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Dr. DUPREE. Yes, sir. I would say that. I would go further and say that I did not mean to imply by that statement that the status quo in terms of the division between the military and the nonmilitary in the support of research, especially basic research, should be maintained. It may very well be that a large amount of research, of which in this respect social science research comes almost first to mind, might better be supported outside the military. The question is, How do you manage such a shift in a way that respects the integrity of the scientists who are providing the input to the system?

I am reminded here of the difficulties that arose in the early 1950's when the assumption was made that the creation of the National Science Foundation would make it easily possible in the physical sciences to transfer virtually all the contracts under the Office of Naval Research to the new National Science Foundation.

That turned out to be a very difficult proposition, and in many cases it didn't work at all. The money that was cut out of the military budget-that is, the ONR budget for basic research-did not find its way over into the National Science Foundation research.

In this case, it is complicated by the fact that there are a large number of research activities. I believe that the military themselves would be perfectly glad to get rid of if there were a competent agency to take them up.

Therefore, it seems to me that the strategy of a NIRAS should be to provide the capability to do research on a scale that is adequate as a necessary prelude to transfer. This would involve, among other things, developing investigators in the university who were willing to come forward with proposals to do that research under civilian auspices.

Only when this is the case will it be possible to say that the large amount of social science research, for example, which is now funded by the military, could be shifted over to a civilian agency.

Mr. DADDARIO. It would be helpful, in the process of making these changes, that this be explained. You have a laboratory that is doing a certain kind of work that must continue, but that, in the process of finishing it, parts of the laboratory can, perhaps, begin to change in some percentage to solve our problems. The transfer probably could take place over a long period of time. The instantaneous taking of a good laboratory and saying it will no longer do any military work but will now answer the problem of our cities is just an impossibility. That ought to be explained.

Dr. DUPREE. That is correct, and I couldn't agree more, that it should be explained and emphasized.

Mr. DADDARIO. Did you have something in mind of this kind when you recommended that organization would not necessarily have to come before a declaration of national purpose in this particular area, Mr. Reagan?

Dr. REAGAN. Yes, I think these things are related, at any rate. It seems to me that anything we are spending $17 billion a year on we ought to be able to make a simple statement of what it is about. And we haven't yet been able to do so concerning R. & D., or at any rate we haven't done so. I just can't believe that we are totally incapable of it at this time.

And each agency, in the absence of some such legislative declaration of purpose, each agency develops its own set of assumptions, its own premises of action, and with great variety among them. I think this impedes comparability, and impedes cooperation and coordination.

If we had some fairly succinct but meaningful statement of overall Federal purpose, it seems to me it would in at least a mild way help us to put together the pieces.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, gentleman, we are already beyond our scheduled time, and the statements have been, as most of the members have said, filled with material that can be helpful to us.

I would hope that, once we have had an opportunity to analyze these statements, other thoughts may come to mind; then we might have a chance to ask you further questions about this for the record. We would appreciate it if we might do that.

Dr. REAGAN. Certainly.

(Questions submitted by the subcommittee to Dr. Michael D. Reagan :)

Question 1. It is common knowledge that the National Science Foundation has always had difficulty selling itself to Congress and the American public. What positive steps can you suggest that the Foundation might take to improve its image, extend its constituency and secure the funds corresponding to a national policy of continued preeminence for U.S. science?

Answer 1. Perhaps the biggest step that NSF could take to "sell itself" better would be to recognize that government is not like science. In science, the evidence is supposed to speak for itself. In government, support must be built for programs; citizens and legislators must be persuaded of the value of programs-the facts do not speak for themselves.

I have the impression that NSF has been inept and lackadaisical in its Congressional and public relations. I would hope that the new Director would take a much more positive attitude that his predecessors apparently did toward the political processes by which authorization and appropriation decisions are made. One of the concrete steps would be greater efforts to acquaint legislators on the relevant committees with NSF programs and officers in greater degree. Another would be to keep every Congressman and Senator informed of NSF funds supporting research/education in his district or state.

NSF does have a constituency. In fact, it has three constituencies: the scientists; the colleges and universities; and the school teachers aided by summer institutes. I have the impression that none of these areas of programmatic support has ever been systematically tapped. Why not some area conferences to which NSF could invite representatives of its various constituencies for briefings on the agency and for program suggestions and criticisms? Why not a newsletter to all beneficiaries, institutional important developments in the agency, including legislative and appropriations happenings? In short, NSF should frankly recognize the legitimate role of interest groups in our political system, for informing policy makers, and build a conscious support system among its constituencies. As regards the general public, too, NSF could do more. I recall seeing some years ago, for instance, a travelling AEC exhibit on the atom. Why not travelling NSF exhibits, to high schools and small colleges, to show what basic research is, and to exemplify some of the ways in which basic research underlies major technological developments? NSF could also provide prizes at science fairs.

Question 2. What is your opinion concerning the effects on management or organization of Federal science activities which have resulted from the application of planning-programming-budgeting methods and techniques?

Answer 2. I do not have sufficient information about the application of PPB to science activities to permit an informed reply to this question.

Question 3. In recent years there has been considerable discussion of the need for an annual report on science and technology. You too have made this recommendation. What do you think such a report should contain? Should it be a review of the immediate past or a blueprint for the future, or both?

Answer 3. An annual Presidential report on science and technology should be only in small degree a review of the year past. In major part, it should be a real attempt to articulate an Administration position on the forthcoming year's special needs for emphasis and priority, an attempt to grapple with and present reasoned positions regarding selected major issues of science policy each year. Mr. DADDARIO. This committee will adjourn until 10 a.m. on Monday at this same place.

(Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene the following Monday, July 28, 1969, at 10. a.m.)

CENTRALIZATION OF FEDERAL SCIENCE ACTIVITIES

MONDAY, JULY 28, 1969

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Emilio Q. Daddario (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. DADDARIO. This meeting will come to order.

Dr. Wenk?

We might proceed, Dr. Wenk, with you, and finish your statement. As I recall it, Dr. Wenk, you were on page 8, were you not, of your report?

Dr. WENK. Yes, Mr. Chairman; perhaps for the sake of continuity I should highlight in a minute or two the points made earlier, because these do furnish a springboard for later discussion.

Mr. DADDARIO. Fine. Proceed as you like.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD WENK, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT

Dr. WENK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development.

I believe you have had laid before you a number of propositions from wise and perceptive men that some of the imperfections in our Federal apparatus bear correction by reorganization. You have said, Mr. Chairman, that you are examining the problems but do not have a commitment to any specific remedies.

I think the point of my testimony is to get at the question, "What are we organizing for?" In order to get a better appreciation of the problem, I tried to set forth six items that were of special concern to me. The first is an inability to apply science and technology to urgent social problems of our time. Second, an increasing cleavage between science and the humanities. Third, a difficulty of imbedding science and technology in public decisionmaking by the Federal Government, and also by State and local governments. Fourth, the prevailing absence of long-range views. Fifth, still-primitive processes for sorting out priorities. And sixth, a lack of progress in public understanding of the role of science.

The part of the testimony which I have covered so far, Mr. Chairman, is focused particularly on this question of science not serving our

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society. I concluded that section with four observations: First, that we do have a problem today in articulating science to the problems of our society. The loss of interest in science has been fairly widespread, to some extent reflecting an interval of time since the 1957 Soviet space shot, which, among other effects in this country, caused the budget of the National Science Foundation to undergo its sharpest percentage increase.

The second point was that this failure to increase public understanding of the dynamics of science, at the same time as its potency for contributing to our national welfare increased. And we have lost some time.

Third, that the desire of the scientific community in the past to isolate science from politics has created a breakdown in understanding of science's values and purposes.

Then I went on to point out that in my view there is a fourth problem, perhaps the most serious one, which has special relevance to this issue of Federal organization-that is the imperfect linkage between knowledge producers and consumers. We have not sufficiently considered the institutional framework by which scientific discovery, exploration and inventions are carried through the processes of engineering and technology to meet public purposes.

We have done quite well in the case of defense, in the case of nuclear energy, and in the case of our space program; but we have not done well on the civilian side.

The point of this observation is that when we consider Federal organization, I would caution against isolating science and technology into an organizationally "pure" status, in which-leading a life of its own-it could inadvertently contribute to further splintering. Therefore, I would favor looking very hard at steps for strengthening science and technology in the existing civilian agencies-and I am talking about this now across the board-and also at the mechanisms by which the wellsprings of new knowledge can both contribute to and be influenced by our social concerns.

Now, Mr. Chairman, going back to the prepared statement, I see I have skipped all the way up to page 11.

Mr. DADDARIO. I think that is about where you were, in fact. My own notes indicate that you had just finished the first full paragraph, bringing you down almost to the middle of page 11.

Dr. WENK. I think you are correct, Mr. Chairman, Why don't I go ahead with the next action Long-Range Planning and Policy Research? Mr. DADDARIO. All right.

Dr. WENK. Let me now turn to the third and fourth problems of long-range planning and the need to undertake policy research to imbed science, science and technology, more effectively in public decisionmaking.

Let me be clear, first, about what I regard as policy planning. I would suggest that it include:

(1) Identification of unmet needs and opportunities;

(2) The definition of clear goals;

(3) The formulation of plans for their achievement;

(4) The pros and cons of alternatives and the selection of priorities;

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