sake as to encourage the manufacture within the country of articles necessary in time of war. This is recommended by Washington in his first message to Congress. In 1792 Hamilton submitted a powerful argument to Congress in favor of protection, but it did not seem to have much effect on legislation, for the old duties remained with little change until the War of 1812. Of manufacturing in the United States, except home manufacture for family use, there was almost none until 1808, when suddenly a radical and permanent change was wrought. Our greatness as a manufacturing nation takes its rise from this date.

The change was brought about by the English Orders in Council and by the Milan and Berlin decrees of Napoleon, which forced the embargo; and this was followed by the nonintercourse act of 1809, which in turn was soon followed by the War of 1812. This series of events, which amounted to a prohibitive tariff, covered several years and became a twofold stimulus to domestic manufacturing. First, it brought about a dearth of commodities that had hitherto been imported; second, it set

free thousands of men along the seaboard who had been engaged in commercial pursuits. These commodities must now be made at home and these men must have employment, and it was not long until they were busily engaged in the new occupations. The manufacturing of cotton and woollen goods, of pottery, glass, and iron wares soon spread over New England, and busy workshops were to be found in every town and village.

By the time peace came in 1815 manufacturing had become an important industry of the people, and they called upon Congress to protect by tariff laws what had been protected before by the embargo and the war. This call was answered by the enactment of the tariff of 1816. This tariff raised duties generally to an average of about twenty per cent,1 and, unlike its predecessor, the protective feature became the chief feature, and the raising of revenue was relegated to a second place. The protection afforded seems to have been ample, as the new manufactories continued to grow and flourish. The statement often made

1 Taussig's "Tariff History," p. 19.

that this tariff was too low for protection and a want of higher duties resulted in the financial panic of 1818 seems without foundation. This panic came from other causes, the principal one being the natural reaction of the disturbed condition during the war and of the inflated currency incident on the reëstablishing of the United States Bank.1 The fact that the cotton spindles in operation increased from 130,000 to 220,000 in the five years between 1815 and 1820 shows that the tariff could not have produced the panic.

It

It was about this time, however, that a protection wave swept over the country. All sorts of industries called upon Congress to protect them. Congress in response framed a tariff bill increasing the duties very materially. passed the Lower House, but was defeated in the Senate by a single vote. This was in 1820. The clamor for protection did not subside, and four years later a tariff known as the tariff of 1824 passed both Houses and became law. The duties were raised very considerably above those of the old tariff; those on cotton and

1 Benton gives this view.

woollen goods from twenty-five to thirty-three and one-third per cent1 while the duties on iron, hemp, lead, and many other articles were increased. This tariff was not a party measure, most of the leading statesmen, Clay, Adams, Jackson, Crawford, and others, favoring it.

It is curious to note that the North and the South changed places on the tariff question during the fifteen years following the War of 1812. The South at first favored protection, while the North advocated a low tariff or free trade. These conditions were exactly reversed before 1830. The cause of this gymnastic feat of the two sections is not far to seek. The South at first expected to work its own cotton and would have protection. But it was discovered that slave labor wanted the necessary intelligence to engage in manufacturing, nor could free labor flourish by the side of slave labor. The South, therefore, was forced to sell its raw cotton and to buy its manufactured articles, and with free trade it could buy them more cheaply than otherwise. Hence the

1 This protection to woollens was partly offset by a duty of thirty per cent on raw wool.

change of doctrine. The North, on the other hand, especially New England, was first engaged in shipping and desired that commerce with Europe be as free as possible. But New England grew into a manufacturing centre and thus came to favor a protective tariff.

The "Tariff of Abominations"

In midsummer, 1827, a National convention of manufacturers was held in Harrisburg for the purpose of advocating a general increase of protective duties. About a hundred men were present, representing many of the States. They framed a tariff bill to be urged upon Congress, each manufacturer fixing the duty on his particular goods without regard to the interests of anybody else. This became a model for the tariff of 1828, known as the "Tariff of Abominations." In its passage, this bill was certainly an anomalous piece of legislation. A majority of the committee that framed it were opposed to high protection, and they fixed the rates ridiculously high on raw materials and on articles that needed no higher protection, on the supposition that the

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