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ment; they asked that the principle involved in a tariff for the direct protection of domestic industry might be settled, and also "that a system of Federal taxation may be established which shall be equal in its operation upon the whole people and in all sections of the country." The question of protection had recently forced itself upon the attention of the country through the success of the protectionists in passing the tariff of 1828. The States of Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Virginia protested against it as unjust and unconstitutional; these protests proving to be of no effect, South Carolina had attempted to put in force the doctrine of nullification.2

It was over thirty years before the next proposition on this subject was introduced. In 1864 Senator Saulsbury included in the series of amendments proposed by him, as a substitute for the thirteenth amendment, one which provided that duties on imports might be imposed for revenue, but should not be prohibitory or excessive in amount. The last of these amendments, presented in 1871, proposed the abolition of duties on imports and excises and the substitution of a direct tax instead.1

149. PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION.

The great increase in recent years in the amount of special and private legislation has led to several attempts to counteract this evil by means of a constitutional provision. Some thirteen resolutions of this character have been introduced since 1876. The first of these was presented in that year by Mr. Springer of Illinois, prohibiting Congress passing any special law in a long list of enumerated cases, among which were included the granting of pensions, land or prize money, or relief to any person, or authorizing the payment of any claims against the United States, except to pay the judgments of courts or commissions. It also forbade the granting to any corporation any special or exclusive privileges, subsidy, immunity, or franchise," and in all cases where a general law could

App., Nos. 615, 616.

2 For protests see post, par. 156, note; also, Journal of Senate of Pennsylvania (1829-30), pp. 30, 31; Ibid. (1832–33), pp. 307, 308. Canning is said to have declared that "he would make the people of America reduce their tariff or dissolve the Union." Bishop, Hist. of Manufact., 1, pp. 333-334.

3 App., No. 1019.

App., No. 1338. See ante, par. 140.

App., Nos. 1415, 1462, 1472, 1473, 1483, 1488, 1528, 1583, 1606, 1642, 1653, 1673, 1693.

App., No. 1415.

be made applicable no special law should be enacted. A similar resolution has been proposed by Mr. Springer at eight different times since, the aim of which was to limit the legislative power "to enactment of laws general in their application and effect to all sections and persons within the jurisdiction of this Constitution."

Mr. Beach of New York, who was also very active in urging an amendment which should prevent Congress from passing private bills, in addition has presented two propositions to prohibit the giving or loaning of public property or credit in aid of private or corporate enterprises. Two amendments of a similar nature had previously been proposed. One of these, presented in 1869, forbade Congress passing any "law granting subsidies to corporations or companies to aid in the construction of railroads, canals, or other public improvements," as long as the national debt shall exceed the sum of $500,000,000.3 The other, introduced in 1873, prohibited Congress guaranteeing or paying the indebtedness of any State, Territory, District, or any municipal corporation.1

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The prohibition proposed by these various amendments is analogous to the restrictions in many of the recent State constitutions, and is prompted by the unwillingness of the people to trust their representatives. It is contrary to the longaccepted practice of the United States, and possibly would tend to reduce the feeling of Congressional responsibility. Perhaps a more effective remedy would be the severe application of the veto to doubtful cases.6

150. STATUS OF FINANCIAL LEGISLATION.

Since the early years there has been little disposition shown to restrict, by means of amendments, the power of the General Government over the collection of the revenue, except in regard to the imposition and collection of direct taxes, and in a slight degree the customs. Likewise there has been little effort to

1App., Nos. 1472, 1488, 1528, 1583, 1642, 1673, 1693.

2 App., Nos. 1607, 1653.

App., No. 1316. "Except to complete such as are already commenced in which the United States has a large interest." The Union Pacific Railroad doubtless suggested this. 4 App., No. 1375.

Bryce, I, pp. 491, 552-533; Hitchcock, Am. State Const., pp. 34-44.

President Cleveland applied this remedy during his first term to nearly three hundred cases. See Mason's Veto Power, App. A, Nos. 133 to 433; also pp. 90-93, 128-129, 132–133. See ante, par. 58, for discussion of the proposition to give the President power to veto items in appropriation bills.

place any check upon the power of Congress to make expenditures, save in recent years there have been some indications of a desire to fix limitations to special legislation, and to prevent extravagant appropriations.'

The debt of the United States and of the States are on an entirely different basis; the United States debt being guaranteed by the Constitution, while the State's debts are assumed by the laws of the State. At the close of the civil war, the various propositions guaranteeing the national debt, prohibiting the payment of the Confederate debt, and the claims of disloyal persons, resulted in the incorporation of a section in the fourteenth amendment embodying the provisions of some of these various resolutions.

In general, Congress has exercised the extensive power conferred upon it with good results.

151. COMMERCIAL POWER.

It will be remembered that the great cause for the failure of the Government under the Articles of Confederation was that the Congress had no power over the subject of commerce, and the attempt to amend the Articles in order to give them control over it, even to a limited degree, met with failure." Owing to the critical condition into which the whole country had been brought by the system of permitting each State to make its own navigation laws, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to give to Congress express powers over all commerce not confined to the limits of a State. In addition, the subjects of the post-office, coinage, weights and measures, patents and copyrights were also expressly committed to the General Gov. ernment. Out of this large assemblage of powers flowed many implied powers. It is not suprising, therefore, that in the early years there was serious apprehension that the Federal Government might abuse these powers, and that many attempts have been made to limit or define the implied powers, and that not a few efforts have been made to increase the catalogue of express powers.

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152. CHARTERING CORPORATIONS.

Almost the earliest evidence of jealousy toward the commercial powers of the Government is the action of the ratifying

1 On the other hand, there has been one attempt, following the financial crisis of 1873, to confer upon Congress full power to pass necessary laws to protect the financial affairs of the people of the United States." App., No. 1375e.

2 The last amendment on commerce was proposed by the Congress April 12, 1783.

conventions of five of the States. Mindful of the evils of the great commercial monopolies of the Old World, such as the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company, they were desirous that no such monopolies should secure recognition from the United States Government, and to that end they proposed as an amendment to the Constitution an article declaring "that Congress erect no company of merchants with exclusive advantage of commerce." The attempt made in both the House and the Senate to include a similar amendment in the series recommended to the States by the First Congress failed. The last effort to secure such an amendment was made in 1793, in the Senate of the Second Congress, but the resolution was tabled.".

153. NATIONAL BANKS.

Not only did Congress decline to tie its hands and take away any implied power of chartering corporations, but it pro ceeded in 1791 to create the United States Bank and grant it a monopoly of its privileges for twenty years. The act provoked the first and one of the most searching discussions of the powers of Congress, but led to no amendments. During the interim of 1811-1815, when the bank was not in existence, Mr. Jackson of Virginia thrice introduced, in connection with the amendment authorizing the appropriation of money for internal improvements, an amendment conferring power upon Congress to establish a national bank. In January, 1814, the proposition was reported favorably by the Committee of the Whole House, but upon its consideration in the next session of Congress it was struck out of the series of amendments.

Upon the return of peace, a new national bank was established by the party that had formerly been opposed to it. In the financial crisis of 1818-19, the State banks becoming jealous and the people believing that the bank had done much to produce their ills, under the leadership of the DemocraticRepublican party, a movement was begun in Maryland, which Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other States promised to follow, to attempt to tax the institution out of the State. The banks

Namely: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. App., Nos. 5, 18, 51, 99, 123.

App., Nos. 239, 262.

3 App., No. 315.

App., Nos. 413, 418, 423.

resisted the Maryland law, and this gave rise to the celebrated case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland. In this opinion the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, declared the State tax unconstitutional and asserted the power of Congress to establish such an institution. In the meantime, in deference to the popular clamor, the Fifteenth Congress ordered an investigation of the bank, in which certain abuses, misappropriation of funds, and defalcation in certain of the branches, especially those located in Philadelphia and Baltimore, were discovered. Upon the disclosure of the report, the legislature of Pennsylvania, within which State the central office of the bank was located, early in January, 1820, presented to Congress a resolution to amend the Constitution so as to prevent the establishment by Congress of any bank except within the District of Columbia, the branches of which were to be confined to the District. Within a short time the legislatures of Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois passed resolutions concurring in the resolution proposed by the legis lature of Pennsylvania. No action, however, was taken by Congress beyond reforming the bank.

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The legislatures of at least eight States passed resolutions of nonconcurrence. The reply of the legislature of South Carolina is of especial interest, in view of the decidedly dif ferent position taken by the legislature of that State on a simi lar question within seven years. This resolution, passed in December of 1821, declared that they were "of the opinion that as Congress is constitutionally vested with the right to incorporate a bank, it would be unwise and impolitic to restrict its operations within such narrow limits as the District of Columbia. They apprehend no danger from the exercise of the power which the people of the United States have confided to Congress; but believe that in the exercise of these

14 Wheaton, 316.

2 App., Nos. 492, 495. Passed by the legislature March 29, 1819; vote of House, 81 to 4. 3 App., Nos. 492a, 494, 496, 506a.

The legislatures of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia. Journal of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania (1819-20), pp. 538–539; ibid. (1820-21), pp. 65-67, 462; ibid. (1822–23), pp. 75–76, 420-421, 646–647; ibid.(1823–24), pp. 25-26. Resolves of Massachusetts, Vol. XVI, pp. 118-120, Massachusetts Archives, Nos. 6886, 8859. The resolution of the legislature of Georgia de. clared that it was "not expedient to deny absolutely" the power of Congress to establish a bank, although impressed with the belief that the original grant of such power should be accompanied with a restriction requiring the assent of each and every State to the loca tion of the said bank or any branch thereof within the limits of such State." Journal of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania (1822–23), pp. 646–647.

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