are considerable difficulties attending the doctrine, the denial of it is accompanied by those that are still greater. May God enable us to seek truth with impartiality, and in all cases to give that degree of assent, which is proportionate to the evidence exhibited.

LECTURE XXXII.

HUMAN DEPRAVITY.

My present object is,

I. Briefly to inquire as to the extent or degree of that corruption, the existence of which I have before endeavored to prove:

II. To notice some objections to the doctrine in question additional to those, which have been already mentioned:

III. Inquire, whether there is any connexion between the sin of our first parents, and the present moral character of their descendants.

I. As to the extent or degree of that corruption, the existence of which I have endeavored to prove. It is not implied, in the remarks which have been made, that the disorders, common to the human heart, are the greatest conceivable. The Scriptures, with great clearness and frequency, inform us, that there will be diversity, not only in the rewards, bestowed on the righteous, but in the sufferings endured by the wicked. Though the wicked will find no period to their punishment, the degree awarded to some, will be less than that inflicted on others: He who knows not his Lord's will, and does things worthy of stripes, will be beaten with less severity than he, who does the same things with more distinct knowledge of his duty. On the sinners of Sodom and Gomorrah, Tyre and Sidon, will doubtless be laid, in the day of judgment, no common burden of infamy and pain; which will, however, be exceeded by theirs, who contemned the personal ministry of Jesus Christ. Pun

ishment will be proportionate to guilt. Therefore, all sinners are not, in the same degree, guilty. But in one particular, there is universal similarity. They are all destitute of that holiness, or moral goodness, which is implied in love to the Supreme Being. If not, all the difference between those whom God will receive, and those whom he will reject, consists, not in the nature of their characters, but in their degree of goodness. Those who have much of divine love, will be received, and made eternally glorious; those, who have little of this quality, will be forever the objects of their Maker's displeasure. Now, it would be quite inconsistent with the general import of Scripture, to suppose, that any, who have sincere affection for their Creator, on account of his moral rectitude, will be treated as incorrigible enemies. But if the moral character of God, is not the object of our love, such love can neither be the foundation of virtue, nor necessarily connected with it.

Further It is asserted by St. Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, that they who are in the flesh cannot please God. (Romans, 8: 8.) What is meant by this term, appears by the connexion in which it stands. Those to whom this term applies, and they who are led by the Spirit, constitute the whole human family. Persons of the latter description, are called the sons of God; and it is said concerning them, that they shall live. Of the others, who live after the flesh, it is said, they shall die. But this assertion is true in relation to all, who are not led by the Spirit. Of all such then, it is true, that they cannot please God. Of persons who have love to the Supreme Being on account of his holiness, or moral rectitude, this cannot be asserted. Therefore, all who are not led by the Spirit, are destitute of this quality; and consequently of all virtue, of which this quality is the foundation.

It is further said, that the carnal mind is enmity against God: that it is not subject to the law of God; neither indeed can be. It cannot be questioned, that the carnal mind is the mind of those, who, agreeably to the apostle's language, are in the flesh. As the apostle must have had some meaning, when he asserted,

concerning such persons, that their minds are enmity against God, to ascertain his meaning, must be an object worth inquiry. That men have a dislike to all restraints, whether civil or divine, which they habitually disregard, will hardly be doubted. They, who habitually refuse compliance with the laws of God, must dislike those laws. Though their reason may, their hearts do not approve them. But these laws are an expression of the character of God. If, therefore, they dislike the one, it is impossible, that they should not dislike the other. It is certain then, that those who do not live after the spirit, dislike the divine moral character. That they are not subjeet, i. e. not obedient to the divine law, is beyond dispute.

Suppose further, that persons, thus disliking their Maker, as a moral being, should reflect that his law will be executed, and the punishment which it threatens, will be inflicted, would it not follow, as a natural consequence, that their feelings of dislike would be increased? Were they not restrained by fear, and had they nothing further to hope from the Almighty, would not their dislike, thus increased to violent enmity, be expressed by word? A disloyal subject under an earthly monarchy, while persevering in sedition or disobedience, thereby exposing himself to punishment, would, as a matter of course, not only dislike the government, but desire a revolution; which revolution he would effect, were power sufficient lodged in his hands. While convinced of the impracticability of such an enterprise, he may never express such a wish, nor perceive it distinctly formed in his mind. Now, if disobedience has the same expression in regard to the divine government, which it doubtless has in relation to civil government, it follows, that the wicked man's dislike of the law, and consequently of the character of God, would under certain circumstances, lead to measures, most strikingly impious.

That we may understand still more distinctly the apostle's assertion, that the carnal mind is enmity against God, let it be considered, under what circumstances, one man becomes the enemy of another. These are an opposition of character and

interest. If there is a man, whom I know to be of such a character, as to view mine with unvarying displeasure or abhorrence, and who is preparing to inflict heavy sufferings in proof of such displeasure, my feelings towards that person are not those of friendship, but hostility. Now, the wicked, if they view the subject justly, know that Deity is of such character, as to contemplate theirs with displeasure; and that he is preparing to inflict heavy sufferings in proof of this displeasure. Must there not be the same inference in this case, as in the other?

But wicked men, you reply, are not conscious of possessing a mind, hostile to their Maker. The remark is true; but admission of its truth imposes no necessity of relinquishing the doctrine in question. Suppose the best created being in the universe were in company with the worst; while each was ignorant of the other's character, there would be no actual hostility. Were two persons, between whom there had been a settled enmity, brought together, under circumstances, which prevented each from knowing the other, no unfriendly feelings would be excited. Yet they are in truth enemies. In like manner, if sinners mistake the attributes and requirements of God, fancying, that no great difference exists between his character and their own, it is easy to perceive, why they are not conscious of any hostility. Although they should, in words, acknowledge the extent of his demands, yet if they never make these the subject of deliberate reflection, or if they suppose, that he, who makes these demands, will, in some way or other, dispense with them, feelings of enmity are not likely to be perceived.

In using the term enmity against God, in application to the human heart, we mean nothing more, than that state of feeling, which necessarily results to a corrupt being, from contemplating the divine rectitude, in connexion with a full persuasion of his own exposure to punishment, in consequence of his opposition to this rectitude. There can be no particular excellence in any sound, or combination of letters. Extreme attachment to this, or to any term, is not to be justified. As the object of language is to convey ideas, whenever a term is found to be often misVOL. I.

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