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Act of March 3, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 104.

36. § 62. Executors or administrators may sue, or be sued upon all judgments, bonds, or other specialties, bills, notes or other writings of their testators or intestates, whether the executors or administrators be, or be not,(dd) named in such instruments, and also upon all their personal contracts. 1785, c. 61, 12 Stat. Larg. 152; 1792, c. 92, R. C.

37. § 64. Actions of trespass may be maintained by or against(ee) executors or administrators, for any goods taken or carried away (2) in the lifetime of the testator or intestate; and the damages recovered shall be, in the one case, for the benefit of the estate, and in the other, out of the assets. lbid. 4 Ed. 3, c. 7.*

38. § 65. Executors of executors shall do and perform all things, in the execution of the will of the first testator, which shall remain undone at the death of the executor; and shall and may sue or be sued, in all things respecting the estate, in the same manner as such first executor could or might have sued or been sued. 25 Ed. 3, st. 5, c. 5, and 1bid.(ff)

executor as representing his testator in his executorial character. Shearman v. Christian et al. 6 Rand. 49.

And for requisites of plea by defendant, that testator &c. was guardian &c., see Wyatt's ex'r v. Woodlief, 1 Leigh, 473.

A. marries a feme executrix or administratrix, and so being executor or administrator in his wife's right, administers the estate, and wastes the assets of her testator or intestate, and then dies, leaving the feme executrix or administratrix, him surviving: Held, the waste committed by the husband during the coverture, does not constitute a debt due from him to the testator's estate, which is entitled to preference in the administration of his own estate over his own proper debts under this (§ 60,) section. Tucker, P. dissenting, (concurring in opinion with Brockenbrough, J. who decided the cause in the superior court. Henrico Jus. ex rel. of Craddock v. Turner's adm'x, 6 Leigh, 116.

B. the executor of A. commits a devastavit of the estate of A.; C. the executor or administrator of B. is bound to pay the debts due to the estate of A. before any proper debts due to B.'s own creditors. Coates's ex'x v. Muse's adm'rs et al. 1 Brock. R. 540, 547, &c.

(dd) Though the heir is not bound unless he be particularly named, yet in all cases the executors [or administrators] are, whe ther the covenant respect real estate, or be purely personal. Harrison v. Sampson, 2 Wash. 155; Plowd. 439; Cro. Eliz. 553.

(ee) This section is an extension of the stat. of 4 Edw. 3, c. 7, de bonis asportatis, to embrace actions brought against, as well as those brought by, executors and administrators. See Vaughan's adm'r v. Winckler's ex'r, 4 Munf. 136; Lee v. Cooke's ex'r, 1 Gil. R. 331. The first, was an action of trespass by an executor against an administrator for goods taken away by the defendant's intestate from plaintiff's testator. The second, trespass for mesne profits of

land, recovered in ejectment, against the defendant's testator. In Pulteney v. Warren, 6 Ves. jun. 73, 94, under special circumstances, relief was obtained against executors for the mesne profits. On this subject, see Hambly et al. v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 371; Foster v. Stewart, 3 Mau. & Selw. 191; and serj. Williams's note (1) to Wheatly v. Lane, 1 Saund. [216,] 9 Wend. 29.

(2) An action of trespass quare clausum fregit, is not converted into an action de bonis asportatis by an allegation in the declaration that trees were carried away. The rule actio personalis moritur cum persona, applies to the action of trespass, quare clausum fregit. If in this action the defendant dies before verdict, the writ will abate, but if after verdict and judgment the plaintiff has a right to a sci. fa. against the personal representative of defendant, though not against his heir or devisee. Harris v. Crenshaw, 3 Rand. 14.

*See act of March 9, 1827, Ses. Acts 1826-7, c. 29, p. 27, Sup. R. C. c. 196, p. 258, which enacts, that if any person shall commit a trespass either by injuring or destroying the slaves or other personal property of another, and before the institution or determination of a suit to recover damages therefor, either or both parties shall die, the suit may be brought or revived by the injured party or his representative against the wrong-doer, or his representative, in the same manner that actions survive or may be revived in form ex-contractu: Provided, That in no case any higher or greater damages shall be recovered than the value of the injury sustained.

(f) See Hutton, 30; Cro. Jac. 614; Salk. 309; Shep. Touch. 464, as to the right of the executor to renounce the administration of the first testator.

It was decided in Jones v. Hobson, 2 Rand. 483, 502, that the sureties of an executor are not responsible for the acts of his executor in the administration of the estate of the first testator. See act of Feb. 16,

Act of March 3, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 104.

39. § 66. The executor or administrator of an executor in his own wrong, and the executor or administrator of a rightful executor or administrator, by whom any waste shall have been committed, shall be chargeable in the same manner as his testator or intestate might have been.(3) May 1730, c. 8, 4 Stat. Larg. 284; Oct. 1748, c. 5, 5 Stat. Larg. 465; 1792, c. 92, R. C.; 30 Car. 2, c. 7; 4 and 5 Wm. and Mar. c. 24.

40. 63. When any person or persons shall have heretofore recovered, or shall hereafter recover any judgment against executors or administrators, in their representative character; and, upon execution issued upon such judgment, it shall be returned that there are not found, in the possession of the said executors or administrators, sufficient assets(5) of the testator or intestate, to pay and satisfy the whole, or any part, of such judgment, (costs excepted,) such person or persons, recovering such judgment, his, her or their executors or administrators, (6) may, upon such return of the execution as aforesaid, im1825, Ses. Acts 1824-5, § 11, p. 13, 14, Sup. R. C. p. 119, by which it is provided, that hereafter, upon the qualification of any executor of an executor, it shall be the duty of the courts in which such qualification shall take place, if the executor shall desire to represent the estate of the first testator, to require bond with good security of such executor, in a sum sufficient to ensure the performance of all things in the execution of the will of the first testator, (payable to the same persons to whom his bond as executor, is made payable,) which shall remain undone at the death of the executor of such first testator; and the bond to be executed upon such qualification, shall be as effectual to bind as well the principal as the sureties in such bond, for the faithful performance of the duties of such executors of executors, in relation to the estate of the first testator, as for the faithful performance of the duties of such executors of executors, in relation to the estate of the executor of such first testator. If such executor shall fail to give bond and security as aforesaid, for the faithful administration of the estate of the first testator at the time of qualifying as executor to the executor, he shall be regarded as having renounced all authority over the estate of the first testator; and a representative of that estate may be appointed, in the same manner as if the first executor had died intestate.

(3) That is, liable directly to the creditors, legatees or distributees of the testator or intestate. For an administrator de bonis non cannot sue the representative of a former executor or administrator, either at law or in equity, for assets wasted or converted by the first executor or administrator. This remedy once existed in Virginia by act of 1661, 2 Stat. Larg. 91, which was repealed by act of 1711, 4 Stat. Larg. 12. Coleman, adm'r &c. of Wernick v. M'Murdo et al. 5 Rand. 51; see Allen et al. v. Irwin et al. 1 Serg. & Raw. 549. Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gil. & Johns. 270.

An administrator sells personal property of decedent, partly for cash, and partly on

credit, and admits on oath, in answer in chancery, that he did not mean to convert proceeds to his own use; before credit payment become due, his administration is revoked, and administrator de bonis non granted to another: Held, administrator de bonis non entitled to sue for, and recover the deferred payment of the vendee. Heffernan's adm'r v. Grymes's adm'r, 2 Leigh, 512. But an administrator de bonis non may maintain an action of debt, on a judgment obtained by the executor. Dykes & Co. v. Woodhouse's adm'r, 3 Rand. 287; and Just. of Buckingham for Hill's adm'r v. Cunningham's ex'r, 26 May 1832, ct. app'ls. And he may maintain a writ of error, on a judgment against the previous executor or administrator. Dale v. Roosevelt, 8 Cowen, 333. And see act March 29, 1831, Ses. Acts, 1830-31, c. 32, p. 101, by which it is enacted, "that where any suit hath been or shall be commenced and pending, or any judg ment or decree hath been or shall be recovered in any of the courts of this commonwealth, by executors or administrators upon contracts made, or for cause of action which accrued in the lifetime of the testator or intestate, it shall and may be lawful in such case, for the administrator de bonis non of such testator or intestate, to sue forth a scire facias to revive and prosecute to judg

ment or decree such suit so commenced and pending, and to have execution upon such judgment or decree."

(5) A fi. fa. on judgment against an administrator, is returned, "no unadministered or unincumbered effects found," &c.: Held, a return of nulla bona, to entitle plf. to an action on the administrator's bond. Allen et al. v. Cunningham et al. 3 Leigh, 395.

(6) M. H. adm'r of R. H. recovers a judgment against E. B. adm'x of R. B. for debt due pli.'s intestate, and sues out a fi. fa. thereon, which is returned nulla bona; then M. H., plf. dies, and administration de bonis non of R. H.'s estate is granted to A.: Held, the action of debt on the adm'n bond of E. B. against her and her sureties, lies at the relation of A. the adm'r de bonis non of R.

Act of March 3, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 104.

mediately commence and prosecute his, her or their action, against such executors or administrators, and their securities, or against either of them, or the executors or administrators of either of them, upon the bond given by them, for the performance of the duties of such executors or administrators; in which said action the defendants may plead any plea or pleas, and in support thereof offer any evidence, which would be legally admissible in any action against executors or administrators suggesting a devastavit. See March 1657-8, act 30, 1 Stat. Larg. 426; Feb. 7, 1814, c. 13.(gg)

41. § 67. If all the executors named in any last will, shall refuse to undertake the executorship, or, being required to give security, shall refuse to give, or be unable to procure the same, and no person will apply for administration with the will annexed, or if no person shall apply for administration of the goods and chattels of any intestate, it shall be lawful for the general court, or other court having jurisdiction of such probat or administration, as herein before mentioned, after the expiration of three months from the death of the testator or intestate, to order the sheriff, or other officer of the county or corporation, to take the estate into his possession; (alt. from Dec. 1656, act 2, 1 Stat. Larg. 416; Mar. 1657-8, act 105, Ib. 480; 1705, Oct. 3 Stat. Larg. 374, x. xI.; 1748; act 1785, c. 61,) whereupon such sheriff or other officer, without being required to give any other bond or security, than he may have already given, or to take any other oath of office than he hath before taken, shall be, to all intents and purposes, the administrator, with the will annexed, of the testator, if there be a will, or the administrator of the intestate if there be no will, and shall be thenceforward entitled to all the rights, and bound to perform all the duties of such administrator. (1) The court, however, shall

H. and not at the relation of the representative of M. H. the first adm'r of R. H. by virtue of this act. Allen et al. v. Cunningham et al. 3 Leigh, 395.

(gg) For the law prior to the provisions of this section, see Braxton, ex'r of Claiborne v. The Spottsylva. Just. 1 Wash. 31; 4 Call, 308, S. C. more fully reported; and Taylor et al. v. Stewart's ex'rs, 5 Call, 520; Gordon's adm'r v. The Frederick Just. 1 Munf. 1; Catlett et al. v. Carter's ex'rs, 2 Munf. 24; Hairston v. Hughes et al. 3 Munf. 568; Spottswood v. Dandridge et al. 4 Munf. 289. By these decisions the general rule was settled, that, before a creditor can call upon the securities of an executor or administrator, he must first establish a devastavit against the executor or administrator by a distinct suit. The case in 4 Munf. 289, was in equity, and by its peculiar circumstances, taken out of the general rule. Although in the case of a creditor, the demand must be established against the executor, before a suit can be brought on the executorial bond, yet in the case of a legatee, a suit in equity may be brought on it in the first instance; because the decree can be made so as to operate against the executor in the first instance, and an account of the assets can be taken at once. Taliaferro's ex'rs et al. v. Thornton et ux. 6 Call, 21.

If, in an action of debt, on a judgment against an administrator, suggesting a devastavit, the plaintiff produces the judg

ment and execution, and the defendant demurs to the evidence, the plaintiff is enti tled to a final judgment on the demurrer. Nuttall's adm'r v. M'Douall, 6 Call, 53.

(1) A sheriff, to whom the estate is committed, is, to all intents and purposes, an administrator, under this law; and, therefore, is responsible for the due administration of the estate, after his office of sheriff expires. Cocke v. Harrison et al. 3 Rand. 494.

Where the representative of a sheriff is sued on account of an estate committed to his hands, and it appears that the deputy (who is also sued) had the entire manage. ment of the estate, the court may decree against the deputy, in the first instance, if assented to by plaintiff, reserving liberty to him to resort to the court, for ulterior decrees against other parties: but if such consent be not given, it is the duty of the court to decree between the defendants in order to throw the burthen on the person ultimately liable. Ibid. and Dabney's adm'r v. Smith's legatees, 5 Leigh, 13.

Douglass, is commissioned sheriff of Loudoun county in July 1805, and continues to act as sheriff for the second year, 1806-7, without having received a commission for the second year; the estate of a decedent is committed to him by order of court during the second year: Held, that D. though not regularly commissioned, was sheriff until his successor was appointed, and responsible for the administration

Act of March 3, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 104.

have power, at any time afterwards, to revoke such order, and to grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration, to any person entitled thereto. When by the death of any executor or administrator, or sheriff or other person to whom the estate of a testator or intestate shall have been committed, there shall be no personal representative of such estate, and no person shall take letters of administration, or letters testamentary upon such estate, within three months after such death, it shall be lawful for the court, in the manner aforesaid, to commit such estate to the sheriff or other officer of the county or corporation, who shall thereupon, in like manner, be the administrator de bonis non, of such estate. Rev. 1819; Jan'y 7, 1807, c. 94, 2 Old R. C. p. 120.

42. § 28. It shall be the duty of the clerks of the respective courts of record within this commonwealth, to deliver or cause to be delivered, on or before the first day of June annually, to the clerk of the general court, a list of all certificates for probats and administrations granted in their courts respectively, within the year next preceding the first day of April, in this form?'

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For which said docket and list, the said clerks, respectively, may demand of the clerk of the general court his receipt. And if any such clerk shall fail herein, for every failure he shall forfeit and pay to the commonwealth forty dollars, to be recovered on motion, without notice, in the general court, and the onus probandi shall lie on the defendant. And the clerk of the general court shall, after the first day of June, in each year, deliver to the attorney general a list of the clerks (if any) who shall have failed to deliver, or cause to be delivered to him, the lists of certificates for probats and administrations, agreeably to the directions of this act; and it shall be the duty of the attorney general to proceed to a recovery of the penalty aforesaid. See Oct. 1660, act 27, 2 Stat. Larg. 27; Nov. 1711, c. 2, 4 Stat. Larg. 25; 1748; 1785; 1792; Feb. 12, 1811, c. 13. [See act of parliament, (1833) the Romilly act, for rendering freehold and copyhold estates assets of the payment of simple contract debts.]

of the decedent's estate by his deputy; and is responsible for the acts of his deputy in administering the fund arising from the real as well as the personal estate; and for

his deputy's administration as well after as during his continuance in office. Douglass's ex'r v. Stumps et al. 5 Leigh, 392.

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tor or intestate, leaving unpaid any debt of superior dignity, due by judgment or otherwise, such executor or administrator shall not thereby be chargeable out of his own estate, with the payment of such debt of superior dignity, or any part thereof, unless at the time of paying the debt of inferior dignity, he had actual notice of such debt of superior dignity."

The order of administration between citizen and citizen, is: 1st. funeral and testamentary charges. As against a creditor, the rule of law is, that no more shall be allowed for funeral expenses than is abso

lutely necessary; regard being had to the degree and condition of the decedent. Hancock v. Podmore, 1 B. & Adolp. 260. As to testamentary expenses, see Brown v. Groombridge, 4 Madd. 495; Loomes v. Stotherd, 1 S. & Stra. 458; Edwards v. Edwards, 2 Cromp. & Meeson, 612.

Defendant, before taking out letters of administration, sanctioned an expensive funeral, which a relation had ordered for the deceased: Held, that after taking out administration, defendant was liable in the capacity of administrator for this expense. Lucy v. Waldron, adm'r, 3 Bing. N. C. 841. In this case defendant paid a certain amount into court. And see Rogers v. Price, 3 Younge & Jew. 28.

2d. debts of record, see Eppes et al. v. Randolph, 2 Call, 188. Quare, of what dignity are judgments obtained before a justice of the peace? See Martin v. Sturm, 5 Rand. 693; Sherwood v. Johnson, 1 Wendell, 443; James v. Henry, 16 Johns. 233; Witherwax v. Averille, 6 Cowen, 589; Tankersley v. Lipscomb, 3 Leigh, 813.

3d. debts by specialty. "In the administration of the personal assets of decedents' estates, debts due by specialty, and promissory notes, or other writings, signed by the decedent, or some other person, by him or her thereunto lawfully authorized, shall be regarded and taken to be of equal dignity." Act of March 29, 1831, Ses. Acts 1830-31, c. 33, p. 102.

The recognition of a simple contract by an instrument under seal, does not change its character, and give it the effect of a sealed instrument. See Hamilton v. Houghton, 2 Bligh, 169-186; and Jackson ex dem. v. Sackett, 7 Wend. 94; Lacam v. Mertins, 1 Ves. sen. 312-13; Twopenny v. Young, 3 B. & Cress. 208.

And 4th. debts by simple contract. See Mayo v. Bentley, cited by Roane, J. in Nimmo's ex'r v. Com. 4 H. & M. 76; and Webster v. Stevenson's ex'rs, 3 Har. & M'Hen. 133-136. See No. 35, § 60.

'Tis the duty of an executor or administrator to apply the assets of the estate, not necessary for the payment of debts, to the exoneration of the real estate of his testator or intestate, which may be under mortgage. Dandridge & al. v. Minge, 4 Rand. 397.

The proceeds of land, directed by the will of the testator to be sold for the payment of his debts, are equitable assets, distributable among the creditors pari passu, under the cognizance of a court of equity alone. Nimmo's ex'r v. The Com. 4 H. & M. 57. See Silk et al. v. Prime et al. 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 138 (note); Benson et al. v. Le Roy et al. 4 Johns. Ch. R. 651; Jones v. Hobson, 2 Rand. 501; Clay v. Willis, 1 B. & Cress. 364; Barber v. May, 9 B. & C. 489; Backhouse et al. v. Patton et al. 5 Peters's R. 160; Soames v. Robinson 1 Mylne & Keene, 500; Beale et al. v. Scott, ex'r of Leslie et al. 2 Brock. R. 325.

Powell's

The jurisdiction of a court of equity in the administration of assets and the mode of obtaining its aid, is fully considered by Kent, Ch. in Thompson et al. v. Brown et al. 4 Johns. Ch. R. 619-631-645; Mactier v. Lawrence et al. 7 Johns. Ch. R. 206; Drewry v. Thacker, 3 Swanton, 529.

On a bill, by creditors of a decedent, against his administrators and heirs, to marshal assets, the court may decree a sale of lands descended to the heirs; but it is not bound, and ought not, to decree such sale, if the rents and profits of the land will satisfy the debts within a reasonable time, especially if the heirs be infants. And on a bill against infant heirs, to marshal assets, it is error to decree a sale of the lands descended, without giving the infant heirs a day, after their attainment to full age, to shew cause against it. Tennent's heirs v. Pattons, 6 Leigh,

white

196.

Quare, whether a creditor at large can maintain a bill in chancery against the executor of the debtor, for a discovery and account of assets and satisfaction?

Distributees of a decedent may maintain a bill in equity to assert their rights in the decedent's estate, though they cannot have distribution thereof without having the executor or administrator of the decedent before the court, as a party in the cause. Hansford, &c. v. Elliott, &c. 9 Leigh,

79.

An executor or administrator is chargeable with the debts due to his testator or intestate from the time he actually receives them, and not from the time they were due, except such as are lost by his improper conduct. And his account rendered on oath, of the sums, and periods when received, is prima facie evidence of the facts. Cavendish v. Fleming, 3 Munf. 198. He will be chargeable with all the assets of his testator or intestate, that might have come to his hands by using due diligence. See Burnley's adm'r v. Duke et al. 1 Randolph, 113, and Swearingen's ex'r v. Pendleton's ex'x, 4 Serg. & Raw. 389.

Schultz v. Pulver, 11 Wend. 361; Attorney General v. Dimond, 1 Compt. & Jarvis, 356, 370, as to the duty of administrators, &c. to collect debts &c. due in other states and jurisdictions.

If he omit to insert in the inventory, credits belonging to his testator or intestate, he will be no farther chargeable than with the amount received by him, or lost by his negligence. M'Call v. Peachy's adm'r, 3 Munf. 288. See Giles et al. v. Dyson et al. 1 Stark. 32; Ruggles v. Sherman, 14 Johns. 446.

As to the liability of executors or administrators, for the acts of each other; of the effect of a joint receipt, &c., &c., see the cases reviewed by Kent, Ch. in Manahan v. Gibbons, (in error,) 19 Johns. R. 437, 440; and Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 283, 294, 296; Southerland v. Brush, 7 Johns.

11 Leigh 309.

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