God. The only reason he supposes, why finite beings do wrong, or forbear to act benevolently, is either 1. That through ignorance, they see not what is right and fit to be done : or, 2. Being weak and dependent, they have some present interest in doing wrong. As neither of these causes exists in regard to Deity, it is thought demonstrable, that God will act benevolently. By his perfect intelligence, he understands or perceives, that the communication of happiness is a real good, a valuable object, a thing fit to be done, and as he is almighty and independent, he can have no interest, which should lead him to neglect this valuable object, therefore, he will always to the greatest possible degree pursue and communicate happiness.

If this mode of reasoning is conclusive, it proves, as we have said, not only that the goodness, but that the whole moral character of God is deducible from his natural attributes. This is, indeed, the opinion of those eminent men, whose names we have mentioned. The substance of the argument seems to be this. God will do right, because he can have no temptation to do wrong; whereas, it is conceived, that something more than the absence of temptation to do wrong, is implied in a perfect moral character.

But though this reasoning does not give that entire satisfaction which we desire, it must be confessed that the idea of moral rectitude naturally unites itself to infinite power, independence, and knowledge. Let a person, having arrived at years of discretion, be told, for the first time, that there is a God, eternal, self-existent, infinite in wisdom, and power, he would, it is believed, immediately himself conclude, that this being is perfect in his moral attributes.

Though these considerations are entitled to notice, the proofs of divine benevolence, most to be relied on, are taken from the works of God. Some of these will now be considered.

Many of the appearances which have been mentioned in proof of divine wisdom or intelligence, may, with equal propriety, be adduced in proof of divine goodness. As evidence of such goodness, we first mention the provision, which God has made.

for the support and comfort of brute animals. Though the kinds, and the individuals, belonging to each kind, are innumerable, their hunger is satiated with such food, as their various appetites crave; and this food, which their appetites crave, their internal structure renders them capable of digesting. How ong may the forest and the desert be traversed, before one carcase is presented of an animal, having perished with hunger! The ravens and young lions are, indeed, represented in Scripture, as occasionally suffering hunger; but they are said at the same time, to obtain meat from God. Though our present object is to prove the divine benevolence not from Scripture, but from the works of nature, it cannot be improper to convey the idea, just expressed, in the beautiful language of the psalmist : These all wait on thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them they gather: Thou openest thy hand, and they are filled with good.

That natural affection, which brutes entertain for their young, is no inconsiderable proof of divine goodness. Without this, not only would the helpless progeny endure much, but nearly the whole animal kingdom would become extinct. Who can observe the extreme anxiety, manifested by the parent bird or beast, when dangers threaten its offspring-who can observe what labor, privations, and weariness, are cheerfully encountered by animals, whether wild or domestic, for the security and sustenance of the young, without acknowledging the influence of a Being, who is good to all, and whose tender mercies are over all his works?

The divine care has been equally exerted in securing the brute creation from the severity of the cold, and from the hostile attacks of other animals. God has not only provided a warm covering for their defence, but taught them, in a variety of ways, to shelter themselves from the storms of winter. Birds of a certain kind he instigates to leave the higher latitudes, as the cold season approaches, and return with the opening year. Others immerse the selves in the soft earth, and remain torpid during the empire of winter. Some animals build for them

selves places of residence, and provide stores for their support; others avail themselves of the dens and caverns, which nature has formed in the forests and mountains. Most animals are furnished with weapons of defence, and those which are not, are usually rapid of flight.

Whoever contemplates, with due attention, the animal kingdom, will perceive, that God hath regard to the work of his hands; not only that he hath design in their creation, but designs of goodness. Though they are, by no means, exempt from suffering, there is among them decidedly the general appearance of happiness. To prove the goodness of God, it is not necessary to show, that each creature has a degree of happiness, greater than which, nothing can be conceived; but, that happiness is intended and that more of it is obtained, than misery endured, for that being who has ten degrees of happiness and five of suffering, stands on the same ground, as another, that has no suffering, and but five of enjoyment.

To invalidate the proof of divine goodness, arising from a survey of the animal kingdom, we may be reminded of the devastation, which one tribe of animals makes upon another, and that this seems to take place agreeably to the design of the creator. We allow the fact in its full extent. We allow not only that one tribe of animals feeds upon another, but that Deity designed, that they should be thus supported. That this, however, proves the want of benevolence in God, we totally deny.

In the first place, I take it for granted, that no one considers the death of animals, in itself, as an argument against the divine goodness. It will not be said, that benevolence requires the Creator to render brutes immortal. If so, it is certain, that those, which die by the violence of their superiors, suffer more than if they died by sickness or age? If not, what argument is hence obtained against the divine benevolence? Is it of any importance to the dead animal, whether his flesh be left to putrify, or be used as food by his survivors? Is it not rather eviVOL. I.

17

dence of goodness in God, that the ruins of one creature should be employed for the support and sustenance of another?

It is further proof of divine goodness, that creatures, capable of happiness, exist in great variety. The sum of human enjoyment is by no means diminished by that very distinct sum, which is imparted to the brutes. The sum of enjoyment allowed to the quadrupeds is not diminished by that which is bestowed on the fowls of the air, the reptiles, or the fishes of the sea. Happiness flows out in a variety of channels, none of which channels are replenished by exhausting another. "This shows," says a judicious writer, "that the benevolent principle is not confined to one method of manifestation, but that the manifestation of it is suited to every exigency of all the objects, which are capable of it. The inexhaustible fountain flows in various streams, satisfying every living thing, with that which is convenient for it. Besides, no one kind could so replenish the earth with inhabitants, the monuments of the Creator's bounty, as now it is replenished; nor could an equal multitude of one kind be so well furnished with the necessaries of life by its productions, as the different kinds are. Men would increase no further than they do, if there were no brutes; nor would they be better accommodated. On the contrary, they would want many advantages for the comfortable enjoyment of life, which they now possess."

That part of the universe, which comes within our view, is full of animal life. The air is peopled with myriads of insects. The ocean teems with the crowds, which inhabit it; and the earth is covered with beasts and with men. All these are calculated to enjoy that kind of life, which the Creator has given them. If, on a leaf, or a flower, there appear, to a critical observer, an indefinite multitude of living creatures, which escape general observation, what millions may we not suppose, there are which, on account of their minuteness, are never discerned !

In the brute creation, there are different degrees of intelligence and sensibility; consequently some are more capable of enjoying happiness, than others. Some discover great quick

ness of feeling; others, remarkable apathy. Some are endowed with a degree of intelligence, apparently little inferior to that which is possessed by some of our own species; while others seem but a few removes from inanimate matter. To create the meanest insect, or reptile, and put him into any degree of enjoyment, proves divine benevolence. Now if the existence of the most inconsiderable creatures, accompanied with any degree of unalloyed happiness, is evidence, that God is good; the existence of a creature with capacities for higher enjoyment, is evidence, still greater. Proofs will, therefore, strike our minds more and more forcibly, as we pass on from the lower to the higher order of beings.

From the gradation, which we observe on earth, beginning with inert matter and proceeding to the most intelligent of our species, it would be analogous, that there should be, and reasonable to conclude, that there are, beings in various degrees of superiority to man, it would be reasonable to believe in the existence of superior spirits; such as those, to whom revelation gives the name angels. And, as there is more happiness among men, than brutes, it is analogous, that there should be more happiness among angels, than among men.

Now, if we take into consideration not only the numerous classes of beings, but likewise the immense number of which each class is composed, and reflect, that among all, happiness predominates, the doctrine of divine benevolence will be established by an immense accumulation of proof.

In opposition to the doctrine, which we wish to substantiate, it may be observed, that the world is, by no means, free from misery, and that a portion of this seems to be distributed with no very sparing hand through all parts of creation, which comes within our view. To this I answer,

1. Agreeably to an observation, already made, that in proving the goodness of God, it is not necessary to show that no sufferings exist; it is enough that happiness preponderates. It will not be questioned, I apprehend, that the existence of the various classes of creatures on earth, is better, than none.