secured after one of the strongest fights he had made when a member of the assembly.

Mr. Roosevelt announced that he would enforce the laws as he found them. He gave special attention to the operations of the excise law on Sunday, and after severe measures had been used with some of the more hardy saloon-keepers, New York at last had, in June, 1895, for the first time within the memory of living man, a 'dry'' Sunday. A great deal of good was done by Commissioner Roosevelt in breaking up much of the blackmail which had been levied by policemen; in transferring and degrading officers who were notoriously responsible for the bad name the force had, and in making promotions for merit, fidelity and courage. Mr. Roosevelt's career as a police commissioner made him extremely unpopular with the class at which his crusade was aimed.

The fierce crusade against the saloon-keepers was brief, and its effect lasted but a few weeks. The new commissioner gave his attention to more important matters, and really made the force cleaner than it had been before. He undoubtedly gained the hearty devotion of the better class of policemen. He was most careful

of their comfort, and quick to see and reward merit. He was also quick to punish, and this kept the worse half of the men on their good behavior.

One important result Mr. Roosevelt obtained in this position was the dissipation of much of the antagonism which had theretofore been apparent on every occasion between labor unions and the force. Men on a strike had been accustomed to regard the policeman as a natural enemy, but all this was changed. On one occasion, when a large number of operatives were out of work, Mr. Roosevelt sent for their leaders, and, after a discussion of the situation, suggested that the strikers should organize pickets to keep their own men in order. He promised that the police should support and respect the rights of these pickets and the result was most satisfactory. The threat of a cordon of police was removed from the strikers, and no collisions such as had occurred on so many similar occasions took place with the guardians of the law.

The attacks of the enemies which Mr. Roosevelt's methods raised up against him were not confined to verbal denunciation, nor expressions through the press. As has been said above,

dynamite bombs were left in his office. A part of his associates on the police board fought his every move, and all the skill of New York politicians with whom he interfered was exercised to trap him into a situation where he would become discredited in his work. In this they were unsuccessful and the stormy career of the police force continued. In the end the new commissioner conquered. He had the necessary power and the personal courage and tenacity of purpose to carry out his plans. He fought blackmail until he had practically stopped it, and he promoted and removed men without regard to color, creed or politics. He resigned in April, 1897, to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

CHAPTER XI.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

REBUILDS THE AMERICAN NAVY-INTRODUCES TARGET PRACTICE WITH POWDER AND BALL-ACTIVE IN PREPARATION FOR WAR WITH SPAIN-ADVISES ORDERING COMMODORE DEWEY TO THE CHINA STATION-RESIGNS FOR ACTIVE DUTY IN THE FIELD.

President McKinley was first inaugurated March 4, 1897. He immediately announced his cabinet selections, and as quickly thereafter as Hon. John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy, could effect a reorganization of his department, Theodore Roosevelt was made First Assistant Secretary, and really the executive officer-the controlling and directing force-of that very important arm of the nation's power. appointment was most fitting, as his "Naval History of the War of 1812" had proved him as completely master of the subject as any man not trained to a naval life could possibly be.

The

Years before a sentiment of hostility against Spain had grown up in the minds of the American people. It was never officially recognized,

and the Madrid government had always been treated as a friendly power by each successive administration at Washington.

It would scarcely be exact to state that the antipathy mentioned went even in the most aggressive minds to the extent of a desire for the conquest or the humiliation of Spain, beyond one single consideration. It was felt that the Spaniard should be driven from Cuba. The surface sentiment was that Cuba should be free. Beneath that, doubtless, rested the hope, in many minds, that the island, with all its riches and its possibilities, should be added to American territory. The terms of that accession had never been crystallized into anything like a national sentiment. Probably they had never been formulated in the mind of any adventurer who made essay for the liberation of the Cuban. But the student, the observer of great affairs, the man capable of estimating international causes and effects, knew that whenever collision came-and its coming was certain-Cuba would not only be wrested from the Spanish crown, but would become a part of the territory of the United States, and that the century-old habit of hermitage would be broken by the people of the grow