One interesting provision of this resolution was that the vote should be by secret ballot, thus foreshadowing the desirability of methods now in use in the majority of the States.1

44. ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT DIRECTLY BY A COMBINATION OF DISTRICTS AND VOTES AT LARGE.

Corresponding to the amendments proposed in an earlier period by Senator Dickerson and others, for the choice of the electors in districts, there were introduced during the early "seventies," in both the House and Senate, propositions of a somewhat similar nature save that the electoral colleges were to disappear.2 Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, who was at this time the most earnest and zealous advocate of the necessity of a change, called up the question through a resolution which he offered in March, 1873. It directed the Committee on Privileges and Elections, of which he was chairman, "to examine and report at the next session upon the best and most practical mode of electing the President and Vice-President, and providing a tribunal to adjust and decide all contested questions connected therewith."3 The committee, in May, 1874, reported, presenting a proposition, in seven articles, as an amendment to the Constitution. It provided that the people should vote directly for the President, each State being divided into districts equal to the number of Representatives to which it should be entitled. The person having the highest number of votes in each district for President should receive the vote of that district, which should count as one Presidential vote. The person receiving the highest number of votes in the State should receive two Presidential votes from the State at large. The candidate receiving the highest number of Presidential votes in the United States should be President. In case two persons have the same number of votes in any State, it being the highest number, they should receive each one Presidential vote from the State at large.5

Additional sections of the same article made provision for applying the foregoing provisions to the election of Vice

1 App., No. 1519.

2 Ante, par. 39. (1817-1826.)

3 Cong. Record, Forty-third Congress, special session, p. 30.

4 App., No. 1393. The report of the committee which accompanied the amendment was one of great ability. It was the work of Mr. Morton. Senate Reports, Forty-third Congress, first session, Vol. II, No. 395.

If more than two, then no Presidential vote shall be counted from the State at large. If more than one receive the same number of votes in a district, it being the highest, no Presidential vote shall be counted for the district.

President, for conferring upon Congress the power to conduct such election, when it choose to do so, to alter the division of the State into districts, and to establish tribunals for the decision of such election as may be contested.1

The resolution was not brought up for consideration by the Senate until the following January, when it called out an important debate, Senators Morton and Anthony delivering long and valuable speeches. Senator Morton's address especially was a clear exposition of the working of the electoral system up to that date. It is worthy of note that he accurately forecast the contested election of 1876. In opening his remarks he declared it as his conviction that "no more important question can be considered by the Senate at this session of Congress, for, in my opinion, great dangers impend, owing to the imperfection of the present system of electing the President and Vice-President3." In support of the district system, he quoted the figures from the report of the committee, which showed that in the eight Presidential elections between the years 1844 and 1872 four of the Presidents had received less than a majority of the popular vote, while during the same time the district system, as shown by the Congressional elections, approached more nearly by one-third to the whole popular vote than the election by the present method. Two votes by the proposed system were to be given by the State at large, in order that "the autonomy and power of the small States" might be preserved.

In the meantime a very similar resolution was reported to the House by the Committee on Elections, which awakened considerable interest, but neither in the House or the Senate was the proposition brought to a vote, the general opinion being that the greatest danger lay in the matter of the electoral count. Senator Morton introduced the same amendment in the next Congress, but no action was taken beyond its reference."

Post, pars, 53, 54.

Cong. Record, Forty-third Congress, second session, pp. 627-634. Senator Anthony declared "all the machinery of the existing system is absurd." Senators Thurman and Conkling also spoke agreeing that some change was necessary.

3 See also report of the committee as given on previous page.

4 Polk, 1844, 50 per cent; Taylor, 1848, 47 per cent; Buchanan 1856, 45 per cent: Lincoln, 1860, 40 per cent. Ibid., also report of committee. For a table showing the difference between the popular and electoral vote in all elections from 1832 to 1876, see House Reports, Forty-sixth Congress, first session, Vol. 11, No. 347.

App., No 1386. In lieu of the section conferring upon Congress power to create tribunals to decide contested elections, was one making it the duty of the Supreme Court. Post, pars. 54, 70. It was recommitted and again reported with Mr. Smith's substitute. No. 1393, post, par. 45.

6 App., No. 1431. For criticism of the district system, see post, par. 51.

45. ELECTION OF PRESIDENT BY A DIRECT VOTE BY STATES.

In the Continental Congress and its successor, the Congress of the Confederation, all officers had been chosen by a vote by States. A similar principle was recognized in the Constitution, which provided in the electoral system that each State should have two votes, corresponding to the number of Senators, besides one for each Representative in Congress; and in case of no choice by the electors, the election should devolve upon the House of Representatives, the vote being taken by States, "the representation from each State having one vote."1 Thirty-five propositions retaining this federative principle of the Constitution proposed that the President and Vice-President should be elected by a direct vote of the qualifiéd voters, given by States. While doing away with the electoral colleges, the electoral ratio or votes of the States were to be retained. Such propositions were brought forward at two different periods, the first between the years 1826 and 1848, the second since 1875. In their general characteristics they fall naturally into two groups, corresponding very nearly to the periods just mentioned; the one providing that the persons receiving the greatest number of votes in a State should be declared to have received the entire vote of the State; the other that the Presidential vote of each State should be divided among the candidates in proportion to the popular vote received by them in the State.

2

The earliest of the resolutions of the first group was presented by Mr. Haynes of Georgia, in 1826.3 Eleven similar resolutions were proposed at different times within the next twenty years, the greater number, indeed, within the next ten.* Three of these resolutions, from the general assembly of Georgia and the legislatures of Alabama and Missouri, are interesting as showing with what jealous care the sovereignty and equality of the State was guarded. The general assembly of Georgia declared their concurrence with the legislature of Missouri in the proposal to amend the Constitution so as to

6

1 Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1, cls. 2 and 3, as originally adopted, retained in article XII of the amendments.

2 A number of votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the State was entitled in Congress.

3 App., No. 559.

4 App., Nos. 560, 583, 594a, 600, 609, 641, 661, 663, 683, 735, 741.

5 App., Nos. 583, 600.

Ante, par. 42, App., No. 601a.

provide a uniform mode of electing President and Vice-President by the direct vote of the people, "provided such alterations can be so made that the sovereignty of the States be not invaded and the weight of the States and the present basis of representation be retained according to existing conditions of the Constitution." The Alabama and Missouri resolutions were very similar.2

1

The only essential difference between the amendments of this group was the provision for the method to be employed for the choice of President in case no one received a majority of the vote of all the States.3

This amendment, so frequently urged at this time, was not again presented until 1878, when it was revived by Mr. Sampson of Iowa. The same proposition has been introduced once since, in 1886.5

The amendments of the second group, providing for the division of the electoral or Presidential vote of the State, were for the most part introduced since 1875. They were preceded by two isolated propositions which foreshadowed the terms of the amendment of the later period. The first of these was presented by Mr. Lawrence of New York, in 1848.6 His plan proposed that the number of votes given to each person shall be estimated as such a proportion of the vote of the State" as the said vote shall bear to the whole number of votes given within the State for President. "Any person receiving a majority of all the votes so estimated, given in all the States for President, shall be President." By this method it is seen that the relative weight of each State is retained, and yet provision is made that the minority vote given in each State shall be counted. To Mr. Lawrence should be given the credit of having been the first to suggest in Congress a system of proportional voting.

Similar resolutions were introduced in the legislature of Maryland, Niles' Register, XXXVII, 428. The legislature of Vermont nonconcurred with the Georgia resolution, Am. An. Reg., VI, 322. The Georgia resolutions further declared it desirable to amend so that in no case shall the election devolve upon the House of Representatives if provision is made for securing to the States an equal vote in such decisions in the last resort. App., No. 600

2 App., Nos. 583, 594a. The legislatures of Connecticut and Vermont disapproved of the Missouri amendment. Massachusetts Archives, Nos. 9919, 9019.

3 Post, par. 50, especially Mr. McComas s amendment, No. 661.

4 App., No. 1467, in case of a tie in a State the vote to be equally divided.

App., No. 1672.

App., No. 754.

Which was to be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of said State in Congress.

Over twenty years later Mr. Ashley of Ohio, who was very zealous in his attempts to secure a new method of electing the President,' renewed the suggestion of a proportional division of the vote of each State among the different parties, but, curiously enough, his plan retained the colleges of electors. With the renewal of the discussion of the desirability of changing the method of electing the President in 1874-75, the first of twenty resolutions suggesting anew the adoption of a system of a proportional division of the electoral vote of a State among the various candidates was presented.3 It was introduced by Mr. Smith of New York as substitute for the amendment reported by the House Committee on Elections, which proposed the district system. Mr. Smith's substitute was designed to meet the objection urged against a popular vote regardless of State lines, for it still proposed to leave to the States their weight of influence by an ingenious but complicated system of computing the votes. This plan, Mr. Smith said in proposing it, he framed "for the purpose of obviating the danger and difficulty of a large accumulation of contestedelection cases in the electoral districts proposed by the plan of the Committee on Elections, and to prevent the gerrymandering of States by partisan majorities in the construction of election districts, and to dispense with the cumbersome machinery of electoral districts, while preserving the autonomy of the States in the election of President and Vice-President." The next resolutions were suggested by the contested election of 1876. They were presented by Messrs. Maish, Springer,

1 For other methods proposed by him, see ante, par. 42. From the variety of proposi tions he introduced he was known as "the suggesting member."

*The voters were to vote by ballot for President and Vice-President. Then the legialature of each State was to divide the total number of votes cast by the number of Senators and Representatives to which such State was entitled in Congress, and the product shall be the ratio of one elector. The legislature was then to appoint the electors, “taking care to secure to each candidate voted for in the State an equitable representation in the electoral college, as indicated by the number of votes returned for each candidate." The electors thus appointed were to vote for one of the candidates named for President and Vice-President, respectively, by the voters at the general election. App. No. 1283f. 3 App., Nos. 1386, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1441, 1475, 1493, 1503, 1508, 1537, 1538, 1542, 1569, 1589, 1624, 1639, 1640, 1697, 1705, 1735. It was generally supposed to be an entirely new plan. 4 Ante, par. 44. App., No. 1386.

5 It required that the aggregate vote for President in each State shall be divided by the number of Representatives apportioned to such State in the House of Representatives and twice the result or quotient shall be added to the vote of the candidate having the highest number of the popular vote in such State for President as, and for the State vote for, such candidate. The person having the highest number of votes in all the States, including the popular vote and the State vote, shall be President.

Cong. Record, Forty-third Congress, second session, pp. 748-749.