ruary 18th next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral Powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews, passengers, or merchandise to such vessels. Their attention is furthermore called to the fact that it is of urgency to recommend to their own vessels to steer clear of these waters. It is true that the German navy has received instructions to abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recognizable as such; but in view of the hazards of war, and of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered by the British government, it will not always be possible to prevent a neutral vessel from becoming the victim of an attack intended to be directed against a vessel of the enemy." The cause assigned for this extraordinary innovation in the practice of naval warfare was the disrespect of neutral rights and disregard of international law, particularly of the Declaration of London, evinced by the British government in capturing non-contraband German property on board neutral ships, in apprehending German subjects on neutral ships, in altering the contraband rules, and in declaring the whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be a seat of war. The Germans alleged that Great Britain had adopted a ruthless policy of starving the civilian population. The British, on the other hand, declared that since the German government had commandeered foodstuffs (Jan. 25, 1915, see GERMANY), the British navy was quite justified in intercepting food supplies which might be confiscated by the German government for the use of the German army. The United States government endeavored to obtain mutual concessions from the belligerents in the interest of neutral rights, but its proposals were rejected by the British government, and a new British Order in Council, March 15th, having declared a virtual blockade of Germany, the issue was squarely joined between the British blockade and the German submarine. Neutral Powers were adversely affected by the contest, because (1) numerous neutral merchantmen were torpedoed; (2) because several belligerent liners were sunk by German submarines either without warning or without opportunity for safeguarding the lives of the passengers, some of whom were citizens of neutral Powers; (3) because neutral trade with Scandinavian ports and with Holland was interfered with by the British policy of intercepting all goods of German origin or ultimately destined for Germany, even when the goods were carried by neutral ships between neutral ports; (4) because British operations in the North Sea and German submarines in the Channel made navigation hazardous for neutral merchantmen. The intricacies of the controversies which ensued with regard to the rights of neutrals may not be discussed in this article; it is important, however, to indicate at least a few of the salient features of the submarine-blockade contest, in relation to the general issues of the war. (1) The sinking of the Cunard liner Lusitania (q.v.), May 7th, without warning, with the loss of 1396 lives, undoubtedly embittered the anti-German sentiments of British and Allied nations, and did much to promote an anti-German agitation in neutral countries. The German government, it

may be noted, laid the responsibility for the Lusitania tragedy upon the British government; in a note to the United States, Herr von Jagow stated: "The case of the Lusitania shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of conducting war employed by our adversaries leads. In the most direct contradiction of international law all distinctions between merchantmen and war vessels have been obliterated by the order to British merchantmen to arm themselves and to ram submarines, and the promise of rewards therefor, and neutrals who use merchantmen as travelers thereby have been exposed in an increasing degree to all the dangers of war. If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the Lusitania had caused the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing a torpedo this would have meant the certain destruction of his own vessel." Notwithstanding this attempted justification, it may safely be asserted that the sinking of the Lusitania furnished the Allies with a most powerful recruiting argument and stimulated pro-Ally sentiment in neutral countries. (2) What the German government hoped to gain by its submarine warfare was obvious: the flow of ammunition to Great Britain from neutral countries would be seriously interrupted, British shipping would suffer, and possibly the British government could be compelled to relax its measures against German imports. The submarine campaign was at once a defensive operation to prevent Great Britain from "starving Germany out," and an offensive operation to interfere with Great Britain's munitions supply and commerce. (3) The results of the submarine campaign had not yet been definitely established by the close of the year, but it appeared reasonably certain that in its major objects the campaign had failed, inasmuch as the British government, instead of relaxing, had drawn more tightly the restrictions on German imports through neutral countries; and although very considerable injuries had been inflicted upon the Allied and neutral merchant marines, the flow of munitions to Great Britain and the course of British sea-borne trade had not been seriously disturbed. In the last quarter of the year the statement was quite generally credited that a large proportion of the German submarine flotilla had been destroyed by British trawlers, motor-boats, and aviators, or entrapped in great submarine nets.

VII. AËRIAL OPERATIONS

The importance of airmen in directing the fire of artillery and in detecting unexpected movements of enemy troops had already been well established by the first few months of the war. During the year 1915 the services of air-scouts to the belligerent armies and navies remained invaluable. The most interesting phase of the aërial operations in 1915, however, was the use of airships and aëroplanes for independent operations. Intense excitement, and a certain amount of genuine concern, were manifested with regard to the possibility of German Zeppelins inflicting serious damage upon London or Paris. Most elaborate precautions were taken to darken the city of London at night; gigantic searchlights and anti-aircraft guns were pointed towards the murky London skies. But after the repetition of comparatively harmless German

air-raids on England-including the Zeppelin raid on London on May 31st, in which six persons were killed, the Zeppelin raid on London of August 17th, in which ten or more persons were killed, and a third Zeppelin attack on London, September 7-8, in which 37 persons were killedthe fear of serious German air raids became less acute. The most serious German raid on London occurred on October 13th and resulted in 169 casualties, of which 55 were fatal. “In reprisal" for the German air raids, the Allies organized frequent counter-raids. On February 16th a fleet of 40 British and French aëroplanes and seaplanes bombarded the German lines in Belgium; in August a powerful flock of 32 "battle 'planes," larger and stronger than ordinary aëroplanes, dropped bombs on German munitions factories at Saarbücken; on August 25th a still more ambitious raid was made on Dellingen by 62 Allied 'planes. Less important aërial operations were conducted on other fronts. One of the most interesting single events in the year's war in the air was the duel between a British monoplane and a huge German Zeppelin, on June 7th, which ended in the destruction of the Zeppelin and won the Victoria Cross for the gallant aviator, Lieut. Reginald A. J. Warneford, who was killed 10 days later.

that the "just cause" and preponderant resources of the Entente Allies must ultimately triumph. The war, insisted the Allies, would be decided not by campaigns or by battles, but by men, munitions, and trade. Thus Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, one of England's most prominent statesmen, with a sublime contempt for ephemeral German victories, might proclaim his belief that: "It is not necessary for us to win the war to push the German line back over all the territory they have absorbed, nor to pierce it. While the German lines extend far beyond their frontiers, while their flag flies over conquered capitals and subjected provinces, while all the appearances of military success greet their arms, Germany may be defeated more fatally in the second or third year of the war than if the Allied armies had entered Berlin in the first year." The factors upon which Mr. Churchill, in common with other Allied and proAlly observers, counted to ensure the Entente's final victory, may be briefly summarized under five heads. (1) Military manhood. The TurcoTeutonic coalition, if we may place confidence in the calculations of Mr. Hilaire Belloc, one of the most sanguine English historians of the war, was vainly striving by spectacular strategy to conceal the alarming wastage of its military manhood, while the Entente Powers were just

YEAR

To the close of the year 1915, the most impressive events of the War of the Nations were spectacular but incomplete demonstrations of German military supremacy. In 1914 Belgium and a considerable sector of Northern France had been overrun by German armies, but the French army, prudently commanded by General Joffre, had remained unshattered, and Calais had not been reached; in the summer of 1915 the Russian "steam-roller" had been trundled back from Galicia and from Russian Poland to the Riga-Dvinsk-Pripet Marshes line in a badly battered condition, but von Hindenburg had failed to win Dvinsk or Riga, and the Russian army, though defeated, was not annihilated; in the closing months of 1915 Bulgaria was won to the Turco-Teutonic coalition, Serbia was conquered, and the route opened up from Antwerp through Berlin, Vienna, Nish, and Sofia to Constantinople and even to Bagdad; but an Anglo-French army was left to entrench itself at Saloniki. Three gigantic offensives had won new laurels for the German generals and new territories for the Central Powers, but the Russian army was still able to stand at bay, the "contemptible" little British expeditionary force had been swelled by repeated reënforcements until it was a million strong, and General Joffre was planning a new Anglo-French forward movement for the spring of 1916. The German military machine had brilliantly proved its ability to carry out smashing, irresistible offensives; it had demonstrated its amazing mastery of the new science of trench warfare, which enabled numerically inferior German forces to hold General Joffre's "forward movements" in check; but it had not won the war. Hence it was not surprising that whereas statesmen and journalists in Germany expressed a puzzled inability to understand the stubborn refusal of the defeated Allies to sue for peace, orators and publicists in France and in England gave voice to the immutable conviction

Similarly Mr. Churchill affirmed: "At the outset of the war the number of males capable of bearing arms in Germany compared with the number in this country [Great Britain] was three to two. To-day our [the Allies'] numbers are greatly superior if we use them, and at the end of the second year the original proportion will probably be reversed. We are becoming, therefore, a continually stronger power actually and relatively so far as military manhood is concerned." It was upon the Allies' resources in men that the French military critics counted when they praised General Joffre's persistent war of attrition, which by pin-pricks would bleed the German army to death. Lord Derby's recruiting campaign, backed up by a compulsory military service bill, promised at last to place the full military strength of the British nation in the field. The Russian "hordes" would still probably suffice to recruit new Russian armies in replacement of those Grand Duke Nicholas had lost. The French with grim courage were sending mere striplings to the front. (2) Economic resources. Even should the Allies fail to overwhelm the Central Empires by sheer weight of numbers, it was believed that the failure of Germany's economic resources would bestow the final victory upon the financially invincible coalition of London and Paris. To the student of finance elaborate statistical reviews professed to prove the inevitable bankruptcy of Germany and the financial solidity of France and England. German economists, it is only fair to remark, published similar arrays of figures just as conclusively demonstrating the ability of Germany to endure to the end, thanks to the willingness of her patriotic citizens to invest in the government's war loans, and thanks to more efficient management of resources. Furthermore, the partisans of the Germanic Powers pointed out that the military successes of the Turco-Teutonic armies had immensely improved the economic situation of the Central Powers: the rich coal and iron regions

of Belgium and Northern France had been virtually annexed to Germany; the agricultural expanses and the industrial resources of Poland and other Russian provinces had been conquered; the herds and the copper mines of Serbia and the food-products of the Balkan countries had been made available by the conquest of Serbia; and the failure of the Anglo-French Dardanelles campaign had ensured the safety of German communications with the vast empire of Turkey in Asia, which if properly developed might supply Germany with much-needed stores of meat, oils, cotton, petroleum, and copper. (3) Naval supremacy. With increasing frequency as the war dragged on, allusion was made to the historic parallel of the present war, the contest between Napoleon's military might and Britain's naval supremacy. As sea-power at the beginning of the nineteenth century had overcome invincible armies then, so it was assumed that England's super-dreadnoughts would overcome Germany's armies in the twentieth century. Command of the seas enabled the Allies to utilize their own resources to the full, to preserve their own trade, to "capture" German trade, and to institute a virtual blockade of Germany. Germany's attempt to break the blockade by means of submarines had failed. It remained to be seen whether German efficiency, which had already staved off a food crisis, could so wisely regulate the economic life of the nation, and so advantageously exploit the resources of Belgium, Poland, the Balkans, and Asiatic Turkey, that the British navy would be unable to reverse the victories of German armies. (4) Diplomacy. At the close of the year public opinion in Allied countries definitely counted upon and expectantly awaited the intervention of new Allies against the Central Powers. Above all, Rumania was momentarily expected to enter the war, to conquer from Austria-Hungary at least part of the coveted provinces of Bukovina, Transylvania, and the Banat. The Germans, on the other hand, seemed to be confident that Rumania's neutrality, if not her sympathy, had been secured by Teutonic diplomacy. Furthermore, Sweden showed some signs of irritation against British contraband rules, and journalists speculated on the possibility of Sweden's intervention on the German side. (5) Finally, the spokesmen of the Allied Powers continued to voice the hope that the military and governmental authorities of the Central Powers would be handicapped by a revulsion of popular sentiment against the war and against "Prussian militarism"; that the Slavic nationalities in Austria-Hungary would refuse to fight for a distasteful government; and that the Arabs would rebel against the Turks, and the more conservative and reasonable elements in Turkey would become disgusted with Enver Pasha's "Young Turk" clique. To be sure, the enthusiastic valor of the Teutonic and Turkish armies proved that the popular discontent with "German militarism" was less universal than had been supposed; but reports of Socialist demonstrations in Germany, of popular insurrections in Austria-Hungary (see AUSTRIA-HUNGARY), and of unrest in Turkey, bolstered up the conviction of the Allies that in defending the cause of "liberty, democracy, and humanity," against Prussian "militarism" and Turkish "barbarism," they might to some extent enlist the sympathy of the "oppressed masses" in

the Central Powers and Turkey. If, on the whole, the year had disappointed the Allies' hopes of serious popular insubordination in the Central Powers, it had likewise disappointed the Germans' expectation of Moslem revolutions in India and in Egypt. Summing up the situa tion at the end of the year, then, the hackneyed statement may be once more reaffirmed that the war had become a war of resources, but with this modification, that the relative resources of the contending coalitions of the Powers might be considerably and even decisively altered by great German victories or defeats, and by "imponderable" political factors.

IX. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

In the light of the foregoing discussion, the futility of negotiations for peace during the year 1915 should be patent. Recurrent rumors from Rome throughout the year affirmed that the Pope, through the instrumentality of Teutonic, French, and Belgian cardinals, was indefatigably laboring to bring the lamentable European conflict to a speedy and happy termination; but no authoritative statement of His Holiness' activities in this field has yet been vouchsafed to the public, and the arrangement for the mutual exchange of hopelessly crippled soldiers between the belligerents remained the only well-verified achievement of papal diplomacy. Moreover, not to mention the Socialists' pacific propaganda (see SOCIALISM), the chival ric voyage of Mr. Henry Ford, with a band of adventurous pacificists, from America, with the altruistic object of persuading the unhappy nations of Europe to desist from their insensate conflict, must at least be mentioned in this connection, although it failed to achieve its aim. The Teutonic Powers appeared to be ready for peace on their own terms; and Italy seemed to lack determination in the war; but, before peace could be made in Europe, either France and England must undo the Teutonic victories of 1914-15, or Germany must, by new and more ambitious campaigns, bring Great Britain to defeat or compromise.

X. BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE. The following bibliography is offered, not as an exhaustive catalogue of war literature, but simply as a guide to assist the casual reader in selecting a few of the most useful and most valuable of the countless books, pamphlets, and articles which have been written about the war. For more extensive bibliographies, and for notices of new publications, the reader is referred to F. W. T. Lange and W. T. Berry: Books on the Great War (London, Grafton and Co., 1915-), an annotated bibliography appearing serially; Library of Congress: List of References on Europe. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 15 cents); G. W. Prothero: List of Publications Bearing on the War (London, Central Committee, Patriotic Organizations, 1915); the Book Review Digest, a current guide to new books; the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature (monthly); the Library World; and the New York Times Book Review (weekly).

HANDBOOKS OF THE WAR. Of the many handbooks containing general information about the war, some are hasty and inaccurate compila

a

Pamphlets) and Politische Flugschriften (Political Pamphlets) lay the burden of guilt upon the Allies. Some of the best statements of the case against Germany are: E. P. Barker and other members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History, Why We Are at War: Great Britain's Case; James M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case (New York, Putnam's, 1914); E. J. Dillon, A Scrap of Paper (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1914); H. A. L. Fisher, The War, Its Causes and Its Issues (Longmans, 1914); Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany (Manchester University Press, 1914); J. Holland Rose, The Origins of the War (Cambridge University Press, 1914); and A. B. Hart, The War in Europe, Its Causes and Results (New York, Appleton, 1914). The most striking indictment of the German government purports to have been written by a German; the volume was originally published in Lausanne with the title, J'accuse: von einem Deutschen, and has since been translated into French and into English. Germany's War Mania: The Teutonic Point of View as Officially Stated by Her Leaders (Dodd, Mead and Company) is a valuable collection of significant utterances by German public men. Germania contra Mundum, brochure by Earl Cromer, sets forth the views of a noted British "empire-builder" as to what Great Britain is fighting for and against. The Spirit of the Allied Nations (Macmillan, 1915), edited by Sidney Low, is a more comprehensive statement of the anti-German viewpoint. For profound discussions of the pernicious influence which German philosophy is alleged to have exerted, consult Prof. J. Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics (New York, Holt, 1915), and J. H. Muirhead, German Philosophy in Relation to the War (L. Murray, 1915). The German version of the diplomacy that led up to the war has been most ably presented by Hans F. Helmolt, Die geheime Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges (Leipzig, K. F. Koehler, 1914). Paul Rohrbach, Germany's Isolation (Chicago, McClurg, 1915, translated from the German), and Col. H. Fobenius, Germany's Hour of Destiny (preface by Prof. W. R. Shepherd) argue that the Allies endangered the peace of Europe by endeavoring to isolate Germany diplomatically and to impose restrictions upon her economic expansion. J. W. Burgess, The European War of 1914: Its Causes, Purposes, and Probable Results, is a vigorous justification of Germany, written by an eminent American scholar. Gen. Friedrich von Bernhardi, whose explanations of How Germany Makes War and forecasts of Germany and the Next War have operated so powerfully against the German cause, has replied to his critics in a new volume, Germany and England (New York, Dillingham, 1915). C. L. Droste has compiled a comprehensive indictment of the Allies, consisting of Documents on the War of the Nations from Neutral and Anti-German Sources (Richmond, Dietz).

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. The subject of Belgian neutrality is touched upon by many of the above mentioned controversialists. For more thorough expositions, the reader is referred to The Case of Belgium, by the Belgian delegates to the United States (Macmillan, 1914); Emile Waxweiler, La Belgique neutre et loyale (Lausanne, Payot, 1915); and La neutralité de la Belgique (preface by Paul Ay

mans, official publication of the Belgian government). The German contention that Belgian neutrality had been violated before the German invasion is best presented by Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium (New York, Funk, 1915).

MILITARY OPERATIONS. The best military histories of the war have been noted in the section Continued Histories and Collections (supra). Among the Daily Telegraph War Books and in the Oxford Pamphlets will be found fairly detailed narratives of campaigns and battles, such as A. N. Hilditch, The Stand of Liége; H. W. C. Davis, The Battle of the Marne and the Aisne; Edmund Dane, The Battle of the Rivers; Percy Standing, The First Campaign in Russian Poland. G. H. Ferris has a volume describing the Campaign of 1914 in France and Belgium (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1915). Germany in Defeat is a decidedly biased sketch of the military operations through the battle of the Marne, by Count Charles de Souza and Major H. Macfall. Stanley Washburn's Field Notes from the Russian Front (London, Melrose, 1915), supplemented by his more recent volume, The Russian Campaign (Scribner's, 1915), brings the story of the operations in the Eastern theatre of war down to the fall of Warsaw. For vivid and impressionistic accounts of military operations, one may read Richard Harding Davis, With the Allies (London, Duckworth, 1915); Dr. Sven A. Hedin, With the German Armies in the West (London, Lane, 1915); Stanley Washburn (supra); Frank Fox, The Agony of Belgium (London, Hutchinson, 1915); R. Dunn, Five Fronts: On the Firing-Lines with English, French, Austrian, German, and Russian Troops (New York, Dodd, Mead and Co.); or Frederick Palmer's realistic portrayal of life in the trenches, My Year of the Great War (Dodd, Mead and Co.). Granville Fortescue has written graphic stories of his adventures in At the Front with Three Armies (London, Melrose, 1915), and of the Dardanelles operations. One of the most widely read journalistic descriptions of the war is Eye-Witness's Narrative of the War: From the Marne to Neuve Chapelle, September, 1914, to March, 1915 (London, Arnold, 1915). For special topics, the following books are useful: J. K. O'Connor, The Afrikander Rebellion (London, Allen and Unwin, 1915); Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa; F. S. Burnell, Australia versus Germany (London, Allen and Unwin, 1915); R. Granville Baker, The Passing of the Turkish Empire in Europe (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1915); Marion I. Newbigin, Geographical_Aspects of Balkan Problems (New York, Putnam); H. C. Woods, War and Diplomacy in the Balkans (London, The Field, 1915); Noel and C. R. Buxton, The War and the Balkans (London, Allen and Unwin, 1915); Anon., The Dardanelles: Their Story and Their Significance in the Great War (London, Melrose, 1915). The atrocities committed by the troops of the belligerent nations have been made the subject of investigations, pamphlets, official reports, and official denials, too numerous to be included in this list.

OFFICIAL DISPATCHES. For the operations of the British troops in France the collected Despatches of Field Marshal Sir John French, which have been published in several different editions, furnish an authoritative source.

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