proposals which have been so tightly limited? If the scientists have developed science policies, as Dr. Dupree indicates, didn't this come about because the scientists themselves developed the proposals along these lines or did it because they lived within these tight compartments themselves?

Dr. REAGAN. They certainly do. I think Alvin Weinberg has written a lot of perceptive pieces about science. To me one of the most perceptive was a piece 3 or 4 years ago in which he argued that the universities themselves need to undergo a great deal of change to break down the disciplinary barriers and orient themselves to interdisciplinary or public problems.

Exactly how to arrange this in some sort of overlapping matrix, I am not sure, but I think in the universities we have to move in that direction. And there should be accompanying changes in governmental organization.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DADDARIO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Isn't this particularly true in the biological sciences, where you get the herpetologists who don't want to talk to the zoologists. Somebody else goes off in his own way. They think he is crazy, if his discipline isn't theirs.

Dr. REAGAN. I don't know where it is the most true. I don't know the scientific disciplines myself that well. On campus I am told by a theoretical physicist that he hardly ever speaks to an experimental physicist. And in the social sciences, we work in political science, which I am in, sociology, economics, in considerably separate ways much of the time.

But increasingly, too, we are finding that problems do bring us together on our campus. On our campus we have, for instance, members in these three social science departments all of whom have discovered in the past year that the major problem they are working on is poverty. Well, there is a politics of poverty, there is a sociology of it and obviously an economics, and none of us can make full sense of what he is trying to do without some fruitful interrelationship of the three. If we went in to NSF with a combined proposal, we would have had great difficulty. Now maybe their new interdisciplinary program will make this more possible.

Chairman MILLER. Doctor, would you say that one of the experiences we got out of NASA was breaking down some of these tight compartments and bringing together people in different disciplines of science that had never in the past talked to one another. I am speaking of the electronics engineers and doctors. For instance, the things they have brought out in the medical field, which developed as a result of having to get sensors to put on people in space.

We find that this applies up and down the line now.

Dr. REAGAN. Right.

Dean PRICE. Could I say just a word, Mr. Chairman, on the social science problem?

Mr. DADDARIO. Yes.

Dean PRICE. If I am a social scientist at all, which may well be doubtful, it is very much on the applied side. I think that the difference between organization by discipline and organization by problem is a very important one.

You have to have both in order to get anywhere in science. And in sciences that are rich both in money and in the development of their field, this comes about pretty naturally. Nobody thinks that a theoretical physicist can do the job of an engineer or vice versa.

Nobody thinks that a basic biologist can set a broken leg, or that a practicing physician is expected to make an advance in basic biology. But in the social sciences, we kind of expect people to do both basic and applied work, and we don't really have the related professional fields very well identified or the types of professional training very well identified. And it is in the practicing professions that we find men who want to use the sciences, but who also want to be aware of their shortcomings and limitations.

By not keeping in mind these distinctions we don't get the basic disciplines of the social sciences developed very well. And then when we try to use them, we try to use them prematurely and distort them a bit. The best example I can think of is the way in which the economists made contributions to systems analysis, the theory of choice, and so on. This made possible the planning, programing, and budgeting business, which was a great advance. But the trouble came when we tried to apply it everywhere immediately in field where it wasn't suitable and appropriate, as well as in fields where it was suitable and appropriate.

And I think that the departments of Government which need the social sciences the most are under the most pressure from their own consciences, from the administrative superiors, and from Congress to make their support of the sciences fruitful immediately.

And the more the department is a do-gooder, the more it wants its research grants to be tailored to its particular needs and to be immediately productive. And I think this is very bad for the development of the basic disciplines.

On the other hand, the universities are very much at fault, because they are typically not eager to support the kind of work that is aimed at practical problems and interdisciplinary work. And this is our responsibility in the universities and one I think we ought to work harder on.

Mr. DADDARIO. Dr. Dupree?

Dr. DUPREE. I would like to add my bit to emphasize this and inject, if I might, a feeling of alarm to it.

I think that the blame lies predominantly on the university side, and I would like to illustrate it with an example, if I may.

I might remark parenthetically that 2 years ago I served on an advisory committee to the National Research Council on the Behavioral Sciences in the Federal Government, in which we spent a year examining this problem very thoroughly.

We heard people from all the agencies of the Government. When one got down to it, there was an immense amount of support for the social sciences being provided right now by the Government, even if it could be focused better. It did not strike me that the essential problem was Government support for the social sciences.

On the other hand, when one goes onto a university campus today, there is immense need in social sciences for doing what would be called in the physical sciences basic research.

When a question like what is going on in the cities comes up, the crying need is, in effect, basic research on social processes are and how they are working out in a city. What happens on a university campus today in connection with urban studies?

The administrators are so afraid of the clamor at their gates that they are ready to bash together any kind of a program, call it urban studies, pull up any kind of an investigator that can be dressed up and called an urbanist and put to work on the most shortrun problem that they can find to get the splashiest result that will please the external forces that are closest at hand. As a result there are very few fundamental questions being asked about the growth of cities and how cities work and whether some of the social problems in the cities may not originate very far from urban problems.

It might be instructive to study the social forces operating on cotton fields in Mississippi rather than focusing on the central cities to find out where the sources of some of our problems are. But the practicing scholar on a campus today is under immense pressure, and not from the Federal Government but from his own university, to drop whatever adequate, long-range fundamental work that might contribute to a solution to our problems, and to go into what is in effect a public relations gimmick for his university.

Mr. DADDARIO. Then, in the administration and organization of these matters, we should take into consideration that serious long-range interdisciplinary type of research is necessary. This sort of falls into the category of the recomendations made that we ought to eliminate some of the redtape problems, which Mr. Price referred to as having been necessary perhaps in the first instance but now have outlived that particular usefulness, and to organize in such a way that if there are programs of a serious type that they can find a place in Government to get support.

Does this fit in with everybody's recommendation? I find this point to be particularly important. We were quite distressed in the National Science Foundation authorization hearings about the interdisciplinary programs, because they first of all weren't well explained. As we went back and looked over them, we found that the universities and the National Science Foundation, as much as they had worked together in this particular area, had not much of an idea as to what might result from this particular program, even though they had requested some $10 million.

We believe it to be important, and yet recognize the problem that you just spelled out for us so nicely, Dr. Dupree.

Mr. Brown?

Mr. BROWN. I pass, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Mosher?

Mr. MOSHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, all three of these gentlemen have presented such a flood of useful and stimulating advice this morning it is difficult to know where to start.

Because of my personal loyalities to Oberlin College I can't help but comment on Hunter Dupree's testimony, because he also is an Oberlin product.

I submit that his was very unusual testimony, fascinating review and analysis from the historical standpoint, and therefore particularly useful.

I am interested, Dr. Dupree, that you do seem very favorable to the NIRAS model that the report proposed, and I am interested in this

sentence:

The crucial ingredient would be the policy planning capability available to the administrator.

Do you want to expand on that a little bit? How would this policy planning capability be effected to make it adequate, in your mind? Do you have any suggestions there?

Dr. DUPREE. Mr. Mosher, this remark comes from a long observation of the whole area of the National Science Foundation's efforts to develop a capability in policy planning. Much of what I had to say before I got up to this point had to do with the importance of balancing off a much broader series of forces than is done by any single agency at the present time.

One of the serious problems here and I may say that I believe this applies to an extent to the Office of Science and Technology and to the National Academy as well-is the belief on the part of scientists that only they can plan their own policy.

In actuality, it seems to me the planning of policy is a very different problem which requires a skill very different from the kind of skill that is required for the working scientist at the bench. It requires nothing short of the development in this country of a whole discipline which is devoted to the study of the policy of intellectual power, if you will, as a separate discipline.

This is as different from science per se as the study of national defense policy is from the workings of line military organizations. Mr. MOSHER. Are you saying that if a NIRAS-how are we going to say that, "NIRAS"?

At least I like that better than Mr. Reagan's "DRAG."
Mr. DADDARIO. "NIRAS" sound like a Greek coup.

Mr. MOSHER. If we are to have a NIRAS, are you saying that the administrator, to make it work, to do the job to effect the improvements we are seeking, is going to have to rely on a staff of people who have capabilities in disciplines that really don't exist as yet?

Dr. DUPREE. I am pretty close to that. I feel that this is one of the great weaknesses of the present central organization. There is not in this country a pool of people who do understand the science policy as a substantive field of study in itself, as distinct from science as a field.

The National Science Foundation has made recurrent efforts to create a staff which would be skilled in the study of science policy. Mr. Reagan mentioned a classic point in his testimony; that is, to study the relation of basic and applied research as a problem in itself.

If you are either a basic scientist or an applied scientist, you have a bias going into that problem which makes it virtually impossible for you to come up with a solution.

Mr. MOSHER. Well, now, Gene Skolnikoff of MIT was here the other day with some 90 faculty people-I guess most of them were faculty people, and graduate students from various universities around the country who I understand are beginning to pay some very particular attention to the skills that you are talking about.

Now, would we have to recruit these people from that source, or would we recruit them from fellows like Phil Yeager and Dick Carpenter here who through their very practical staff opportunities at this level would have some special experience and qualifications?

Dr. DUPREE. Well, of course I think that a closed source would be a violation of the interdisciplinary nature of the skills needed in planning as well as in the operation of research. I may say parenthetically, Mr. Mosher, that I am in touch with Mr. Skolnikoff and have been in setting up programs at Brown University. This is precisely what he and some of us scholars in the United States are trying to do.

But we are not doing anything so dramatic as to say we are creating a closed corporation from which you must choose your people. Rather, the aim is to provide a pool from which the Government can choose people who will provide a policy-planning capability which will transcend the individual components of the organization which you are creating.

The problem here is that the Bureau of the Budget has been the only place at which all these things come together, and the administrator must create a way in which he can deal with problems—and Mr. Reagan mentioned a good many of these in his testimony-which are common to all of these agencies without at the same time destroying their identity.

The National Science Foundation, again I say, has tried to do this over the years in a number of efforts. My first contact with the National Science Foundation came in 1953, just two years after its founding. At that time it had a "program analysis office."

As a matter of fact, my entry into this field, and my book, "Science in the Federal Government," is a direct result of the program analysis office of that period. One might be tempted to say that, except for the North Carolina study of research in state governments, this was about the only result.

It was reorganized out of existence into a special studies office and then the reorganizations go on down. Yet it has never been able to develop the kind of independent view which would make it able to stand up even to the research divisions of the National Science Foundation, much less to make a judgment between, say, the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation.

If the administrator is going to make this organization work, that is precisely the kind of job that he not only must do, but at which he must spend most of his time. And he must do it in an informed sort of way rather than in a simple cutting of the pie between the agencies which on paper are under his jurisdiction.

Mr. DADDARIO. It would be helpful along this line to have people of this kind, with this policy-planning capability added to the National Science Board?

Dr. DUPREE. I certainly think this point of view is one that needs to be represented at all of the policy areas of the Government, and I would answer your question yes.

Dr. REAGAN. I would like to add a comment or two there. I think that science policy, or what Christopher Wright has called science affairs, very much exists, that it is not the same thing as science itself; that we do need to develop some new capabilities for handling the problems of science policy and science practice.