And if not, another matter of certainty comes into view where we are more particularly and immediately concerned. The need of an English alliance over there will fade out one fine day, and therewith all thought of it as a phantom fades.

A good many people, apparently, are quite unprepared for this result. They do understand that before the war with Spain loosed the desire in America for 'the grandeur that was Rome," an Anglo-American alliance such as Mr. Chamberlain proposed was unthinkable; at any rate, by Americans. They must also understand that if the United States end the war in a repentant mood, declining colonial entanglements and shaking off the temptations of the "new national policy," there will again be no ground for the alliance of Mr. Chamberlain's hopes and their own: a fighting alliance, in short. But they do not seem to understand that unless an unreasonable European interference is carried to ultimatum point the same result will follow. War in denial of American rights of conquest on this occasion, war in defence of them, are conditions without which there will be no serious consideration of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal in the United States. The feeling of friendship there is mostly provisional attendant on doubt as to what may happen when the time comes to settle accounts with Spain. Does Europe make no considerable difficulty, or perhaps show itself unexpectedly agreeable, then all idea of the alliance will drop instanter. Were I to add that it would be dropped with a joyful sense of relief, and that their gladness will be doubled if the people of the United States can feel that their new career does not begin with every door to friendship closed but one, I should only speak of a natural and blameless sentiment. And there is forgiveness, I hope, for mentioning neglected facts which are also stones of stumbling.

It has been said that the surer way to provoke European constraint upon America is to convince the Governments that an Anglo-Saxon coalition is probable. Whatever the worth of

that opinion, it is certain that any attempt to suppress by diplomatic "squeeze" the American longing for adventure and command will be as a fanning wind to hidden fire. Like hidden fire, this longing smouldered in the popular mind for years. When it began to show, not by signs but openly, Jingoism" was the name for it even among Republican politicians; and as such it seemed feeble and evanescent to practised observers-themselves Americans no longer ago than when the war began. After that, much less expression of contempt for jingoism. Under the excitement of attacking a European nation in its colonies, the feeling came out more strongly every day. At the beginning of this month of June. "it must be acknowledged" that the

new national policy" is taking hold at a great rate. In the middle of the month the annexation of Hawaii is voted in the House of Representatives by a majority of 209 to 91, amid “loud cheers" for the cry that "we hope, every patriot hopes, that Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines will be ours by conquest. We must have them if we would not drop out of the procession of the nations struggling for the commerce of the world." Conquest, and "the procession of the nations." No doubt much of this may be explained by present excitements, which events may moderate. More probably, however, events will have the contrary effect. The last report is of “an irresistible wave of Imperialism which carries all before it." But whether enthusiasm for a new American policy increases or declines, the question of adopting it will have to be determined while the excitement of the war continues; which is an important consideration. In any case, there is no likelihood of a lasting return to the old American policy. It has immense advantages, but such, perhaps, as an old nation should covet rather than a young one cling to. It is not taking. It is not ennobling, according to the standard of nobility among nations. There is the fact that the United States are filling up, with an increasing number of poor men in the population; and

that is an argument. But the moving spirit is emulation of the great historic peoples, and a craving, more immediately felt (it is this that Mahan is most responsible for), to cut a better figure both by land and sea. And if that desire began to operate before the war, it must be far more importunate now, after so many thrills of apprehension lest a Spanish fleet should be at large on the American seaboard, and such galling lessons from the want of military preparation. Whatever else may happen, the United States will go on to make a great Navy; no doubt the regular Army will be much strengthened; and, Spain being worsted, there will be a use for both soldiers and seamen from the end of the war. If the If the conquered islands are not resigned (resignation being nearly impossible) or sold (which seems most unlikely there are various difficulties here), they must either be annexed or placed under a strong-handed protectorate. We know what that means. In short, there will be another great fighting Power in the world: a great naval Power.

66

And if so, in due time that addition will make a considerable difference to the rest, and not least to England. Though, therefore, the project of an Anglo-American alliance may drop with all need of it over these, and though in that case the United States may be expected to keep ostentatiously clear of entanglements," we may think ourselves lucky in the good feeling that sets in between the two countries at the turn of the new time. That it rose on either side at the prompting of self-interest takes nothing from its worth. If at bottom it really meant partnership in armed defence, it could have no other origin to be sound. Say

that it sprang from the consideration that "blood is thicker than water," and if you really think that you give expression to a stronger or trustier motive than mutual need you may depend upon it that you are mistaken. The thought that "blood is thicker than water" was no restraint upon the unspeakable slaughter of the American Civil War: and when should it be more appealing? The mere accident that at the time of the American "new departure" England and the United States were both looking for a friend, and saw the staunch right sort in each other, is worth all there is in that sentimental saying and ten times more. The need may pass, but the occasion should suggest a continuity of good relations as a provision for the future. The occasion may return in more peremptory guise for both nations.

Meanwhile it behoves us to take account of the fact that soon there will be another great fighting Power in the world. As matters stand, that should be to our advantage. Imagination sees various ways in which the mere entrance of the newcomer, armed, might disturb or even disrupt the combinations formed against us, making way for a change; and though reason at the same time says that such eventualities will be carefully watched for and counterworked in Europe, there seems a good balance of promise on the right side. If only we could be sure of the balance! But there is no such surety -nothing that can be counted upon for one year certain; and since that is so, I suppose a wise man would say that the appearance of another competitor for empire by no means lightens the obligation to go well armed.-Nineteenth Century.

THERE is no error more vulgar than that which declares that the people of the United States have no right to the barbarous but useful term, 'AngloSaxon." We are told, for example, that what little Englishry they once

66

possessed has long ago been bred out of them by foreign intermixture, and that the new American is a compound of a hundred races with hardly a dash of the true English-speaking strain. A more preposterous notion was never

put forth by those who are induced by a muddy mixture of pride and ignorance to retaliate for American rudeness and boorishness in the past by British rudeness and boorishness in the present. Fortunately these extreme anti-Americans are few and significant of little; but nevertheless a considerable section of "the better-vulgar" are apt to take up and believe the statement that the Americans have to a large extent ceased to possess the right to call themselves the most numerous branch of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Let us for a moment examine the facts. To begin with, we must say that we shall not attempt to argue the matter with ethnographical precision. All that we want to assert, and that we can assert with perfect equanimity, is that the American people are as Anglo-Saxon as the British people. That is enough, and more than enough, to smash the argument that the people of this country have no concern with America owing to recent changes in its population. The Anglo-Saxons of the British Isles, or, to be more correct, the English-speakers of the British Isles, are made up of Englsh, Scotch, Irish and Welsh. Three of these divisions are, of course, not Anglo-Saxons; but if they are rightly to be counted as AngloSaxons here, they must be rightly counted Anglo-Saxons in America. No doubt enormous numbers of true foreigners have come into the United States, but so they have into the United Kingdom, and considering how small

was

our population when the first Flemings landed, and afterward when the French and German Protestant refugees arrived, we cannot claim any very great immunity from foreign intermixture. At any rate, in America the great mass of the population is composed of natural English-speakers-that is, of men who belong to the races to whom English has become the natural tongue. We should greatly doubt if more than eighteen per cent. of the population was of foreign or of unmixed foreign origin-using that term, of course, to mean people who did not naturally speak English.

But though a study of the census re

turns show clearly and decidedly enough that the Americans are not foreigners, there is a far more satisfactory way of proving that fact. The ethos, morale and natural characteristics of the Republic are distinctly Anglo-Saxon-quite as distinctly as are those of the United Kingdom. The best way of determining the distinguishing characteristics of a nation are to observe (1) the men who rule it, lead it and represent it, (2) its religious proclivities, (3) the system of law under which it lives, (4) its literature. Now, we claim that in all these respects America is overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon. Take the names of the men who have ruled America in the past and who rule her now. Every one of them has the true English ring. Are not Washington, Lincoln, Garfield, English names? Take the names of the presidents from the foundation of the Republic-Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Jackson. They are quite as English as those of our own premiers. In the whole list the only name which is not English, or Scotch, or Irish is Van Buren, a Knickerbocker from New York. But no one seriously puts Van Buren among the great men of the Republic. This is ancient history? Not a bit of it. Look at the men who rule America to-day. The President is Mr. McKinley, the Vice-President is Mr. Hobart. The Secretary of State was Mr. Sherman, and is Mr. Day. The Secretary of the Treasury is Mr. Gage. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are Mr. Alger and Mr. Long. The Secretary of the Interior is Mr. Cornelius Bliss. But it is not necessary to go on; not a single member of the Cabinet has a foreign name. If we consider the question of religion, we shall at once have to admit that the religious complexion of America is distinctly and intensely Anglo-Saxon-too Anglo-Saxon, assert many of the religious critics. Look next at American. law. Throughout the Union the common law of England is the law of the land. In only one State, Louisiana, its principles do not hold; and as our legal readers will remember, that great jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, laid it down

that the common law of England is part of the law of the United States. The courts of Michigan are more Anglo-Saxon than those of Edinburgh. Lastly, the literature of America is distinctly Anglo-Saxon. What could be more Anglo-Saxon or more "right English" than Fenimore Cooper, Longfellow, Lowell? The statement is as true of the living as of the dead. Howells, for example, in spite of his literary system, is intensely AngloSaxon in feeling. It is, however, not necessary to labor the point. As Carlyle said, we are all subjects of King Shakespeare. As long as the Americans acknowledge that allegiance, and in truth none could be more loyal, there can be no doubt as to their Englishry. It takes an Anglo-Saxon-that is, one who has been brought up to speak English from a child and whose father and mother thought in English-to appreciate Shakespeare properly. The Germans may write far more learned treatises on Shakespeare's use of the infinitive than we do or can, and may seize a dozen new points in Hamlet's soul, but they do not appreciate the poet as does the true Anglo-Saxon. Only an American or an Englishman can read "Henry IV." and "Henry V." and feel the blood tingling in his veins or his sides shaking with laughter. That is our history, our poetry, our life, and no other race can understand it and love

If

A word remains to be said on another point. We are all very anxious just now, and rightly anxious, to declare that our fellow-subjects in the Colonies. are, as citizens of the British Empire, full partakers with us in our great heritage. But if we consider all the white, self-governing peoples of the British Empire as one, our population becomes perhaps less purely AngloSaxon than that of America. we throw in the French Canadians and the Cape Dutch, as well as all the Germans that have settled in our Colonies, the population of the Empire will show a very strong foreign element. We do not deplore the fact, but rather rejoice in it, for as long as our governing force, our religious impulse, our law and our literature remain Anglo-Saxon, the mixture does good, not harm. Still, the fact is worth noting. Those who try to draw an ethnological indictment. against the United States will find that it will come home to roost when they consider the Anglo-Saxondom of the British Empire.-Spectator.

BOTH the great island possessionsin the West and East Indies respectively-which are now the seats of war between Spain and the United States, were, for a time during last century, possessions of the British Empire. Havana and Manila were both captured by Great Britain in 1762, and Cuba and the Philippines occupied. A very rare and interesting "Plain Narrative" of the capture of Manila was published by Rear-Admiral Cornish and Brigadier-General Draper in reply to accusations of infringement of the Capitulations made against these officers by the Spaniards. Their own allegations are sufficiently strong: "Through the whole of the above transactions the Spaniards, by evasions, avoided complying with the Capitulations in every one respect, except in bringing the money from the Misericordia and Ordentacara [ships], which it was out of their power to secrete. They basefully and ungratefully took up arms against us after having their lives given them. They preached publicly in their churches rebellion," etc. At the Peace of Paris, however (1763), which concluded the Seven Years' War, Canada, Louisiana, and various islands in the West Indies having been ceded by France, and Florida and Minorca by Spain, Great Britain on her part ceded to the latter power Cuba and the Philippines. Yet there is still to be seen

or was during my residence at Manila at the mouth of the Pasig, and under the ramparts, a dilapidated brick and stucco monument with an inscription celebrating the expulsion of the invading British by the noble and patriotic Don Simon de Anda—an inscription which afforded great amusement to British naval officers visiting the port.

Few island clusters are so uniformly beautiful as the Philippine group, nor among these can any vie with its chief island, Luzon, in verdure-clad, cloudcapped mountains, fertile plains and

valleys, wide fresh-water rivers, placid inland lakes, and sparkling waterfalls. Discovered by the great Magellan in 1521, and named twenty-one years later by Villalobos in honor of Phillip II., then Prince of Asturia, this archipelago was finally won for the Spanish Crown by the intrepid Miguel de Legaspi. First obtaining a footing in Cebu, he, in 1564, subdued part of Luzon, and founded Manila, gradually extending the Spanish Dominion into the rest of the islands forming this group.

The Philippine islanders comprise. many races and tribes, presenting varied characteristics. They may, however, be classed generally into three chief groups: Ilocan Malays in the north of the archipelago, Tagals in the centre, and Bisayans in the south. In the north more particularly there is an infusion of Chinese, Formosan, and Japanese blood; on the eastern shores are traces of Polynesian or Papuan. admixture; while part of the population of the large southern island of Mindanao resemble the Dyaks of the opposite Bornean coast. But though the Philippines been for over three centuries a Spanish possession, it is computed that, at the present day, onefifth of the population of Luzon, and one-fourth of that of the southern Bisayas islands are still unsubjected to Spain, while in Mindanao only small portions of the coast districts are occupied by the Spaniards. The only section of the native inhabitants which has been completely subdued, converted to Christianity, and domesticated are the Tagals, and some of the Bisayans of the southern islands.

have

The Tagals are of a markedly Malay type, having smooth black hair, prominent cheek bones, large lively eyes, and flattish noses with dilated nostrils. They are, as a rule, of rather low stature, slightly built, and of a copper color, more or less dark. The absence of beard in the men gives them