will be as direct as the response of the young lady, who when asked, "Do you have trouble making up your mind?" replied, "Well, yes and no."

The question of the control of science and engineering is too complex to admit a simple "yes" or "no" response. I agree on the importance of the questions raised in the committee report. Their very importance suggests that we ought to analyze carefully the alternatives. actually available to us, the problems which prompted the questions in the first place, and how we might feel toward possible outcomes. Mr. DADDARIO. Dr. Tribus, you will notice in our report that we took somewhat that same attitude. We really didn't ask anybody to say "Yes" or "No" to one specific set of facts, but rather set out a whole series of proposals diverse enough to include where we are, to create a central position where a czar might sit, as Mr. Waggonner has put it. So we find ourselves somewhat in the same position as you. Dr. TRIBUS. C. P. Snow and others have called attention to a growing cultural dichotomy between science and the humanities. I feel this type of attitude is generated in part by the fear that science and technology might become ends in themselves. This fear must be disabused. Science and technology are not ends in themselves. The process which controls science and technology must be responsive to human needs, and I cannot emphasize this point too strongly.

The nature of control of our programs should be appropriate to the objectives. Our judgment of any type of control will be dependent upon our view of the role of the Federal Government in supporting research and development. Without agreement as to the responsibilities of Government, there will be no guidelines for the management research and development projects. Different expectations regarding the role of the Government will lead to different evaluations of the effectiveness of any arrangement, centralized or not.

I might insert here the remark that I have sat upon National Science Foundation committees that were concerned with giving funds to universities. And we were often puzzled as to whether we should give this money to a center of excellence where the best research would be done, or whether we should give this money as a social welfare gesture to help an institution which was poor in research. And the inability of those who were guiding us at the moment to tell us what our objective was made it extremely difficult for us to render good advice.

Now, in the private sector, research and development is usually carried out with a view toward a specific end product. The Federal Government, on the other hand, carries out research and development for a wide variety of reasons. The Federal Government conducts research to promulgate standards; for example, standards for auto safety, or for air pollution. The Federal Government conducts research and development in order to provide information for evaluation; for example, to guide purchasing by GSA. The Federal Government subsidizes the education of most of the engineers and scientists who study at the graduate level in the United States.

For example, NASA and the AEC research and development contracts with universities have also served as a means of enticing young men into new fields. I have often discussed contracting with representa

tives of AEC and NASA and from time to time contracting officers have indicated to me that in addition to getting a particular research activity accomplished, they also realize they were funding the young men who would enter their field.

Project THEMIS, of the Department of Defense, is a frank attempt to create new centers of excellence in science and engineering throughout the country. The Federal Government engages in research and development to provide leadership in a field. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, through its Taft Sanitary Engineering Center in Cincinnati, provides fundamental information on methods of sewage disposal. And the personnel of that laboratory consider that they have a responsibility to become the leaders in the field, the center of information to which all of those who have a problem in the field may turn.

The Department of Commerce, through the National Bureau of Standards, provides fundamental information to the building industry, for example, and to many others.

As I have said, the Federal Government employs R. & D. for a wide variety of purposes. I shall not dwell here upon the mission-oriented research and development carried out by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the space agency, the Federal Office of Saline Water, the Maritime Administration, and the Post Office, to name a few. At the present time, no one person or committee really knows in detail how much research and development is being done by the Government, or precisely for what purpose, although the National Science Foundation, through its Federal Funds for Science, has provided much useful data and analysis of the overall nature of Federal support of research and development.

The committee report uses the word "science" to cover a multitude of activities including basic research, routine engineering, data gathering, and engineering for production-all more or less under one title. But the different activities included in "science" require different approaches in their management. Therefore, one point I wish to make is that the question as I posed it at the beginning of my presentation is much too broad.

If we wish to respond to the problems which prompted the question in the first place, we ought to distinguish among basic research, developmental studies, developmental engineering demonstration projects, and engineering for production. Each activity requires its own managerial style.

As I have said, science and technology are not ends in themselves. Managerial styles should not be chosen just to make science "healthy." They should be chosen to make science and technology responsive to human needs.

As an idea moves from research to development and then to production it needs to be managed very differently.

The research stages are the least expensive and the most resistant to close management. Bob Charpie, former president of Bell & Howell, made the point very well when he said:

The kinds of revolution, the kinds of upsets, the kinds of dramatic change that result in consequential action on the national economy often come out of the blue from unexpected quarters. The photographic industry did not invent instant

photography; the textile industry did not innovate synthetic textiles; and tungsten carbide did not come out of the machine tool industry. In fact, a tabulation of 180 major technical innovations made in the first six decades of this century, shows only 20 percent of them came from within the industries, which they finally became part of.

As Charpie said:

It's not only humbling, it is positively shocking to see how many of these came from outside the establishment.

He also said:

There are 200 enterprises in the United States which spend 94 percent of all the R. & D. dollars, yet 70 percent of the important innovations came from outside these 200 companies in the 60 years of the century.

My colleague in my former position, Prof. Joseph Ermenc, of the Thayer School of Engineering at Dartmouth College has made taperecorded interviews with important inventors whose contributions have had a strong impact on our economy. Listening to Carlson describe the development of Xerox, or to Sikorsky talking about the early days of the helicopter, or Pilkington explaining his difficulties in getting anyone to accept his float method of making plate glass, I cannot help but wonder how it is that any invention survives and sees its way to the marketplace. As far as I can tell, just about every method we devise to attempt to control and promote invention, in fact, serves to impede the inventor. Sometimes when we see a blade of grass growing up through a crack in the city sidewalk, we marvel at the tenacity of nature, which somehow or another overcomes man's obstacles to growth. I feel the same way about inventors and inventions.

Mr. DADDARIO. Dr. Tribus, I would like to advise you that the committee is quite familiar with the way in which these processes have developed. Some years ago, the committee, because of its concern over control of inventions, held a series of hearings and made recommendations which led to a much more flexible form of Government activity insofar as control of scientific inventions coming from Federal activities was concerned. This criteria established by the committee saw itself involved in the memorandum President Kennedy issued some years back, 1962, the year before his death. So we have been concerned about this and have taken actions in this regard.

I do mention that not only because it appears to me that there is a fundamental disagreement with your approach so far as I can see it to the question that we are asking, but because I don't see our question being so broad or being so difficult to come to grips with from the standpoint of the management and administrative requirements. Taking everything else that you have said into consideration, the fact remains that this activity is going on and somebody is managing it. As you have said, nobody really knows how much research is going on. The fact that the National Science Foundation puts all of this activity under the term of "science" does not mean that we believe that it all ought to be, or that we are unfamiliar with the fact that basic research, applied, and development, are pretty hard terms to come to grips with. There is some sort of spillover one to the other.

I really don't see that we have put before you a question which is so difficult to talk about. I think it boils down to simply recognizing that there is this jumbled situation, which is difficult to come to grips

with. Definitions are diverse. The language which one agency speaks as it refers to its science involvements is different from the language that another agency uses. This is really why we are asking these questions.

We recognize all of these things, that you are saying, and have for some time and believe that it is subject to analysis. We can, in fact, see to it that science is not only directed toward the needs of the human being and his individual advancement, but also that it can be better understood.

Dr. TRIBUS. Well, perhaps in reading the report I was misled by tenor, which says, in effect, we are putting forward a number of possibilities without necessarily taking sides, and that we are looking at a number of possible ways that science might be administered, the way decisions might be made relative to support of science and science activities. And, as I said at the beginning, I wanted to discuss the options open to us, and in particular to make sure that what might be construed as an option was or was not an option. I also want to make sure that we understood what the consequences of some of these options were. It didn't seem to me the committee report made this clear. In attempting to present all of these options as though they were equally valid options, the committee report left me with the impression that you would like a commentary on all of these options.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, I think that ought to be clear and that obviously is not, at least insofar as you are concerned, and I must admit, too, to other people who have read it. On the other hand, as I have gone over it, it seems to me that it simply spells out a problem, sets out various alternatives. We recognize as a committee that when the testimony is in, we will then be able to create a model which the committee will then stand on.

I would doubt, too, that this report can in any way be taken by itself. The work of this committee over a long period of time in the area of patents and scientific inventions, geographical distribution of funds, and education generally, are all preludes to the investigation presently underway.

I have difficulty going along with you because it appears to me that you are lecturing us about many things that we have as a committee gone into in great detail over a long period of time, and with which we are extremely familiar.

Dr. TRIBUS. Well, I certainly don't intend to try to give you information that you already have, or to present a point of view that you already have.

I took the committee report as the matter to which I should respond, and perhaps it would have been better had I gone back and read more of the proceedings of the committee, particularly in its previous work.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, at any rate, I take no issue with you about what you are saying. Except that as we went along, I was compelled, in a sense, to break in to advise that what you were telling us is not new to us, that we had looked into these matters in detail, and to get that as a matter of record, because silence might have assumed that we were just beginning our work, and it has been going on for a long time.

Dr. TRIBUS. Well, the next point that I would like to try to make has to do with some specific examples of research that I have been in

volved in. I wish to make these points to establish a conclusion to which I have come, which conclusion may well have been reached by the committee. But it hasn't been apparent to me that it has. The point is, there is an enormously different style required in the management of research as compared to the management of development. Attempts to centralize the funding of research will be self-defeating.

Now, I have prepared some special examples of this from my own personal history and people I have worked with. If this point is well understood by the committee, I certainly can skip over it.

Mr. DADDARIO. No, I would like you to keep going as you have. Obviously it would be impossible for you to take into consideration some of these points I have raised. I just wanted you to recognize what basis we are on.

Dr. TRIBUS. Well, I think I should say at this point that I have read some of your speeches, Mr. Chairman, and I have heard you present them on more than one occasion, and I am quite sure that you have made many of these points before me.

At the present time I happen to be deeply involved in planning for the development of weather modification and I, therefore, would like to cite it as another example of the relation between research and management. I was intimately associated with the earliest activities in this field. I was assigned to what was then the Army Air Corps. at Wright Field, Ohio, during World War II and put to work on problems of ice prevention in aircraft. In this way, I met Irving Langmuir, who then was a Nobel Prize winner, with the General Electric Co. He was then working on the problem of radio interference from static electricity on aircraft. Static electricity on aircraft generally occurs in snowstorms of the type which often involve icing conditions. His unorthodox approach to this problem got him into a quarrel with the authorities then in the field. These authorities controlled his budget. I was told just as he was about to lecture in 1943 that they had decided that his project was going to be denied further financial support because they had gotten into a technical quarrel with him.

Now, I was very much impressed with Langmuir, and so impressed that my office gave him a new contract to look into the stream lines of water droplets flowing past airfoils, because we thought that if we had better understanding of how these particles flowed we would understand better how the ice formed on the airplane, and we would therefore be able to design better protection equipment. But Langmuir didn't confine himself to the questions we posed in the contract. He wanted to know why the drops of water turned out to have the sizes they did. And so, he established a small group that investigated the conditions of cloud growth on the summit of Mount Washington, in New Hampshire.

When Langmuir began to understand the details of cloud formation, he then started to work on the possibilities of cloud dissipation. Now, this work was outside the field of the original contract, and I decided to take his ideas to the Weather Service, which was then operated as part of the defense activity during wartime. This was the place in which the support of weather research would logically have been centralized.

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