neutral countries. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Great Britain began detaining American ships bound for neutral ports on the ground that their cargoes were destined for the enemy. For some months the United States government did not protest, hoping that Great Britain would modify her policy. Finally on Dec. 26, 1914, the United States addressed a communication to Great Britain calling attention to the interference by the latter with American commerce with neutral nations, on the ground that goods so consigned might reach the enemies of Great Britain. In this connection the note stated that "mere suspicion was not evidence, and doubts should be resolved in favor of neutral commerce, not against it." To this note Great Britain replied on Jan. 7, 1915, that that country had not aimed to interfere with the "bona-fide" trade of the United States with neutral countries, but figures were given showing the marked increase in exports of such articles as rubber and copper from the United States to neutral countries contiguous to Germany. It was stated that with such figures the presumption was very strong that such goods were ultimately destined for a belligerent country. The note further stated that Great Britain was prepared to admit that foodstuffs should not be seized without the presumption that they were intended for the armed forces of the enemy. In regard to the placing of cotton on the list of contraband it was stated that the British government had not contemplated any such action. In conclusion the British government agreed to make reparation for any injury improperly done to neutral shipping.

A novel question arose due to the action of the German government in placing under government control all of the food supply of the Empire. The British government declared that it would be impossible to distinguish between food intended for the civilian population of Germany and food to be used by the German military forces. In view of this situation the British government stated that foodstuffs intended for consumption in Germany would be considered contraband. A test case was made with the steamship Wilhelmina, which reached England Feb. 9, 1915, from the United States, loaded with grain for Germany. She was placed in the Prize Court, and on April 13, 1915, the British government announced that it had agreed to purchase the cargo of the Wilhelmina and to compensate the owner for loss. This offer was accepted.

For some months after the outbreak of the war Great Britain hesitated to declare a blockade of German ports. This attitude was due, in part at least, to the recognized difficulty of rendering such a blockade effective in view of the geographical position of Germany, and of the activities of submarines. But events forced Great Britain to abandon her somewhat anomalous position. On March 1, 1915, Mr. Asquith, in the House of Commons, stated that Great Britain and France, in retaliation upon Germany for her declaration of the "war zone" around the British Isles (see below under The United States and Germany), would confiscate all goods of "presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin." Such action, of course, could only be justified under the existing rules of international law on the presumption that a lawful blockade of German ports had been

declared. In answer to an inquiry from the American government as to whether such a blockade was contemplated, the British government stated that as an effective "cordon" controlling intercourse with Germany had been established and proclaimed, the importation and exportation of all goods to or from Germany was, under the accepted rules of blockade, prohibited. The British government further defined the "radius of activity" of the French and British fleets in enforcing the blockade as "European waters, including the Mediterranean.” It was further stated that they would refrain from exercising the right to confiscate ships and cargoes for breaches of the blockade, and restrict their claim to stopping cargoes destined to or coming from the enemy's territory.

In an extended communication addressed to the British government by Secretary Bryan on March 30, 1915, attention was called to the unusual character of the proposed blockade and the interference with legitimate neutral commerce which might readily result. The United States government was willing to concede that the changed conditions of naval warfare, especially the operations of submarines, might jus tify some modification of the old form of "close" blockade, but it was unwilling to concede the right of belligerents to blockade neutral ports. It was further pointed out that alleged illegal acts of Germany could not be offered as an excuse for unlawful acts on the part of Great Britain. In conclusion it was stated that the German Baltic ports were open to the trade of the Scandinavian countries, although it is an essential element of blockade that it bear with equal severity upon all neutrals.

For some months the question was allowed to remain in abeyance, due to more serious questions which had arisen in connection with Germany's submarine warfare (see below, The United States and Germany). It was clear, however, that irritation at the continued interference by Great Britain with American commerce was constantly increasing. On Aug. 3, 1915, the State Department at Washington published five diplomatic communications which had been exchanged between the two governments relating to the detention of American ships and cargoes. In response to the American note of March 30, 1915, on the subject of the restrictions imposed on American commerce by the British Orders in Council, Sir Edward Grey defended the Orders on the ground that it was necessary for Great Britain and her allies to take every step in their power to overcome their common enemy in view of the shocking violation of the recognized rules and principles of civilized warfare of which she had been guilty during the war. He further denied that the Orders in Counci violated any fundamental principle of international law by applying a blockade in such a way as to cut off the enemy's commerce through neutral ports, "if the circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective." It was contended that the only question that can arise in regard to the new character of blockade is whether the measures taken conform to "the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war," as stated in the American note of March 30, 1915. Sir Edward Grey contended that there was precedent for the British policy in the position taken by the United States dur

government felt justified in using all means within its power to retaliate on England. Com plaint was made of the large quantities of munitions of war which were being sent to Great Britain, and it was stated that Germany intended to suppress such traffic "with all means at its disposal." Finally it was suggested that, in order to avoid mistakes, all American vessels carrying non-contraband through the war zone should travel under convoy.

In order to avoid, if possible, the very serious consequences of the proposed German naval policy, the Government of the United States addressed an identical note to Great Britain and Germany suggesting an agreement between these two powers respecting the conduct of naval warfare. The memorandum contained the following suggestions: (1) That neither power would sow floating mines on the high seas or in territorial waters, and that anchored mines should be placed only in cannon range of harbors for defensive purposes, and that all mines should bear the stamp of the government planting them, and be so constructed as to become harmless when freed from their anchorage. (2) That neither would use submarines to attack the merchant vessels of any nationality, except to enforce the right of visit and search. (3) That each would require their merchant vessels not to use neutral flags for purposes of disguise.

The note further suggested that the United States government designate certain agencies in Germany to which foodstuffs from the United States should be sent, and that the German government guarantee that such foodstuffs be used for noncombatants only. Great Britain was requested to agree not to put foodstuffs on the list of absolute contraband, and that ships of foodstuffs sent to the designated consignees in Germany should not be interfered with.

Nothing of practical importance came from these suggestions. Germany replied, accepting some and rejecting others, while Great Britain reviewed the alleged violations of international law and defended the stoppage of foodstuffs des tined for Germany as a legitimate incident of the blockade.

Thus matters rested pending the first case in which an American vessel should be sunk or American lives lost. On March 28, 1915, news was received that the British steamship Falaba had been sunk, and that among those lost was an American citizen, Leon C. Thrasher. Accounts differed as to the actions of the steamship when called upon by the commander of the submarine to stop. The German government defended the action on the ground that the Falaba had attempted to escape after being warned and that, upon being overhauled, 10 minutes had been allowed for the crew and the passengers to take to the life boats before the vessel was torpedoed. While this case was still under consideration by the United States government, it was reported that the American vessel Cushing had been attacked by a German aëroplane in the English Channel on April 29, 1915, one bomb being dropped on the ship which caused some damage but no loss of life.

Within two days following this, word was received that the American steamer Gulflight had been attacked by a German submarine off the Scilly Islands on May 1st. Two members of the crew were drowned, and the captain died of heart failure the following morning. Before the Gov

ernment of the United States had formulated any action in connection with these cases, the civilized world was shocked at the terrible news that the Cunard Line steamship Lusitania had been sunk on May 7, 1915, by a German submarine off Old Head of Kinsale at the southeastern point of Ireland, resulting in the loss of 1152 lives, of whom 114 were known to be American citizens (see LUSITANIA). Prior to the sailing of the Lusitania from New York on her fatal voyage, an advertisement signed by the German embassy appeared in many American newspapers, warning Americans of the danger of traveling on British vessels through the "war zone." The first feeling of horror at the terrible catastrophe was succeeded by a feeling of bitter resentment in this country at what appeared to be a ruthless sacrifice of innocent lives. It appeared, at first, as if a break between the United States and Germany was inevitable. President Wilson waited six days before taking definite action, stating that it was important to act "with deliberation as well as with firmness." In the meantime the German government on May 10, 1915, sent a communication to the United States government expressing its sympathy for the loss of American lives, but at the same time maintaining that the responsibility rested with the British government, which, "through its plan of starving the civilian population of Germany" by prohibiting the importation of foodstuffs, had forced Germany to resort to retaliatory measures. It was further claimed that British merchant vessels were generally armed, and repeated attempts had been made by such vessels to ram submarines. Finally it was stated that the Lusitania carried a large quantity of ammunition in her cargo, and warning had been given by Germany that such vessels were liable to destruction.

On May 13, 1915, the eagerly awaited statement of the United States was sent to Germany. With a dignity and earnestness which the gravity of the situation called for, President Wilson reviewed the series of acts of German submarine commanders, culminating in the sinking of the Lusitania, which he said "the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement."

Referring to the claim that the alleged illegal acts of her adversaries justified Germany in adopting retaliatory measures, the American note stated that the Government of the United States could not admit that any such measures were legal which infringed the clearly established rights of neutrals under international law. These rights include the protection of the lives of noncombatants traveling on unarmed merchant vessels, and the right of neutrals to travel on the high seas wherever their legitimate business calls them. In view of these clearly established principles, the note stated that "it confidently expects the Imperial German government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains; that they will make reparation as far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure; and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare, for which the Imperial German government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended." In conclusion it was stated that "the Imperial German government will not ex

pect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens, and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoy

ment."

During the days immediately following the terrible event, newspaper comment in Germany indicated that the feeling in that country was characterized by regret at the loss of so many lives, but that the government was justified in sinking the Lusitania on the ground that she was carrying large quantities of ammunition, and that she had guns mounted and concealed between decks. The last charge was categorically denied both by the British authorities and the American port officials at New York.

Some hope was felt that the German government would disavow the act, when on May 11, 1915, a note was issued explaining its attitude with respect to American and other neutral ships in the "war zone." It stated that the German government had no intention of attacking such neutral ships if they were guilty of no hostile act. Even if such ships carried contraband, they were to be dealt with according to the rules of international law applying to prize warfare. It further stated that, if a neutral ship should be destroyed by mistake, the German government would "unreservedly recognize its responsibility therefor." While this did not cover the question involved in the Lusitania case, viz. the right of neutrals to travel in safety on merchant vessels under a belligerent flag, nevertheless it was a distinct modification of the policy announced in the proclamation establishing the

"war zone."

On May 28, 1915, the German government submitted a note defining its position, in regard to the various questions raised in the American note. With regard to the cases of the Cushing and the Gulflight, it was stated that an investigation was in progress and the results of this investigation would be communicated to the United States government shortly. (In this connection it is well to state here that a note was sent by the German government on June 4, 1915, expressing regrets for the sinking of the Gulflight, explaining that no distinctive marks were seen on the vessel by which she could be identified. Germany further agreed to furnish full recompense for the damage done. In regard to the Cushing, the German government asked for additional information in the possession of the American government in order that a conclusion might be reached in the matter.) In regard to the Falaba, it was again stated that the commander had disregarded the order to lay to, and had sent up rocket signals for help.

Concerning the Lusitania, the German government took the position that the Government of the United States had not considered all of the material facts in the case. It then repeated the charge that the Lusitania had guns on board, mounted under decks; that the British government had issued orders to merchantmen to ram submarines; and that in view of these alleged facts the German commanders "were no longer in a position to observe the rules of capture otherwise usual." It was further contended that the Lusitania carried large quantities of ammunition and a number of Canadian troops, and that the German government was justified in destroying war munitions destined for the enemy.

Finally it was asserted that the rapid sinking of the Lusitania was due to an explosion of the cargo of ammunition. The German government requested the American government to carefully consider the above statements and express its view in regard to them, and that thereupon the German government would make a "final" statement as to its position. This note did not meet the issue squarely and was clearly an invitation to further negotiations between the two governments.

It was at this juncture in the negotiations that Mr. Bryan resigned as Secretary of State on the ground that he was unable to agree with the President as to the proper policy to pursue in dealing with our difficulties with Germany. The two points upon which Mr. Bryan in his letter of explanation stated that he was not in agreement with the President were: (1) as to submitting the Lusitania case to the investigation of an international commission, and (2) as to warning Americans against traveling on belligerent vessels or vessels carrying cargoes of ammunition. Mr. Bryan held that the questions in dispute should be considered by an international commission, and that, secondly, American travelers should be warned as above indicated. Much comment was aroused by Mr. Bryan's act, and the consensus of opinion appeared to be that it strengthened rather than weakened the administration.

The next move in the diplomatic game was made on June 9, 1915, when the American gov ernment replied to the German government that it noted with satisfaction the position taken by the latter in the cases of the Cushing and Gulflight. In regard to the Falaba the United States was unwilling to admit that the attempt on the part of merchantmen to escape capture alters the obligation of the commander of the attacking vessel to provide for the safety of the lives of those on board the merchantman.

In regard to the statements made by Germany that the Lusitania was armed, the American government stated that it had official information that such was not the case. With regard to the carrying of contraband by the Lusitania, it was held that this was entirely irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used in sinking the vessel. Brushing aside these extraneous issues the American government took its stand firmly on the ground that it was "contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity," and it stated that it "very earnestly and very solemnly" renewed its representations made in the previous note.

A reply to this note came from the German government on July 8, 1915. There was in this communication little evidence of a desire to meet the issue. There were the usual assertions in regard to England's "inhuman" methods of warfare and a suggestion for guarding the safety of American vessels in the war zone.

The rejoinder to this note sent by the Government of the United States on July 21, 1915, indicated very clearly that it considered the German communication evasive and unsatisfactory. It stated once more in the clearest manner possible the real question at issue, namely, that acts of reprisal against an enemy are indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights. The note further gave pointed evidence that the United States government felt that the discussion had gone far enough, and

that "it cannot believe that the Imperial government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander." Despite this urgent suggestion from the United States that the matter should be speedily settled, the negotiations dragged on during the remaining months of the year. There was evidence, how ever, that the German government was attempt ing to find some solution which would concede most that the United States was contending for, while at the same time avoiding the appearance of being humiliated. For example, on Sept. 1, 1915, Ambassador von Bernstorff in a letter to Secretary Lansing gave assurance that German submarines would not sink any more liners without warning. It is to be noted that this included ships belonging to belligerents as well as neutrals. Finally, in November, the German government authorized its ambassador at Washington to begin negotiations with the American authorities looking to a settlement of all outstanding issues. These negotiations were still in progress at the close of the year.

While the controversy in connection with the Lusitania was in process of settlement, a number of other issues had arisen due to attacks on other vessels in which American property and lives were destroyed. These cases will be briefly stated.

On Jan. 28, 1915, the American schooner, Wm. P. Frye, loaded with a cargo of wheat consigned to an English firm, was sunk by the German auxiliary cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich.* In a communication to the German government the Government of the United States contended that the act was unwarranted by international law, as the cargo could only be considered conditional contraband, and there was no evidence that it was to be used for military purposes. To this the German government replied on April 4, 1915, asserting that the act was justified by the Declaration of London, and the German Prize Law. Nevertheless, Germany agreed to pay for the ship and cargo provided it was shown that both belonged to American citizens. This action was based on an interpretation of the treaties of 1799 and 1828 between Prussia and the United States. It was provided, however, that the case should go before the German Prize Court.

The Government of the United States replied to this note on May 5, 1915, declining to submit the question to the German Prize Court, and suggesting direct diplomatic negotiations.

A further German note on June 7, 1915, and an American rejoinder on June 24, 1915, failed to bring the question any nearer to a solution. On July 10, 1915, the German Prize Court rendered its decision justifying the sinking of the Frye, but holding that Germany must pay an indemnity under the terms of the Treaty of 1799. The German government then suggested that the amount of indemnity be determined by two experts, one appointed by each government, and that the differences between the governments as to the interpretation of the treaty be submitted *The Prinz Eitel Friedrich and the Crown Prince Wilhelm, two German commerce destroyers, entered the harbor of Newport News after extended cruises in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans during which a number of French and English vessels were destroyed. At first the commanders of both vessels indicated their intention of making necessary repairs and putting to sea again. The presence of English war vessels outside the harbor caused them to change their plans, and both vessels were eventually interned.

to arbitration of The Hague Tribunal. These suggestions were accepted by the United States on Aug. 10, 1915, provided that arrangements should be made for the immediate submission to arbitration of the question of the legality of the sinking of the vessel. The United States further requested a statement from Germany as to whether it intended to govern future naval operations, pending the arbitration, according to its interpretation of the treaty. To this the German government replied on Sept. 23, 1915, that no more American merchantmen would be destroyed when carrying conditional contraband, but that it reserved the right to sink such vessels carrying absolute contraband.

In a further note the United States government on Oct. 18, 1915, stated that, pending arbitration, it could agree to the sinking of American vessels carrying absolute contraband only on condition that persons on board such vessels were placed in "safety," and that this condition would not be satisfied by placing them in lifeboats in the open sea. To this suggestion the German government replied on Nov. 29, 1915, stating that it agreed that all possible provisions should be made for the safety of persons on a vessel to be sunk. It was stated that thereafter no persons would be ordered into lifeboats unless conditions of weather and the proximity of land made it "absolutely certain that the boats will reach the nearest port."

This closed the controversy over the Frye case, and the outcome was a notable victory for the American contention for the safety of innocent persons on the high seas.

On May 25, 1915, the American steamer Nebraskan was torpedoed, 40 miles southwest of Fastnet, off the coast of Ireland. The ship was not seriously damaged and no lives were lost. After an investigation, the German government explained that the attack was an "unfortunate accident," due to the fact that the vessel displayed no flag or distinguishing marks to indicate its nationality. Regret was expressed and liability for damage sustained was assumed by Germany.

The destruction of the Allan liner Hesperian on Sept. 4, 1915, by which an American citizen named Wolff was drowned, involved a question of fact. Germany maintained that the ship was sunk by a mine, not by a submarine. Great Britain, on the other hand, asserted that fragments of a torpedo had been picked up on the deck of the Hesperian after she was struck. Samples of this metal were submitted to American naval experts who declared that they were parts of a torpedo. The United States authorities held, however, that there was no conclusive evidence that the fragments of metal were found on the Hesperian, and the case was dropped.

The Arabic Case. The White Star liner Arabic, outward bound for New York, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine off Fastnet on the morning of Aug. 19, 1915. Eighteen passengers and 21 members of the crew were reported missing. Among those lost were two American citizens. Depositions of survivors indicated that the Arabic was torpedoed without warning and had made no attempt to escape or to ram the submarine. A formal and detailed communication from Ambassador Gerard Sept. 7, 1915, stated that the German government had received information that the Arabic had altered its course while approaching the

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