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Act of April 16, 1831, Ses. Acts 1830-31, ch. 11. Sup. R. C. ch. 109.

58. § 23. And the circuit superior courts of law and chancery, as courts of common law, shall have power to hear and determine all treasons, murders,

entertain jurisdiction and grant relief after a failure at law. Talbert, &c. v. Jenny et al. 6 Rand. 159; Foushee v. Lea, 4 Call, 279. It is not the province of a court of equity to see that justice in the abstract is done in all possible cases, but only to lend its aid when, from any cause, without his own default or negligence, a party cannot have justice done him in the courts of law. Nor does the circumstance, that the discounts, or abatements, or damages, claimed to be set off in equity, arise out of a breach of the same contract on which the judgment at law is founded, form an exception to the general rule, unless there be also some circumstance in the case, which, without the default or negligence of the party, prevented him from availing himself of such a breach by way of defence, or in an action at law. Cabell's ex'r v. Robert's adm'r, 6 Rand. 580. In an action of debt, defendant pleads a special plea in bar, and the issue joined thereon is found against him, and judgment rendered for plaintiff. Then defendant exhibits bill in chancery, stating that though he was unable to prove the matter of his plea on the trial at law, he is now able to prove it, without suggesting fraud, accident, mistake or other circumstance, which prevented him from establishing his defence at law, and praying relief against the judgment: Held, the court of chancery had no jurisdiction to grant relief in such a case. Norris v. Hume, 2 Leigh, 334.

If the defendant's counsel means to move for a new trial, because the finding of the jury is contrary to evidence, he is not bound to do it at the time the verdict is rendered, but may postpone it to another day of the term; and if one of the justices who tried the cause does not attend on the day of the motion, so that a quorum cannot be had to decide on it, that will be ground for relief in a court of equity. Foushee v. Lea, 4 Call, 279.

If the parties are fairly before a court of law which can give full redress, equity has no jurisdiction of the case. Harvey v. Fox, 5 Leigh, 444. A court of equity has no jurisdiction to relieve a plaintiff against a judgment at law, where the case in equity proceeds on grounds equally available at law and in equity. The plaintiff must establish special equitable ground for relief. Harrison v. Nettleship, 2 Mylne & Keen, 423.

It is a well established principle, that a court of equity cannot interfere, in a case purely legal, merely on the ground that the judgment at law is erroneous, or on the ground that the party failed to produce the evidence which was in his power for his defence in the court of law. Bierne v. Mann et al. 5 Leigh, 364.

The general rule is, that after a verdict at law, the party comes too late with a bill of discovery, unless he shews a clear case of accident, surprise or fraud. This is the established doctrine in England and in the United States. Brown v. Swann, 10 Peters' R. 497. If he had knowledge of the facts during the pendency of the suit at law, he must apply to equity for aid, and not wait until judgment. Ibid.

Bill in equity for relief against a judg ment at law, on grounds which would have been a good defence at law, without shewing any reason why the defence was not made at law; defendants object to the jurisdiction in their answers; the court directs an issue to try the facts on which relief is asked, and verdict found for plaintiff, and then court decrees relief: Held, the case was not proper for relief in equity; and, notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff on the issue, the bill should have been dismissed. Collins et al. v. Jones, 6 Leigh, 530.

Though courts of equity and courts of law have concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fraud, yet, if a suit be first brought in a court of law, in which the question of fraud may be tried and determined, the party injured by the fraud must make his defence at law; if he neglect to do so, the court of equity has no jurisdiction to relieve him. Thus, if S. by fraud and deception practised on G., procures G. to execute a bond to H., upon which H. brings suit against G. and recovers judgment against G. by default, and G. files a bill in equity to be relieved against the judgment, on the ground of the fraud practised on him, without assigning any reason for not having defended himself at law, he will not be relieved in equity, because he might have defended himself at law, on the plea of non est factum. Haden v. Garden, 7 Leigh, 157.

In a motion by Turner v. Davis to recover money which T. alleged he had paid as D.'s surety, the court holds they were both principals, and gives T. judgment against D. for one moiety of the money paid, D. making no defence at law; then D. files a bill in equity, shewing that T. was the principal and he the surety, and states a reason for his failing to defend himself at law, which he does not prove to be true; he proves that T. was the principal and he the surety but, Held, his case is not relievable in equity. It is the settled rule of this court, that where a party has been grossly inattentive and negligent of his defence at law, he shall have no relief in equity. Pr. P. Tucker, in delivering opinion of court, Turner v. Davis et al. 7 Leigh, 227, 229; and see Morgan v. Carson, 7 Leigh, 238. The plaintiff seeks here, says

Act of April 16, 1831, Ses. Acts 1830-31, ch. 11. Sup. R. C. ch. 109.

felonies, and other crimes and misdemeanours, committed within their respective jurisdictions, except such as are or may be made exclusively cognizable

Tucker, P., to arrest a judgment at law, on a ground of defence which might have availed him in a court of law, and which he neglected to make. Such an attempt cannot receive the countenance of this court. A long train of decisions, no longer necessary to be cited or reviewed, leaves us no room for hesitation in dismissing such a case from the equitable forum. P. 241.

The jurisdiction of a court of equity, to injoin the collection of purchase money of land after conveyance executed, on the ground of a deficiency in quantity, the contract being a sale by the acre, is not now to be questioned. And equity will injoin the collection of the purchase money, on the ground of defect of title after vendee has taken possession, under conveyance from vendor with general warranty, if the title is questioned, by a suit either prosecuted or threatened, or if the purchaser can shew clearly that the title is defective. But, quary, whether equity will interfere to relieve against the collection of purchase money, on ground of defect of title in a case, in which the conveyance contains covenants of seizin, good title or the like, on which vendee may bring suit at law against vendor before actual eviction? Koger et al. v. Kane's adm'r et al. 5 Leigh, 606, and authorities cited; and Kayton's adm'x, &c. v. Brawford's ex'rs, &c. 5 Leigh, 39.

If the cause has not been fully and fairly tried and determined at law, equity will give relief. Ambler v. Wyld, 2 Wash. 36, 41; Picket v. Morris, 2 Wash. 255, 272; Hawkins v. Depriest, 4 Munf. 469; and see Armstrong et ux. v. Hickman, 6 Munf. 287-291. If the defendant is taken sick on his way to the trial of the cause, and is thereby prevented from making an affidavit that the original deeds are lost, and for want of such affidavit the court refuses to receive copies of the deeds in evidence, the court of chancery may relieve against the verdict, and judgment obtained by the plaintiff. Hord v. Dishman, 5 Call, 279; Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 402; Mitchell v. Bunell, 2 Paige, 606; Ld. Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 Mylne & Keene, 104.

On general principles of equity, the superior courts of chancery have power to direct the venue to be changed after issue joined in a county or other inferior court, where it appears that strong prejudices existed against the defendant which were unknown to him until after such issue was joined, and that a fair and impartial trial could not be expected in the court where the suit was depending. Darmsdatt v. Wolfe, 4 H. & M. 246.

A court of equity has not jurisdiction to settle the bounds of land between adverse claimants, unless the plaintiff has an equity

against the defendant claiming adversely to him. An equity against other persons will not give such jurisdiction. Stewart's heirs et al. v. Coalter, 4 Rand. 74; Lange v. Jones & Adams's ex'rs, 5 Leigh, 192.

Land sold, being erroneously described in the conveyance executed by vendor, mistake corrected on bill in equity filed by vendee. Long's ex'r, &c. v. Israel et al. 9 Leigh, 556.

A., in consideration of a certain price per acre to be paid him by B., undertakes to procure C., who is in possession of a tract of land as owner thereof, to make a good deed for the same to B. with general warranty. A. purchases the land from C., pays him the purchase money, and directs him to make the conveyance to B., which is made accordingly with general warranty; B. executes to A. his notes for the price agreed upon between them and takes possession of the land, which he holds without eviction or disturbance: Held, 1. Equity will not injoin A. from collecting the money due him by B., whatever be the defects of C.'s title to the land. 2. No eviction or disturbance of B.'s possession having taken place, defect of title is no ground for his coming into equity against C. Ibid.

Vendor is not estopped by his receipt from claiming the purchase money in equity. Wilson's curator v. Shelton's adm'r, 9 Leigh, 342.

And where the subject is peculiary appropriate to the jurisdiction of a court of equity, as trust and confidence, and it was proper that the complainant should have a discovery from the defendant, the court of appeals relieved after a judgment at law, notwithstanding the complainant assigned no reason for not having defended himself at law, and though he did not aver in his bill that he needed the aid of the defendant's testimony. Spencer et al. v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 130; see West's ex'r v. Logwood, 6 Munf. 491; and Ryle v. Haggie, 1 Jacob & Walker, 234.

A general delusion on the subject of a point of law, is a good ground for relief in equity. Tomkies v. Downman, 6 Munf. 557, Brooke, J. dissent. 568-571; and see Lyon et al. v. Richmond et al. 2 Johns. Ch. R. 51, 14 Johns. R. (in error,) 501, S. C.

Although it may be manifest that great injustice has been done a defendant at law by the verdict and judgment against him there, yet, if this injustice has not been produced by any fraud or surprise on the part of the plaintiff, but is the result either of the defendant's own negligence, or of his counsel's ignorance or bad management, a court of equity can give him no relief. Tapp's adm'r v. Rankin, 9 Leigh, 478.

Every claimant who asks relief of a court

Act of April 16, 1831, Ses. Acts 1830-31, ch. 11. Sup. R. C. ch. 109.

in some other court, by express statute; and jurisdiction over all persons, and
in all causes, matters and things at common law, which were cognizable in the
general court, on the twenty-second day of December, one thousand seven hun-
dred and eighty-eight, and which were cognizable in the former superior courts of
law, and which shall amount, exclusive of costs, to fifty dollars, (a) or fifteen
of equity ought to exhibit his claim within
a reasonable time, so that in giving him a
decree, the court may not do injustice to the
defendant. Atkinson v. Robinson, 9 Leigh,
393.

Bill in equity dismissed, because amount remaining due to complainant was uncertain, and could only be ascertained by a settlement of accounts in reference to transactions more than twenty-seven years old at the commencement of the suit. Ibid. S. C.

For the general principles of equity jurisdiction, see Carr, in delivering opinion of court in Bower et al. v. Creigh et al. 3 Rand. 26.

The true meaning of account, that will give a court of equity jurisdiction. Smith v. Marks, 2 Rand. 449; The Trustees of the Presbyterian Church v. Manson et al. 4 Rand. 197.

Where a plaintiff goes into equity for a settlement of accounts, on the ground that he cannot substantiate the items, except by the answer and testimony of the defendant himself, and in the progress of the suit it appears by his own shewing, that the account is susceptible of proof by witnesses in a court of law, his bill ought to be dismissed. Meze v. Mayse, 6 Rand. 658.

And a bill praying an account, and a decree for the balance which should be found due on a claim, on which an action at law would have lain, without shewing any obstacle which would defeat or embarrass the legal remedy, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Poage v. Willson, 2 Leigh, 490; and Fowle et al. v. Lawrason, 5 Peters's R. 495, acc'd; Moses v. Lewis, 12 Price, 502.

Bill in chancery stating running accounts for many years, between complainant and defendant, consisting of numerous items of debit and credit, or claims for them on both sides, and praying an account and decree for balance: Held, this is a bill for an account which equity will entertain, though assumpsit might have lain at law. Hickman v. Stout, 2 Leigh, 6.

Where a party comes into a court of equity to be relieved against proceedings at law, he must confess judgment at law, and rely solely on the court of equity for relief, though he may have grounds of defence at law distinct from the grounds of relief preferred to the court of equity. Warwick et ux. et al. v. Norvell, 1 Leigh, 96.

It is a settled rule, that when a court of equity gets possession of a cause for one purpose, as for discovery, &c. it may retain it generally. See Pryor v. Adams, 1 Call,

382; Chichester's ex'x v. Vass's adm'r, 1 Munf. 98, 117; Rathbone v. Warren, 10 Johns. R. 587; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 294-6; Ryle v. Haggie, 1 Jacob & Walker, 234-237.

(a) One hundred dollars by former law; and under that law it was decided that if the claim be one hundred dollars or more, and it be reduced to less than one hundred dollars by set-offs offered and allowed at the trial, the court may enter judgment for the balance. See Maitland v. M'Dearman, Virg. Cas. 131. And where debt was brought by the assignee of a single bill for $100 34 cts. against the maker, the jury, allowing a credit of $20, proved to have been collected by the assignor for defendant's use, and unaccounted for, found for plaintiff $87 34 cts., the court entered judgment for that sum by the advice of general court. Ferguson, assignee, v. Highley, gen. ct. June T. 1821, 2 Virg. Cas. 255. And see Pitts v. Carpenter, 2 Stra. 1191, 1 Wils. 19, S. C.; Gross v. Fisher, 3 Wils. 48; Heaward v. Hopkins, 2 Doug. 449; Gobed v. But, 2 Chitty's Reports, 394.

But if the balance be reduced by the proof of payments, the court cannot enter judgment. Larrowe v. Harding's adm'r, gen. ct. June T. 1820, 2 Virg. Cas. 203; Gross v. Fisher, 3 Wils. 48; Cook v. Johnson, 2 Price's Eq. Rep. 19, acc'd.

Penal bill for $100, conditioned to pay $47, the court has jurisdiction. Quary, if the penalty had been increased in fraudem legis? Heath et al. v. Blaker et al. gen. ct. June T. 1820, 2 Virg. Cas. 215. See Newell v. Wood, 1 Munf. 555; The U. S. v. M'Dowell, 4 Cranch, 316; and the remarks of judges Brooke and Roane in Lewis v. Long, 3 Munf. 151, 155.

In actions sounding in damages 'tis impossible for the court to know the amount of the matter or subject in controversy, except from the declaration, and therefore they are governed by the amount declared for, and not by the verdict. See Lyons, J. in Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. 212; Horton v. Kilmore, Hardw. Cas. 6, Ridgw. R. 29, S. C.; Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dall. 404, 407; Hancock v. Barton, 1 Serg. & Raw. 269; Kline v. Wood, 9 Serg. & Raw. 294.

Where damages for breach of contract are uncertain, and therefore unknown till ascertained by verdict, the superior court has jurisdiction, though the verdict is for less than one hundred dollars. Newsum et ux. adm'r, v. Pendred, 2 Virg. Cas. 93; Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Peters's R. 33; Scott v. Lunt's adm'r, 6 Peters, 349.

By Jess: Art Jan 1842. Count may enter ap Jam jusgrant in actions head in less than the vsampete where lips See at 1841 4

Act of April 16, 1831, Ses. Acts 1830-31, ch. 11. Sup. R. C. ch. 109.

hundred pounds of tobacco, whether brought before them by original process, by habeas corpus, writ of error, supersedeas, mandamus,(1) certiorari, to remove proceedings for any purpose, or by any other legal ways or means whatever; except in the cases herein after mentioned, and such cases as by the constitution of this commonwealth, or some particular statute heretofore made, or hereafter to be made, are or shall be exclusively vested in the general court. [They shall have and exercise, in vacation, the same power of granting writs of prohibition and mandamus, that they now have and exercise in term time. Act of March 27, 1837, Ses. Acts 1836-7, c. 57, p. 37.] They shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the quarterly county and corporation courts, in all matters of detinue and trover, and they shall have and exercise all other jurisdiction which by the provisions of this act herein after contained, or by any future statute shall be conferred upon and vested in them.

59. § 24. The said circuit superior courts shall also have the same jurisdiction concerning mills, roads, wills and letters of administration, public debtors, whether sheriffs or others, and caveats, as the former superior courts of law had; allowing the person entering such caveat to return a certified copy thereof from the register to the circuit court office within sixty days from the time of entering such caveat; and the said courts shall hear and determine all controversies relating to the same: Provided, That writs of habeas corpus, error, supersedeas, mandamus, and certiorari, and controversies concerning mills, roads, wills, letters of administration and caveats, shall not be heard and determined in the said circuit superior courts, unless such writ of error, supersedeas, mandamus or certiorari, relate to some record or proceeding within the county or corporation for which such court is held, or the person praying the habeas corpus, or the mills, or roads, or lands for which the caveats have been or shall be instituted, be within the same, or the wills or letters of administration be cognizable by the court of the county or corporation in and for which the said circuit superior court is held, or the court of some corporation within the county, except those cases in which it is or may be otherwise particularly provided by statute.

60. 25. The power of the several courts of this commonwealth, and of the justices and judges thereof, to issue attachments, and inflict summary. punishments for contempts of court, (2) or of the justices or judges thereof, shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any person or persons in the presence of courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct or

Where the principal sum demanded, together with the interest, is of sufficient amount to give jurisdiction the court will take it. Stratton v. M. A. Society, 6 Rand. 22.

(1) The result of these authorities, (4 Bac. Abr. 507; 3 Burr. 1267, 1659; Cowp. 378; 1 D. & E. 404; 3 D. & E. 651; 4 Burr. 2168, &c.) seems to be, that the superior court of law, which, quo ad hoc, possesses the same power possessed by the court of king's bench, will oblige all courts and magistrates to execute that justice to which any party is entitled, and which they are enjoined to do by law, especially if it be enjoined by statute; that they will do this by mandamus in all cases where there is a right, and no other specific remedy; that the original nature of the writ, and the end for which it was framed, ought to direct upon what occasions it should issue; that the end for which it was framed was to prevent a failure of justice, and a defect of police; and that it ought

to be used on all occasions where there is no other specific remedy, and justice and good government require one; and that ministerial and police officers are not protected from its control by any discretion which may be supposed to grow out of the nature of their functions. Pr. White, J. in op. ct. The Com. v. Fairfax Just. gen'l ct. Nov. T. 1815, 2 Virg. Cas. 14, 15. See post. 470, note (1.)

Mandamus lies from the superior court to county justices to compel them to administer the oath of insolvency, &c. See the case of Braxton Harrison v. Emmerson et al. justices of Norfolk county, general court, Nov. T. 1830.

Mandamus never lies if there is another specific legal remedy for the party complaining. King William Justices v. Munday, 2 Leigh, 165.

(2) See ante, title CONTEMPTS of Court, p. 157, 158.

Act of April 16, 1831, Ses. Acts 3,1830-31, ch. 11. Sup. R. C. Ch. 109.

interrupt the administration of justice, and except cases of violence, or threats of violence, offered to the judge or justice of the court, or any officer thereof, or any juror, witness or party, in going to, attending, or returning from the court, for or in respect of any act or proceeding had or to be had at the court; and except the misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said courts, in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance of any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of the said courts: Provided, That no court shall, without the intervention of a jury, for any such contempt of misbehaviour, in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice therein, impose any fine on any person or persons, exceeding fifty dollars, or commit him, her or them, for a longer period than ten days: And provided, That in any case of aggravated contempt of the kind last mentioned, the court may impannel a jury, without any indictment, information or pleadings, in a summary manner, to ascertain the amount of fine or term of imprisonment, proper to be inflicted for such of fence, and may impose the fine or imprisonment ascertained by the jury in manner aforesaid. That if any person or persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavour to influence, intimidate, or impede any judge or justice, juror, witness or officer, in any court of this commonwealth, in the discharge of his duty, or shall corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, every person or persons so offending, shall be liable to prosecution therefor, by indictment, information or presentment, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the discretion, and according to the finding of the jury.

61. § 26. And those cases in which the court of admiralty heretofore had jurisdiction by law, and which are not taken away by the constitution of the United States, are hereby transferred to the said circuit superior courts, to be proceeded in as the law requires in the said court of admiralty.

62. § 27. The circuit superior courts of law and chancery, directed by this act to be held for the county of Henrico, at the capitol in the city of Richmond, [or in the city hall, as the judge thereof may from time to time think proper; act of March 17, 1840, c. 12, § 3, p. 24,] shall [exercise the same power and authority which is exercised by the other judges of the general court, and shall have the same power and authority which the other circuit superior courts of law and chancery now have, and shall exercise like jurisdiction, and shall have and exercise all the power, authority and jurisdiction. now by law especially assigned to, and shall discharge all the duties now imposed upon the circuit superior court of law and chancery, for the county of Henrico. [See tit. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, No. 83, p. 243.] The judge shall reside within his circuit, and shall receive as a compensation for his services a salary of two thousand dollars per annum, to be paid him quarter yearly out of the public treasury.(d) Act of Feb. 25, 1837, Ses. Acts 1836-7, c.

(d) Before the county of Henrico and the city of Richmond were formed into a new circuit, (the twenty-first,) the judge of the court of Henrico, which was then the seventh circuit and in the fourth district, was entitled to receive in addition to his salary the annual sum of three hundred dollars, and when this county and city were severed from the seventh circuit no change was made in the allowance to the judge of that circuit.

See the case decided by the court of ap

peals, 9 Leigh, 109. A judge of the general court, elected for and assigned to the seventh judicial circuit, has an additional salary allowed him in consequence of the great mass of judicial business in one of the courts of his circuit; that court is afterwards severed from the seventh circuit, and formed into a new circuit, and a new judge appointed for the same, the former judge yet remaining judge of the seventh circuit: Held, 1. That as the act establishing the new circuit makes no mention of the addi

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