saw any advantage to themselves in facilitating their execution, were afraid to take sides with us openly, from the knowledge that, if our troops. were withdrawn, our influence would be at an end, and that they themselves would be exposed to the hostility of the Court and the Pashas as having been friends of England. Again, every English official had the conviction brought home to him, day by day, that the work of reform, however beneficial it might prove in the end to Egypt, was calculated to retard, not to advance, the formation of a strong native government; and, therefore, however strongly he might believe in the possibility of regenerating Egypt under English influence, he was not prepared to put forth all his strength so long as he saw cause to fear that the British garrison-which formed the basis, so to speak, of the fabric he was endeavoring to erect-would be withdrawn long before the fabric could be completed. Having been much here during the early years succeeding the occupation, I can say confidently that the great majority of our officials contemplated the withdrawal of our troops as being within the possible contingencies of the near future. I can say, also, having had more occasion than most people at that time to know something about the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's Government, that these apprehensions were fully justified. I am convinced that Mr. Gladstone himself was genuinely desirous of bringing our military occupation to an abrupt close. I am also fully convinced that when Lord Hartington stated in the House of Commons that evacuation might be expected to take place within a few months, or even weeks, he was giving utterance not only to his own opinion, but to that of the Cabinet. I have reason to believe that some of his colleagues were not equally confident as to the possibility, and still less as to the policy of evacuation. But I am absolutely convinced that none of the dissentient Liberal Ministers of the day would have actively opposed immediate evacuation if it had been proposed by the

Premier, and supported-as in those days it would infallibly have been-by the strength of the then united. Liberal Party. It was not till the secession of the Liberal Unionists and the accession of the Conservatives to power that the danger of the immediate withdrawal of our troops begun to pass away. That this should have been so was due not so much to one Party having succeeded another at home, as to the circumstance that in England popular sentiment about Egypt had been affected by the Conservative reaction of which the defeat of Home Rule had been the result rather than the cause. As a matter of fact, Lord Salisbury was, if I am well informed, as anxious in 1885, as Mr. Gladstone had been ever since 1882, to close the period of our occupation. Lord Randolph Churchill, then the coming leader of the Party, was hostile to the retention of our troops in Egypt; so, also, was the late Lord Iddesleigh. Indeed, the one practical effort made by England to get away from Egypt was made during the short-lived Conservative Administration of 1885. Sir Henry Wolff was sent to Constantinople by the Government, and concluded a convention with Turkey for the settlement of the Egyptian question, which would have necessitated the withdrawal of our troops if France had ratified the convention. Happily, as I think, for England and for Egypt, France refused her consent, and the project was stillborn. The fact, however, that an early evacuation was brought to the very verge of accomplishment under a Conservative Ministry, seems to explain the want of confidence in the permanence of our occupation, which, up to nearly the close of the last decade, impeded and retarded the work of reorganization in Egypt to which England had set her hand. It is sufficient for my present purpose to state that from the collapse of the Wolff-Mouktar Mission, both the natives and the English residents in Egypt began to realize that England had got to stay; while, at the same time, popular opinion at home became far more favorable, or, at any rate,

far less unfavorable, to the idea of a permanent occupation than it had been previously.

The progress effected in Egypt under the British occupation has recently been recorded in a singularly clear and simple statement issued by the British financial adviser to His Highness, the Khedive. I am quite aware that statistical returns cannot be regarded as matters of mathematical demonstration; and I have no doubt that exceptions may be taken to certain of the inferences which the compilers of the Statistical Returns, 1881 to 1897, have drawn from the figures they cite. About the substantial accuracy of the returns there is, however, no possibility of question; and the margins of profit shown by these returns are so stupendous, that though it may be argued that the profit is over-estimated, it is idle to contend that under any fair estimate the profit could be converted into a loss. Let me point out the main conclusions of this remarkable Report as briefly as I can.

From 1882 to 1897 the population of Egypt has increased from a little under 7,000,000 to close upon 10,000,000. This increase is not due to foreign immigration, as the number of foreigners resident in Egypt has only risen some 20,000 in all. Speaking in round numbers, the population of the Delta, the wealthiest and most thickly inhabited part of the country, has increased by 1,000,000; that of Upper Egypt, the least prosperous and fertile part of the country, by 2,000,000. The increase is enormous, and can only be accounted for by the fact that conditions of life amid the mass of the population are more favorable than they were of old; that marriages are more frequent; that families are larger; that infant mortality, which previous to this period kept the population at a dead level, is less frequent; and that the general health of the people has improved. To put the same idea in plainer words, this marvellous and rapid increase in the population is due to the fact that under the British occupation the Fellaheen are better fed, better paid for their labor, better housed, better clothed, and

better cared for than they have ever been within any period the recollection of which is retained by popular tradition.

Up to 1882 the acreage of taxable land in Egypt was calculated at 5,000,000. It is now increased by over 600,000 acres, or close upon 13 per cent. Yet the total amount levied by the land tax-the great permanent source of revenue in Egypt-is actually less in 1897 than it was in 1881. According to Sir Elwin's figures, the average land tax per acre has been diminished during the above period from 22s. to 18s. 3d. The arrears of land tax, which formerly attained colossal proportions, have now practically been paid off. The Fellah, when once he has paid his annual contribution, has no longer any apprehension, as he had in the days of Ismail, of being called upon to pay again. in advance long before the date of the next instalment had become due. The Fellah has in consequence no need to borrow money from the Greek village usurers in order to save himself from being bastinadoed and his crops from being seized. The extraordinary recent rise in the price of land throughout Egypt is, I am assured by old residents in the country, solely due to the fact that whenever land comes into the market its price is run up by the brisk competition of the Fellaheen in the neighborhood, who are now both able and willing to invest their savings in the purchase of fresh allotments. The enormous properties which Ismail had appropriated to some extent by enforced purchase and to a still larger extent by peculation and confiscation, are rapidly returning into the possession of the small peasant landholders. I may mention in connection with this that of the persons who own land, and therefore pay land tax in Egypt, the native landowners are, roughly speaking, 750,000 as against 6,500 foreigners; while of the number of persons who own lands exceeding 50 acres in extent, there are 10,400 natives as against 1,500 foreigners.

Indirect taxation has risen from £2,000,000 in 1881 to £3,400,000 in 1897. But this rise is due to the in

crease in the population and to the yield of the taxes being greater, owing to larger consumption of the articles taxed and more honest collection of the taxes. The only indirect tax which has been increased is that of the duty on tobacco, which has risen from some £100,000 in the first-named year to £1,000,000 in the latter. But notwithstanding this, the total taxation per head has fallen from 228. 2d. to 17s. 9d. during the period of our occupation.

The general improvement in the prosperity of Egypt is shown by the following figures: traffic returns on the railways have risen from £1,300,000 in 1881 to £2,000,000 in 1897; Post Office receipts from £91,000 to £119,000; the number of letters posted in Egypt from 3,500,000 to 11,300,000; and though the fall in the market prices of cotton and sugar has slightly diminished the gross value of the exports, the fact that the imports have grown in volume though not in value is shown by the increase in the tonnage of the port of Alexandria alone from 1,250,000 to 2,270,000 tons.

It may be said, however, that the development of Egyptian prosperity is due not so much to the direct action of British Administration as to the indirect effects of a prolonged period of tranquillity and order. I quite admit the truth of this assertion. What I contend is that under a native administration Egypt would never have enjoyed such an era of orderly quiet, and never can enjoy it unless the native administration had remained under European control and supervision. I have no doubt that if any other European nation had occupied in Egypt during the last fifteen years a position similar to that we have held, there would have been a marked improvement in the condition of the country. I am, however, convinced that no other European Power could have administered Egypt with the same honest desire to do the best for the country as England has evinced. What other Power is there which would have forbidden the Kurbash, which would have practically abolished the Corvée, and which would have protected the Fellah

against injustice and oppression, and enabled him to reap the due reward of his own toil and labor?

But we have done or at any rate we have tried to do-more for Egypt than to confer upon her the benefits accruing automatically from a period of order, tranquillity, and economy. Under our occupation we have constructed, or rather caused to be constructed, 212 miles of new railway; and in this calculation the line now being laid down from Wady Halfa to Khartoum is not included. It may be asked why we have not done more in a country where railroads are practically the only modes of locomotion. The answer is that our hands are tied by the system under which the railways are administered. In virtue of the financial settlement concluded between Egypt and her creditors, the State railways are hypothecated to the service of the Public Debt, and are placed under the administration of three International Commissioners who are bound by the terms of their trust to hand over 55 per cent. of the gross receipts to the Caisse de la Dette; while out of the remaining 45 per cent. they have to provide for the working expenses of the line, the repair of the roadway, and the rolling stock. A very simple calculation will show that, as long as this arrangement holds good, the construction of any new line, however profitable as a going concern, involves a positive loss to the Railway Administration, and yet this extraordinary arrangement cannot be modified without the consent of all the Powers who sanctioned the compromise between Egypt and her creditors.

This consent is certain to be refused, and therefore new railways can only be constructed by a complicated process under which the cost of construction is borne in the first instance by private. companies and repaid by debentures, the interest on which is provided out of the small surplus of the revenues accruing to the State. Still the increased efficiency and economy introduced into the management of the railways under British supervision has done wonders. In fifteen years the third class traffic, which is practically

the native traffic, has increased from 3,000,000 to about 9,500,000 in the number of passengers carried. I saw a statement the other day in a London paper, which devotes much attention to Egyptian affairs, that the British troops at the front had grave cause of complaint because the cost of their rations was unnecessarily increased by the exorbitant rates of transport charged by the railways, which all belonged to the State. As a matter of fact, the State in Egypt has no more power to reduce the transport charges on the State lines than the British Government has to reduce the traffic rates on the Paris and Lyons Railway. In Egypt, the railway administrators are powerless because they are bound by the conditions of the Trust to which they owe their authority; while the State has no more voice in the matter than the owner of an estate under liquidation has in the management of his property.

In irrigation our efforts have had a freer field of action than in any other department. To every individual in Egypt the maintenance, extension, and improvement of the irrigation system are matters of vital importance. Thus, when Sir Colin Moncrieff, supported by a singularly able body of British engineers, undertook the control of the water supply of the Nile, he had popular sympathy on his side, and was much less thwarted by the sullen hostility of the native officials than most of his English fellow officials in other branches of the public service; while his efforts did not encounter the same active opposition from the International authorities. To go into details is unnecessary for my purpose. It is enough to say that, under his régime and that of his successor, Sir William Garstin, the French barrage just below Cairo has been turned into an effective dam, which it had never been before; a number of canals have been constructed or restored so as to convey the water stored up behind the dam to all parts of the Delta at any season of the year, and Lower Egypt has thus been provided with a regular supply of water which is capable doubtless of great

extension, but which suffices for the wants of all the Delta lands at present under cultivation.

The costly and unsatisfactory system of steam pumps has fallen into comparative disuse owing to the improvements already effected. The employment of subdrains has been introduced, and 2,200 kilometres of drains have been constructed, by means of which the stagnant water has been drawn away from the subsoil. 2,000 kilometres of new canals have been opened in Upper Egypt, and 1,000 in Lower; while 500 kilometres of fresh banks have been raised along the canals. To British occupation the credit is also justly due of having solved the problem of the irrigation of Upper Egypt. From the time when Sir Colin Moncrieff had proved by experience that the barrage built by Mongel Bey, at the apex of the Delta, could be made to serve the purpose for which it was erected, it was obvious that the best way to procure a permanent regular water supply for Upper Egypt was by the erection of similar barrages higher up the Nile. Yet, for years after this conclusion had been arrived at, nothing was done to carry it into effect. As usual, international difficulties barred the way. Egypt, under the terms of the Liquidation Convention, cannot raise any fresh loan without the consent of the Caisse, and the Caisse, even if it had the power, had not the will to authorize the borrowing of an amount sufficient to construct the proposed Upper Egypt barrages, or to advance the amount out of the reserved funds amassed by them owing to the actual revenue of Egypt having enormously surpassed the value estimated by the Commission of Liquidation. These funds are kept as a reserve against the possible, though most improbable, contingency of the Egyptian revenue falling short in any year of the amount required for the service of the debt. The importance, however, of having the Upper Egypt barrages constructed was impressed so strongly upon our Government by the British Authorities in Egypt, that a group of London capitalists was induced to provide the capital for the work in ques

The

tion, and to trust to the recovery of their advances by a series of half-yearly instalments, spread over so long a period that the Egyptian Government will easily be able to pay the instalments as they become due out of the revenue left at its disposal. I have sufficient confidence in the ability of the capitalists, by whom Mr. John Aird, the contractor, is backed, to entertain little doubt that their calculations will prove to be in the main correct, and that this being so, they will make a fair, though not an unreasonable, profit on the transaction. But there is no possibility of doubt as to the transaction being a most advantageous one for the Egyptian Government. barrages at Assouan and Assiout will be constructed without the State having to pay a piastre for the work of construction. If, owing to any unforeseen difficulties, the cost of the barrages should prove greater than is expected, and should result in a loss instead of a profit, the State will lose nothing by the loss of the contractors. It is only when the barrages are completed and in working order that the State will be called upon to commence paying off the debt due to the contractors by instalments. The amount of these instalments is a mere trifle compared with the increase in the proceeds of the land tax which is expected to result from the new reservoirs. Even hostile critics of the project can only urge that the amount Egypt has virtually borrowed. by this ingenious scheme-which I believe owes its existence to the financial genius of the author, Mr. Cassel-will, according to their calculations, bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent., while the interest on the State debts does not now exceed 4 per cent. According to the opinion current in Egypt, amid the best local authorities on the culture of the soil, the reservoirs will nearly double the revenues of the State; the question, therefore, of 1 per cent., more or less, paid as interest for the necessary outlay is hardly worth considering. Since the conclusion of the contract between Mr. Aird and the Egyptian Government the price of land in Upper

Egypt has, I may add, more than doubled.

In respect of education, we have not done so much as might have been done. But in this respect I think we have acted wisely in not endeavoring to introduce any drastic reforms. In the East, even more than elsewhere, education and religion are indissolubly connected, and until our position in Egypt is more clearly defined and more emphatically recognized than it is at present, we cannot afford to introduce any changes under our regime, tending to excite the latent hostility which even at the best of times exists between the Crescent and the Cross. It is obvious, however, if newspaper reading is any proof of the spread of education, that education has spread very rapidly in Egypt. During the last fifteen years the number of newspapers posted in Egypt has increased from 2,000,000 to 7,000,000. Foreign newspapers for Egypt are posted abroad, and the proportion of local newspapers posted in Egypt for delivery abroad must form an insignificant proportion to the total posted. The foreign population in Egypt is comparatively small, and none of the papers printed in English, French, Greek, or Italian are supposed to have any considerable circulation. The explanation, therefore, of the enormous increase in the home newspaper postal service of Egypt must be found in the large circulation of the native Arabic newspapers. Prior to 1881 there was hardly a paper published in Arabic other than the Official Gazette. Now the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and the large towns are filled with newsboys selling native papers. Considering the character of these papers, it may be doubted whether their increased circulation is a benefit or otherwise; but the fact shows that under our occupation there has been a rapid growth of intellectual activity amid the native population.

We have also made very vigorous efforts to improve the administration of justice. Under our control, and at our instigation, a great many abuses have been removed. Examination by tor