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division from North Carolina. There was sharp fighting during the ensu

an, had been occupied and fortified for the Union not long after the recovery of Norfolk, and a fight had occurred" at Kelly's Store, eight miles south of it, between a Rebel force under Gen. Roger A. Pryor and a Union expedition under Gen. M. Corcoran, wherein both sides claimed the advantage. Our loss was 24 killed and 80 wounded. Pryor reports that his loss "will not exceed 50;" among them Col. Poage, 5th Virginia, and Capt. Dobbins, killed. Suffolk was never seriously threatened till the Spring of 1863, when Longstreet advanced" against it with a force which Peck estimates at 40,000: 24,000 (three divisions) having been drawn from Lee's army; while D. H. Hill had brought a full

ter and of naval cöoperation on our side overbalanced that of superior numbers; and every attempt to break through our rather extended lines was decidedly repulsed. A Rebel battery having been planted near the west branch of the Nansemond, it was stormed and carried by Gen. Getty, with the 8th Connecticut and 89th New York, aided by Lt. Lamson and our gunboats: 6 guns and 200 prisoners being the net profit. Still, the siege was prosecuted, with no decided success, until May 3d; when Longstreet gave it up and drew off-doubtless under orders given by Lee when he seemed most in need of help on the Rappahannock. Peck estimates the Rebel loss during the siege at 2,000 men; while ours was inconsiderable.

tain and the Antietam? Grant was beginning to be triumphant in Mississippi, and would soon be thundering at the gates of Vicksburg; Dick Taylor, chased almost out of Louisiana by Banks, could do little toward the rescue of threatened Port Hudson: why not spare Longstreet to needy, beseeching Jo. Johnston, enabling him to overwhelm Grant and then to crush out Banks, restoring the Confederate ascendency on the Mississippi, while simply holding on along the Rappahannock, trusting to the great advantages afforded to the defensive by the rugged topography of that region, and to the terrors inspired by the memories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville?

In fact, Lee's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania at that juncture was justifiable on political grounds alone. The Confederate chiefs must have acted on the strength of trusted assurances that the Northern Peace Democracy, detesting the Emancipation policy now steadfastly ascendant at Washington, and weary of high taxes, dear fabrics, a disordered currency, and an enormous yet swelling National Debt, were ripe for revolt: so that a Rebel victory on Northern soil would enable the devotees of Slavery in the loyal States to seize upon the pending Conscription and wield it as an engine of revolution. Lee hints this obscurely where, in the opening of his report on this campaign, after trying to give military reasons for his movement, and failing to satisfy himself of their plausibility, he says:

"In addition to these results, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained

by military success."

1

A month had barely elapsed since Hooker recrossed the Rappahannock, when Lee put his columns in motion up the southern bank of that river. McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps led the march from Freder icksburg, followed' by Ewell's corps; while Hood moved up from the Rapidan; all concentrating, with the cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, on Culpepper Court House. These movements were of course carefully screened from observation on our side; A. P. Hill's corps being left to make as much display as possible in and around Fredericksburg: but Hooker was soon aware that something unusual was in progress, and threw over Gen. Howe's division of the 6th corps a little below the city, to ascertain if the enemy were still in force there. Hill soon convinced him that they were; creating an impres sion that there had been no material reduction of the Rebel strength in that quarter; but, as it was not his policy to fight, and Howe did not care to attack the entire Rebel army, there was no serious conflict. Howe, after some careful skirmishing, desisted, and ultimately withdrew without loss.

It being at length clear that the enemy were operating on our right, Hooker massed his cavalry near Catlett's Station, giving its command to Pleasanton, who speedily prepared to look across the Rappahannock and see what was going on there. He was backed by two small but choice brigades of infantry under Gen. Ames, of the 11th, and Gen. Russell, of the 6th corps, each taking a battery; and the whole moved quietly down to Kelly's and to Beverly

5

fords, six miles apart, where they were to cross in two divisions, and advance on Culpepper C. H. (alias Fairfax), where J. E. B. Stuart was understood to be. But scarcely had Gen. Buford's cavalry, supported by Ames's infantry, crossed' Beverly ford, when they were sharply engaged; the Rebel ferry guard, whom they had hoped to surprise, falling back on Jones's cavalry brigade, encamped just behind, and checking our advance until these could mount and charge; when the 8th New York was routed with loss, and Col. B. F. Davis, its commander, killed. The 8th Illinois cavalry, now charging, drove the enemy back in disorder: meantime, Gen. Russell brought over his infantry, and Pleasanton directed him to engage them in front, while Buford, with the cavalry, should strike them in flank. The charge was made with spirit by the 6th Pennsylvania, supported by the 5th and 6th regulars; but, just as the 6th had reached the enemy's guns, it was charged in turn by two regiments of Rebel cavalry which burst from the woods on its flank, and routed with heavy loss.

Pleasanton now found himself in a hornets' nest. Every moment increased the force in his front, which had an infantry corps at hand to draw upon; while Gregg, who had crossed at Kelly's ford, and had sent word at 8 A. M. that he would soon be up, did not make his appearance till afternoon. The fight was therefore allowed to drag, in this quarter; each side covering itself with woods and shelling or sharp-shooting, as oppor

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tunity offered, until about 1 P. M., when Gregg came up. He had been fighting pretty steadily all the morning, charging and being charged in turn, and had crowded his antagonists back to Brandy Station, where, Col. Wyndham reported, they were bringing up infantry in railroad cars. Gregg's cavalry had fought well, and taken 150 prisoners, but had lost heavily. The two divisions were now connected, and the Rebels in their immediate front pushed back; two regiments narrowly escaping capture. And now Pleasanton saw that he must begin to fall back or prepare to fight half of Lee's army; so he retreated to the fords and recrossed about dark; having lost about 500 men, and brought off over 100 prisoners.

J. E. B. Stuart (who of course claims the result as his victory) admits a loss of over 600 of his cavalry in this affair, including Col. Saul Williams, 2d N. C., and Lt. Col. Frank Hampton, 2d S. C., killed; Gen. W. H. F. Lee and Cols. Butler and Harman being among his wounded. He claims 3 guns and a good many small arms captured; and an unofficial Rebel account says they took 336 prisoners, including wounded.

Considered as a reconnoissance in force, Pleasanton's expedition was a decided success. There was no longer any doubt-if there had been till now-that the Rebel army was in this quarter, and tending westward. There had been a grand review of all the cavalry of the army at Culpepper Court House, a few days before; Gen. Lee and his staff being present. Pleasanton sent over next

ing Longstreet's ammunition train on his way to Pennsylvania. Among our wounded here was Col. Percy Wyndham.

day to ascertain the fate of some of his missing officers, and received for answer that every thing had been done for our wounded that humanity dictates, but that they could hold no further communication with him save by truce-boat on the James. Nevertheless, it was already ascertained by our reconnoissance that a Rebel column of infantry and artillery, moving westward, had been three hours and a half in passing through Sperryville, near the Blue Ridge; so that the Rebel army must be making its way into the Shenandoah Valley once more.

Two days later, 250 Rebel cavalry dashed across the Potomac at Edwards's ferry, driving back part of the 6th Michigan cavalry, picketing the river, and burning their camp-recrossing, of course, but making no haste to quit that neighborhood. It was clear that active hostilities in that direction were meditated.

6

Still, Howe's division remained across the lower Rappahannock, well intrenched, as were the Rebels in its front; and Gen. Hooker, though he had begun to send his sick and wounded to Washington, lingered on the Rappahannock, as if doubtful of Lee's real purpose, and expecting to find him advancing by Warrenton to Bull Run; when a blow was struck that dissipated all reasonable doubt.

Gen. R. H. Milroy was in command in the Valley, holding Winchester, under Gen. Schenck as department commander at Baltimore, to whom Halleck had suggested that Milroy's position seemed perilous; he having too many men to lose, yet not enough to insure his safety. His entire force numbered some 10,000

⚫ June 12.

men, whereof 7,000 may have been considered effective. Of these, one brigade, Col. A. T. McReynolds, was thrown out on his right, holding Berryville, observing the adjacent passes of the Blue Ridge and fords of the Shenandoah; while his cavalry scouts patroled the Valley so far as Front Royal and Strasburg. So early as June 1st, he felt that the enemy holding the Valley above him were inclined to crowd; and, on the 12th, he sent out a strong reconnoissance on either road to ascertain what this meant. That on the Strasburg road went nearly to Middletown, where its troopers decoyed a Rebel cavalry patrol into an ambush, and routed it with a loss of 50 killed and wounded and 37 prisoners. Col. Shawl returned to Winchester, and reported no force on that road which had not been there for months.

On the Front Royal road, the 12th Pennsylvania cavalry, Lt.-Col. Moss, 400 strong, went only to Cedarville, 12 miles, and returned, reporting that they had been stopped by a large Rebel force; but Milroy refused to credit the story; insisting that they had been too easily frightened, and that, if any such force could be there, he should have heard of its approach from Hooker or Halleck; nevertheless, he advised McReynolds to look sharp. sharp. Next morning,' however, his patrols on the Front Royal road reported the enemy advancing in force; whereupon, Milroy signaled McReynolds to join him, while he sent out a considerable force on either road to learn what was brewing.

They had not far to go. Col. Ely, on the Front Royal road, was stopped barely a mile from Winchester,

'June 13.