allowing Cuba to pass from the possession of Spain, unless it were to be independent. In his time, and for many years after, the United States and France were both desperately anxious to possess the island. John Quincy Adams, in a confidential despatch* to the American Minister at Madrid in 1823, prophesied that within fifty years "the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself," and in 1825 France secretly organized an expedition to seize Havana, but was defeated by the vigilance of Mr. Canning. The resolute. persistency with which the United States pursued her annexationist designs, ultimately had the effect of uniting Great Britain and France in a tacit understanding for the protection of Cuba, and this anti-American accord remained in force until quite recently. No unfriendliness to the United States was implied by it. It was a measure of precaution founded, so far as we were concerned, on British interests only. Successive Presidents, from John Quincy Adams to Andrew Johnson, had favored annexation, and every effort to secure the status quo in the island had been defeated by the United States. In 1852, when the Lopez and Crittenden fillibustering expeditions from New Orleans aroused the suspicions of Europe, Great Britain and France proposed to the United States' a tripartite treaty, "by which they should bind themselves severally and collectively to renounce, both now and hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the Island of Cuba, and to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of others." Although this treaty did not prejudice the right of the Cubans to assert and win their independence, it was rejected by President Fillmore, who in his reply hinted, not obscurely, that Cuba was no concern of England and France. This despatch elicited from Lord John Russell a * Blue Book: "United States, Spain, France, and the Island of Cuba" (1853), p. 21. + Stapleton: "Some Correspondence of George Canning," vol. i., pp. 276-78, 282. snappish statement of the position of this country. Lord John declared that "If it is intended, on the part of the United States, to maintain that Great Britain and France have no interest in the maintenance of the present status quo in Cuba, and that the United States have alone a right to a voice in that matter, Her Majesty's Government at once refuse to admit such a claim. Her Majesty's possessions in the West Indies alone, without insisting on the importance to Mexico and other friendly States of the present distribution of power, give Her Majesty an interest in this question which she cannot forego. . . . While fully admitting the right of the United States to reject the proposal. . . Great Britain must at once resume her entire liberty; and upon any occasion that may call for it, be free to act singly or in conjunction with other Powers as to her may seem fit." * Several statements of the considerations by which this policy was actuated have been placed on record, and it is important to notice that with the progress of time they have only increased in emphasis and cogency. Early in the century they were comparatively simple. ple. In 1822 Mr. Canning, who was of opinion that "what cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime Power should get possession of Cuba," + set forth the following reasons in a Memorandum to the Cabinet proposing the despatch of a squadron to Havana "to keep in check the Americans ": "It may be questioned whether any blow that could be struck by any foreign power in any part of the world would have a more sensible effect on the interests of this country, and on the reputation of its government. The possession by the United States of both shores of the Channel, through which our Jamaica trade must pass, would, in time of war with the United States, or, indeed, of a war in which the United States might be neutral, but in which we continued (as we must do) to claim the right of search, and the Americans (as they would do) to resist it, amount to a suspension of that trade, and to a consequent total ruin of a great portion of the West Indian interests." ++ This view soon ceased to be so narrow ly localized. In 1852, when Sir John Crampton presented Mr. Webster with the draft of the proposed Tripartite * Blue Book: "Cuba, etc." (1853), pp. 2-4, 58-64, 81-83. + Stapleton: op. cit., p. 276. tt Ibid., pp. 52, 53. self-denying Treaty, new and wider interests had come to attach themselves to the Cuban question. These are indicated in the following passage from one of Sir John's notes to the Secretary of State: "There is, at the present time, an evident tendency in the maritime commerce of the world, to avail itself of the shorter passages from one ocean to another, offered by the different routes existing, or in contemplation, across the Isthmus of Central America. The island of Cuba, of considerable importance in itself, is so placed geographically, that the nation which may possess it, if the naval forces of that nation should be considerable, might either protect or obstruct the commercial routes from one ocean to the other. Now, if the maritime Powers are, on the one hand, out of respect to the rights of Spain, and from a sense of international duty, bound to dismiss all intention of obtaining possession of Cuba, so, on the other hand, are they obliged, out of consideration for the interests of their own subjects or citizens, and the protection of the commerce of other nations, who are all entitled to the use of the great highways of commerce on equal terms, to proclaim and assure, as far as in them lies, the present and future neutrality of the Island of Cuba."* With the launching of the Nicaragua and Panama Canal schemes, and the opening up of the markets of the Far East, this consideration has vastly increased in weight. The United States herself soon saw that it was hopeless to contest the view, that the Cuban question was not exclusively American, and in 1875 she recognized the European rights claimed by Lord John Russell twenty-three years before, by asking the Powers to countenance the intervention she was then contemplating. All the All the Powers returned unfavorable replies, but we have Mr. Fish's authority for the statement that, had England stood out, as she is now doing, intervention would have proceeded, and General Grant would have saved President McKinley the labor and anxieties of his present great enterprise.t It may be said that, if we have now separated ourselves from France and the European Powers on this question, *Blue Book: "Cuba, etc." (1853), p. 13. North American Review, March, 1898. (Latane: "Intervention of the United States in Cuba.") and have associated ourselves with the United States, the reason need not be sought in any general political understanding, since it is already supplied by the self-denying clause of the resolution of Congress which inaugurated the present war. There are, however, a good many reasons for not attaching a high value to this argument. In the first place, the sympathetic attitude of Great Britain toward the United States is of earlier date than the Congressional resolution. In the second place, the self-denying clause does not seem to have been contemplated when the war die was first cast, for there is no suggestion of it in the message to Congress, in which President McKinley demanded a mandate to intervene in Cuban affairs. Thirdly, an assurance of this kind was actually offered to Great Britain by President Grant in 1875, but it had no mollifying effect upon us. Fourthly, the fulfilment of such a pledge is not always within the power of the State making it, and if John Quincy Adams's assertion, that the population of Cuba "are not competent to a system of permanent selfdependence," still holds good, the pledge would obviously prove worthless, Hence even with the best intentions. it is unlikely that this self-denying resolution has had anything to do with the friendly attitude of Great Britain, for if the abandonment of our old policy. did not take place before this resolution was passed, the pledge of Congress was scarcely sufficient, in view of the importance of the interests involved, to justify it afterward. The truth is that the service rendered the United States by our undisguised sympathy is out of all proportion to any visible compensations. Without it the war would probably not have taken place, and America would have had to bear the Cuban nuisance for yet another generation. In 1875 the conditions were precisely the same as now, with the exception that we ranged ourselves with Europe in discountenaneing the proposed application of pressure by America to Spain, and that exception alone kept the peace. Since then the popularity of the United States has not increased on the European Continent. It is not many months since Count Goluchowski, a sober and prac tical statesman, expressed the opinion in public speech that an economic coalition of the European Powers against the United States would one day be necessary. With all the Powers frowning upon her, the risks of war would have been too serious even for the great American Republic. Certainly she would not have enjoyed a free hand in the Philippines, and her present dreams of colonial expansion would have been denied the fascinating prospect of realization. Is it likely that Lord Salisbury has thus covered the isolation of the United States without taking corresponding guarantees for the isolation of Great Britain? But what guarantees? Mr. Chauncey Depew was quite right when he told a French interviewer the other day that an Anglo-American defensive and of fensive alliance was impossible.* To this I would add that, even were it possible, only a very short-sighted statesmanship would dream of embarking upon it. The advocates of an AngloAmerican understanding want something more durable than a back-scratching convention, the obligations of which might be ignored or evaded when the sense of need has disappeared. This brings me to my second question: If there is an understanding, what are its probable conditions? I have already pointed out that an alliance, even among kinsmen, can only be solidly founded on the consciousness of common interests. Does such a consciousness exist in America in regard to ourselves? A year ago this question would have been answered in the negative. Apart from the strained relations with Canada, the Monroe doctrine, the Dingley Tariff, and the long conflict of Anglo-American interests in Cuba, the most cherished political tradition of the United States was against what President Jefferson first denounced as "entangling alliances." It is interesting to recall at this moment the exact words of this tradition as contained in * Le Temps, June 9th, 1898. Washington's memorable farewell address: gard to foreign nations is, in extending our "The great rule of conduct for us in re commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." 66 Neither Washington nor his later interpreters foresaw that a time would come when the very extension of commercial relations urged in this message would bar that systematic avoidance of political connection" with Europe which the same document so solemnly enjoined. To-day the "primary interests" of Europe and America, which in 1826 John Quincy Adams declared “have none, or only a remote relation to each other," are in many respects in active conflict. The principles of the Holy Alliance no longer exist, but their place has been taken by a campaign against colonial markets and an economic conception of Colonial Empire, which none the less imperil American interests, and are indeed a direct menace to that portion of Washington's valedictory counsel which bade the American people extend their commercial relations. With a growing export trade, which they are ambitious to increase on a vast scale, but hampered by a tradition which forbids them to seek dominion outside their own hemisphere, the people of the United States. find themselves to-day confronted by the possibility of the neutral markets of the world being seized and closed against them by a combination of Protectionist Powers. Now this movement is resisted by one Power alone Great Britain. She has pronounced for the "open door” “even at the risk of war," and the occasionthe recent Chinese crisis-on which she made this pronouncement-unfortunately without much effect-is one which has deeply impressed the American mind. That this should be so is not surprising. Already the United States has a great trade with China, and if the design manifested by the Powers to partition that Empire among them were realized, the future of the Pacific States would be robbed of half its glowing promise.* Of the extent to which this danger has been appreciated in the States we have abundant evidence. While the struggle between Great Britain and the Powers was in progress, Commodore Melville, of the United States Navy, publicly pointed out that "the time is approaching when the cottongrowers of the south, the wheat-growers of the west, the meat-producers of our plains, and manufacturers and wage-earners all over our land, will realize that exclusion from Asian markets will be disastrous to their best interests." + General Wilson, reviewing the same question in an article on the identity of British and American interests China, observed: in "How far we should go in an independent effort, or by open co-operation, or by an alliance expressed or implied, for safeguarding or, extending these interests, is a matter for careful consideration."++ Since then Russia has made good her hold on Port Arthur, and the extension of the Russian tariff to Manchuria, where American cottons have hitherto found a valuable market,§ it is only a question of time. When Americans ask why their interests have been thus imperilled, in the face of British opposition, they are presented with a pregnant answer in Mr. Chamberlain's Birmingham speech : "If the policy of isolation, which has hitherto been the policy of this country, is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests. If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals, then we must not re ject the idea of an alliance with those pow ers whose interests most nearly approximate to our own." | *Consular Report "On Trade between the United States and China (No. 455, Mis. Ser., 1898). North American Review, March, 1898, ++ Ibid., February, 1898, p. 138. The moral of this must appeal all the more strongly to the American public, since it might have been spoken by an American statesman to an assembly of his fellow-countrymen without the sacrifice of a word. Is it, then, carrying this speculation too far to suggest that the understanding, of which I have argued the probable existence, is based on the recognition of the identity of the interests of England and America in the markets of the Far East, and the further recognition that this identity of interests deprives us of our chief excuse for fettering the liberty of American action in Cuba? The two questions are really cne, for the importance of Cuba in our eyes is very largely that it is a possible blockhouse of great strategical value on the inter-oceanic highway, which will one day deepen the community of Anglo-American interests in the Open Door of the Far East. That it should be in the possession, or under the tutelage, of a power bound to us by every tie which makes for enduring political union, is almost as much an advantage as the contrary is a disadvantage. Of course, all this may be the merest day-dreaming. The responsibility, however, is not mine; it is Mr. Chamberlain's. For what are the alternatives? There are three: 1. If the Cabinet has not abandoned the principle of Isolation in its foreign policy, Mr. Chamberlain ought, on his own showing, to have ceased to hold his portfolio! 2. If it has abandoned that principle, but has not yet concluded an understanding with a foreign power, Mr. Chamberlain has, by his Birmingham speech, placed it in a position in which it will be difficult for it to conduct the negotiations on equal terms. 3. If our new ally is not the United States, we have made concessions to that power which ought not to have been made without solid compensations, and there is no evidence of such com § Consular Report, Mis. Ser., No. 455, pensations having been obtained by us. p. 294. p. 5. Times, May 14th, 1898. -Fortnightly Review. VITALISM. BY JOHN HALDANE. ABOUT the middle of the present century a great change occurred in the general trend of investigation and speculation in animal physiology. Whereas previously the majority of investigators had treated life as something essentially different from the phenomena met with in the inorganic world, it now came to be almost universally held that, apart from consciousness, which, of course, stands by itself, life must ultimately be susceptible of analysis into a series of physical and chemical processes, and can be investigated on no other lines than those of ordinary physics and chemistry. The older belief is now usually known as "vitalism." The movement away from vitalism was coincident not only with great advances in physics and chemistry, but also with the appearance of plausible physical and chemical theories to explain some of the most fundamental physiological processes. Subsequent investigations have, however, gradually shown that these theories were all more or less incorrect; and the question whether there was not in the older belief an important element of truth is now constantly before the minds of physiologists. To all the forms which vitalism at different times assumed, the doctrine was common that in a living organism a specific influence is at work which so controls all the movements of the body and of the material entering or leaving it that the structure peculiar to the organism is developed and maintained. This assumption completely differentiated what is living from what is not living, and implied that true principles of explanation in biology can be reached only by a study of life itself, and not of inorganic phenomena. The reasons which have been given for rejecting vitalism are: (1) that there has been steady progress in the direction of explaining life in terms of physics and chemistry; (2) that the hypothesis of the vitalists is meaningless, and nothing but a substitution of mere words for definite explanation. For a proper understanding of the present position of the question it is necessary to consider these two reasons very closely. As regards the first reason, it is undoubtedly the case that by the application of physical and chemical principles an immense amount of light has been thrown on the phenomena of life. Perfectly satisfactory physical explanations can, for instance, be given of the manner in which contractions of the muscles and of the heart respectively bring about movements of the limbs and circulation of the blood. Physical and chemical investigations have made clear the ultimate sources of the energy which manifests itself in animal heat and in bodily movements of all kinds. In every direction investigation along similar lines has advanced our knowledge, and is rapidly advancing it further. Nevertheless, if the question be put whether this advance has brought, or is apparently bringing, us nearer to the goal of a physico-chemical explanation of life, the answer must without doubt be in the negative. At certain times it has doubtless appeared as if substantial progress were being made toward a physico-chemical explanation of life. Thus, at the middle of the seventeenth century, about the time of Descartes, rapid progress was being made in physics and chemistrv, and the work of the human anatomists of the Italian schools, together with Harvey's discovery of the circulation, afforded material for vigorously pushing forward physico-chemical speculations in physiology. Descartes' treatise, "De Homine" gives an admirable idea of the drift of these speculations. The book is a general description of the mechanisms by which the functions of the living body were supposed to be carried on. To take one example, mus |