public will suffer from exorbitant rates. For all these reasons, therefore, we believe that the rate-making provisions of this law tend to prevent adequate service at reasonable rates.

We believe, also, that the excess-profits provisions of the law operate to prevent adequate service at reasonable rates; for the law provides that all profits above a fixed per cent shall be turned over to the government to be given as loans to the needy roads. Now, such a provision, if it works at all, will injure, rather than help, the poorer roads; for it will lead them to abandon all initiative with the thought that their neglect will be made good by the government loans; and, when they have continued to rely on this source of funds indefinitely, they will become so heavily sunk in debt that no amount of initiative can extricate them. This provision, furthermore, destroys initiative in the better roads; for they will have no desire to earn money to be lent to poorer rivals; and they will always consider the operation of this clause in the law as amounting to confiscation. Among the better roads, therefore, this provision will result in extravagant expenditures and graft, with the effect that the public will continually suffer from exorbitant rates. For these reasons, the Affirmative maintains that this provision of the law is in every way detrimental, and should be repealed. 'The excess-profits provision, however, is no more detrimental than the Labor-Board provision; for this provision establishes a Labor Board with power to hear all disputes between railroad capital and railroad labor, with power to recommend a settlement, but no power to compel acceptance of its decisions. This board consists of three members representing capital, three representing labor, and three representing the public. Such a board cannot restore the morale of railroad labor, because it fails to give labor any

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direct incentive to promote the welfare of the roads. It continues the idea of natural hostility between the two opposing forces. It, furthermore, leads labor to suspect the board of partiality to capital, because the representatives of the public are likely to be men of prominence who live on their investments and, therefore, have capitalistic sympathies. This board, moreover, will be utterly helpless in cases of violent disputes; because it cannot enforce its decisions on either capital or labor. This third important provision of the law cannot accomplish its purpose. It cannot secure to the public adequate service at reasonable rates; and, therefore, should be repealed.

"The fourth important provision of the law which strengthens and extends the supervisory powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission is, also, detrimental; for this provision overwhelms with duties the already heavily taxed Interstate Commerce Commission. It destroys all initiative of the private owners in improving the roads, because every project of theirs must be approved by men who, they think, have far less knowledge and sympathy for their needs than they have themselves. And, finally, this provision destroys all sense of responsibility in the management of the roads, because the managers can shift responsibility to the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Labor Board; and each of these bodies may then shift responsibility to the other body or back to the private managers. This portion of the law is utterly bad like all the rest, and should be repealed.

"The fifth and last fundamental provision of the law is one providing for permissive consolidation. Under this provision, consolidation and coöperation among the roads are not compulsory, but merely optional. Nothing could be more short-sighted than such a policy; for this policy

leads to consolidation and coöperation only among the better roads. The poorer roads are left to struggle for themselves; and they are the very roads that need assistance most. Consolidation and coöperation, after this fashion, will inevitably lead to the strangulation of the poorer roads; and they have no recourse, except to higher rates, which are fatal, and to government loans, which are equally fatal. This provision in the law, therefore, is one of its most objectionable features, and, with all the other provisions, should be repealed.

"The Affirmative, therefore, maintains that every one of the permanent, fundamental provisions of the Esch-Cummins Law should be repealed. The rate-making provisions should be repealed. The excess-profits provisions should be repealed. The Labor-Board provisions should be repealed. The supervisory provisions should be repealed. The consolidation provisions should be repealed. And, therefore, the whole law, as it now stands, should be repealed."

The first speaker for the Affirmative of a proposition experiences little difficulty in adopting the strategy of direct and overwhelming assault, provided he has a strong case to present; but the following speakers for the Negative always experience much greater difficulty, because they must first overcome the effect produced by the speaker who preceded them.

These speakers may employ this strategy, however, if, in their Introduction, they will only strike one quick, hard blow in refutation, and then proceed to let loose a perfect avalanche of points against the Affirmative in the form of objections to the proposition.

An illustration of the use of this strategy by the Negative may be taken from the opening speech of Patrick Henry

1

in the Virginia Convention for ratifying the Federal Constitution. In this speech Henry opened his attack with the following extremely brief Introduction :

“Mr. Chairman," he said, "I wish I were possessed of talents or possessed of anything that might enable me to elucidate this great subject. I am not free from suspicion; I am apt to entertain doubts. I rose yesterday to ask a question which arose in my own mind. When I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation was obvious. The fate of this question and of America may depend on this. Have they said, We, the States? Have they made a proposal of a compact between States? If they had, this would be a confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The question turns, Sir, on that poor little thing, -the expression, We, the people, instead of the States of America. I need not take much pains to show that the principles of this system are extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous."

With such an Introduction, Henry then proceeded to pour down upon his opponents the following avalanche of points:

That, in some parts of the Constitution, the rights of freemen were endangered; in other parts, taken away.

That no guarantees were given for proper representation of the States in the House of Representatives.

That the right of trial by jury in civil cases was taken away, and in criminal cases not sufficiently secured.

That the army, provided for in the Constitution, would be an instrument of oppression.

1 Denney, Duncan, McKinney, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 121

That the method of amendment, provided for, made amendments practically impossible.

That the Constitution violated the spirit of democracy.

That, under its provisions, to punish Federal officials who violated their trust would be impossible.

That the Federal Government would deprive the States of their only means of defense against tyranny when it took over control of the State militia.

That the government as planned, would provide no effective checks and balances.

That its operation would result in oppression of the middle and the lower classes.

That it violated the provisions of the Virginia Bill of Rights.

That it reduced the powers of the States to nothing.

That it created a double system of taxation, which the people could not possibly endure.

That it provided a President who might easily make himself king.

That by giving Congress a control over the time, place, and manner of holding elections, it would destroy utterly the purpose of the franchise.

That it made possible a reckless expenditure of public money without any responsibility to the people.

These are only a few of the points used by Henry in his attack on the Constitution; but even this brief list may be sufficient to show the general nature of this kind of strategy. In this case, Henry employed the strategy of direct and overwhelming assault so effectively for the Negative, that, from the very outset, throughout the entire session of the convention, extending over twenty-three days, he maintained a continuous offensive against the advocates of the Con