hands the disposal of the benefits of protection, and it is certain that the laborer too frequently does not receive his rightful share. Many manufacturers raise the price of their products to the highest point that the tariff will admit, and then keep down wages even to the extent of employing foreign contract labor. If the products of labor are protected, why should not labor be protected by the same power? As an example of the evils of over-protection let us cite here an instance. Soon after the Civil War the great copper mines of Lake Superior began to be developed. These are the richest copper mines in the world, and in consequence the American people should have been supplied with copper at a lower rate than any other people, but just the reverse is true. Why? In 1869 the owners of these mines asked a higher tariff on copper while in truth no protection whatever was needed owing to the richness of the mines and the cost of transportation from other countries. Through the means of a powerful lobby they secured a very high tariff in spite of the President's veto. Whereupon straightway the mineowners banded together and raised the price of

copper to almost double its former price. For many years thereafter the people paid two dollars, or very nearly, for every dollar's worth of copper they used. Where did the extra dollar go? Not to the Government, for the tariff was prohibitory and yielded no revenue: not to the workmen who operated the mines, for they received no higher wages than did railway employes and many others who are not protected by the tariff. It went into the pockets of the rich mine-owners-and so great was the yield of the mines that copper was actually shipped to foreign countries and sold at a lower price than in America! This alone proves that the American people were the victims of extortion. Why should a self-governing, intelligent people tax themselves so heavily on a widely used commodity for the sole benefit of a few multi-millionaires? Is this protection? The only imaginable explanation is found in the assumption that the people do not study the subject of protection critically. If lumber, for example, is highly protected by our tariff, what are the results? The wages of a few thousand lumbermen, a majority of whom are Ca

nadians,1 are doubtless a little higher than they would be otherwise, but the chief advantage falls to the very few millionaire owners of the forests. But there are other results. Not only are our forests depleted more rapidly than they should be, but the price of lumber is raised to a point much above its normal value, and this affects every man who builds or rents a house, or uses furniture or anything made of wood. As James G. Blaine said, "Whenever the frontiersman undertakes to make himself a home, he needs lumber for his cabin, for his fence, for his cart, for his plough. He needs lumber for almost every purpose of his daily life."2 Protection is truly a blessing if discriminately applied; but if not applied with discriminating judgment, it may become a burden grievous to be borne.

The First American Tariffs

We now come to the main subject of this chapter a brief survey of the tariff during our National period.

1 Strange's "Farmer's Tariff Manual," p. 236.

2 Speech in the House, June 10, 1868.

During the period between the Revolution and the adopting of the Constitution, the old Congress attempted more than once to lay a duty on foreign imports for the purpose of raising money with which to pay the Revolutionary debt; but under the Articles of Confederation no such measure could become a law without the consent of every State,1 and in no case could this be secured. In 1782 a five per cent impost duty was proposed. Twelve of the States agreed to this; but one-Rhode Island - refused, and the whole project had to fall to the ground. Again the next year a desperate effort was made to relieve the financial situation by a tariff limited to twenty-five years. The time limit was attached in the hope that this feature would be an inducement to any reluctant State to join in the project. Twelve again agreed, including Rhode Island, but New York refused, and not a dollar could be raised by this means. But these fruitless attempts were useful in bringing about a new . Constitution by showing the people how impotent was Congress in governing the country.

1 See "Side Lights," Vol. I. p. 31.

No sooner had the new Constitution gone into operation than the people turned their attention to the deplorable financial condition of the country. The first important act of the First Congress was the enactment of the tariff of 1789, which was completed and sent to the President on the 4th of July, and soon after went into effect. No refractory State among the thirteen could now prevent this needful legislation, and it was not long until the financial condition was greatly improved.

This tariff of 1789 was exceedingly moderate compared with our tariffs of recent times. The average duty on dutiable goods was about eight and a half per cent. The highest duty, that on carriages, was fifteen per cent. The question is often debated as to whether this tariff was laid for revenue only, or for protection also. The great object of this tariff was to raise revenue; but it is certain that it was meant for protection also, as stated in the preamble. The protective feature was fully debated at the time of its passage. The object, of the protection aimed at, however, was not so much to foster new industries for their own