followed. Cleveland was defeated, and the Republicans took their success as a mandate from the people to raise the tariff. The McKinley Bill of 1890 was the result. This tariff marks a new departure in the history of protection. It not only surpassed all antebellum tariffs, it exceeded even the highest of the war tariffs in the rate of its duties. The average on dutiable goods was about sixty per cent, the details of which we have not space to notice.

But the people seemed to have received an overdose of protection, for in the ensuing congressional elections the Republicans were swept from power and the House became Democratic by a large majority. The Republicans explained by saying that the new tariff had not time to ingratiate itself with the people. But two years later the same thing happened. The Democrats swept the country, reëlecting Cleveland and gaining control of both Houses of Congress. This victory of the Democrats was now interpreted by them to mean that the people repudiated the McKinley Bill and desired a reduction of the tariff, and they proceeded to give them the

Wilson Bill. Even this tariff was by no means low. It reduced the McKinley duties about twelve or thirteen per cent on the average. How

such a tariff higher than was any of the war tariffs, higher, we believe, than that of any other protected country in the world—could be branded as a free-trade measure is difficult to understand. But so it was branded by the protectionists, and they appealed to the country and the country sustained them. In the National election of 1896 the Republicans won a victory as sweeping as that won by the Democrats four years before, electing their President and gaining control of House and Senate. Although the main issue of this campaign was the silver issue, it was the chief apostle of protection that won first prize, and the party was not slow to interpret their victory to mean a call for a return to high protective duties. The Dingley tariff was the outcome. By this the duties of the McKinley Bill were largely restored, the general average, however, being somewhat below those of that famous act. This tariff is still in force and there seems to be no immediate prospect of change.

The rapid fluctuations in our tariff legislation in the past decade would indicate that the American people scarcely know what they want. It is certain that a vast majority of the people have not given the subject thoughtful, intelligent consideration. They pay the tariff tax in the purchase of commodities, and concern themselves as little as possible whether it reaches the National treasury or the coffers of the millionaire. The Lead Trust, for example, enjoys a prohibitory tariff. It has raised the price of lead to the highest point that will not invite foreign competition. It not only supplies the country with lead, it also ships lead to foreign countries, and, after paying the cost of transportation, sells it at a lower price than in America. But who buys lead? Everybody. It is used in the manufacture of many articles that we all use every day, and the price of such articles must be higher accordingly. Where does the extra tax go? Not to the Government, for the tariff is prohibitory. It does not go to the employee. It goes to the Lead Trust, a soulless corporation composed of a very few rich men.

Protection is a salutary thing and its application has been beneficial in many instances; but it becomes robbery when not applied with discriminating judgment, with justice, and in accordance with common sense.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SPANISH WAR

Of all great nations of the world ours is preeminently the nation of peace. From the time that President Washington took his bold stand for neutrality in the spring of 1793, we have adhered to our policy of standing aloof from the military and political broils of Europe. The year 1898 marks our first war with a European power except with the Power from which we won our independence. This war with Spain will doubtless take the name in history of "The Spanish War" in this country, while in Spain it will probably be known as "The American War."

In our limited space but a meagre outline can be given of this short but important war. It must be remembered, too, that the time has not come to write a critical history of this war. This must be done by the historian of the future. Our present chapter will aim to give