Act of March 10, 1819. R. C. ch. 41. same construction shall be made, as would have been made if this act had never been passed. Ibid.(1) Act of February 22, 1819. R. C. ch. 1, App. 1. 4. § 5. In printing the acts of assembly, it shall be the duty of the public printer, to print the same in two parts; the first, to contain the acts of a general nature, with a separate index; and the second part, to contain those laws, which are merely local and private in their operation: and as soon as the same shall be printed, [which must be within forty days after the rising of the assembly in each session, and be three thousand two hundred copies in number,] it shall be the duty of the executive [Nov. 16, 1792, § 8,] to cause one copy of the said laws, to be sent at the public expense by mail, to the respective clerks of courts within this commonwealth, for the immediate use of their courts; and in like manner, to transmit one copy to the executive authorities of the respective states and territories of the United States, with a request to interchange the laws with them, annually. See Resol. Dec. 5, 1795, Gen. Assy. See Chitty's note [87] 1 Black. Com. 185. Act of February 24, 1820, c. 18. 5. § 1. It shall be the duty of the governor of this commonwealth, to transmit annually, to the secretary of state of the United States, four copies of the acts of each session of assembly; one copy whereof, shall be for the use of each of the two houses of congress, one for the president of the United States, and one for the library of congress. Act of February 25, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 128. 6. § 92. Private acts of assembly may be given in evidence, without pleading them specially. (c) 1789, c. 28. (1) Proudfit v. Murray, 1 Call, 394; Allen v. Harrison et al. 3 Call, 289; Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365. Where two acts of parliament, which passed during the same session, and were to come into operation the same day, are repugnant to each other, that which last received the royal assent must prevail, and be considered pro tanto a repeal of the other. The King v. Just. of Middlesex, 2 Barn. & Adolp. 818; and Atty. Genl. v. Gov. and Co. of Chelsea Water Works, Fitzg. 195; 'twas held, that where the proviso of an act of parliament is directly repugnant to the purview, the proviso shall stand, and be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers. Where two statutory provisions in pari materia are passed at different times, but both are incorporated in several statutes enacted at a general revisal of the statute laws; if there be any difference between them, the court will look to the dates of the original enactments, and give effect to that which was last passed. Winn adm'x v. Jones, 6 Leigh, 74. (c) But the courts will not notice them as public acts: they must be given in evidence as facts. Legrand v. Hamp. Sid. Col. 5 Munf. 324. It seems, that the edition of the laws published by the public printer agreeably to the general act of assembly for that purpose, sufficiently authenticates the private as well as the public acts. See Young v. The Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cran. 388; Thomson v. Musser, 1 Dall. 463; Biddis v. James, 6 Binney, 321; see Jacob Warner's case, 2 Virg. Cas. 95; Hunter v. Fulcher, 5 Rand. 126; Sir Tho. Picton's case, 30 St. Tr. 514; Lacon v. Higgins, 1 Dowe & Ry. N. P. C. 38; 16 En. C. L. R. 425; see Brett v. Beales, 1 M. & M. 421. The printed copies of the aets of congress, distributed to the executives of the several states to be distributed among the people, are proper evidence of the statutes therein contained, without other authentication. Taylor's adm'r v. The Bank of Alexandria, 5 Leigh, 471; and pr. Tucker, prest. delivering opinion of the court, p. 476. We concur in the opinion expressed by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, that the laws of a sister state, printed by public authority, are admissible evidence, without other authentication. Thompson v. Musser, 1 Dall. 462. The wisdom or folly of any particular system, is for the consideration of the legis Resolution of April 9, 1838. No. 5. 7. It shall be the duty of the executive to furnish to the judges of the circuit and district courts of the United States, for the 5th circuit and eastern and western districts of Virginia, and to the librarian of congress, for the use of the members, one copy each, of the sessions acts of the general assembly, bound in the usual manner; so far as the same are now within the disposal of the government, and the said judges may not already be in possession thereof. And in future the said judges shall be annually supplied in like manner with the laws of Virginia. lature, not of the court; and when the policy of the law is mentioned by a judge, I always understand him to use the term in reference to the object of the legislature, and to the means by which that object is to be effected, as disclosed in the words they have employed. Pr. Ch. J. Marshall, in the case of The ship Adventure and cargo, 1 Brock. R. 238. Constitution paramount to the legislature See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cran. 176; Eakin et al. v. Raub et al. 12 Serg. & Raw. 330. Statutes are prima facie, prospective in their operation; retrospective laws being odious, it ought never to be presumed, that the legislature intended to enact them, where the words will admit of any other meaning. Elliott's ex'or v. Lyell, 3 Call, 268; and see Turner v. Turner's ex'x, 4 Call, 234, 237; Op. of court by Pendleton, prest. A remedial act, may operate retrospectively, but not without express words or declaration plain, of the intention of the legislature. Com. v. Hewitt, 2 H. & M. 181; Towler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258. In construing statutes, words obviously intended by the legislature to have been inserted, may be considered as inserted, to effectuate such intention. Wallace v. Taliaferro, 2 Call, 447, 491. A new law introductory of a new remedy, contrary to the course of the common law, ought to be strictly pursued. Asberry v. Calloway, 1 Wash. 74; Mantz v. Hendley, 2 H. & M. 308, 315; Stewart v. Hamilton, 2 H. & M. 48. For a review of the general rules for the construction of statutes, see Roane, J. opn. in Dilliard v. Tomlinson, 1 Munf. 200-211. In construing statutes the court must take into consideration not only the language of the preamble, or of any particular clause, but of the whole act; and if in some of the enacting clauses, expressions are found of more extensive import than in others, or than in the preamble, the court will give effect to those more extensive expressions, if, on a view of the whole act, it appears to have been the intention of the legislature, that they should have effect. Doe dem. Bywater v. Brandling et al. 7 Barn. & Cress. 643. Where the enacting clause is clear, and more extensive than the preamble, its operation cannot be confined by the preamble. Perkins v. Sewell, 1 Wm. Bl. 659, pr. Ld. Mansfield; and Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bing. 260, pr. Ch. J. Tindal. Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration. Pr. Marshall, C. J. deliv. op. of ct. in Fisher v. Blight, 2 Cranch, 386; and Story, J. in Chs. Riv. Br. Co. v. Warren Br. C. 11 Peters's R. 612. When the words of a statute are doubtful, general usage may serve to explain them; but the maxim communis error facit jus, has no application to the usages of particular corporate towns or other places. Currie et al. v. Page et al. 2 Leigh, 617. It is reasonable to suppose, that where a British statute is re-enacted in this country, we adopt the settled construction it has received, as well as the statute itself; and such, I believe, has been the course of every court in the Union. Pr. Ch. J. Marshall, in Kirkpatrick et al. v. Gibson's ex'ors, 2 Brock. R. 391. Penal laws of every description, are to be strictly construed, and nothing therein taken by implication or intendment, per Fleming, J. Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf. 436. It is an uncontroverted principle of law, that in all prosecutions on penal statutes, the strict letter of the law, must be pursued, and nothing admitted by inference or implication, per Fleming, J. Fell v. Overseers of Augusta, 3 Munf. 507. The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law, for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. It would be dangerous indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or kindred character, with those which are enumerated. U. States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95-6. Marshall, C. J. deliv. court's opn. "Laws which create crimes, ought to be so explicit in themselves, or by reference to some other standard, that all men, subject to their penalties, may know what acts it is their duty to avoid." Per Washington, J. in U. S. v. Sharp et al. 1 Peters's Rep. 122. It is always competent to a court, in the construction of a statute, to look to the evil intended to be remedied; and this purpose may be gathered either from its general notoriety, or from its recital in a preamble. Dade, J. in deliv. cts. op. in Aldridge's case, 2 Virg. Cas. 454; and see Mercer alias Wilson v. Com. 2 Virg. Cas. 144, 146-7. We are undoubtedly bound to construe penal statutes strictly; and not to extend them beyond their obvious meaning by strained inferences. On the other hand, we are bound to interpret them according to the manifest import of the words, and to hold all crimes, which are within the words and the mischiefs, to be within the remedial influence of the statute. And this is what I understand by expounding the stat. liberally, as to the offence. Per Story, J. in the Schooner Industry, 1 Gal. 114, 117. The general rule is, that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. This rule is, however, liable to exceptions in cases of statutes intended to prevent a general mischief, or to promote the general good. And when it applies, it means nothing more than that a penal statute shall not be extended by equity to persons or things not expressly provided for by its terms. It ought, however, even when construed strictly, to be carried into effect according to its true intent and meaning. Per Green, J. in Whitworth et al. v. Adams, 5 Rand. 360-1; 4 Bur. 2082. The maxim, that penal laws are to be construed strictly, has never been understood, by me at least, to imply, that the intention of the legislature, as manifested by their words, is to be overruled; but that in cases where the intention is not distinctly perceived,-where, without violence to the. words or apparent meaning of the act, it may be construed to embrace or exclude a particular case,-where the mind balances and hesitates between the two constructions, the more restricted construction ought to prevail; especially in cases where the act to be punished is in itself indifferent, and is rendered culpable only by positive law. Per Ch. J. Marshall, in the case of The ship Adventure and cargo, 1 Brock. Rep. 238-9; and Ld. Mansfield, in Rex v. Royce, 4 Bur. 2082. The passage of an act which prescribes a new punishment for old offences, and repeals all laws coming within the purview of it, without providing, that offences committed before the operation of the new law, shall be punished under the old ;-operates as a discharge of all who have committed such offences, and have not been convicted previous to the new law taking effect. Scutt v. Com. 2 Virg. Cas. 54; Attoo v. Com. 2 Virg. Cas. 382; and see Miller's case, 1 Bl. R. 451; Hollingsworth et al. v. Virga. 3 Dall. 378; U. S. v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; The Irresistible, 7 Wheaton, 551; The Com. v. Leftwich, 5 Rand. 657; Rex v. M'Kenzie et al. Russ. & Ry. Cro. C. 429. A doubt relative to the construction of a statute, or respecting the intent of the legislator, ought to be as effectual, in favour of a prisoner, as the most thorough conviction, per Johnson, J. in U. States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 637. A statute gives a penalty to be recovered by bill, plaint or information. Held, that the penalty may be recovered by action of debt. Sims v. Alderson, 8 Leigh, 479; see P. Tucker's op. 1. 3 No statute or act of parliament shall have any force or authority within this commonwealth. Nov. 25, 1789, c. 17, 13 Stat. Larg. 23. (a) 2. 5. Saving to this commonwealth, and to all and every person and persons, bodies politic and corporate, and each and every of them, the right and benefit of all and every writ and writs, remedial and judicial, which might have been legally obtained from, or sued out of any court or jurisdiction of this commonwealth, or the office of the clerk of any such court or jurisdiction, before the commencement of this act, in like manner, with the like proceedings thereupon to be had, as fully and amply, to all intents, constructions and purposes, as if this act had never been made. See tit. RENTS, No. 33. 1. § 6. Every person, not being a servant or slave, committing adultery, or fornication, and being thereof lawfully convicted by the oaths of two or more credible witnesses, or confession of the party, shall, for every offence of adultery, forfeit and pay twenty dollars, and for every offence of fornication, ten dollars; to be recovered by the suit or prosecution of the overseers of the poor of the county or corporation wherein such offence shall be committed, by bill, plaint or information, in any court of record within this commonwealth, wherein no essoin, protection or wager of law shall be allowed; which said fines and penalties shall accrue to the overseers of the poor, for the use of the poor of the county or corporation wherein the said offence shall be committed. (a) Mar. 1657-8, act 2, 1 S. L. 433; act 14, Ib. 438; April 1691, act (a) The offences of adultery, fornication and the like, cannot be punished by our courts of law as common law offences, unless they be accompanied with other circumstances which of themselves constitute a misdemeanour, such as the public commission of the act, or a conspiracy. The offence designated in this act must be punished ac cording to the act. Anderson v. The Commonwealth, 5 Rand. 627. The offence of fornication, (or the cohabiting together by a man and a woman, in a state of illicit commerce, as man and wife,) is not punishable as a common law offence. The statute must be pursued in such cases. The Commonwealth v. Isaacs et al. 5 Rand. 634. Act of December 26, 1792. R. C. ch. 141. 11, 3 S. L. 71; Sept. 1696, act 1, Ib. 137; Oct. 1705, c. 30, 3 Stat. Larg. 361. Act of February 10, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 239. 2. 31. If any single woman, (2) not being a servant or slave, shall be delivered of a bastard child, (1) which shall be chargeable, or likely to become(3) chargeable to any county, and shall, upon examination before any justice of the peace of the county, to be taken in writing, (a) upon oath, charge any person, not being a servant, with being the father of such bastard child, it shall and may be lawful for any justice of the peace of the county, wherein the person so charged shall be a resident or inhabitant, upon application made to him by the overseers of the poor, or any one of them, (b) of the county wherein such child shall be born, to issue his warrant for the immediate apprehending the person so charged as aforesaid, and for bringing him before such justice, or before any other justice of the peace of the county wherein he is resident or inhabitant; and the justice, before whom such person shall be brought, is hereby authorized and required to commit the person so charged as aforesaid, to the common jail of his county, unless he shall enter into a recognizance, with sufficient security, in the sum of not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars, upon condition to appear at the next court, to be held for such county, and to abide and perform such order or orders, as shall be made by the said court. And, if any such recognizance shall be forfeited, the amount of the recovery thereupon, shall be paid to the overseers of the poor for the county or corporation, for the use of the said poor. And if, upon the circumstances of the case, the court shall adjudge(c) the person so charged to be the father of such bastard child, (d) and that such child is likely to become (2) These provisions accord with those of 6 Geo. 2, c. 31, § 1, which have been held to comprehend the case of a child born by adulterous intercourse, as well as one born of a single woman. See the elaborate case of The King v. Luffe, 8 East, 193-8, 204-211; and The King v. The inhabitants of Tibbersham, 9 East, 388, 392; Rex v. Abbert Alberton, 1 Ld. Raym. 395; 2 Salk. 483, S. C. But see Sword v. Nester, 3 Dana's Ky. Rep. 453. (1) Rex v. England, 1 Stra. 503, the sex must be stated in the order. 6 Geo. 2, c. 31, § 1. receive new evidence of the fact, which was (d) To substantiate the charge, the mother's testimony alone is sufficient, if believed. If she swears that a certain man is the father, and that 'tis impossible she should be mistaken, Roane, J. was of opinion that it was competent for the defendant to offer testimony to prove that the mother, about nine months before the birth of the bastard, was guilty of criminal commerce with other men. Brooke, J. inclined to the contrary opinion; especially, as the defendant ad(3) The King v. The inhabitants of Hart-mitted that he had criminal intercourse with ington, 4 M. and S. 559. (a) (b) It should appear in the proceedings, that the charge before the magistrate by the mother, was in writing, and that the warrant issued by the magistrate, was so issued on the application of the overseers of the poor, or one of them. Mann v. The Com. 6 Munf. 452; Howard v. The Overseers of the poor, 1 Rand. 464. (c) The superior courts of law have jurisdiction to grant writs of supersedeas to this judgment; and the court of appeals may in like manner correct the errors of the superior courts in their judgment thereon. Fall v. Overseers of Augusta, 3 Munf. 495; Mann v. The Com. 6 Munf. 452. On an appeal from an order of a county court, providing for the support of a bastard child, it is error for the appellate court, to Fall v. the mother about the same time. As to the competency of testimony, see The Head v. Head, 1 Simons and Stuart's R. |