per cent). As compared with 1895, the year 1907 showed an increase in waste and forest land and a slight decrease in cultivated land. In 1907, about 28 per cent of the population were supported by agriculture, as compared with about 35 per cent in 1895.

For some of the principal crops, the area, in thousands of hectares, and the yield, in metric tons, are reported as follows:

Wheat Rye Barley Oats

Metric tons

1918 4,655,956

1914 3,971,995

1000 hectares 1912 1913 1914 1,925 1,974 1,996 .6,268 6,414 6,299 12,222,394 10,426,718 .1,590 1,654 1,582 3,673,254 3,137,983 .4,387 4,438 4,388 9,713,965 9,038,185

Potatoes ..3,342 3,412 3,386 54,121,146 45,569,559

On account of the war, figures for the 1915 crops are not available. In 1913, about 533,000 hectares were planted to sugar beets, yielding 16,939,979 metric tons; in 1914, 569,082 hectares, 16,918,782 metric tons. The output of raw sugar in 1913 was 2,706,327 metric tons; in 1914, 2,617,938 (provisional figure). In 1913 and 1914 respectively, 27,048 and 27,685 hectares were under hops; yield, 106,179 and 232,366 metric quintals. The average yield of hops in 1905-14 was 192,307 quintals. The area under vines is gradually declining, from 119,873 hectares in 1904 to 105,876 in 1913, and 102,855 in 1914; the yield varies greatly, having been 7.5 hectolitres per hectare in 1910, 26.6 in 1911, 18.6 in 1912, and 9.5 in 1913. The total yield of wine in the latter year was 1,004,947 hectolitres. The average yield in 1905-9 was 2,628,034 hectolitres.

Live stock has been enumerated as follows on December 1st, the figures for horses not including those used in the army and the 1914 figures being provisional:

87,233; iron ore, 27,200 and 28,608; zinc ore, 644 and 642; lead ore, 143 and 110; copper ore, 974 and 948; rock salt, 1296 and 1392; potassium salts, 11,161 and 13,306. The output of pig iron in 1911 and 1912 is reported at 15,574,039 and 15,220,900 metric tons respectively; zinc, 243,784 and 313,600; lead, 161,450 and 165,000; copper, 37,455 and 45,500; tin, 12,426 and 10,600; sulphuric acid, 1,724,981 and 1,649,700. For 1913, the total output of pig iron was reported at 19,291,920 metric tons; for 1914, 14,389,547.

COMMERCE. The German customs territory includes the grand duchy of Luxemburg. On account of the war, commercial statistics for 1914 have not been published. For 1913 and preceding years, total foreign commerce, except goods in transit, is shown below, in millions of marks:

3,534,327

FISHERIES. Fishing in 1914 was interrupted by the war, and statistics for that year have not been issued. The value of the North Sea catch in 1912 and 1913 respectively was: fish, 21,241,700 marks and 21,857,200 marks; shellfish, 798,400 and 962,200; other marine animals, 6700 and 5700; salt herring and other fishery products, 8,937,800 and 11,786,100; total, 30,984,600 and 34,611,200. Value of the Baltic catch, including that of the bays (Stettiner Haff, etc.), in 1912 and 1913: fish, 10,554,500 marks and 10,341,100 marks; shellfish, 2900 and 6100; other animals regarded as marine (chiefly wild ducks), 24,700 and 31,000; total, 10,582,100 and 10,378,200. Total value of North Sea and Baltic catches in 1912 and 1913, 41, 566,700 and 44,989,400 marks.

MINERALS AND METALS. The output of the grand duchy of Luxemburg is included in the statistics of Germany. The value of the mineral output in 1912 is stated at 2369 million marks, as compared with 2086 million in 1911, and 2009 million in 1910. The production of the principal minerals in 1912 and 1913 are reported as follows, in thousands of metric tons: coal, 174,875 and 190,109; lignite, 80,935 and

For 1912 and 1913 respectively, the values in millions of marks, of the principal imports of merchandise for consumption, were as follows: cereals, 1130.5 and 1037.0; hides and skins, 575.5 and 672.4; cotton, 623.6 and 664.1; wool, 527.0 and 511.7; chemicals and drugs, 395.4 and 421.8; copper, 320.0 and 346.7; timber, lumber, etc., 355.5 and 325.5; live animals, 252.9 and 291.6; coal, 275.7 and 280.6; iron. 213.3 and 238.3; copra, coconuts, etc., 195.3 and 225.9; coffee, 252.7 and 219.7; silk, 229.9 and 193.3; eggs, 187.5 and 188.2; fruits, 126.0 and 148.8; rubber and gutta-percha, 184.2 and 146.1; fish, 126.5 and 135.9; leaf tobacco, 135.6 and 134.3; wheaten products, 186.8 and 130.3; linseed, 104.8 and 129.7; animal fats, 111.2 and 118.9; butter, 126.3 and 118.7; oilcake, 116.5

and 118.6; cotton yarn, 104.0 and 116.2; flax and hemp, 120.4 and 114.4; woolen yarn, 107.6 and 108.0; rice, 102.6 and 103.9; southern fruits, 94.2 and 101.2; tin, 107.2 and 101.1; jute, 74.7 and 94.0; iron manufactures, 97.9 and 93.7; meats, 84.8 and 81.4; machinery 77.1 and 80.4.

For 1912 and 1913 respectively, the values, in millions of marks, of the principal exports of domestic produce were as follows: iron manufactures, 1185.8 and 1337.6; coal, 611.9 and 722.6; machinery, 630.3 and 680.3; chemicals and drugs, 546.4 and 658.0; cotton goods, 421.6 and 446.5; cereals, 341.6 and 278.2; paints, dyes, colors, etc., 278.2 and 298.1; electrical apparatus, 239.7 and 290.3; woolen goods, 253.4 and 270.9; sugar, 132.2 and 266.6; paper, 232.2 and 262.8; leather, 230.1 and 242.9; copper manufactures, 184.7 and 240.7; silk goods, 205.2 and 219.5; furs, etc., 182.2 and 193.8; hides and skins, 182.3 and 178.4; ships, 155.9 and 175.2; woolen yarn, 84.2 and 166.3; glass and glassware, 119.5 and 146.1; apparel, 118.3 and 132.0; rubber manufactures, 120.5 and 128.3; leather manufactures, 98.1 and 114.2; pottery, 102.0 and 112.8.

The value of imports of merchandise for consumption and of exports of domestic produce by countries in 1912 and 1913 was as follows, in millions of marks:

Of the foreign shipping entered in 1913, British vessels numbered 5285, of 6,178,714 tons; Swedish, 5931, of 2,172,577 tons; Danish, 8101, of 1,703,232 tons; Norwegian, 2184, of 1,356,681 tons; Dutch, 3635, of 1,022,585 tons; Finnish, 512, of 207,215 tons; Russian, 517, of 197,031 tons.

Of the total in 1913 there were entered at Hamburg 14,054 vessels, of 13,141,362 tons; at Bremerhaven, 1803, of 2,298,689 tons; at Bremen, 3310, of 1,928,950 tons; at Stettin, 4900, of 1,893,434 tons; at Rostock (Warnemünde), 3423, of 1,409,908 tons; at Cuxhaven, 1777, of 1,305,900 tons; at Sassnitz, 3277, of 1,235,117 tons; at Lübeck, 4047, of 958,239 tons; at Neufahrwassar (Danzig), 2811, of 781,498 tons; at Emden, 1870, of 779,031 tons.

The table below shows the number of vessels, with their registered net tonnage, comprising Germany's merchant marine Jan. 1, 1914 (excluded are steamers of less than 15 tons and sail of less than 22 tons):

Tons 1,640,828

Bremen

810,275

Prussia

Netherlands

693.5

Lübeck

Mecklenburg.

Australia

276.7 296.1

Schwerin

Recapitulation:

North Sea

Baltic Sea

1912

1901

46.9 60.5 122.7

Besides the normal-gauge railway shown in the foregoing table, there were in operation on March 31, 1913, 2218.5 kilometers of narrowgauge railway, of which 1075.3 kilometers were state railway and 1143.2 kilometers private.

The railway service in Germany during 1915, and in the previous year, was handled under military conditions. The German government maintained a complete military organization of its railway lines, and construction was primarily for strategic purposes and military operations. From the time that war was declared on Aug. 2, 1914, the mobilization of the troops was effected rapidly by railway service which included not only the actual moving of military units, but also bringing men to their homes or appointed places, while at the same time a large number of tourists were transported to frontiers or elsewhere.

The early movements of the railway lines included the elimination of loading and unloading freight cars that were not needed for the transport of military material. The operation of troop trains began a few hours after the actual mobilization under the direction of the chief of the military railway organization and his staff, under whom all railways became immediately subject, as he was empowered to issue all orders for regulating the war traffic, and had at his disposal the railway sections of the great railway staff in Berlin. Germany's railway systems were soon augmented by the railways in the conquered territory, which had to be repaired in case of damage to track, and put in working order and connected with the German lines. The organization of the railway traffic in the conquered district was on a basis similar to the railway administration in Germany. Two military railway administrations were formed for this purpose. One of these had its headquarters at Aachen previous to proceed. ing to Belgium, and straightway the lines of the conquered district were repaired so rapidly that German rolling stock could be sent even as far as Louvain, filled with troops, and empty trains returned, even under fire. The second military administration was set up on Aug. 20, 1914, at Ulflingen, and gradually pushed forward, while railway commandos were established in Luxemburg, and in the East, at Lodz, to take care of the conquered districts of Russian Poland.

As was natural, the construction operations of the German railway troops consisted during the first months of the war in replacing tracks and restoring damaged railway buildings and other plants, or laying new lines where they were required by the military authorities. The nature of the operations required the construction of small field railways to bring up ammunition and provisions to the particular places where German troops were located, and these lines became increasingly important with the development of French fighting. Many of the bridges which were destroyed, and which had been temporarily repaired, were replaced by permanent structures, various tunnels were restored, and a large number of lines opened to traffic, this requiring in many cases the construction of stations and increased station facilities.

The German official report gave the following statistics for the operation of German military lines in Belgium and France for the month of April, 1915, the figures being approximate:

As a result of the war and the military operation of the railways, the usual train service in Germany was considerably reduced. The timetable itself showed a high percentage of trains withdrawn. The reduced service for the most part, however, carried on by employees over military age was very satisfactory and well organized. In many ticket offices women were employed, and the usual dining and sleeping cars were operated on the more important express trains between large cities. All the German railways were being worked on one single system, which was extended to the whole of Belgium under German occupation, as well as to the occupied portions of France and of Russian Poland. Direct express trains, with sleeping and dining cars, were run from Berlin to Metz-Charleville-Mezières, and also to Brussels and Lille, so that a civilian with proper official papers could travel to the occupied territory to the west to places as far as Noyon, Laon, and Chauny, just as he could travel eastward to Lodz.

The German military authorities, only 11 days after the capture of Warsaw, put on a Lille-Warsaw express train connecting the two extremes of occupied enemy territory, some 800 miles apart. This train left Lille at 6.40 A.M., Brussels at 8.30, Berlin at midnight, and arrived in Warsaw in time for luncheon the next afternoon. Late in the year the German railway administration issued the new time-tables for the BerlinMunich-Constantinople trains. These were not to go through Belgrade, as the bridge over the Save and the Ripanj tunnel were still unusable, but were to follow the route Berlin-MunichBudapest-Temesvár-Verschez, crossing the Danube at Semendria, and reaching Nish by a secondary line. Thence they would proceed to the Turkish capital.

The Imperial administration of ports and telegraphs embraces all the German states except Bavaria and Württemberg; these kingdoms operate, under certain limitations, their own postal and telegraph systems. In addition to the state telegraph lines, there are railway telegraph lines and some private lines. The following table relates to the year 1913 (the figures for the empire do not include those for Bavaria and Württemberg): A number of post offices; B state telegraph offices; C railway and private telegraph offices; D total telegraph offices; E length in kilometers of state telegraph lines; F length of state telegraph wire; G number of places (towns, etc.) having telephonic communication:

The larger ordinary expenditures in 1912 and 1913 respectively were: military administration, 684,182,900 and 747,047,100 marks; Imperial posts and telegraphs, 675,861,300 and 713,458,800 (revenue from Imperial posts and telegraphs, 792,870,500 and 833,314,600); debt, 225,471,200 and 239,391,300; naval administration, 183,676,900 and 204,426,300; pensions, 143,834,000 and 146,336,900; railway administration, 104,406,200 and 111,938,300 (revenue from railway administration, 155,105,000 and 153,580,200); general administration of finance, 97,031,500 and 107,473,400 (revenue from general administration of finance, which includes customs, stamps, etc., 1,792,751,000 and 2,095,196,200); interior department, 90,750,700 and 96, 805,400.

The annual ordinary expenditures of the constituent states amount to a sum far larger than the Imperial expenditures; the latter are exceeded by those of Prussia alone.

The Imperial debt, as reported for Oct. 1, 1913, was 5,177,225,300 marks, of which the interest-bearing debt was 4,897,225,300 marks; the non-interest-bearing debt consisted of treasury bonds 160,000,000 marks and paper money 120,000,000 marks. The interest-bearing debt plus outstanding paper money has stood as follows (March 31st): 1880, 377,526,600 marks; 1890, 1,240,908,800; 1900, 2,418,517,700; 1905, 3,323,500,000; 1910, 5,013,500,000; 1912, 5,014,012,900; 1913, 4,925,796,200.

The interest-bearing debt of Prussia in 1913 was 9,901,769,100 marks; Bavaria, 2,285,976,100; Saxony, 861,109,900; Württemberg, 621, 377,000; Baden, 586,355,500; Hesse, 434,632,400; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 144,574,400; Saxe-Weimar, 2,222,600; Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 2,680,200; Oldenburg, 82,689,800; Brunswick, 43,763,800; Saxe-Meiningen, 7,287,800; Saxe-Altenburg, 882,700; Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 6,004,600; Anhalt, 5,329,300; Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, 1,672,200; Schwartzburg-Rudolstadt, 4,560,200; Waldeck,

Reuss

1,531,000; Reuss Elder Line, none; Younger Line, 1,040,600; Schaumburg-Lippe, 387,100; Lippe, 970,600; Lübeck (city and state), 74,906,300; Bremen (city and state), 299,766,400; Hamburg (city and state), 780,581,000; Alsace-Lorraine, 44,546,600.

ARMY. See MILITARY PROGRESS, passim.
NAVY. Authentic information is not avail-

able in regard to naval construction since the beginning of the war in 1914. The following summary is taken from a statement of the Office of Naval Intelligence at Washington and relates to July 1, 1914. Number and displacements of warships of 1500 or more tons, and of torpedo craft of 50 or more tons, built and building: Dreadnoughts (battleships having a main battery of all big guns, that is, 11 or more inches in calibre): built, 13, of 285,770 tons displacement; building, none. Coast-defense vessels, 2, of 8168 tons; building, none. Battle cruisers (armored cruisers having guns of largest calibre in main battery and capable of taking a place in line of battle with the battleships): built, 4, of 88,749 tons; building, 4, of 112,000 tons. Armored cruisers: built, 9, of 94,245 tons; building, none. Cruisers: built, 41, of 150,747 tons; building, 5, of 26,900 tons. Torpedo-boat destroyers: built, 130, of 67,094 tons; building, 24, of 14,400 tons. Torpedo boats, none built or building. Submarines: built, 27, of 14,140 tons; building, 18, of 14,400 tons. Total tonnage: built, 951,713; building, 354,864. Excluded from the foregoing: ships over 20 years old from date of launch, unless reconstructed and rearmed within five years; torpedo-boat destroyers over 15 years old; vessels not actually begun or ordered, although authorized; transports, colliers, repair ships, torpedo-depot ships, and other auxiliaries. After the outbreak of the war, the battle cruiser Goeben (22,640 tons) and the cruiser Breslau (4550 tons) were reported as sold to Turkey.

In the summer of 1914, the active personnel of the navy was reported at 79,197, including 2 admirals of the fleet, 6 admirals, 12 viceadmirals, 22 rear-admirals, 154 captains and commanders, 2220 other line officers, 340 medical officers, 276 pay officers, 162 naval constructors, 30 chaplains, 3183 warrant officers, 65,797 enlisted men, 177 marine officers, and 5791 marines. See also NAVAL PROGRESS.

GOVERNMENT. The empire is a federal state. Its constitution bears date of May 4, 1871, and was amended March 19, 1888. This instrument vests the executive authority in the King of Prussia as German Emperor; he is authorized to conclude treaties, to declare war (if defensive) and peace, and to appoint and receive diplomatic representatives. In 1915, the Emperor was William II, who was born Jan. 27, 1859, and succeeded his father (the Emperor Frederick III) June 15, 1888. The heir-apparent or Crown Prince is Prince Frederick William, born May 6, 1882.

The legislature consists of the Bundesrat, a federal Council (61 members appointed for each session of the governments of the several states), and the Reichstag (397 members elected for five years by direct manhood suffrage).

The Imperial ministers, or secretaries of state, do not form a ministry proper, but act independently of each other under the general supervision of the Imperial Chancellor. The Chancellor, who is the highest official of the empire

and president of the Bundesrat, is appointed by the Emperor without reference to the political majority in the Reichstag, and to the Emperor he is directly responsible. The Imperial Chancellor (and Prussian Prime Minister) in 1915 was Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (from July 14, 1909). Imperial secretaries of state in 1915: foreign affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow (he succeeded Alfred Kiderlin-Waechter, who died Dec. 30, 1912); interior, Klemens Delbrück (from July 14, 1909); marine, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (from June 15, 1897); justice, Hermann Lisco (from Nov. 1, 1909); treasury, Karl Helfferich; posts and telegraphs, Reinhold Kraetke (from 1901); colonies, Wilhelm Solf (from Dec. 20, 1911).

HISTORY

THE FOOD SUPPLY. Considering that the ultimate issue of the war must depend in part at least upon the ability of the British navy to "starve Germany out" by cutting off the food supplies which had formerly been imported from abroad, vital importance attaches to the measures which the German government instituted for the conservation of the food supply in Germany. Soon after the outbreak of war maximum prices had been fixed for some commodities, like cereals and potatoes; but still the prices of food continued to rise, and the drastic action of the government was obviously demanded to correct two glaring abuses-the extravagance of consumers and the manipulation of the market by speculators which manifestly aggravated the misery of the poorest classes and caused widespread discontent. In January, therefore, the government decided to lay its hands upon the food supply, to stop speculation, and to regulate consumption. To this effect ordinances were published in the Reichsanzeiger of January 25th, providing that all supplies of wheat or rye, pure or mixed, threshed or not, were to be confiscated and taken over from private individuals by the War Grain Association; at the same time all supplies of flour were to be taken charge of by the Communal Association in each town. In compensation, private owners would be paid the average price which prevailed between Jan. 1-15, 1915, except in cases where a maximum price had been fixed by the government. Dealers and trade mills would be permitted to handle half the amount of flour per month that they had sold from January 1-15. Bakers and confectioners were limited to threefourths the amount they had been accustomed to use. The consumption of cereals was to be regulated under the general supervision of an Imperial Distributing Bureau, composed of 16 delegates to the Bundesrat, in addition to one representative of the German Agricultural Council, one representative of the German Commercial Congress, and one representative of the German Municipal Congress. While the Distributing Bureau in coöperation with the War Grain Association controlled the general distribution of the grain and flour supply, local consumption was to be regulated by Communal Associations, which would have the power to distribute flour to bakers, confectioners, and retailers, to determine the composition of bread, to prohibit the baking of cakes, to regulate the delivery of bread and flour by dealers, subject to the general principles of, and limited by the maxima

established by, the Distributing Bureau. The ordinance also contained a clause that foreign grain, if imported, could be sold only to the War Grain Association or to the Central Purchasing Association, or to the Communal Associations; but this provision was rescinded on February 6th. On the same day that the confiscation of grain and flour was decreed, January 25th, an order was issued obliging towns of over 5000 inhabitants to acquire and maintain a supply of preserved meat adequate to suffice for the needs of the population in case of emergency. In February, a further step was taken for the regulation of the bread supply. Each individual was given a "bread card" with coupons calling for 25, 50, and 100 grams of bread, enough amply to supply his or her needs for the week, but not to permit the purchase of a large supply for future use. The cards were to be presented and the appropriate number of coupons clipped, before bread could be purchased at restaurants, bakeries, or grocery stores. In this manner, by enforcing the strictest economy, the German government hoped to minimize the hardship occasioned by the shortage of food until the next harvest. It was anticipated that as time progressed, in case of a long-drawn-out war, the situation would become more instead of less favorable. Potatoes could be much more extensively cultivated and used to feed live stock as well as to supply the table. Grain hitherto used for the manufacture of starch or of alcohol could be saved for food. A yeast-process was invented that would help supply albuminous fodder. Instead of producing a surplus of rye and of beet sugar, Germany could raise more wheat and more beans and peas. Moreover, there were at least 33,000,000 acres of moorland which could be converted into valuable grainfields if men could be found to perform the labor and if sufficient quantities of fertilizer could be applied; and what with the invention of new fertilizers and the increasing number of prisoners of war (at the beginning of January there were 586,000 prisoners of war in Germany; in March, 810,000; at the end of July, 1,900,000), it began to appear that neither the fertilizers nor the labor would be lacking. See also FOOD AND NUTRITION.

EFFECT OF THE FOOD REGULATIONS. By the beginning of June, the effect of the regulation of the bread-supply had become apparent. On June 5th the Prussian minister of the interior announced that the bread problem was practically solved. There would even be a surplus of grain to carry over into the next harvest year, so that no anxiety need be felt if the coming harvest should not be extraordinarily plentiful. Moreover, and this was a most important result of Germany's military successes, grain and potatoes had been planted in large quantities in conquered territory, so as to relieve the pressure upon German agriculture. In August it was calculated that, thanks to the bread cards, and thanks to the increased supply of grain from conquered territory, the next year it would be possible to allow a very generous increase in the individual consumption of wheat and rye flour. Meantime, as the bread question became less pressing, the shortage of meat began to cause the gravest anxiety. In Berlin, May 29th, hotels were ordered to abolish table-d'hôte dinners, to encourage the use of more vegetables and less meat, to substitute boiled meat for roast meat