as to due execution." In that case the signature was written by another for the decedent. We discover no reason for a different rule when the will is signed by a mark. Such a distinction has not been made by the authorities, and certainly the recitals of the attestation should be given quite as much weight when the will is signed by a mark as when this is done by writing the name or having some one else do so: See Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144, 4 Am. Dec. 330; Nickerson v. Buck, 12 Cush, 342. The point is made that proponents did not prove the will to have been read over to the deceased before he signed it, or that he was informed of its contents. Whether the burden was upon the proponents to affirmatively show this, we need not now determine. But see notes in 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 244. In any event it was included in the execution of the will. As said in Kirk v. Carr, 54 Pa. St. 285: "The law allows the attesting signature to speak when the tongue is silent; and it attests that everything was rightly done, unless the act attested be impeached, not negatively merely, but positively": Carpenter v. Denoon, 29 Ohio St. 379.

It is suggested that John Scott's name was not written by one of the attesting witnesses. In some states this is required by statute: St. Louis Hospital Assn. v. Williams, 19 Mo. 609; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 51 Am. Dec. 567; but such is not the law of Iowa. Indeed, the writing of his name. was not essential to the signing of the will, his mark alone being sufficient for that purpose: Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 159; In re Savory, 15 Jur. 1042; Thompson v. Thompson, 49 Neb. 157; In re Bryce, 2 Curt. Ecc. 325; Everhart v. Everhart, 34 Fed. Rep. 85; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 168. As the evidence referred to alone established the execution of the will, we need not 727 consider the alleged errors in admitting other evidence for the same purpose.

Affirmed.

WILLS-SIGNATURE-TESTATOR'S MARK.-The mark of a testator to his will is just as effective as when he signs his name: Robinson v. Brewster, 140 Ill. 649, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265, and note; Plate's Estate, 148 Pa. St. 55, 33 Am. St. Rep. 805; Ray v. Hill, 3 Strob. 297, 49 Am. Dec. 647; Chaffee v. Baptist etc. Convention, 10 Paige, 85, 40 Am. Dec. 225.

WILLS-PUBLICATION.-If the due subscribing and attesting of a will be proved, it need not be shown that the testator made the usual declarations that it was his last will and testament: Small v. Small, 4 Greenl. 220, 16 Am. Dec. 253.

WILLS-EXECUTION-PROOF OF.-If the witnesses to a will

cannot be found, or, though found, deny their signatures, circumstantial evidence may supply the deficiency. The handwriting of the witnesses may be proved, and the jury left to determine from all the circumstances whether the will was published with the requisite formalities: Pearson v. Wightman, 1 Mill, 336, 12 Am. Dec. 636, and note; Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286, 84 Am. Dec. 619; Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144, 4 Am. Dec. 830.

ACTIONS AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS-WHEN TRANSITORY.-An action against a stockholder of a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kansas, to compel the payment of a debt against the corporation, is transitory.

CORPORATIONS - STOCKHOLDERS · LIABILITY TO CREDITORS-TRANSITORY ACTION.-The liability of a stockholder in a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kansas for the debts of the corporation is several, and may be enforced by an action against him in any court of general jurisdiction in the state where personal service of process can be made upon the stockholder.

EVIDENCE. THE LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE are facts to be proved.

EVIDENCE-FOREIGN

LAW-QUESTION OF LAW.—If the evidence of foreign law consists entirely of statutes or reports of judicial decisions, the construction and effect of the statutes and decisions are usually for the court alone.

EVIDENCE-FOREIGN LAW-QUESTION OF FACT.—If the evidence of foreign law consists of reports of judicial decisions, the question of what the law is becomes one of fact, where the decisions are conflicting, or where inferences of fact must be drawn.

W. R. Bigelow and H. J. Jaquith, for the plaintiff.

A. Hemenway and E. B. Adams, for the defendant.

39 FIELD, C. J. This case was once before considered by us on demurrer to the declaration: Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414. The demurrer having been overruled, the defendant answered, and the cause was heard by a justice of the superior court, without a jury.

At the close of the evidence, both the plaintiff and the defendant made numerous requests for rulings. The presiding justice gave the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth of the rulings requested by the plaintiff, and all of the rulings requested by the defendant, and made the following special findings: "1. I find that the Commonwealth Loan and Trust Company ceased to do business on February 21, 1891; 2. I find from the evidence that such corporation did not resume business thereafter, and that by virtue of the statutory law of Kansas there was a dissolution of the corporation previous to the date of this writ; 3. There was no legal or competent evidence given at the trial which enabled me to find what were the assets or the liabilities of this corporation at the date of the original judgment against the corporation, or at the date of the issue of execution against it, or at the date of the writ in this action."

The first four rulings requested by the plaintiff which the court gave were as follows:

"3. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the court is bound to find that, under the law of Kansas, stockholders in corporations organized under the laws of Kansas are liable severally, and not jointly, to the judgment creditors of the corporation, 40 who pursue the remedy provided by paragraph 1192 of the General Statutes of Kansas of 1889.

"4. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, stockholders in Kansas corporations who appear as stockholders upon the books of the corporation are conclusively presumed to be stockholders of the corporation within the meaning and liability of said paragraph 1192, already referred to.

"5. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, the stockholder's liability under said paragraph 1192, already referred to, is a contractual liability, and arises upon the contract of subscription to the capital stock made by the defendant in becoming a stockholder; and that in subscribing to said stock and becoming a stockholder he thereby guaranteed payment to the creditors of the corporation of an amount equal to the par value of the stock held and owned by him.

"6. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, the stockholder who is liable under said paragraph 1192 is liable to the judgment creditor of the corporation who first pursues his rem

edy under the statutes, and is discharged from all further liability by once paying the full amount thereof to such creditor." Among the rulings requested by the plaintiff which the court declined to give is the seventh, which is as follows:

"y. Upon all the evidence in the case, as matter of law, the court is bound to find that, under the laws of Kansas, an action to enforce the stockholder's liability under said paragraph 1192, already referred to, is transitory, and may be brought in any court of general jurisdiction in the state where personal service can be made upon the stockholder."

The rulings requested by the defendant which the court gave are to the effect that the obligations imposed by the statutes of Kansas will be enforced in Massachusetts only as a matter of comity; that the courts of Massachusetts will not enforce them against a resident citizen of Massachusetts unless it appears that no injustice will be done; that these courts are unable to do justice to stockholders resident in Massachusetts who have paid the debts of the corporation and are entitled to sue other 41 stockholders to enforce contribution, especially if the corporation has been dissolved or has suspended business; that the statutes of Kansas which provide for contribution are a part of a scheme for ultimately compelling stockholders ratably to pay the debts of the corporation, and that, concerning as they do the relations between the corporation and its stockholders, they can be effectually and completely enforced only by the courts of Kansas; and the enforcement of them should be left to those courts. The Commonwealth Loan and Trust Company is a private corporation, established under the laws of the state of Kansas on February 2, 1887, for the purpose of transacting the business of a loan and trust company, and having places of business at Kansas City in Kansas and in Missouri, and in the city of Boston in Massachusetts. The plaintiff, the Hancock National Bank of Boston, is the same corporation as the Traders' National Bank of Boston. On September 1, 1891, the Traders' National Bank of Boston, having previously lent the Loan and Trust Company twenty-five thousand dollars, received its promissory note therefor signed by the loan and trust company, indorsed on which appear payments of interest and certain sums of money on account of the principal. On September 9, 1893, the bank commenced suit against the loan and trust company on this note in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, and on December 8, 1893, recovered judgment