because of their local character would be beyond its jurisdiction. Most serious however is the consideration that although security may be attained through federation it is gained only at a sacrifice of liberty. The scope it allows to individuality is provincial rather than national. The measure of state autonomy which federation permits is far short of national independence. Imperial federation would probably carry with it for a period at least British ascendency owing to the inevitable preponderance of Britain in a federal parliament. Apart from the fear of ascendency however, which possibly is only an imaginary danger, the dominion federalists have met a reluctance on the part of their people to surrender any part of the national autonomy now enjoyed.

At a meeting of the British Empire League in Toronto, in May, 1901, the premier of Ontario discussed this question. "In a federated parliament of the British empire, Canada would be subjected," he declared, "to the decisions of the representatives of all parts of the empire of men, that is to say, who have no knowledge of our social conditions or of our national aspirations." In the opinion of Mr. Asselin, the French-Canadian nationalist, "the idea of an imperial parliament legislating, even on some subjects only, for all the British realms, may appeal to the imagination, but no one as yet has shown how such legislation could be passed without the bigger and more powerful partners overriding the will, now of this, now of that colony."

Although the attitude of the dominions has been characterized as one of narrow pride in nationality rather than one of largesouled allegiance to the empire, the fact continues to stand forth stubbornly that the spirit of colonial nationalism cannot be ignored.

The conception of Britannic alliance, on the other hand, rests, in the opinion of Mr. Jebb, on "the theory that in democratic communities the integrating force which tends to make them organic is not the compulsive power of a central government but the conscious sense of mutual aid." It is urged that the growing unification of economic interests is tending automatically to bring into being an expanding and permanent basis for empire

coöperation. Thus would disappear the necessity of any "overriding" imperial authority. Under this scheme there would be no call for any dramatic act of constitution-making, bringing in its wake a new imperial government. It would involve the process of deliberately continuing developments already well begun, supplemented by a further elaboration of the imperial conference to serve as a central organization. No less an imperialist than Lord Milner himself has outlined his ultimate ideal for the empire as "a union in which the several states, each entirely independent in its separate affairs, should all coöperate for common purposes on the basis of absolute unqualified equality of status."

To illustrate the underlying contrast between the two imperialistic policies, in question, allusion may be ventured to a hypothetical situation pictured by Mr. Jebb. We are asked to assume that Great Britain has resolved to enforce its treaty rights with China to compel the latter to continue to receive Indian opium so long as any opium is being produced in China itself. The procedure that normally would ensue under the operation of the Britannic alliance plan may first be outlined. In this scheme as already implied there would be no federal parliament. The British foreign secretary, who, by hypothesis, having made up his mind that China must be coerced, requests the Canadian and Australasian ministers to confer at once with him with a view to assembling the several units of the Pacific fleet in Chinese waters. The naval units of the Pacific, in the alliance scheme, would naturally constitute a part of the fleets of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The British secretary having pointed out the "emergency" would request the dominion ministers to cable their respective governments for the requisite orders in council, to make possible immediate action. "These ministers, however, would unanimously refuse," says Mr. Jebb, "to recommend the mobilization of the Pacific fleet for a purpose so repugnant to the national instincts of their people." Some other policy must be found, they insist. According to the federalists this would precipitate the much-feared end, the disruption of the empire, which they have insisted would be the ultimate conse

quence of the "separate navy" policy. Autonomists, however, the advocates of the alliance plan, fall back on a larger faith.

Under imperial federation the policy to be followed in meeting the assumed emergency would be determined in the federal parliament. Notwithstanding the opposition of the dominion representatives to the proposed exploitation of China the majority vote of the parliament would carry the day. On their return to their respective countries the dominion statesmen would attempt to soothe popular indignation by explaining that individual conviction must be sacrificed in behalf of "imperial interests." Such a contingency giving rise to a genuine dissatisfaction in the dominions over their empire status might the more swiftly hasten the very end which the federalist would avert.

Probably the most impressive charge against the principle of Britannic alliance is that technically it is inferior to centralization; theoretically yielding less naval strength, for example, for the same expenditure of money and rendering less certain the availability of all the fleet units in a moment of emergency. On the other hand, however, national patriotism as compared with imperial compulsion may properly be deemed a superior factor of efficiency. An empire which is to have any reality "cannot be maintained by pressure from the center on the circumference" but must exist and flourish by the spontaneous desire of the component parts to remain in a definite relation to the parent state by accepting the implied obligations. In brief this expresses the creed of the believer in Britannic alliance. He would add that if the dominions are to remain indefinitely in the empire it must be because none of them would have occasion to wish to leave it. This proposal possesses the additional advantage over imperial federation of being essentially in accord with recent developments within the empire.

THE CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS OF TODAY

WILDER H. HAINES

Cambridge, Mass.

The convening of the 64th congress makes timely a brief discussion of the organization and operation of the Democratic caucus system in the house of representatives during the last two congresses; since the Democratic party remains in control of the present congress, it is to be presumed that the past caucus system will be continued in substantially the same form.

The caucus system used in the 62d and 63d congresses was adopted by the Democrats, upon their accession to control of the house in 1910, to replace Cannonism, which had become of ill repute among the voters, and which had been partly overthrown at the preceding session. The unwieldy size of the house, as well as the exigencies of party, required some extra-legal machinery to coördinate and direct the action of the members; the substitute chosen by the Democratic leaders was an adaptation of the senate caucus, formerly known as Aldrichism. The essence of Cannonism had been the control of the house by the speaker through his power of appointment of committees and his domination of the rules committee, backed by the power of the majority party caucus; the essence of the new system is direct control of legislative action by the caucus itself.

As at present constituted, the Democratic caucus is composed of all members of the majority party in the house. For the election of caucus officers and for the nomination of candidates for house officers, a majority of those voting binds the entire caucus; on questions of policy Rule 7 of the Democratic caucus rules reads:

"In deciding upon action in the house involving party policy or principle, a two-thirds vote of those present and voting at a caucus meeting shall bind all members of the caucus; provided,

the said two-thirds vote is a majority of the full Democratic membership of the house, and provided further, that no member shall be bound upon questions involving a construction of the Constitution of the United States or upon which he made contrary pledges to his constituents prior to his election or received contrary instructions by resolutions or platform from his nominating authority."

If a member decides not to be bound by the caucus on any question, he must notify the caucus in advance.

According to what has become the custom, shortly after the congressional elections those members of the congress then in existence who have been reëlected convene in a caucus; elect the caucus chairman, the party candidate for speaker, and the party floorleader for the coming session; and appoint the Democratic members of the ways and means committee a committee on committees to arrange all Democratic committee-assignments. In this action the newly elected members of course have no part, since their congress does not meet until nearly a year later; the caucus positions are thus easily dictated by the old leaders who have been reëlected. The caucus meets once more, a few days before the opening of the new congress, to consider the other side of caucus organization-the distribution of patronage among its members, to appoint a representative to confer with a Republican representative on the committee-assignments of the minority party, and probably also to define the legislative program for the session. The caucus is then ready for business.

Among the actual instruments which the caucus uses to control the legislative action of the house the basis is of course the

1 Lawmaking in America, by Lynn Haines, p. 10.

2 E.g. The resolution offered by Underwood of Alabama, floorleader: "Resolved, That the Democratic members of the various committees of the house are directed not to report to the house during the first session of the 62d congress, unless hereafter directed by this caucus, any legislation except with reference to the following matters." (Caucus Journal, April 1, 1911.)

N.B. It is interesting to note that the average attendance at the caucus of the 63d congress for consideration of important matters was 65 per cent of the membership of the caucus; that therefore 132 votes (out of 291 members) was the normal two-thirds majority for controlling party policies; and that 16 southern states had exactly 132 representatives.