sorge? Stalin Never Heard of You
84
Why Did Stalin Believe It?
173
CHAPTER 18 Secret Letters
185
CHAPTER 19 The Purges Revived
192
CHAPTER 20 On the Eve
204
CHAPTER 21 A Summer of Torture
216
CHAPTER 22 The Final Reckoning
232
Will the Future Be a Repeat of the Past?
245
Organization and Functions of Soviet Military Intelligence
253

CHAPTER 9 NKVD Foreign Intelligence
91
CHAPTER 10 Fitins Recruited Spies
97
CHAPTER 11 Listening to the Enemy
108
CHAPTER 12 Working on the Railroad
117
CHAPTER 13 The Border Troops Knew
124
CHAPTER 14 Proskurov Is Fired
137
CHAPTER 15 Golikov and Operation Sea Lion
145
CHAPTER 16 We Do Not Fire on German Aircraft in Peacetime
162
Hitlers Letters to Stalin
256
Those Executed without Trial on October 28 1941
259
Chronology of Agent Reporting
261
Glossary of Spies and Their Masters
264
Notes
275
Index
301
Copyright

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About the author (2005)

David E. Murphy, now retired, was chief of CIA’s Berlin base from the early 1950s to 1961 and then became chief of Soviet operations at CIA headquarters in the United States. He is coauthor of Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, also published by Yale University Press.

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