der the masterly direction of Field Marshal von Hindenburg, after conquering Warsaw (August 5), Brest-Litovsk (August 25), and Vilna (September 18), was halted only by the swamps before Riga, the lakes before Dvinsk, and the marshes of the Pripet. (3) After two important Austro-Hungarian attempts to "punish Serbia" had failed (in August and in December, 1914), a new Austro-German invasion of Serbia was undertaken in October, 1915, with the aid of Bulgaria, and by the end of November Serbia was completely conquered. AngloFrench forces attempting to interfere with the conquest of Serbia were defeated in the battle of the Vardar and driven back upon their base, Saloniki, in Greek territory (December, 1915). (4) Turkish armies engaged the Russians in the Caucasus region, invaded Persia, repelled an Anglo-French naval attack on the Dardanelles (March 18), withstood Anglo-French troops on the Gallipoli peninsula (April 25, 1915, to January, 1916), delivered futile attacks on the Suez Canal, and opposed a British invasion of Mesopotamia. (5) The Italians, from May to December, 1915, advanced only a few miles into Austrian territory, towards Trent and towards Gorizia. (6) Almost all of the German colonies were captured: Kiaochow (in China) by the Japanese (Nov. 6, 1914); the German is land possessions in the Pacific by the British and Japanese; Togoland and Kamerun in Africa by Anglo-French forces; and German Southwest Africa by British South Africans. German East Africa, however, repelled the British attacks.

Detailed accounts of the events here summarized will be found in the YEAR BOOK for 1914 under the WAR OF THE NATIONS, in the present article, and in the articles on the German colonies. Additional information bearing on the war is given in the articles on AGRICULTURE, The War and Agriculture; ANTISEPTICS; LABOR, German-Austrian Activities; MILITARY PROGRESS; NAVAL PROGRESS; SOCIALISM; in the sections_entitled History under AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, GREECE, ITALY, RUSSIA, TURKEY; UNITED STATES AND THE WAR; and in the biographical articles on conspicuous generals

and statesmen.

II. CONTROVERSIALISTS ON THE WAR Less sanguinary than the battles in the trenches, but hardly less fiercely contested, was the wordy conflict waged between "pro-German" and "pro-Ally" controversialists. Journalists like Dr. E. J. Dillon, sober historians like J. Holland Rose, lawyers like James M. Beck, economists like Dr. Karl Helfferich, statesmen, psychologists, and retired university presidents, all have argued the case from a hundred different angles. The publication of an Austro-Hungarian Red Book, a Serbian Blue Book, an Italian Green Book, a second Belgian Grey Book, and additional British, German, Turkish, and Russian correspondence furnished valuable material confirming the story of the negotiations as outlined in the YEAR BOOK for 1914 (article: WAR OF THE NATIONS, III. The Outbreak of War). Although the documents appearing in these publications provided subject-matter for many controversial discussion, and although the Red Book, the Blue Book, and the Green Book,

a

taken together, might have furnished the material for an illuminating study of the AustroSerbian dispute, less interest was taken in the many-colored official publications than in the documents semi-officially published by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and alleged to have been discovered in the Belgian government's archives by German invaders. To these documents the German apologists triumphantly referred in support of their contention that Belgium had surrendered her neutrality to the Allies, since Belgian military authorities had conferred with British military attachés in 1906, and in 1912, and had discussed plans for joint military action against Germany. The Belgian government frankly admitted that such conversations had taken place, and justified them on the ground that preparation to resist invasion was the duty of a neutral state. But the Belgian government refused to admit the German allegation that the Anglo-Belgian military conversations were in the nature of a "convention" or formal agreement binding the governments of the two nations; and a second Belgian Grey Book was published to prove that the Belgian government had never contemplated allowing British troops to be landed in Belgium for hostile operations against Germany, except in case Belgian neutrality had previously been violated by Germany. Even granting that no unneutral obligation had been contracted by the Belgian government, German polemists maintained that by revealing her military secrets to the Allies, by preparing her German frontier more strongly than her French frontier, and by omitting to concert plans with Germany, as she had done with the Allies, for the defense of her neutrality, Belgium had violated the spirit of neutrality. Furthermore, affidavits were reproduced by Mr. Alexander Fuehr, in his book on The Neutrality of Belgium, to prove that French officers and soldiers had violated Belgian neutrality before the German army crossed the frontier. In reply, pro-Ally controversialists pointed out that, regardless of the truth or falsity of these more recent accusations against Belgium, the German government, according to the public confession of the German chancellor, had consciously violated international law by invading Belgium; that the German declaration of war against Belgium was based, not upon Belgium's alleged conspiracy with the Allies, but upon Belgium's perfectly proper refusal to permit German armies to pass through her territory; and, finally, that Belgium's guilt should have been proved before, rather than after, Belgium had been "punished." While the more active controversialists continued to debate specific questions, the general public, particularly in neutral lands, wearied of the discussion of details and tended more and more to disregard the ever-increasing mass of "official" documents, from which apparently such contradictory conclusions could be drawn. "The vindication of the sanctity of treaty obligations" still figured as one of the ends for which the Allies were fighting; but more frequently the war was conceived, by "pro-Ally" writers and speakers, simply as a defense of democratic institutions against German bureaucracy, of small nations against German imperialism, of peace-loving peoples against German militarism, and of "humanity" against German "barbarism." From this rather

un

critical standpoint, the success of the German military machine in conquering Belgium, Poland, and Serbia, and the development of a frankly annexationist sentiment in Germany (see GERMANY, Debate on Peace Terms) rendered the German megalomania more than ever menacing to the free nations of Europe and America, according to the belief of the more excitable prophets of disaster. The spokesman of the Teutonic powers likewise evinced a tendency to forget the particular incidents which precipitated the struggle, and to regard the war as the culmination of British commercial jeal ousy, of French revenge for 1871, of Russian Pan-Slavic aspirations, of Italian perfidy. Both Germans and Allies delighted to picture their antagonists as savages devoid of ordinary humanity. The Germans accused the Belgians of the most revolting crimes against civilians as well as of "sniping" German soldiers; the Serbs had committed similar outrages against Austrian troops; the English had used "dum dum" bullets; the Russians had massacred Polish Jews. Similarly the Allies published impressive official investigations of German "atrocities" in Belgium and France, of Austrian crimes in Serbia, and of Turkish atrocities in Armenia. The Germans reproached the British for endeavoring to "starve" innocent women and children in Germany; the British characterized German Zeppelin raids and the sinking of the Lusitania as wanton murder. The Germans taunted their antagonists with reliance upon black and yellow soldiers-men of "inferior" races-and upon British "mercenaries." The Allies reproached the Teutons for dragging in the infidel Turk and the Bulgars stained with the wanton blood of the Balkan War. The effect of such recriminations was to fortify the impression that the war was a war in defense of civilization, each side representing itself as the defender. Meanwhile expressions of opinion in influential circles in the belligerent countries began to afford a more precise indication of the concrete interests at stake. Belgium was fighting for independence and indemnity; Serbia, for Greater Serbia, including the AustroHungarian provinces of Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and possibly Dalmatia, the Banat, and Croatia. France was determined to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine. British patriots were divided, some demanding the "complete destruction of German militarism," others contenting themselves with the restoration of Serbia and Belgium to independence, Alsace-Lorraine to France, in addition to indemnities, the maintenance of British naval supremacy, and possibly the annexation of some German colonies. British commercial organs gave the war a more predominantly economic character, and urged British business men to "capture German trade." Members of the Russian government officially expressed the hope that the Austrian and Prussian parts of Poland would be reunited with Russian Poland under the Russian sceptre, and that Russia would gain freer access to the open sea to the southward, presumably by the conquest of Constantinople; under Russian control, the ancient citadel of Eastern Christendom would again become the recognized capital of the Orthodox Christian nations of eastern Europe. The Italian government went into the war purely and simply for territorial aggrandizement: for the Italian-speaking districts of Trent and the Aus

trian seaport of Trieste (inhabited by Italians), for a foothold in Albania, ensuring command of the Adriatic, and possibly for privileges in Asia Minor. On the other side, Enver Pasha and his "Young Turk" associates were persuaded that Turkey, in alliance with German capital and with the aid of German industrial and military efficiency, was on the eve of a wonderful rejuvenation; at the very least, Persia and Egypt would be emancipated and incorporated in the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria was obviously determined to conquer Macedonia, to win a seaport at Saloniki, and to regain the ancient Bulgar capital of Ochrida. For the Dual Monarchy, the war was a desperate battle against the Pan-Slavic movement which threatened to sunder Galicia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other Slavic provinces from the Hapsburg Empire; if successful, the war would place a temporary restraint upon Russian PanSlavism, permanently abolish Pan-Serbianism, and secure Austro-German-Bulgar supremacy in the Balkans. Lastly, for Germany, the war was popularly conceived as defensive, but the ruling classes hinted, and the mass of the population appeared to be persuaded, that not only must Germany prevent Russia from annexing East Prussia and Posen, France from regaining Alsace-Lorraine, and Great Britain from "capturing German trade," but in addition Germany must fight to obtain "guarantees" for her future safety and prosperity; stronger strategic frontiers must be acquired by annexing a strip of French territory from Verdun to Belfort and a part of Western Russia; the Baltic provinces of Russia must be "recovered"; Poland must be reconstituted under German influence as a buffer state against Russia; Great Britain must be compelled to respect the "freedom of the seas"; and Germany's economic development must be ensured by obtaining commercial access to Antwerp, by strengthening the Turco-Teutonic Empire in the Near East, and by restoring, if not enlarging, the German colonial possessions. Only the most extreme imperialists favored the annexation of all Franco-Belgian territory now in German possession; more temperate patriots looked for the barter of Belgium and northern France for colonial territory.

III. DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR

Whereas, at the outbreak of the great war German diplomacy, with its blustering ultimatums and its clumsy explanations, failed to enlist the sympathies either of Italy, Germany's ally, or of neutral nations outside of Europe, during the year 1915 German diplomacy regained much of its lost prestige. The negotiations by which, on the one hand, Turkey was persuaded to cede the Dedeagatch Railway to Bulgaria (see BULGARIA), and, on the other hand, the possible conflicts were obviated between Austria-Hungary's Balkan ambitions and Bulgaria's Macedonian claims, to the end that Bulgaria might join in a quadruple alliance with Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, were not made public as yet, but their result, the joint invasion of Serbia and the opening up of the road from Berlin to Constantinople, was on its face a notable triumph for Teutonic diplomacy. Moreover, Rumania was kept neutral by well-calculated promises, if the Bulgarian premier's statement may be credited; King Con