ish was the Aubers ridge east of Neuve Chapelle. If successful, from Lens and Aubers the Allies could press on towards Lille. By the evening of May 12th, Carency, the fortified chapel of Notre-Dame de Lorette, and the cemetery of Neuville St. Vaast had fallen into French hands. From May 13 to the third week in June the French were engaged in capturing the isolated fortins or redoubts which the German engineers had constructed with astounding ingenuity, blocking the way to Lens. By the middle of June the most formidable of these defensive works, the so-called "Labyrinth" (between Arras and Neuville St. Vaast)—an intricate maze of trenches and subterranean tunnelswas mastered by the French. But Lens remained uncaptured. The British in the meantime had failed in their first assault on the Aubers ridge, May 9th, because of insufficient artillery preparation. A second assault on the German lines was delivered by the British at a point a little further south, May 16th. This second assault, "the battle of Festubert," continuing for 10 days, placed the British in possession of "the entire first-line system of trenches" on a front of 3200 yards, according to Sir John French's report, and of the first and second lines of German trenches on a front of two miles more. It was a distinct victory, but the objective of the attack had not been gained, and the British had once more been forced to admit the superiority of the German technique in trench warfare. The only other important fighting on the Western front during the summer was the German offensive conducted by the Crown Prince in the Argonne from June 20th to the middle of July. The German front in the Argonne, as the result of the midsummer battle, was advanced about 400 yards; the forces engaged, however, were relatively small, and the strategic idea obscure. A British historian derisively describes the Argonne battle as "an attempt to retrieve a somewhat damaged reputation on the part of a general (the Crown Prince), whom birth had cast for a part he could not fill."

tro-German armies including von Woyrsch's army operating north of the Galician frontier, Archduke Joseph Fredinand's, and von Mackensen's own armies-concentrated east of Cracow between the Vistula and the Carpathians, Boehm-Ermolli attacking northward in the central Carpathians, von Linsingen further east menacing Stryj from Munkacs, and von Bothmer and von Pflanzer in the extreme east. By feints in the direction of Stryj the Russians were kept in uncertainty as to the direction from which the attack was to be delivered, if, indeed, the Russians realized at all the danger in which they stood. After a preliminary advance east of Neu Sandec towards Gorlice, the main attack began on May 1st with an artillery bombardment of unprecedented magnitude. The Russian trenches along the eastern bank of the Biala River, between Tarnow and Gorlice, were blasted out of existence. In order to visualize the operation, the north-and-south line of the Biala River between Tarnow and Grybow may be conceived as the cross-bar of a huge letter H lying on its side. The northern leg of the H was the east-and-west railway running through Tarnow; the southern leg was the parallel railway running through Novo Sandec, Grybow, and Gorlice. The brunt of the German attack was on the cross-bar of the H, south of Tarnow. In the middle of the cross-bar, the Biala River was crossed at Ciezkowice, May 2nd. Other Teutonic armies were thrown across the Donajetz River, north of Tarnow. Simultaneously an advance was made eastward along the southern leg of the H, where Gorlice was captured, May 2nd. If the legs of the H are continued eastward, a second cross-bar will be discovered in the Wisloka River, about 20 miles east of Tarnow and Gorlice. To this position the Russians fell back after the defeat of May 2nd, and in new trenches along the eastern bank of the Wisloka they waited with grim determination for von Mackensen's attack. It will be noted that Dukla Pass lies almost due south of the Wisloka cross-bar, and that if the Germans could cross the Wisloka, the Russian troops which had penetrated into Dukla Pass would be

June.

While in the West and on Gallipoli, the British and French armies were meeting with discouraging results, in Galicia the Russian armies of General Ivanov were sustaining a disastrous defeat. Up to the end of April, the Russian offensive, in spite of the inadequate supply of munition which hampered General Ivanov's campaign in Galicia, seemed to offer the brightest prospects of success to which the Allies could look. The "military experts" of English and French journals optimistically debated the question whether Cracow or Hungary would be General Ivanov's next objective. Then suddenly the amazing news was received that the Russian armies in Galicia were in full retreat, pursued relentlessly by General von Mackensen. The reason for the surprise was simple. With marvelous secrecy and speed Austrian and German armies, aggregating about 2,000,000 men, had been concentrated for a prodigious blow in Galicia. Probably as many as 1500 heavy guns, and thousands of lighter field pieces, with unlimited supplies of ammunition, had been placed in position. The whole group of Aus

Russian defenders of the Wisloka fought desperately. But irresistibly von Mackensen pressed on until he had crossed the Wisloka at Jaslo, May 7th. The Russians from Dukla Pass fled towards the Wystok River, east of the Wisloka. Here again they were hotly pursued by a German force, which crossed the Wystok, May 8th. Large bodies of fugitive Russian troops were made captive. A considerable part, however, of the Russian Army of the Passes extricated itself in time to join the more northerly portions of Ivanov's armies in a stand on the line of the San. The centre of the Russian line, on May 12th, before the battle of the San, rested on the San River, from the fortress of Przemysl to a point well north of Jaroslav; the right was in front of the San; the left wing was bent back behind the San. The battle of the San, one of the most momentous engagements of the war, began on May 15th with a Russian counter-attack, and ended on May 17th with the Austrians crossing the river at Jaroslav, under the personal observation of the German Emperor. Przemysl, further south, held out until June 2. Meanwhile von Linsingen, striking north through the Carpathians, captured Stryj, June 1st, and ad

vanced north across the Dniester. Although von Linsingen suffered severe punishment at the hands of General Brussilov, the Austro-German advance continued to make progress. On June 20th von Mackensen captured Rawa Russka, north of Lemberg.

Von Mackensen's victory at Rawa Russka rendered Lemberg untenable and compelled the Russians to evacuate the strong line of lakes, river, and marshes which constituted the "Grodek position," just west of Lemberg. On June 22nd the Austrian General Boehm-Ermolli triumphantly reëntered the city which the Russians had captured nine months before. The fall of Lemberg may be taken as the crowning achievement of the first phase of von Mackensen's great drive. The Russians had been driven out of the Carpathian passes in headlong rout, Tarnow, Jaroslav, Przemysl, and Lemberg had been reconquered, and the Russians all but expelled from Galicia-they still held a strip of Eastern Galicia, including Sokal, Brody, and Tarnopol -within an incredibly brief space of time. the end of June and during the first part of July, von Mackensen's battering ram was pointed north, into Russian Poland, presaging an even more ambitious Teutonic offensive.

At

During June alone the Teutonic forces captured 145,000 prisoners, 80 heavy guns, and 268 machine guns. In recognition of his brilliant success, von Mackensen was appointed a field marshal. Archduke Frederick, commander-in chief of the Austrian army, was similarly honored.

(8) Italy's Intervention: May.

In May, while the Russians were in full retreat and while the British, slowly perceiving the gravity of the situation, were reconstructing their cabinet and establishing a ministry of munitions to remedy the shortage of machine guns and high explosive shells, a new factor became prominent, upon which the Allies had long counted to redress the balance of power in their favor. Belligerent speeches by Italian patriots during the winter and spring, when the situation had seemed more favorable to the Allies, had stimulated popular enthusiasm for war to such a degree that in May, in spite of the Russian retreat and the British crisis, the momentum of the anti-Austrian movement carried Italy into the war. From the Green Book published by the Italian government to justify the war, and from the information made public on the other side by the Austro-Hungarian and German governments, it is now possible to reconstruct at least the main outlines of the dip lomatic maneuvres which preceded the AustroItalian break. The secret Triple Alliance treaty, first negotiated in 1882, when Italy was full of resentment against France for seizing Tunis, and renewed in 1887, in 1891, in 1903, and most recently in 1912, bound Italy to the Central Powers in a defensive alliance. From clauses III and IV of the treaty (as pieced together by the Vossische Zeitung from the phrases disclosed in course of the negotiations in 1914-15), it appears that if either or both of her Allies, "without direct provocation on their part" should be attacked by another Power, Italy would be obliged to join in the war against the attacking Power (III). If either Ally should be forced to declare offensive war

against a Great Power which menaced its security, the other members of the Triple Alliance would either join in the war, or "maintain benevolent neutrality towards their Ally." At the outbreak of the War of the Nations, in August, 1914, Italy had remained neutral, announcing that since Germany and Austria-Hungary were engaged in an offensive war, the casus foederis of clause III did not exist. Italy was therefore obliged simply to observe "benevolent neutrality" (clause IV). As the war progressed, however, the spirit of Italy's neutrality became less and less "benevolent," and the Italian government accused Austria-Hungary of violating clause VII, which stipulated that as far as the "territorial status quo in the East" was concerned, the Allies "will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers." "Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic, or the Egean Sea become impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power, or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the status quo for their part by a temporary or a permanent occupation, such occupation would take place only after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties." The clause had been invoked by Austria-Hungary in the Turco-Italian War to restrict Italy's operations against Turkey. It was now invoked by Italy, in December, 1914, to justify a demand for "compensation," since the Austro-Hungarian government had failed to inform Italy in advance of the intention to send an ultimatum to Serbia, and had failed to arrange to compensate Italy for the new advantage which the attack on Serbia would give to the Dual Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian government could retort that Italy had been informed as early as the summer of 1913 of Austria-Hungary's intention of taking action against the Serbian menace (this fact was referred to by Signor Giolitti in a speech before the Italian Chamber of Deputies in December, 1914). Furthermore, no "temporary occupation" of Serbian territory existed, and the Austro-Hungarian government had declared its intention of respecting Serbía's territorial integ rity. The Italian government, however, persisted in its demands. The port of Avlona on the Albanian coast, whither an Italian landing party was dispatched late in December, 1914 (see ALBANIA), would only partially compensate Italy. In addition, Austria-Hungary would have to cede to Italy the Italian speaking districts around Trent and a strip of land along the Isonzo River. This amazing interpretation of the Triple Alliance treaty was accepted in principle by the Austro-Hungarian government on March 9th, but only after a new AustroHungarian foreign minister had been appointed (see AUSTRIA-HUNGARY). The German government, which had consistently advised the conciliation of Italy, and had sent Prince von Buelow to urge moderation in Rome, offered to

guarantee the execution of whatever terms should be agreed upon. The Italian demands, as formulated finally in April, embraced (1) the cession of the Trentino including the towns of Rovereto, Trent, and Bozen; (2) an extension of the eastern Italian frontier along the Isonzo River to include the strong positions of Tolmino, Gorizia, Gradisca, Plezzo, Monfalcone, and Malborghetto; (3) the erection of Trieste into an autonomous state; (4) the cession of several Dalmatian Islands; (5) the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona, and the declaration of Austria-Hungary's disinterestedness in Albania. At first Austria-Hungary absolutely refused the second, third, and fourth demands, and modified the first by reserving Bozen. On May 4th Italy denounced her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary. Unmistakable preparations for war were pushed forward. Before the final rupture, Austria-Hungary made a last attempt to purchase Italy's neutrality, according to a statement made by von Bethmann-Hollweg, May 18th, by offering (1) the Italian part of the Tyrol; (2) the western bank of the Isonzo, "in so far as the population is purely Italian," and the town of Gradisca; (3) sovereignty over Avlona and a free hand in Albania; (4) special privileges for Italian nationals in the Dual Monarchy, and amnesty for political prisoners who were natives of the ceded provinces; (5) "Trieste to be made an imperial free city, receiving an administration giving an Italian character to the city, and to have an Italian university." Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian government accepted the Italian demand that the concessions should be made as soon as the new boundaries could be delimited, instead of awaiting the conclusion of the war. Signor Salandra, however, having tested the strength of the war-spirit by tentatively resigning (see ITALY), was so confident of popular support that he refused to bargain longer, and on the evening of May 23rd the Italian government announced that the war against Austria-Hungary would begin the following day. Italian intervention in the war must not be regarded simply as the culmination of unsuccessful haggling over a few paltry patches of territory. Italy went to war first of all because the people had been aroused to wild enthusiasm for a war of emancipation to "redeem" the Italian populations of Trent and Trieste from the hereditary enemy of Italian national unification. At the same time chauvinistic journals had already begun to preach the doctrine that Italy as a great and growing Power must contest the possession of the Adriatic Sea with her rival Austria-Hungary, and must secure new territories outside of the Italian peninsula. While chauvinists were frankly urging an aggressive war for imperial expansion, humanitarian radicals were exhorting the Italian nation to join in the defense of civilization, democracy, and liberty against Austro-German militaristic imperialism. These three powerful sentiments -anti-Austrian nationalism, aggressive imperialism, and anti-German liberalism-enabled at least a majority of the Italian nation to accept with approval, if not with actual jubilation, the result of the diplomatic contest. The Italian declaration of war, as might have been expected, was received with delight in France and England, with deep resentment in the "Teutonic" countries. It is significant that notwithstand

The

ing its abhorrence of Italy's "treachery," the German government remained at peace with Italy; a possible explanation of this anomaly might be the belief in Germany that after breaking her strength against impregnable Austrian fortifications, Italy could be induced to make peace separately, deserting the Entente Powers. THE ITALIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. Italy's entry into the war added to the Allied forces a field army of 1,000,000 with 2,000,000 reserves (territorial militia), under the nominal command of King Victor Emmanuel, and the actual command of Count Luigi Cadorna, and a navy comprising 4 dreadnoughts, 10 older battleships, 20 submarines, 40 destroyers, and other craft, under the command of the Duke of the Abruzzi. Austria-Hungary at the outset was too much occupied in the Galician campaign (supra) to take the offensive against Italy, and contented herself with a naval and aërial raid on the Italian coast, from Venice to Brindisi, early in the morning of May 24th. Against AustriaHungary's weakened resistance, it was predicted that Count Cadorna's army would make brilliant progress. His plan of campaign was largely determined by geographic factors. main strength of the Italian army was concentrated at the railheads along the southeastern portion of the Austro-Italian frontier, for an attack in force against the Isonzo River, just east of the border line. Within a week the Italian armies had penetrated Austrian territory as far as the Isonzo and were ready to assail the main Austrian defenses, the fortified heights east of the Isonzo, from Monte Nero in the north to Monfalcone and the Carso plateau on the coast: if this line could be carried, the way would be opened for the capture of Trieste and the invasion of Carniola. Against the middle sector of the Austro-Italian frontier, which is simply a northward-bulging mountain ridge, General Cadorna sent only a comparatively thin line of troops, with the commission of guarding the passes and preventing an Austrian counterinvasion. In the first week of the war the Italians possessed themselves of the mountain pass called Val d'Inferno in the centre of the middle sector, and captured Cortina, in the Val d'Ampezzo, at the southern entrance to the Strada d'Allemagna, an important pass at the western end of the sector. The third or western sector of the Austro-Italian frontier was formed by the irregular triangle of the Trentino, jutting scuthward into Italy. The strong popular sentiment demanding the “liberation” of the Italian inhabitants of the Trentino, taken in combination with the military necessity of forestalling an Austrian invasion from commanding heights of Trentino, furnished ample justification for an Italian offensive in this region. With Trent as its ultimate objective, one Italian army penetrated the blunt apex of the triangle, following up the valley of the river Adige and the basin of Lake Garda towards Rovereto and Riva. Simultaneously small parties of Italian mountaineers attacked the mountain passes along both sides of the triangle, threatening Trent from the east and from the west.

(9) Lull in the Serbian Operations: JanuarySeptember

After the exhausting campaign of December, 1914 (described in the YEAR BOOK for 1914),