891,164 tons. Japanese shipping in the foreign trade receives government subsidy. Merchant marine, Jan. 1, 1914: vessels of European construction, 2072 steamers, of 1,528,264 tons, and 7343 sail, 571,872 tons; sailing craft of Japanese construction, 20,635.

COMMUNICATIONS. The reported length of railway (including the railway of Korea and Formosa) in operation March 31, 1913, was 10,986 kilometers, of which 7837 kilometers state and 3149 kilometers private. Electric tramway, 1098 kilometers.

The final plans for the construction of the government railway line from Tokyo to Koté, cutting off the haul over the Hakone Mountains by boring a tunnel through the mountains near Atomi, were adopted during 1914. It was proposed to use electric power for hauling through the tunnel. During the year 1914 the Imperial Japanese government opened 175 miles of new sections of railway. The 1914 extension included 25 miles on the Tokushima line, 23 on the Sakata line, and 20 miles each on the Murakami and Gwanyetsu lines. The new central station in Tokyo was completed in 1914, and a government electric railway was opened between Tokyo and Yokohama. This parallels the existing steam track and is 19 miles in length, with 14 intermediate stations. Soon after this railway was opened in 1914, for a few days at the end of the year, it was necessary to discontinue the service, as trouble developed with the overhead equipment.

A general plan of railway construction was adopted in 1915. This contemplated the completion of the railway system for the country within 10 years, and the addition of 1219 miles to the mileage already operated. During the fiscal year new lines of 79 miles were to be completed and opened to traffic. Within the succeeding six years 238 miles were to be completed. Lack of capital prevented the announcement of a programme for the remaining construction. All the light railway lines, with a total length of 331 miles, were to be postponed until the year 1916-17, or later.

Telegraphs (1913), 4478 offices, with 40,379 kilometers of line and 179,295 kilometers of wire. Radiotelegraphic stations, 31, and stations on board ship, 20. Post offices (1914), 7983.

FINANCE. The standard of value is gold; the monetary unit is the yen, having a par value of 49.846 cents. In 1911-12, revenue and expenditure amounted to 657,192,221 and 585,374,613 yen, respectively; in 1912-13, 687,392,484 and 593,596,445. For 1914-15, revenue was estimated at 654,282,173 yen, and expenditure at 559,759,598 yen; for 1915-16, estimated revenue and expenditure balanced at 556,396,000 yen. In the 1914-15 budget, ordinary revenue was placed at 534,065,202 yen, and extraordinary at 120,216,971; ordinary expenditure, 414,682,071, and extraordinary, 145,077,527. The larger items of estimated ordinary revenue for 1914-15 were: public undertakings and state property, 133,671,011 yen; liquor tax, 91,030,740; land tax, 75,120,976; posts and telegraphs, 60,824,265; customs, 57,863,480; monopolies, 54,151,634; income tax, 31,296,279; stamps, 30,531,533; business tax, 26,433,398. The larger estimated disbursements for 1914-15 were, by departments: finance, 188,463,862 yen (including interest on the debt); army, 75,542,228; communications,

61,644,342; navy, 40,887,512. Public debt, March 31, 1913, 2,493,969,745 yen; March 31, 1914, 2,545,070,505, of which 1,054,633,854 internal and 1,490,436,651 foreign.

ARMY. In 1915 the army of Japan was making further progress towards organization established by the law of 1907, which contemplated an army of 1,637,000 trained men, of whom 742,000 were in the standing army, 780,000 in the reserve, and 115,000 in the last reserve. Each year 450,000 men reach military age, but the annual recruit list amounts to only 130,000, and the training commences December 1st. Every male subject between the ages of 17 and 40 is liable for service, and the recruit contingent is obtained by general conscription. In the army the length of service is two years for the infantry, and three years for the other branches, while in the navy it is four years. Service in the first line reserve is four years for the army, and three years for the navy; in the second line, ten years for the army, and five years for the navy. There are also first and second levies on the last reserves consisting of those who have passed out of the reserves and those who have been excused from service. commissioned officers are selected from privates who show the requisite capacity, while the officers come from military academies and from civil life, on a basis of family standing and competitive examination. Those failing to reach a certain grade by a certain age come to the inactive list, so that a young corps of officers is provided, while a corps of reserve officers is maintained.

Non

The army consists of 1 guard and 18 line divisions, the former being recruited from the whole country, while the 18 line divisions, of which the 9th and a special brigade are in Korea, and the 5th and a brigade for a railway guard are in Manchuria, come from districts, each district for recruiting and mobilization purposes furnishing a division. A division is composed of 2 infantry brigades, each brigade of 2 regiments of 3 battalions of 4 companies, and of a machine gun section with six guns each. A division has a cavalry regiment of 3 squadrons, 1 regiment of field artillery, and six 6-inch batteries, 1 three-company battalion of engineers, and 2 companies in the train. The guard, 1st, 8th, and 15th divisions possess about twice the cavalry and artillery strength of the others.

The total strength of the Japanese army in organization consists of 248 battalions of infantry, 89 squadrons of cavalry, 152 field batteries, 9 mountain batteries, 57 heavy artillery batteries, and 57 engineer companies, 12 railway companies, 6 telegraph companies, 1 aëro battalion, and 36 companies of train troops. On a war strength each division possesses 12,000 rifles, 450 sabres, 36 field pieces, and 24 machine guns. The arm of the infantry is the Arisaka rifle, model of 1905, calibre 65 mm.

The Budget Committee of the Japanese Diet approved during the year a measure providing for an addition of two divisions, about 24,000 men, to the Japanese army.

NAVY. The number and displacement of warships of 1500 or more tons, and of torpedo craft of 50 or more tons, built and building, on July 1, 1914, are reported as follows: Dreadnoughts: built, 2, of 41,600 tons; building, 4, of 122,400 tons. Predreadnoughts: built, 13; building, none. Coast defense vessels: built, 2, of 9086

tons; building, none. Battle cruisers: built, 2, of 55,000 tons; building, 2, of 55,000 tons. Armored cruisers: built, 13, of 138,483 tons; building, none. Cruisers built, 13, of 57,915 tons; building, none. Torpedo-boat destroyers: built, 50, of 20,487 tons; building, 2, of 1676 tons. Torpedo boats: built, 27, of 3017 tons; building, none. Submarines: built, 13, of 2672 tons; building, 2, of 1200 tons. Total tonnage built, 519,640; building, 180,276. Excluded from the foregoing are: ships over 20 years old from date of launch unless reconstructed and rearmed within five years; torpedo craft over 15 years old; transports, colliers, repair ships, torpedodepot ships, and other auxiliaries; vessels not actually begun or ordered, although authorized. On July 1, 1914, Japan was fifth among the nations in the amount of warship tonnage both built and building. See also NAVAL PROGRESS. GOVERNMENT. The executive authority is the Emperor, acting through a cabinet of ministers whom he appoints and who are responsible to him. The legislative power is vested in a parliament, or imperial diet, consisting of two chambers-a house of peers having 366 members, and a house of representatives having 379 members elected for four years. The Emperor is Yoshihito, born at Kioto, Aug. 31, 1879, and succeeded his father, Mutsuhito, July 30, 1912. The accession ceremony took place Nov. 10, 1915. Yoshihito married Princess Sadako, May 10, 1900. Heir apparent, Prince Hirohito, born April 29, 1901.

HISTORY

ELECTIONS. After the dissolution, Dec. 25, 1914, of the intractable House of Representatives, which had refused to ratify an increase of two divisions in the army, elections were called for March 25, 1915. Although there was evidence of a strong current of popular opinion against the bureaucratic methods and against the military proposals of the government, nevertheless the ministerial party was returned victorious with a majority of some 80 seats in the new House of Representatives. If the statements of disappointed opponents of the government may be accepted as trustworthy, the ministerial victory was due to the use of corruption (infra) and the unjustifiable exercise of governmental pressure upon the electorate, as well as to the fact that under the very restricted franchise, which excluded the poorer classes from the suffrage, popular opinion was not adequately or faithfully expressed.

VICTORY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. The most obvious result of the elections was the approval of the government's plans for national defense, which had been vetoed by the defunct House of Representatives but could now be adopted. The army increase was passed, June 1st, without serious opposition from the anti-militaristic minority, by a vote of 232 to 131. The chief feature of the military programme was the creation of two new army divisions for Korea. The regular naval appropriations were approved at the same time.

CRITICISM OF CHINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS. If the Opposition could not defeat the military proposals of the government, it could at least voice its disapproval of the manner in which the negotiations for special privileges in China were conducted (consult CHINA). In attacking Count Okuma's Chinese policy the anti-militarists of

the Opposition who considered Japan's demands quite unjustifiable could count also upon the support of the extreme chauvinists who complained that the Japanese government was allowing itself to be hoodwinked by the dilatory tactics of Chinese diplomacy. With characteristic political shrewdness, Count Okuma, by presenting an ultimatum to the Chinese government, May 7th, forced China to accept most of the Japanese demands, May 9th, about a week before the Japanese Diet was convened, so that the Diet could have no opportunity of interfering with the negotiations, but only the thankless task of criticising a fait accompli. The newly elected House of Representatives met for the first time on May 17th, and elected as its president, Saburo Shimada, who, by the way, was a conspicuous opponent of a large Japanese navy, on the ground that Japanese naval aggrandizement might antagonize the United States. The Diet was formally opened by the Emperor, May 20th. Before passing to the consideration of the Chinese question, the Diet briefly discussed the California land question. Baron Kato, minister of foreign affairs, explained that the Government of the United States was cordially disposed towards Japan, and that the Japanese government expected an amicable settlement of the California land dispute. The California question having been debated, and the military programme approved (supra), the Diet proceeded with the criticism of Count Okuma's dealings with China. On June 2nd an Opposition speaker introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives voicing the opinion that the attempt of Japan to gain a privileged position in China had been a complete fiasco. Instead of working to establish a firm foundation for peace in the Orient, the Japanese government had caused bitterness between China and Japan and had aroused the suspicions of foreign powers. Furthermore, the concessions granted by China (see CHINA) were likely to furnish occasion for future complications, instead of forming the basis of friendly relationships. The debate on the resolution gave rise to a heated altercation on the floor of the House. Deputies K. Hara, M. Inukai, and H. Ogawa violently denounced the government. Among the most interesting statements was the assertion made by antagonists of the government that Group V, containing the most important demands on China, had been dropped by Japan as a result of diplomatic intervention by the Powers. Baron Kato, the foreign minister, repudiated the insinuation, and declared that Japan had modified her demands as a proof of her conciliatory and pacific intentions. After two days' excited debate, the Chamber rejected the condemnatory resolution, June 3rd.

THE CABINET CRISIS. Unable to defeat the government on the question of the Chinese negotiations, the Opposition resorted to an attack upon the honor of the cabinet. On June 5th the Opposition proposed a resolution expressing lack of confidence in Viscount Kanetake Oura, minister of the interior, on the ground that he had given bribes in an effort to purchase votes in favor of the Army Bill. Again, on June 7th, the Opposition introduced a resolution declaring lack of confidence in the entire cabinet on the ground that the ministry had interfered in the last election. Viscount Oura denied the charge that he had attempted to corrupt members of

the Diet, but following an investigation made by the ministry of justice, he suddenly resigned his portfolio of the interior. Viscount Oura's sudden resignation, coupled with the arrest of K. Hayashida, chief secretary of the House, who admitted having received bribes for distribution to Opposition members, caused a tremendous sensation and an outburst of popular indignation against the government. Count Okuma, assuming responsibility for the actions of his subordinates in the cabinet, tendered the resignation of the ministry on July 30th. While the Opposition demanded the installation of ex-Premier Saionji as the head of a new cabinet, and other adversaries of Count Okuma proposed Baron Goto for the position, the Elder Statesmen advised the Emperor, and Tokyo business-men seconded the advice, that Count Okuma be retained as premier. The Emperor therefore requested Count Okuma to reconsider his resignation, and on August 8th the latter reconstructed his cabinet as follows: Premier and minister of foreign affairs, Count Shigenobu Okuma; minister of finance, Tokitoshi Taketomi; minister of marine, Vice-Admiral Tomasaburo Kato; minister of war, Lieut.-Gen. Ichinosuke Oka; minister of justice, Yukio Ozaki; minister of communications, Katsundo Minoura; minister of commerce and agriculture, Hironaka Kono; minister of education, S. Takata; minister of interior, Kitokura Ichiki. Four days later Baron Kikujiro Ishii, ambassador to France, accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs in the new Okuma cabinet. It is noticeable that the foreign minister and the finance minister, who had been most severely censured by the Diet, were eliminated from the reconstructed cabinet. Late in September a preliminary judicial investigation found K. Hayashida, the secretary of the House of Representatives, guilty of bribery in connection with the attempt to secure support for the Army Bill by corrupt methods. Seventeen members and former members of the House were likewise found guilty of corruption. The sums given to Secretary Hayashida by ex-Minister Oura and distributed as bribes amounted in all to about 40,000 yen ($20,000).

JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN WAR. Japan's activities throughout 1914 with regard to the European war had been mainly confined to the capture of Kiaochow and the imprisonment of German and Austrian soldiers and sailors. Early in January, 1915, a desire was manifested in the French press that Japan be asked to send troops to the western battle front. Prominent among those who advocated this action were M. Pichon and M. Clemenceau. The proposition was discountenanced in Great Britain on the ground that Kitchener would soon be able to send another British army to the Continent, and the Japanese would not be needed. Further more, Great Britain knew that Japan was likely to ask for financial assistance and freedom of action in China in return for her military aid, and British statesmen questioned whether the assistance which Japan might offer would be worth this price. Japan, however, had little thought of sending an army into France or Germany. Baron Kato, minister of foreign affairs, said late in January: "It is a question which should not be lightly discussed, as it has no direct bearing on either Japanese national existence or the peace of the Far East, and it further would seriously affect Japan's finances." Baron

Kato realized, however, that Japan would not be immune, if Germany were successful; therefore, he maintained that the country must be in readiness to send troops to Europe if it became necessary in order to ensure the success of the Allies. With the Chinese situation finally cleared up, Japan, in July, decided to offer aid to the Allies in the form of war munitions. Japanese forts in Manchuria were stripped of their great guns; boots, explosives, ammunition, and gun cases were manufactured in great quantities and shipped across Russia to the western front. New munitions factories were constructed in many parts of Japan, turning out great quantities of war supplies, for which France and Great Britain pledged payment. In August, the announcement was made that since the beginning of the war Japan had lost 1200 men in killed and wounded. Late in October, the Japanese government announced that, in accordance with a request which had been received ten days earlier, Japan had given her adhesion, October 19th, to the Pact of London, binding herself, as the other Entente Allies had already done, not to conclude a separate treaty of peace with the Central Powers.

For Japanese relations with the United States, consult UNITED STATES, Foreign Relations; for relations with China, consult CHINA.

JAPANESE POWDER. See ANTISEPTICS. JAVA. See DUTCH EAST INDIES. JEWISH AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL AID SOCIETY. See AGRICULTURAL CREDIT.

JEWS AND JUDAISM. It is still impossible to give reliable and up-to-date statistics of the world's Jewish population. The most recent and authoritative estimate, that of The American Jewish Year Book for 1915-16, reckons the total Jewish population of the world as 13,277,542, distributed as follows: Africa, 413,259; America, 2,500,054; Asia, 356,617; Australia, 19,415; and Europe, 9,988,197. By countries, the same estimate shows 55,000 Jews in the Argentine Republic; 17,287 in Australia; 2,258,262 in Austria-Hungary; 15,000 in Belgium; 37,656 in Bulgaria; 75,681 in Canada; 100,000 in France; 615,000 in Germany; 6127 in Greece; 43,929 in Italy; 269,015 in Rumania; 6,060,415 in the Russian Empire; 5729 in Serbia; 4000 in Spain; 19,023 in Switzerland; 188,900 in Turkey; 245,000 in the United Kingdom; and 2,349,754 in the United States. Most of these figures, however, fall considerably below the actual present populations in the respective countries. For instance, Russia at the close of 1915 is estimated to have had approximately 7,000,000 Jewish inhabitants; the United States, 3,000,000; Galicia, 1,000,000; and Serbia, 6500. the war, by creating a large "floating" Jewish population in the various war-zones, practically nullifies the most careful estimates. Likewise, ante-bellum estimates for the non-belligerent countries having an appreciable immigration in normal times are apt to run too high just to the extent that they are reckoned upon the regular tide of immigration which the war checked.

But

has

GENERAL EVENTS. With close to three-quarters of a million Jews under arms and more than three-fourths of the world's Jewish population living in the war zone, all accounts of Jewish life and progress during 1915 must still be written in terms of the great world-conflict.