But we have tried to come to an understanding, and have failed; probably because Russia still believes that, even with the opposition we shall give while she pursues her policy of exclusion, she is likely to gain more by keeping us out than by working contentedly beside us. She thinks she will be better off by keeping Manchuria to herself, even at the risk of British opposition.

The attempt to come to an understanding having failed, what, then, should be our policy? There can scarcely be a doubt about the answer. We should resist, as far as is in our power, exclusion from those ports of China in which exclusion is chiefly threatened and would be most detrimental to our interests; and we should take measures to ensure that the remainder of China is secured against the intrusion upon our rights in future. These objects we should carry out in such a way as shall involve the least interference possible with the rights and interests of other people, so that our many rivals may not also become our enemies.

We should, for example, insist upon our right to trade in Manchuria, and we should take every precaution to ensure that no other Power shall assume in the basin of the Yangtse Kiang a position so threatening to our interests as the Russians have assumed in Manchuria. And, in taking such precautions, we should be careful not to infringe on the rights of other nations to freedom of trade in that area.

These principles are clear and easy to enunciate. The difficulty arises in carrying them into effect, and in this I venture to think we are at present proceeding upon fundamentally wrong lines.

I wish to protest against the system of propping up China as a buffer against the advance of civilized States; and I would invite attention to the ground factor of this question and to the immorality of the Chinese position. The Chinese want to keep a large and rich portion of the earth's surface to themselves alone; not for the purpose of developing it for the general good; not because they really believe that the country is better developed under a

system of strict protection, and honestly wish to make an attempt to so develop it; but simply because they are too ignorant to perceive the riches they possess and the advantages they and every one else would gain from throwing all the buried capital upon the world's market.

If a Frenchman wishes to trade in Germany, or a German in France, or to invest his capital in his neighbor's country for the development of its resources, he may do so with comparatively slight restrictions, to his own. and his neighbor's good; but if the same Frenchman or German wishes to invest his capital in the interior of China in order to dig for the coal, or the iron, or the gold, or the silver which lies there in inexhaustible quantity; or if he wishes to set up a trading establishment in the interior for the purpose of exchanging the products of Europe for the products of China, to the mutual enrichment of both European and Chinaman, he is absolutely refused permission. The Chinese say that the land and all that it contains is theirs and they will neither develop it themselves nor sell what it contains to others.

Such a position is clearly untenable and opposed to the spirit of the age. It is contrary to the custom which all civilized nations have found mutually advantageous of allowing each free access to the other, and the maintenance of it means that the whole world remains poorer than it need be. Why then uphold the Chinese in it? Why strengthen them gratuitously, and enable them to continue to maintain it for years to come?

We have grown so accustomed to the idea of organizing the military forces of Asiatic and African States, and have been so successful in carrying it out, that when our interests in China are threatened by Russia we naturally jump to the conclusion that the best way to stop her advance is to organize the Chinese military (including the naval forces) against them. But we ought to reflect upon the vast difference between organizing the forces of an independent State and organizing those of a State over which we have a complete control. In Egypt and India.

we have the administration completely in our hands. We have a garrison of our own, and we can ensure that the power which we call into existence by the skill of our officers and by grants of modern munitions of war is not ill directed. But in the case of China we have no such assurance. The power we raise may, and probably would, be extremely ill directed. It may not be brought into effect at the proper moment; it may prove ineffectual even if it is; and it may even be directed against ourselves. If we had the complete control of China; if we had a British garrison there, and administered it as we do India, and could then practically ensure that the power which we brought into play, and which the Chinese seem by themselves incapable of evolving, would not be ill directed; then, indeed, we might legitimately and advantageously organize the military forces of the country for its defence, and as a safeguard against encroachment on our mutual interests.

But to form an independent China into an irresponsible buffer State is like putting steam into an engine, with an old and ignorant man in the box, who may turn it on without any warning, and send the engine careering madly along, quite as likely backward as forward. It is, moreover, to repeat the error we made time after time in our advance through India; which we made in Turkey and Persia; and which we are even now making in Afghanistan. How often, just at the critical period in our protégée's history, have we not had to leave her in the lurch because we dared not enter into a war with a big rival simply for her sake! How often, again, have our protégées done the very thing we had been most striving to guard against! And how absolutely certain it is in these days, when the fierce moral light of civilized Europe beats down on every dark corner of the earth, that the oppression and corruption which seem to characterize nearly every independent Asiatic State will in the long run necessitate our controlling those we would only too gladly see strong and right-minded enough to hold their own!

Cannot we remember that it was a combination of these very same two

Powers, Russia and France, who are now working against us in China, which forced us, sorely against our will, to break down the buffer States we had formed in India and control them ourselves; that after drilling for years the Persian army, when Persia was attacked by Russia, we had to leave her to fight her own battles, and even subsequently to attack her ourselves; and lastly, that, after supporting Turkey for half a century, it was only fear of Russia that prevented us from condiguly punishing her in mad exasperation at her barbarous cruelties?

It is a degrading and disheartening process this, of backing up uncontrolled semi-civilized peoples against our European rivals; and I, for one, should find but little exhilaration in leading a troop of Chinamen against my rival but very good friend Colonel Grombtchevsky in order to assist in preserving Peking to the Chinese.

Yet even so, some will say, it is better to control the Chinese forces ourselves than to have hordes of Celestials led by Russians against us. That is so.

But, in the first place, it may be doubted whether the Russians ever will do much in the way of organizing and drilling the Chinese. There is a very prevalent idea that the Russians, directly they obtain possession of an Asiatic State, turn the inhabitants into masses of irregular soldiery. We are all, for instance, familiar with the idea. that the Russians have hordes of Asiatic cavalry which they are ready to hurl upon India. As a matter of fact, the Russians make far less use of these methods, which we adopted from the Frenchman Dupleix, than we ourselves do. They seem to have something of the same instinctive fear of arming and training inferior races which I found among the colonists in South Africa. We know little of this sentiment in India, probably because we are not really settled in the country, and reared up there from generation to generation, as the colonists in South Africa and as the Russians are in their possessions. So, directly we annex or extend our influence over an Asiatic country, we invariably begin to drill a portion of the inhabitants into a military force. The Russians seldom do. In Transcaspia

there are Turkoman militia something akin to our frontier levies, and in no sense comparable to our regular Indian ariny. But, according to a recent and very observant traveller in Russian Central Asia, Mr. F. O'Dwyer, of the Indian Civil Service, this militia in peace time consists of only 300 men, and in war time of but 2000.

"This insignificant force," says Mr. G'Dwyer," represents the only thing in the shape of a native army, a fact that is worth remembering in view of the general impression that Russia freely admits the recently conquered tribes into her armies, appoints their chiefs, colonels, and generals, and has at her disposal thousands of irregular Turkoman cavalry, who only await the sig nal to pour into Afghanistan and India, carrying fire and sword before them."

The Yellow Terror of Chinamen, organized by Russian leaders, sweeping through India and devastating Europe, is, therefore, the figment of an imagination much too far-seeing to be serviceable as a present-day guide.

But though the Russians are not likely to organize a powerful Chinese force, they may still gain such a control over the Chinese military organization as to form a serious obstacle to the extension, or even maintenance, of our influence. Supposing they are able to effect this, what, then, are we to do? One thing, at least, we can do. We can keep command of the sea. Perhaps, too, we might insist that, as long as her military power is under the control of Russia, her naval power shall not be allowed to grow. Further, we might obtain a compensating control in some other direction-as, for instance, over the financial administration, as we already have in the past in the case of the Maritime Customs. This particular suggestion may not be feasible, but in some such way as this we might be able to preserve our influence at Peking, and ensure our rights being respected without having recourse to the detestable expedient of arming the Chinese to resist progress.

Similarly, if we find that Russia and France are by territorial aggrandisement so extending their influence to our exclusion as to be really encroaching on our interests, we might resist those encroachments as far as it is in our power to do so and our power is much greater

than most people at home seem to think -and we might extend our influence as a safeguard for the future over territory more immediately accessible to us -up the Yangtse Valley, for instance, and into Yunan. And if we are not able by ourselves to cope with a combination of Russia and France, we might secure an ally; I would only urge that that ally should be white, and not yellow.

Here again we should secure our interests, not by supporting as a friend one who has invariably given more to those she fears than to those who proffer friendship; but, by showing her that if she is unable to stand, to take her place among the civilized nations of the earth, if she refuses to treat those nations as they have learnt by experience to treat each other, and if she is unable to carry out the treaty engagements into which she has entered, then she must take the consequences which inevitably befall every unfit creature and nation on the earth, and which would equally come upon us under similar conditions. In other words, if China is not fit to hold herself together, we must let her fall to pieces; and we and others must build upon and from the ruins a more sightly edifice.

The result of this rivalry of European nations will mean, then, in the long run, the partition of China; will mean that certain provinces will come under Russian influence, others under French, others under German, and others again under British control. Have we any need to shrink from this idea with the hypocritical shudders to which we have accustomed ourselves? Should we not rather give up our ideas of preserving the integrity of China, abstain from academical discussions in and out of Parliament about the advantages of maintaining it, and instead frankly recognize, not only that the disintegration of China has been going on for the last century, but that we ourselves have been taking a prominent and useful part in it, to the benefit of ourselves and of hundreds of thousands of Chinamen ?

To whom now do Hong Kong, Mir Bay, Wei-hai-Wei, Kiao-Chao Bay, Port Arthur, Trans-Amur, Manchuria, the Pamirs, and Formosa belong? Surely it is time for us to open our eyes and see what is going on directly under them!

We should, no doubt, like to see China strong enough to preserve her integrity, and so be able to continue to us the privileges we at present enjoy, and which we are not so likely to continue to enjoy, with China under Russian and French domination. But to undertake the task of preserving her integrity for her not from any special love of her; not from any chivalrous feeling of protecting the weak against the oppression of the strong but simply from the calculated self-interest to make of her a buffer against a civilized rival, is surely as immoral as it is un

wise.

To many, however, the so-called "grab" for China is looked upon with disgust and contempt. To these the encouraging and propping up of effete old China seems a far nobler task. To such as these the partitioning of China appears a political burglary. But if this is so, not only political burglary, but political murder has been the order of history and the means of progress.

To take a country and exploit it at the expense of its inhabitants, as the Spaniards did the States of South America, may justly be called political burglary. To control a country as European nations have now learnt to control Asiatic States, as the Russians rule Turkestan, as we rule India and the French Tonquin, is to take a step in the general progress of the world; to substitute order for chaos; and to give millions of human beings advantages which at present they do not pos

sess.

And I think that those who have travelled in Asia and Africa, and seen with their own eyes the almost incredible advance made in the countries which have been administered or controlled by European nations, and who

compare the conditions existing there with the corruption, the oppression, the lawlessness of such States as China, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, will most readily admit that the immorality lies not in controlling such States, but in persistently bolstering them up as an impediment to progress. More especially do I think that any one who has been able to see the prosperity of the Chinese under a just and liberal gov ernment in the British settlements of Penang, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and to compare the actual there with the possible in China-to realize what China might be with these same Chinamen under an enlightened Government, which would preserve order, and foster private enterprise in the development of trade, the construction of railways and the opening of mines ;-I think that any one who has seen all this will allow that the injustice lies not in assuming control over the Chinese, but in supporting them to resist those who would attempt to so rule them.

Not in sharing in the partition of China when such a course is forced upon us by competition-the driving force of the progress of the world-lies the immorality, but rather in supporting and encouraging China to oppose that progress.

To effectually control backward people, to treat them with justice, and to develop the natural resources of the country with the aid of Western scientific methods, is to confer benefit on all -on the original inhabitants, on our selves, and on mankind in general. Should we not rather, then, in the coming century, recognize the direction in which the finger of destiny manifestly points; give up old ideas that we must necessarily keep still; take heart from what we have done in India, in spite of a century of efforts to avoid assuming the task of government; and not flinch from stepping forward farther east when we feel the requisite strength within us and find the pressure of events urging us on ?-Contemporary Review.

ON reading a most amusing article in the Cornhill on the "Humors of Clerical Life," it occurred to me that the humors of hospital life, though just as numerous, had never been adequately described. If any class of human beings see human nature as it really is -see their fellow men and women at their best and at their worst, without the varnish of conventionality-surely hospital nurses have unrivalled opportunities for this study, though most of them are too busy and too tired to record their impressions.

After twelve years' experience of patients of every grade, I can fully confirm all that is said by the writer of "Clerical Life" about the callousness of the poorer classes with regard to sickness and death. Kind and helpful to each other they undoubtedly are, but their feelings are blunted, possibly by great familiarity and close contact with every form of suffering and disease. The following stories illustrate this condition.

A hospital sister summoned the wife of one of her patients into her private room, and began to tell the woman gently that the doctors thought very badly of her husband.

6

"Well, Miss, that's jes wot I sez to 'im lawst visitin' day. Tom,' I sez, 'I think you're breakin' up,' I sez. 'But we'd miss yer wages of a Saturday,' I sez, 'if so be as it pleased the Lord to taike yer.'"

Another woman, summoned to see her dying husband, who had met with a street accident, showed every sign of grief. She threw herself on the floor and howled at the top of her voice as the man died. Three days afterward she arrived in the ward arrayed in the deepest widow's weeds.

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Please, I've come for pore Walter's clothes. The Lord's took 'im, but I 'ope, please God, as I'll find another."

The Lowland Scottish peasant has also an extremely matter-of-fact way of speaking about her relatives' and friends' deaths. A good woman who had lost her aunt remarked to a sympathizing visitor, "Eh, yes, mem, aunty's deid. But she was very auld and frail. She's far better awa' and far haapier in glory,

and I got a hunner pounds o' a legacy." Another woman said, à propos of her husband's death, "Deed aye, Tom's deid. The wee-est thing pits me aboot, ye ken."

And a servant, who had been many years in one family, lost her only sister. She was allowed to go to superintend the funeral arrangements, and returned in the evening." Well, Mary," said her mistress, this has been a sad day for you, losing your poor sister?" Said Mary, "Me, ah was glad tae git her oot o' the hoose, an' a' the windies opened.'

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But, on the other hand, a desire to express appropriate sentiments gave rise to the following equivocal saying.

In a hospital for soldiers' wives in India, a poor woman was about to be invalided home. A lady got her some warm clothing for the voyage. Unfortunately, the patient died before she could be got away. The matron, anxious to improve the occasion, said to the lady who had provided the clothes, "Ah, well, pore soul. She've gorn w'ere she won't never want no more warm clothing!"

The hero of the following story, however, did not speak of his approaching end in an edifying manner.

A poor little street Arab was brought into hospital by the police. He had been run over by an omnibus, and was badly injured. The chaplain was sent for, as it was thought improbable that the boy would live many hours. With little tact the chaplain began the interview thus: "My boy, the doctors think you are very much hurt. been a good little boy?" Boy (much bored)." You

aout !"

Have you

git

Chaplain (shocked)." But I am afraid you are not a good little boy, and you know you may perhaps be going to die."

Boy (anxious to end the interview). -"Well, t'aint none o' your business any'ow. Wot's me death got to do with you? 'Ave you got a pal in the corffin line?"

It is pleasant to be able to relate that this boy finally recovered.

Several stories are told about hospital