sent later by a special messenger. Such extraordinary haste, after the matter had been pending for five or six years, was based on a twofold ground: first, the very decided stand taken by President Grant in his message to Congress; second, the Franco-Prussian War. In reference to the latter, Lord Granville had said in the House of Lords that there was "cause to look with solicitude on the uneasy relations of the British Government with the United States and the inconvenience thereof in case of possible complications in Europe."

This covered the case exactly. If England had become embroiled in that European war, and the "Alabama Claims" had yet remained unsettled, irreparable damage would no doubt have resulted to British commerce; for this Government could not have been expected to take the trouble to prevent armed vessels hostile to England from being fitted out in American harbors.

The Treaty of Washington

The Joint High Commission was composed of men of the highest character and standing in

the two nations.1 They began their sittings early in March, met thirty-four times, finished and signed the treaty on May the 8th. It was ratified by the Senate the same month, by the British Government in June, and was proclaimed in force by President Grant on the 4th of July.

The Treaty of Washington provided for the settlement of the fisheries question between the United States and Canada, for the settlement of the northwest boundary of the United States, for the adjustment of English claims against America, and above all for settling of the longstanding irritating question of the Alabama Claims. It is with this last, which, however, stood first in the treaty, that we have to deal. In the first place the British Commissioners, authorized by the Queen, expressed the regret of her Majesty's Government for the escape of the Alabama and other vessels from British

1 The United States was represented by Hamilton Fish, secretary of state, Robert C. Schenk, Samuel Nelson, E. R. Hoar, and G. H. Williams; Great Britain was represented by Earl de Grey and Ripon, Sir Stafford Northcote, Sir Edward Thornton, Sir John A. Macdonald, and Professor Montague Bernard.

ports and for the depredations committed by those vessels. This was followed by the adoption of three rules, which, it was agreed, should have a retroactive, or ex post facto effect, so as to apply to the case in hand.

The rules in substance were as follows: A neutral nation is bound, first, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessels intended to make war upon a nation with which it is at peace; second, it must not permit either belligerent to use its ports or waters as a base of naval operations against the other; third, it must exercise due diligence within its jurisdiction to prevent any violation of the above named duties.

The treaty then provided for a Court of Arbitration to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, and to be composed of five persons, no two of whom should belong to the same country.

The Geneva Conference

Of the five men composing the Court of Arbitration at Geneva, one each was appointed by the President of the United States, the Queen of England, the King of Italy, the Em

peror of Brazil, and the President of the Swiss Republic. President Grant appointed to represent our country Charles Francis Adams, ex-minister to England, the son of a former President and the grandson of another. Sir Alexander Cockburn, lord chief justice of England, became the British representative. The King of Italy appointed Count Sclopis of Turin, a man of an eminent family, a distinguished lawyer, judge, and man of letters, whose reputation covered all Europe. The President of the Swiss Republic chose Jacques Staempfli, and the Emperor of Brazil the Viscount d'Itajuba, his minister to Paris. These men were all of the highest respectability and eminence in their respective countries. A few of them enjoyed a world-wide fame. It was generally believed that their decision, whatever it might be, would be accepted as final by the two countries interested.

The first session of the tribunal took place on December 15, 1871, and Count Sclopis was selected as chairman. The claims put forth by Bancroft Davis, the agent for the United States were based on the actual

damage done by the cruisers in question, the enhanced insurance rates caused by the greater peril to United States shipping, the cost of pursuing the Confederate cruisers, and the transfer of American vessels to the British flag. In addition to these, there was a claim for damages on account of the prolongation of the war, caused by the negligence of the British Government. This last was called "indirect claims" for "consequential" damages. This claim was by no means so extravagant as that of Senator Sumner; but nevertheless it was enough to raise a storm of protest in England. The more conservative Americans agreed that this indirect or consequential claim was not warranted by the facts in the

case.

While the British public was in a furor of excitement over the claim, and the Americans, half-hearted, seemed to regret having made it, the Geneva tribunal ended the suspense by throwing it out as "not good foundation for an award of compensation or computation of damages," and both countries breathed freer. It also decided that no compensation be