THE NEW POLICY.

Since the campaign of 1900 a good deal has been spoken and written concerning the plight of the democratic party. That of itself can be of little consequence except as that plight affects those principles upon which the welfare of the whole people depends. But in so far as democratic defeat has introduced mischievous and perilous conditions into American polity, the plight of that party must come home to all Americans with a message of grave significance.

The republic was born of political idealism. If it had sprung from expediency-that is, from a desire to put away present evil-nothing more would have been necessary than a declaration of war against Great Britain. Such a declaration could have been made good by force of arms. And a government of some form could have been founded growing out of the mere selfish, but proper, impulse on the part of our forefathers to have a government of their own. But our forefathers went much farther than that. They spoke not only for themselves, but for all people and for all time. They laid down political principles in precise and comprehensive language. Were those principles true? The English derided them, although we are told that "there are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character which need no expression in constitutions." The

English found a violent conflict between the utterances of the declaration of independence and those "principles of justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character." It resulted that the declaration triumphed through war over those Anglo-Saxon principles and the republic was born.

But after these things had happened did the fathers go about to construct a government which could perpetrate against some other people the oppressions which the English had perpetrated upon them? Was it only their taxation without representation which constituted tyranny? And did they immediately put into action a government which could, according to expediency, tax some other people without representation? It is to this pass of vulgarity and cynicism that the argument is reduced which seeks to extract from the silence of the constitution a power in congress to tax the Porto Ricans without representation.

The words liberty and freedom are words of general significance and mean everything or nothing, according to the peculiar views of him who uses them. They are found in magna charta. But magna charta did not prevent James II from overriding the most sacred rights of liberty. This infamous despot habitually assured the English people that he stood for liberty even while a slavish parliament cooperated with him in the destruction of human rights and human life. This was only a little over 200 years ago and "the principles of natural justice inherent in the AngloSaxon character" laid no obstacles in the way of the bloody assize and the temporary extinguishment of every ray of liberty. Except for the infusion of re

publicanism which came with William from Holland the English would have had no more to boast of in the way of inherent principles than the Russians. And the English constitution would have been even more vague and elastic than it is.

When our fathers adopted the constitution the English parliament, in the language of Mr. Bryce, had the same powers which it has today, as follows: "It can make and unmake any and every law, change the form of the government or the succession to the crown, interfere with the course of justice, extinguish the most sacred private rights of the citizen. Between it and the people at large there is no legal distinction. It is, therefore, within its sphere of law irresponsible and omnipotent."

Did the fathers then intend to make congress an "irresponsible and omnipotent" body upon the theory that those "principles of natural justice" would be sufficient limitation upon congressional despotism? That is the argument, and that is the theory upon which the Porto Rican tariff was sustained by the supreme court.

The opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Justice Brown is historically, legally, politically and ethically false. It is a tissue of sophistry. It is a jumble of assumption. It is a flat reversal of all former decisions. It overrides the solemn deliberations of the fathers. It incurs the sound reasonings of Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Webster, Story, Lincoln and Taney. It flies in the face of common sense. It twistifies and splits the English language into meaningless refinements in an endeavor to overcome palpable and indub

itable truths written in language which does not admit of doubt. Its basic assumption is that the United States can do anything that any other nation can do. Syllogistically expressed Russia, Germany or England as sovereign powers can grab islands, rule subjects and exploit them. The United States are sovereign, and, therefore, they can do whatever Russia, Germany or England can do. It is obvious at a glance that the minor premise is false, and not only has never before been pronounced by the supreme court, but is far beyond the wildest declarations of the maddest Hamiltonian up to this day. Even Marshall when validating the United States bank did it in the name of the constitution and under an assumed power of the constitution; while the Porto Rican tariff is validated in spite of the constitution. In the bank case Marshall said: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution are constitutional." Mr. Justice Brown says the United States are as sovereign as any nation and "we decline to hold that there is anything in the constitution to prevent such action"-namely, taxation without representation.

In the first place the United States have sovereign powers only within their sphere of constitutional grant, and, second, the question cannot be disposed of by the statement that there is nothing in the constitution to prevent such action. Is there anything in the constitution to permit such action, either in

letter or spirit? That is the question which we have been taught by this court and constitutional writers to apply to any course of congressional or executive polity.

Said Marshall: "The government of the United States is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In fact and substance it emanates from them; its powers are granted by them and for their benefit. This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle that it can only exercise the powers granted to it would seem too apparent to have required to be urged by all these arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it was pending before the people, found it necessary to urge." Again Marshall said: "The government of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication."

Mr. Story: "The constitution was from its very origin contemplated to be the frame of a national government of special and enumerated powers and not of general and unlimited powers."

Mr. Webster in 1848. "Arbitrary governments may have territories and distant possessions, because arbitrary government may rule them by different laws and different systems. We cannot do such things. They must be of us, part of us, or else strangers."

William H. Seward-"The framers of the constitution never contemplated colonies or provinces or territories. They contemplated nothing but sovereign states."