Act of February 9, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 241. tion by the auditor of public accounts, in the general court, upon thirty days notice thereof. Ibid. 2.] [Within two months after a runaway slave shali be committed to the jail of any county or corporation, the jailor shall report the fact to the court of his said county or corporation, who shall thereupon order three disinterested persons, being first sworn for that purpose, to value the said runaway, and report the valuation to the court. And if the court, after receiving the valuation as aforesaid, shall be of opinion that the said runaway will not sell, at public auction, for a sum sufficient to pay the prison fees and other expenses, after being confined in jail twelve months, they shall fix the time of imprisonment for any shorter period, and order the said slave to be sold at the end thereof, after the time and place of sale being advertised as now required by law. Act of March 3, 1824, ch. 36, § 3, Ses. Acts 1823-4, p. 36; Sup. R. C. ch. 146, p. 206.] [See ante, No. 74, amendment of February 2, 1835, Ses. Acts 1834-5, c. 62, p. 44, 45.] 78. § 6. The runaway, if he shall have crossed the bay of Chesapeake, shall be delivered to the sheriff of some county bounded thereby who shall transport him to the other side, and cause him to be put into the hands of a constable, to be, by constable to constable, conveyed to the owner, who shall pay to the sheriff twenty dollars, and to the constable ten cents for every mile he shall necessarily travel in performing this duty. 1792, c. 131, R. C. [See post. No. 86.] 79. 7. Any person who shall hereafter apprehend any runaway slave attempting to cross the Potomac, and deliver him to his master or to any person authorized to receive him, shall be entitled to a reward of twenty dollars, and mileage as aforesaid: Provided, The plantation or other place on which such slave is employed, be not less than ten miles from the said river. Feb. 22, 1817, c. 36. 80. 8. Any person who shall hereafter apprehend any runaway slave, belonging to any person residing within this commonwealth, at any place in the states of Maryland and Kentucky, and deliver him as aforesaid, shall be entitled to a reward of twenty-five dollars; at any place in the states of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, or the state of Ohio, and deliver him as aforesaid, to a reward of fifty dollars; and in all cases of the apprehension of a runaway slave in any of the states aforesaid, the person apprehending shall be entitled to receive twenty-five cents for every mile he shall necessarily convey such runaway; the distance to be proved by oath, if required, before any justice of the peace; and the reward and mileage to be paid, in every instance, by the owner of the slave: Provided, That, in all cases where any runaway shall be apprehended in any of the states aforesaid, the person apprehending him shall go before a justice of the peace of the county or corporation, where such slave is apprehended, and make oath, that such slave was apprehended within the limits of such county or corporation, and procure a certificate of such oath from the justice before whom it is made: And, &c. That, if any runaway slave shall be apprehended in any of the states aforesaid, bordering on this commonwealth, at any place not more than ten miles distant from the plantation or other place where such slave is employed; or, if any runaway slave, apprehended in any of the states aforesaid, shall belong to any person residing in any of the counties of this commonwealth which lie west of the Alleghany mountains, and border on the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, or Ohio, the person apprehending, shall not, in either case, be entitled to more than the reward and mileage allowed by this act, for runaway slaves apprehended within the limits of this commonwealth. Ibid. [See post. Nos. 86, 87.] Act of 1840-41, ch. 73, p. 82. 811. § 1. Any person who shall apprehend any runaway male slave above the age of sixteen years, within this state, more than twenty miles from his usual place of abode, and within ten miles of the dividing lines between this state and the states of Ohio and Pennsylvania, and that portion of the line of the state of Maryland, commencing at its intersection with the line of Pennsylvania on the west, and terminating at the point where the dividing line of the counties of Loudoun and Fairfax intersects said line, shall be entitled to demand and recover of the owner of every such slave or slaves, for each one so apprehended, the sum of thirty dollars, besides ten cents for every mile of such distance he shall necessarily convey such runaway, instead of the compensation allowed by the first section of the act, entitled "an act to reduce into one act the several acts for apprehending and securing runaways," passed the ninth of February, eighteen hundred and nineteen, to be recovered in the manner prescribed by the said act. Act of February 9, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 241. 81. § 9.-Owners or keepers of any ferry or bridge across the Potomac, 'Ohio or Pocomoke' not to allow any slave to cross, without special permit in writing, under the penalty of twenty-five dollars to the party aggrieved, to be recovered on motion, in any court of record, having jurisdiction, on ten days notice; judgment to be entered against defendant, unless he shew the permit in evidence. Feb. 22, 1817, c. 36. [If any owner or keeper of any ferry or bridge across any river or water course separating this state from any other state, shall knowingly and wilfully allow any slave to cross the said rivers or water courses, at any ferry or bridge, without permission in writing, attested by a justice of the peace, or the clerk of the county or corporation in which the owner of the slave may reside, signed by such owner, his or her overseer or agent, or without his or her direction in person, the owner or keeper of such ferry or bridge, shall, on conviction thereof in any court having jurisdiction thereof, be deemed guilty of felony, and shall undergo a confinement in the public jail and penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than five years, at the discretion of a jury; and he shall moreover be liable to the action of the party aggrieved for all damages which he may sustain thereby. Act of March 11, 1839, Ses. Acts 1839, c. 76, p. 47.] 82. § 11. Upon any owner's neglecting or refusing to pay the above reward, the taker-up may sue for and recover the same with costs, either by warrant before a single justice where the reward shall not exceed twenty dollars, or, where the reward shall exceed that sum, by action, as the case may require, in any court of record within this commonwealth; in which action bail may be required as of right.' 1769, c. 19, 8 Stat. Larg. 358; 1792, c. 131, R. C. [See post. No. 89.] 83. 12. The keeper of every jail may demand and take for the commitment of every runaway, fifty cents, and the same for releasement; and for every twenty-four hours keeping him or her in jail, twenty-five cents, and no more; and if he, or any sheriff, sergeant, or jailor, shall demand or take any other or greater fee than is or shall be allowed by law, for runaways, he or they so offending shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay four dollars to the party grieved, and shall also refund and pay back all money received over and above the legal fees; recoverable with costs, before any justice of the peace of the county or corporation, where such offence shall be committed. Alt. from 1792, c. 131, R. C. 84. § 13. The keeper of every jail, in which a runaway slave is confined under the provisions of this act, shall be liable to the taker-up of said runaway, for any reward which the owner has advertised to pay; and such jailor Act of February 9, 1819-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 241. may detain the runaway until the reward be paid; but, in any case where such reward shall exceed the fee allowed by law, the taker-up shall not be entitled to receive both. Rev. 1819. [See post. No. 89.] 85. 10. Whereas, many times slaves run away and lie out, hid, and lurking in swamps, woods, and other obscure places, killing hogs, and committing other injuries to the inhabitants of this commonwealth: Be it therefore enacted, That, in all such cases, upon intelligence given of two or more slaves lying out as aforesaid, any two justices of the peace of the county wherein the slaves are supposed to lurk or do mischief, shall be, and are empowered and required, by warrant, reciting their names and owners' names, if known, to direct the sheriff of the said county to take such power with him, as he shall think fit and necessary, for the effectual apprehending such outlying slave or slaves; and go in search of them, and, upon their being apprehended, to commit them to the jail of his county for further trial. April 1691, act 16, 3 Stat. Larg. 86; 1793, c. 131, R. C. Act of February 17, 1823, ch. 35. 86. § 1. Any person who may apprehend any runaway slave in the state of Ohio, Pennsylvania or Indiana, who may have eloped from any person residing within this commonwealth, and deliver such runaway slave either to the owner thereof, or to the keeper of any of the public jails within this state, shall be entitled to a reward of fifty dollars, and twenty-five cents per mile for travelling, from the place where such runaway may be apprehended to the residence of the owner, or the jail at which such runaway may be delivered. And any person who may in like manner apprehend any runaway slave in either of the states of Maine, Nero Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York or Vermont, or in either of the British Provinces, and deliver such runaway to the owner thereof residing within this commonwealth, or to the keeper of any of the public jails of this state, shall be entitled to a reward of one hundred and twenty dollars. 87. 4. If any runaway slave shall be apprehended within any of the states herein before mentioned, bordering on this commonwealth, at any place not more than twenty miles distant from the plantation or place from which such slave may have eloped, the person apprehending shall only be entitled to a reward of twenty-five dollars and the mileage herein before provided. 88. § 2. For the better securing such rewards to the persons apprehending such runaway slaves, it shall be the duty of any justice of the peace within this commonwealth, before whom such runaway be brought, to examine such evidence as the taker-up may offer, as to the place where the slave was apprehended; the distance travelled, where mileage is allowed; to give a certificate ascertaining the sum due to the taker-up; and, if the owner is not present to receive such slave and to pay the amount so ascertained, to commit such slave to the jail of his county, there to remain until reclaimed by the owner, and the reward and expenses fully paid, or until such slave is otherwise disposed of as by law is directed. 89. § 3. The rewards hereby allowed, or any reward offered by advertisement by the owner, shall operate as a lien on the slave, so apprehended; and the keeper of the jail to which such slave may be committed, shall be liable to the taker-up for the payment of the same, on the release or delivery of the slave to the person entitled thereto; or such reward and expenses shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of such slave, if not reclaimed within the time prescribed by law; but if the reward offered by the owner exceeds the sum allowed by law, the taker-up shall not be entitled to receive both. [See act of Feb. 28, 1835, Ses. Acts 1834-5, c. 62, § 3, p. 45; ante, No. 74.] Act of March 5, 1824, Ses. Acts 1823-4, ch. 34. 90. § 3. Every master or owner of a slave of unsound mind, or aged or infirm, who shall permit such slave to go at large, without adequate provision for his or her support, so that such slave must be dependent on charity, trespass or theft for support, shall forfeit and pay for every such offence a fine not exceeding fifty dollars: and moreover it shall be the duty of the overseers of the poor of any county or corporation where such slave shall be found, to provide for the maintenance of every such slave, to charge the master or owner with a sum, quarterly or annually, sufficient for that purpose, and to recover the same by motion in any court of record having jurisdiction thereof, on ten days notice. [For the mode of reclaiming runaway slaves from sister states, see ante, p. 10, notes (jj) (kk.) Act of January 13, 1818-January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 116. 1. § 1. In all cases where judgment hath been, or shall hereafter be, entered up in any of the courts of record within this commonwealth, against any person or persons, as security or securities, (1) their heirs, executors or administrators, upon any note, bill, bond or obligation, and in all cases where execution hath been, or shall hereafter be, awarded by or issued from any of the courts of record within this commonwealth, against any person or persons as security or securities, his, her or their heirs, executors or administrators, upon any bond, obligation or recognizance, upon which, by the laws of this commonwealth, execution can be so awarded or issued, without judgment, and the amount of such judgment or execution, or any part thereof, hath been paid or discharged by such security or securities, his, her or their heirs, executors or administrators, it shall and may(a) be lawful for such security or securities, (1) "Bonds are sometimes so drawn, that it is impossible to distinguish the surety from the real debtor, but when distinguished by proof, the uncertainty arising from the face of the instrument, can make no difference in the principle. Since the act of assembly which gives to sureties a summary remedy against their principals, it might be well to distinguish in the bond the one from the other." Pr. pres't Pendleton, in Harrison, ex'r of Minge v. Field, ex'r of Field, 2 Wash. 140; see Doughty v. Bacot et al. 2 Ves. 546. Evidence is admitted to shew who is principal, and who surety. Graythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. 170. A. B. and C. executed a forthcoming bond to release the goods of A. taken in execution. C. pays the debt, and moves against B. as a principal in the bond. The bond does not ascertain whether B. was surety or not; B. contends that he was only surety jointly with C. The court below gave judgment for C. on the motion. There is no evidence in the record to shew whether B. was surety or principal. This court presuming that the court below had evidence before it, that B. was principal, and not surety, affirmed the judgment. Cunningham v. Mitchell, 4 Rand. 189. One who is in reality only surety, may place himself in the condition of principal, by expressly declaring on his contract, that he binds himself as principal. Sprigg v. The Bank of Mount Pleasant, 10 Peters's R. 257. (a) The provisions of this section are not in exclusion of the jurisdiction of a court Act of January 13, 1818–January 1, 1820. R. C. ch. 116. his, her or their heirs, executors or administrators, to obtain judgment by motion against such principal obligor or obligors, recognizor or recognizors, his, her or their heirs, (e) executors or administrators, in any court, where such judgment may have been entered up, or from which such execution may have issued, against such security or securities, his, her or their heirs, executors or administrators, for the full amount which shall have been paid,(b) with interest thereon, from the time the same shall have been paid and satisfied, until of equity. A surety in a bond, having paid a judgment recovered by the obligee against him, may file a bill in equity, against the administrator and heirs of the principal obligor, for the purpose of establishing his demand; of obtaining an account of the personal and real estates; and of being permitted to stand in the place of the obligee in the bond, so as to be paid out of the real estate, on failure of the personal fund. Tinsley v. Oliver's adm'r et al. 5 Munf. 419. This right of substitution has been frequently sanctioned by the court of appeals. See Eppes et al. v. Randolph, 2 Call, 125, 188-9; Tinsley v. Anderson, 3 Call, 329; Lidderdale v. Robinson, 2 Brock. R. 159, 167; West v. Belches, 5 Munf. 187, 194; and Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. jun. 22; Clason et al. v. Morris et al. 10 Johns. R. 524; Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 413; Hayes v. Ward et al. 4 Johns. Ch. R. 123, 129-31; Miller et al. v. Ord, 2 Binney, 382; Tompkins v. Mitchell, 2 Rand. 428; Mayhew v. Crickett, 1 Wils. Ch. R. 418, 423; 2 Swanst. 193, S. C.; Saunders v. Pate, 4 Rand. 8. Equity does not regard form in enforcing the principles of substitution, but the essence of the transaction; and, therefore, it does not require that a surety shall be bound in the same bond with his principal, in order to make the doctrine of substitution operate; but merely that having bound himself for the debt of the principal debtor he should have paid it. Enders et al. v. Brune, 4 Rand. 438; and see Lidderdale's ex'r v. The ex'r of Robinson, 12 Wheat. 594; see Jones v. Davids, 4 Russell, 277. Where money is paid by a surety for his principal, the surety is subrogated to all the rights of the creditor, whose debt he has discharged. But, quare, is this ever done in favour of a person, not bound by the original security, who discharges it as a volunteer? See The Bank of the U. S. et al. v. Winston's ex'ors et al. 2 Brock. R. 252. The assignee of a debt, secured by deed of trust, is entitled to the security as fully as the original creditor, without a specific assignment of the security. Therefore, where S. executed a deed of trust to secure the payment of three notes to A. B.-the first being paid-the second was endorsed to N. R. without an assignment of the trust deed; and the third note was endorsed to G. who took an assignment of the deed, for his security; the assignee of the second note was held entitled to the first satisfac tion. Gwathmeys v. Ragland, 1 Randolph, 466; Jackson v. Blodget, 5 Cowen, 202; Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80. Plaintiff joined the testator as surety in a bond, which he paid after the death of the testator, taking an assignment of the bond; he is only a simple contract creditor of the testator. Jones v. Davids, 4 Russell, 277; Copis v. Middleton, 1 Turn. C. C. 224; Rebinson v. Wilson, 2 Mad. 435; Hodgson v. Shaw, 3 Mylne & Keene, 183; Douglass v. Fagg, 8 Leigh, 588. (e) This act does not authorize a motion against devisees of the principals. Bacchus v. Gee, 2 Leigh, 68. (b) In proceeding by virtue of this section, the original judgment must be taken as correct. Roane, J. and Pendleton, J. in Graves v. Webb, 1 Call, 449, 456. Payment what? See Pothier on Oblig. p. 2, c. 6, § 7, [430]; Barclay et al. v. Gooch, 2 Esp. R. 571; Taylor v. Higgins, 3 East, 169; Maxwell v. Jameson, 2 Barn. & Ald. 51; Powell v. Smith, 8 Johns. 249; Cumming v. Hackley, 8 Johns. 202; Morrison v. Berkey, 7 Serg. & Raw. 238; Randolph v. Randolph, 3 Rand. 493. Where a judgment is obtained against a principal and surety to a bond, and surety gives a forthcoming bond which is forfeited, the original judgment is not thereby satisfied, although any farther proceedings on it will be barred until the forthcoming bond shall be quashed. The fact of the surety's having given the forthcoming bond, will not authorize him to move against his principal under this act, which requires payment by the surety, and a forthcoming bond is certainly not a payment. This act only requires, in terms, two circumstances to justify a motion by a surety against his principal: First, that there should be an adversary judgment against the surety; and secondly, that he should have paid it in part or in whole. If a surety were voluntarily to pay money, on account of a judgment absolutely barred, there would be good reason to refuse his relief; but a payment cannot be said to be voluntary, so long as the judgment can be enforced in any way. He is not bound to submit to the costs of an execution, scire facias, or a new action on the judgment. Randolph v. Randolph, 3 Rand. 490; Rodman v. Hedden, 10 Wendell, 498, 500-1. See ante, tit. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, No. 5, note (f). See also Butterworth v. Ellis's adm'x, 6 Leigh, 106. |