when the retreating Serbian armies had suddenly rallied, surprised the too confident invader by the vigor of their attack, and swiftly expelled him from Serbian territory, a period of inaction ensued in the Serbian theatre of war. Serbs and Austrians alike had suffered heavily and needed time to repair their losses. Inclement weather and impassable roads added to the disinclination of either party to renew active operations. About the end of January consternation was caused in Serbia and in the other Balkan countries by the report that an immense Austro-German army was being massed for a new invasion of Serbia. The story may have been a canard, fabricated for the simple purpose of intimidating Rumania and Greece-for Rumania and Greece then appeared to be on the point of joining the Triple Entente or possibly the movement of German troops preparatory to the great offensive movement against Russia was honestly misinterpreted by the press. At any rate, rumor of an impending AustroGerman invasion of Serbia in the spring of 1915 was not borne out by the facts. The diplomatic correspondence published in the Italian Green Book throws some light on the situation. According to the Green Book, the Italian government on February 17th warned Austria-Hungary that any military action undertaken by that Power in the Balkans without previous agreement regarding the compensation to be allowed Italy, would lead to grave consequences. In other words, Italy warned Austria-Hungary that the inauguration of a new campaign against Serbia would precipitate a crisis between Austria-Hungary and Italy; and Austria-Hungary, still hoping that Italy could be kept out of the war, consented to postpone the invasion of Serbia. Meanwhile, profiting by the inactivity of Austria-Hungary, Serbia not only repaired the ravages which the typhus, in combination with the past year's campaigns, had wrought in her army, but also invaded Albania, with the cooperation of Montenegrin forces (see ALBANIA, History). Serbian patriots began to discuss the extent of the territories that Serbia should annex at the termination of the war, and a debate was carried on between Italian and Serbian journals respecting the relative merits of the Italian and the Serbian claims to Dalmatia. The consensus of opinion seemed to sanction Italy's claim to a predominant position on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, providing that Serbia should be given access to a port. In April an Austrian aëroplane raid on Podgoritza, Montenegro, resulted in 137 casualties, of which 28 were fatal. In August, after a lapse of many months, the Austrians resumed the bombardment of Belgrade with heavy howitzers. The bombardment was presently discontinued, however, and the Serbian front remained comparatively quiet until October.

(10) Von Hindenburg's Drive: August-Sep

tember.

General Strategy. In July and August, while the Italians were pushing their campaign for Trent and Trieste, and while the FrancoBritish line in the West was enjoying a period of comparative repose before undertaking an autumnal general forward movement, Field Marshal von Hindenburg launched a tremendous of fensive against the Russians in Poland. "Von

Hindenburg's drive," as the movement was popularly called, was the mightiest effort yet put forth in any theatre of war. Its aim was obviously (1) to push the Russians back to a safe distance from Galicia and East Prussia, (2) to conquer Russian Poland, which the Teutonic coalition desired for military, economic, and political reasons, and (3) either to shatter the Russian field army completely, or to drive it back in a badly battered condition to a disadvantageous strategic position, where it would be forced to remain inactive throughout the coming winter. A much clearer conception of the whole situation in the East will be gained if the reader will examine the Russian railway system, as shown on the map on page 715. Warsaw, the capital of Russian Poland, forms the western apex of a westward-pointing wedge of railways. The northern face of the wedge is the all-important line running southwest from Petrograd through Dvinsk, Vilna, Grodno, and Bialystok to Warsaw. The southern face is the main line running southeast from Warsaw through Lublin, Cholm, Kovel, and Kiev to Rostov. Branches of this southern line link up Warsaw with the Black Sea port of Odessa. Between the northern and southern faces of the wedge were two important lines connecting Moscow directly with Brest-Litovsk and indirectly with Warsaw: the more northerly route from Brest-Litovsk to Moscow passed through Baranovitchi, Minsk, and Smolensk; the other route reached Moscow by way of Pinsk, Gomel, and Kaluga. Warsaw and the railway junctions immediately east of Warsaw thus formed the western point of convergence of the Russian railway salient. The importance of defending Warsaw was fully realized by the Russian General Staff. Not only was the city itself formidably fortified, but on the north a line of fortresses-Novo Georgievsk, Pultusk, Ostrolenka, Lomza and Ossowietz-made the natural line of the Narew River a still stronger protection against a flank attack; while to the southeast the broad line of the Vistula with its fortifications at Warsaw and at Ivangorod was deemed sufficiently strong to repel a flanking attack from the southwest. If the Warsaw angle of forts were lost, the Russian armies could still fall back to the line Kovno-Grodno-Bialystok-BrestLitovsk-Cholm-Sokal, with the Niemen River to strengthen their right wing and the upper Bug to support their left. Once that secondary line of defenses gave way, the Russian right would be thrust back to Riga and Dvinsk on the Dvina River; the centre would flounder about in the vast marshes of the Pripet around Pinsk; the left wing would rest on the fortress-triangle of Lutsk-Rovno-Dubno, but would be virtually separated from the northern armies by the Pripet swamps. There would be no convenient north-and-south railways to facilitate the shifting of troops from point to point along the line to meet unexpected attacks. In a word, the loss of the apex of the railway salient would put the Russian armies at a serious disadvantage. This was precisely von Hindenburg's object. The "drive" may well be divided into three phases. During the first phase, the Russians were forced to abandon the Warsaw angle of forts at the tip of the salient; during the second phase the secondary line from Kovno through Grodno-Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk was lost; during the third and final phase of this

famous drive the Russian line was pressed back to the Riga-Dvinsk-Pripet Marshes-Rovno position.

THE FIRST PHASE. At the end of June, just after the fall of Lemberg (June 22nd), the Russian armies were still in complete possession of the railway salient, their line stretching from Windau on the Baltic Sea southward in front of Shavli, Kovno, and Grodno; bending westward through Ossowietz, Lomza, Ostrolenka, and Przasnysz; curving southward again in front of Pultusk, Novo Georgievsk, and Warsaw; sweeping southeast through Radom; and passing considerably south of Krasnik, Sokal, Brody, and Tarnopol. During the last week of June and the first two weeks of July the extreme southern tip of the Russian left wing in Galicia was pushed back from Halicz to the northeastern banks of the Zlota Lipa and Dniester rivers. During the same period, von Mackensen and Archduke Joseph turned northward from Galicia and captured Zamosc and Krasnik, respectively, where they were within striking distance of Lublin and Cholm, on the southernmost of the sheaf of railways converging on Warsaw. At the same time preliminary actions were begun at various points along the German front. The great offensive opened, all along the line, on July 14th. On that day the main blow was delivered by General von Gallwitz against the Warsaw angle of forts; having captured the town of Przasnysz, he assailed and partially pierced the line of the Narew River near Pultusk. Simultaneously von Mackensen captured the town of Krasnostov, July 16-18, and advanced to within 10 miles of the railway at Cholm. Archduke Joseph, just west of von Mackensen, threatened Lublin, on the same railway, from the direction of Krasnik. Still further west, General von Woyrsch took Radom, and drove the Russians back on their fortress of Ivangorod. While these three armies were menacing the southern face of the Russian railway salient, Generals von Gallwitz, von Scholtz, and von Eichorn were pressing against the northern face, from Novo Georgievsk to Kovno. In the extreme north, General von Buelow captured Tukkum and Windau, July 20th, and advanced toward Riga. These simultaneous attacks on the northern and southern faces of the railway salient rendered the position of the Russian centre at Warsaw extremely precarious. At any moment von Mackensen might cut the southern railway at Cholm and von Gallwitz or von Scholtz might cut the northern railway between Warsaw and Grodno; from the north and from the south the Teutonic armies would bite into the salient behind Warsaw, and the Russian army of the centre would be caught between the jaws of the great German offensive. Grand Duke Nicholas, realizing this peril, chose to sacrifice Warsaw rather than expose his central armies to almost certain disaster. The wisdom of the decision was demonstrated when von Woyrsch forced the passage of the Vistula between Warsaw and Ivangorod, July 28th, and when on the next day von Mackensen cut the Warsaw-Kiev railway between Lublin and Cholm. With feverish haste the Russians transported their guns and stores from Warsaw eastward to safety. During the night of August 4th the Russian army evacuated Warsaw, blowing up the Vistula bridges to prevent pursuit. The German cavalry triumphantly entered the

city on the morning of August 5th, with Prince Leopold of Bavaria in command.

THE SECOND PHASE. The fall of Warsaw marked the success of the first phase of the great Teutonic drive; within three weeks the Russians had been forced to abandon their strongly fortified position around Warsaw. An isolated army at Novo Georgievsk held out for a fortnight longer; but the main body of the Russian centre during the second week of August raced back madly towards the secondary line of defense. For a time it seemed as though a large part of the Russian army would be entrapped. But the stubborn defense of Ossowietz protected the northern flank of the retreating Russian centre, and the secondary line, from Kovno through Grodno, and Bialystok to Brest-Litovsk, was safely reached. The second phase of von Hindenburg's campaign was directed against this line. The line was forced on August 17th at both ends. In the north, the Russian fortress of Kovno, inadequately prepared for attack, was surrendered by a Russian general who later was brought up on charges of criminal neglect of duty. In the south, on the same day, the line was turned by von Mackensen's advance east of Cholm towards Kovel. Ossowietz fell five days later; Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk, on August 25th; and Olita on August 26th. By the end of August, Grodno alone remained of the Russian secondary line. The third phase of von Hindenburg's thrust had begun.

THE THIRD PHASE. The third phase of von Hindenburg's drive lasted through the greater part of September. Its aim was to thrust the battered Russian line—since May 2nd the Russians had lost 300,000 killed and wounded, and 1,100,000 prisoners-back on the Riga-DvinskMinsk-Pinsk-Rovno line and, if possible, to envelop part of the right wing while the centre floundered about in the Pripet Marshes. During this phase of the battle, the Russians offered more stubborn resistance, possibly because the cautious Russian generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicholas, had been removed to the Caucasus, September 8th, and Czar Nicholas, with General Alexeiev as his chief of staff, was determined to sacrifice no more Russian territory. On September 1st the Russian line was being pressed back on Riga in the extreme north; it was still more than 20 miles west of Dvinsk and Vilna, and shielded the transverse railway from Riga through Dvinsk and Vilna to Grodno; south of Grodno the line bent back east of Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, Kovel, and Vladimir Volinski; the right wing rested on the fortress triangle of Lutsk-Rovno-Dubno. During the month of September the Russian right wing was pushed back from Lutsk, September 1st, and Dubno, September 10th, in spite of successful Russian counterattacks further south near Tarnopol, in Galicia. The Russian centre lost the fortress of Grodno, September 2nd, and fell back east of Pinsk and Baranovitchi (the railway junction just east of Slonim). In the extreme north, Riga was gravely menaced by General von Beseler, whose troops had stormed the bridgehead at Friedrichstadt and were attempting to envelop Riga from the southeast. But the central feature of the September fighting was the battle of Vilna. The important railway junction of Vilna was defended by the Russians with imprudent valor. For while the Russian army west of Vilna was holding in check the German

Molodetchna, behind Vilna. The Russians still delayed; but finally on September 18th, they evacuated Vilna. A delay of one or two days more might have resulted in the capture of the entire Vilna army. As it was, the Russians extricated themselves with the greatest difficulty, while fighting brilliant holding battles to safeguard their retreat against the German army attacking from Grodno, which had captured Lida, September 19th, and against the northern flanking force which had struck towards Vileika, Smorgon, and Molodetchna. By October 1st the German drive had come to a standstill, and the Russian armies rested from their retreat: the right wing strongly holding the Dvina River from Riga to Dvinsk, and the lake region from Dvinsk through Vidzy, and Postavy to Smorgon; the centre holding an almost straight north-and-south line from Smorgon to Lipsk, and a zig-zag line through the marshes east of Pinsk; the right fighting for possession of the Lustk-Dubno-Rovno fortress triangle, and annoying the Austrians near Tarnopol.

(11) The Anglo-French Forward Movement in France: September-October.

Just as von Hindenburg's drive against Russia was completed, the Allies began a general forward movement in France. Throughout July and August they had been husbanding their resources of men and munitions in preparation for the great effort. In September the renewed activity of Allied aviators and the furious bombardment of the German lines in France indicated that the Allies were about to strike. The

attack began on September 25th. While unimportant assaults were delivered at Hooge (near Ypres), and at other points along the line, the main force of forward movement was concentrated at two points, the first in Artois just north of Arras, the second in Champagne midway between Reims and Verdun. In the Artois region, the initial attack on September 25th and 26th met with brilliant success. The French Tenth Army, north of Arras, captured Souchez, September 26th, and reached Hill 140, and the ridge dominating the town of Vimy. Sir John French, coöperating in the Artois attack, reported that "On the morning of the 25th inst., the First and Fourth (British) Corps attacked and carried the enemy's first and most powerful line of intrenchments, extending from our extreme right flank at Grenay (just west of Lens) to a point north of the Hohenzollern redoubt-a distance of 6500 yards. The position was exceptionally strong, consisting of a double line, which included some large redoubts, and a network of trenches and bombproof shelters. Dugouts were constructed at short intervals all along the line, some of them being large caves 30 feet below the ground. The Eleventh Corps, in general reserve, and the Third Cavalry Division were subsequently thrown into the fight, and finally the Twentyeighth Division." British troops occupied the village of Loos and the outskirts of Hulluck between Lens and La Bassée. "The enemy's second line posts were taken, the commanding position known as 'Hill 70' in advance [east] of Loos was finally captured, and a strong line was established and consolidated in close proximity to the German third and last line." Meanwhile, in Champagne, according to a French report dated October 3rd, the French during September 26th and 27th "succeeded north of Souain and Perthes in occupying a front facing north, and in contact with the German second line along a stretch of seven and a half miles. The ground thus conquered represented an area of some 152 square miles, and was traversed by lines of trenches graduated to a great depth. The borders of the woods were organized for de

connections at Lens in Artois, and at Somme-Py in Champagne. In Champagne, to be sure, the French captured the village of Tahure, October 6th, and further slight gains were made in Artois, but the whole movement reached a standstill by the middle of October, without having accomplished any important result, beyond straightening and slightly advancing the Allies' lines. Bitter criticism was heard in England. Disappointment was expressed in France. In Germany the Allied forward movement was regarded as a costly failure, and a clear proof of the ability of the Germans, with their superior technique, to hold the lines in France against numerical odds. A Berlin report estimated the French casualties at 130,000; the British, 60,000; the German, less than 40,000. (12) The Diplomatic Failure in the Balkans. The months of August, September, and October were discouraging for the Allies. In August and September Russia had been badly defeated; in September and October the great AngloFrench forward movement in the West had begun brilliantly and ended disappointingly; in October yet another misfortune befell the Allies -Bulgaria joined the Teutonic Powers and Serbia was crushed by a combined Teutonic and Bulgarian invasion. In order that the reasons for this disaster may appear more clearly, it is necessary to review the principal elements which stultified the Entente's diplomacy in the Balkans and prepared the way for Serbia's downfall. (1) In the first place, the diplomats of the Quadruple Entente, misled by a mistaken notion that by tactful compromises the ambitions of all the Balkan states (and Russia) could be satisfied, essayed to reconcile Bulgaria with Serbia, Greece, and Rumania, and to bring about the joint intervention of the three neutral states-Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania. To this end, the Entente urged Serbia to cede Macedonia, and Greece to cede Kavala, Seres, and Drama to Bulgaria. Serbia, however, after long negotiations, was only willing to give partial satisfaction to Bulgaria's Macedonian aspirations; as for Greece, Premier Venizelos was willing (see GREECE), but King Constantine refused. While the Entente Powers were still endeavoring to obtain concessions for Bulgaria from Serbia and Greece, the Bulgarian government was successfully negotiating with The Porte for the cession of the Dedeagatch Railway (see BULGARIA), and with the Teutonic Powers for the partition of Serbia. In July, according to apparently authentic reports, a military convention was signed between Bulgaria, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. In August the cession of the Dedeagatch Railway was arranged. Still the Entente Powers persisted, after all hope had vanished, in their negotiations to patch up the Balkan alliance. The other Balkan states were offended at the partiality shown to their bitter enemy and rival, Bulgaria. In both Greece and Rumania popular sentiment at the beginning of the year strongly favored the Entente, but both Greece and Rumania remained neutral throughout the year, while Bulgaria joined the Turco-Teutonic coalition. By attempting to win all the Balkan states to its side, the Entente lost all. (2) A second potent factor in defeating the Entente's Balkan diplomacy was the apprehension frankly expressed in the

Balkan countries in respect of Russia's ambition to take Constantinople for herself; Greek patriots had long cherished the hope that the historic capital of the Byzantine Empire might ultimately become a Greek city; and Balkan sentiment generally was opposed to the establishment of Russian power at Constantinople and Russian hegemony in the Near East. The candid avowal by Russian statesmen of this ambition was, therefore, a serious obstacle to the Entente's diplomatic success in the Balkans. (3) A third difficulty was discovered in the conflict between the territorial ambitions of Greece, Serbia, and Italy. Because Italy aspired to dominate the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, Serbia was compelled to modify her ambitions in that quarter. Between Greece and Italy the conflict was more serious. The Athena, the chief organ of the Greek ministry, in discussing Italy's intervention in the war, openly confessed the fear that as the Entente Powers had been willing to urge the sacrifice of Greek and Serbian interests to Bulgaria, they had also probably promised Italy Albania, part of which Greece desired, the Dodecanessus, which Italy had occupied since the Turco-Italian war despite Greek remonstrances, and parts of the coast of Asia Minor, which Greece regarded as racially and historically Hellenic. (4) A fourth obstacle was Bessarabia. While Rumania might be tempted to attack Austria-Hungary by the hope of "emancipating" the 3,500,000 Rumanians in Transylvania and Bukovina, she might also be tempted by the Teutonic Powers to attack Russia for the purpose of regaining the province of Bessarabia, more exclusively Rumanian in language and far more fertile than Transylvania. (5) Finally, Germantrained military authorities in the Balkan states were firmly convinced of the invincible superiority of the German army. Ferdinand of Bulgaria shared in this conviction. Constantine of Greece had expressed his glowing admiration for German military methods after the Balkan War. Constantine's wife, Sophia, a sister of the German Emperor, was constantly the recipient, during 1915, of messages from Germany describing great German victories. During the summer, moreover, the Balkan nations were duly impressed by the contrast between the magnificent success of von Mackensen against the Russians (supra) and the feeble Anglo-French attack on Gallipoli. The manner in which the Greeks regarded the futile Gallipoli campaign may be inferred from the statement which the Greek premier and foreign minister made in December, that Greece had warned the Allies of the difficulty of their plan of campaign, and that "the Greek General Staff long ago had worked out a perfect scheme of operation to be utilized in the event of war between ourselves [Greece] and Turkey." "We still believe," M. Skouloudis concluded, "you [the Allies] would have succeeded if you had been wise enough to adopt it." In the light of these five factors, the decision of Bulgaria to join the Turco-Teutonic coalition, and the refusal of Greece and Rumania to assist the Entente Allies, will perhaps appear less surprising.

(13) The Conquest of Serbia: October-November. The decree mobilizing the Bulgarian army, September 23rd, and the publication of a gov

war.

von

the plain of Kossovo, by the converging Austrian, German, and Bulgarian columns; thousands were captured, but a few escaped across the frontier into Montenegro and Albania. Novibazar was occupied by the victors, November 20th; Mitrovitza and Prishtina, November 23rd; Prizren, November 30th. By the end of November all of Serbia except a narrow strip in the south had been conquered. The German military headquarters signalized the virtual completion of the conquest of Serbia by announcing, November 28th, that "with the flight of the scanty remnants of the Serbian army into the Albanian mountains our main operations are closed." The political significance of Field Marshal Mackensen's achievement was obvious: it still further increased the respect of Greece and Rumania for German military prowess. The military result of the campaign was the opening up of the railway route "from Berlin to Constantinople," through Nish and Sofia, enabling the Teutonic Powers to supply Turkey with munitions to defeat the Anglo-French force on Gallipoli and perhaps to undertake ambitious offensive operations against Egypt. Nor must the economic aspect of the victory be ignored: not only were the copper mines of Serbia placed at Germany's disposal, but the resources of the Balkan peninsula and of the Turkish Empire in Asia could now be freely drawn upon to replenish the supply of foodstuffs and of minerals in the Central Empires, and, on the other hand, a foreign market was at last procured, despite England's control of the seas, for overstocked German manufacturers.

ernmental manifesto explaining why Bulgaria should join the Teutonic Powers revealed Bulgaria's decision to attack Serbia. When Bulgaria finally entered the war, October 14th, and began the invasion of Serbia from the east, the conquest of Serbia had already been begun by a group of German and Austro-Hungarian armies under the general direction of Field Marshal von Mackensen. The field marshal's strategy was simple and effective. While the main Austro-German army under Generals von Keovess and von Gallwitz smashed its way through the intrenched Serbian position on the southern banks of the Danube and Save rivers, another Teutonic army would cross the Drina River and strike eastward in the direction of Ushitze, Kralievo, and Krushevats, and the Bulgarians would advance from the east against Nish. Outnumbered and almost surrounded, the Serbian army-then about 300,000 strong, reorganized, and equipped with French artillery-would be easily crushed and probably annihilated. In pursuance of this scheme, Austro-German troops were thrown across the Danube and Save rivers, October 6th; Belgrade fell on October 8th; Semendria, October 11th; and Pozharevats, October 14th. The main body of the Austro-German army of invasion could then sweep irresistibly southward from the Danube up the Morava valley. In the meantime, an Austrian army had invaded Serbia from the direction of Sarajevo and Vishegrad, and was approaching Ushitze. Such was the situation when Bulgaria declared The centre of the Bulgarian attack was directed against Nish, the Serbian war-capital. The city was cut off from the south by a Bulgarian army at Vranja, October 17th. On November 5th Nish surrendered. The right wing of the Bulgarian army crossed the Timok River, captured Prahovo and Negotin, and effected a junction with the Teutonic left wing at Liubichevatz, in the extreme northeastern corner of Serbia, October 26th. The left wing of the Bulgarian army was thrown into Southern Serbia by way of Egri Palanka, October 17th, Kumanova, October 21st, and Uskub, October 22nd. The knowledge that an Anglo-French expenditionary force, which had been landed at Saloniki on October 5th, was advancing up the Vardar River with the object of flanking the Bulgarian right, gave the Serbian armies in the south renewed courage to contest fiercely for the possession of Veles* (situated on the railway southeast of Usküb) and to make a desperate stand at Babuna Pass, between Veles and Prilip. The Anglo-French force was held in check (infra), however; Veles was captured; Babuna Pass was abandoned; and Prilip and Krushevo were occupied by Bulgarian troops. Meanwhile the Austro-German armies of invasion had driven the shattered Serbian armies of the Danube and Save back up the Morava valley in a retreat which might well have been called a rout. Kragujevats, the principal Serbian arsenal, was captured on November 1st. Parachin, southeast of Kragujevats and more than half way from Belgrade to Nish, was reached by the Teutonic invaders on November 4th. Krushevats fell three days later. During the second half of November the remnants of the Serbian army (exclusive of the small forces in the extreme south) were swept together in * Another name for Koprili.

(14) The Battle of the Vardar: December.

It remained for the Bulgarians to complete the conquest of Serbia by expelling the Serbians from Monastir and by defeating the AngloFrench troops on the Vardar. The former object was easily accomplished and the Serbians were driven in defeat from Monastir across the frontier into Albania. The presence of 97,000 French and 75,000 British troops in the Vardar valley was a more serious matter. The Allied force, it will be recalled, had been landed at Saloniki in October and had advanced up the Vardar River towards Veles (Koprili) to turn the Bulgarian right wing. The force was too weak, however, to do much more than to hold its own on a triangle of Serbian territory, the base of the triangle being the Serbo-Greek frontier; the western leg was the line of the Tcherna River, held by the French troops under General Sarrail; the apex of the triangle was at the confluence of the Tcherna and the Vardar; the eastern leg was a line from Gradsko and Krivolak on the Vardar to Lake Doiran, near the angle of the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian frontiers. The battle of the Vardar, from December 3rd to December 12th, was simply a series of sledge-hammer blows delivered against the sides of the Anglo-French triangle. During the course of the battle the French line was withdrawn from the Tcherna to the eastern bank of the Vardar, the apex was drawn back from Krivolak to Demir-Kapu, the British line was battered in, and the whole Anglo-French force finally pushed back into Greek territory. The attempt of the Allies to relieve Serbia had ended in ignominious failure. No other result could have been expected from the dispatch of so small