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without the same careful on-going review of the relevance of the work and the competence with which it is being performed as is applied to the contract programs, then I would believe that some changes ought to be introduced.
Not all laboratories in the private sector flourish. Some grow for a while and then cease to grow or decline, or even disappear. All of these possibilities exist for Government laboratories as well. It would be inappropriate for the Government to maintain laboratories and laboratory personnel in pursuit of objectives that no longer have high national priority. Accordingly, redeployment of in-house laboratories in Government is just as important as redeployment of laboratories in industry or redirection of the laboratory activities of the private not-for-profit institutions.
The third part of the question has to do with the capabilities of the not-forprofit institutions to conduct science policy research. I can speak only for my own organization in this matter. We have been attempting for five or six years to create a stronger capability in science policy research. We have people in both physical and behavioral sciences and of course in engineering who are deeply interested in and concerned about science and technology policy. Battelle has been underwriting the preparation of a bibliography in the field of science policy. You have seen issues of the Science Policy Bulletin in the past and I am sending a copy of our most recent compilation for your information. This compilation has made us aware of the growing interest in science policy research and the many institutions involved in addition to our own. Battelle also held a conference on Trends in Science Policy at our Seattle Research Center. I am enclosing a copy of the Proceedings of that Conference, which I had the pleasure of chairing.
However, our ability to proceed in this area has been very severely hampered because there have been almost no funds available from any agency. There have been deep expressions of interest from some groups in the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and of course in the Office of Science and Technology about the importance of a better and deeper understanding of science policy.
I believe we have gone about as far in this field as we can with ad hoc committees discussing on the basis of individual experiences what policies are appropriate. The deeper and more penetrating analyses that a continuing research group could make have not been made because of lack of funds. Accordingly, despite the deep interest in the field, the research institutes have not been able to develop the kind of national capability to support administrators and policy makers that could have been the case if reasonable contract support for specific studies on science policy were available.
Question 4. Concerning your NASA sponsored study:
If analysis of goal statements (legislation, budget requests, authority, etc.) would lead to the placement of Themis under National Security, then doesn't this illustrate the “back door" financing of much of science?
Couldn't you have made your own judgments and come up with another breakdown which would be more useful as to real goals and purposes?
Answer 4. The national security program is heavily dependent upon a very strong scientific community. It is also heavily dependent on effective interaction between the academic science community and those deeply concerned with the administration and management of the Department of Defense. It is entirely appropriate for the Department of Defense to utilize any and all of these institutions to carry out its objectives and to tailor programs in a manner which will ensure the continued identification of these elements of our society with problems of deep concern for the national defense. As a user of much basic science, the Department of Defense has an obligation to be a supporter of basic science. Industrial managers of research and development take the same position in many large industries.
The Statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford on "The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970–74" states “... Project THEMIS, which was started in FY 19967 to stimulate the development of additional academic centers for Defense-relevant research.” (p. 117) This clearly stresses the national security goal. Accordingly, we have assigned the THEMIS program to the field of National Security. If concern with the acquisition of knowledge and the support of education is made a clearer objective of the Government as a whole, the Department of Defense may have to be less
concerned with ensuring an adequate supply of manpower; but it will continue to be concerned with an effective interaction between university science and national security programs. This does not imply a continuing requirement for the conduct of classified research on the university campus; but the Department of Defense, with its deep involvement in high-science-content problems, cannot fail to utilize the great basic research insights of the universities without allowing the national security program of the U.S. to suffer. Accordingly, I do not regard projects of the kind represented by THEMIS as "back door" financing of research. Instead I regard them as evidence of a continuing desire by the Department of Defense to strengthen the interactions between university science and national security programs.
The second part of Question 4 has to do with another breakdown which will be more useful as to real goals and purposes. Our recent study attempted to relate Government programs and expenditures to the Government's goals and objectives. What we have tried to do is to be as formal as possible, utilizing the best information we could and the most cohesive set of statements that we could find about national goals and objectives derived from Executive and Legislative Branch documentation. Such an approach relates Government programs to goals and purposes that are very real and are a proper reflection of the relationships as they exist.
As an aid to changes in allocations, it would be useful to initiate studies of alternative approaches to the statements of national goals and allocations of resources to those goals. Comparison of present practices with a broad spectrum of alternatives might serve to focus national attention and debate on feasible alternatives to the present situation. National goals and purposes, as well as program objectives, can and should change as circumstances require. This is not a static situation, and in part discussions and decisions on changing priorities for the future can be expected to change the organization and results of future studies of the kind we have just completed. However, we think it has been important to start with a thorough and objective analysis of the present and past as a basis for speculation concerning the future.
Mr. DADDARIO. I wonder if, Mr. Lederman, if you have a brief comment you would like to make? We can't allow you just to sit there as an observer.
Mr. LEDERMAN. There was one discussion with which I think the results of the study may be a little helpful. One of the most striking and startling conclusions of this whole study was that there are relatively few changes over even 10-year periods of time in the way we allocate our resources, that there is a great deal more talk about what we should do than in fact we really do.
Except for the space program there isn't another good example of a major reallocation of resources in the decade of the sixties, and now that there is so much discussion of national goals and objectives, I think this historical past gives some suggestion that as a society we may not be very enthusiastic about very rapid change, that this is upsetting, that this is disturbing to many people, institutions, and So on.
So we may have a penchant for talking about changes, but doing very little about it. I think this general comment in part goes to your question about using scientific and technological talents in housing and community development and other fields. There is a great deal of resistance in the system. It takes a long time to overcome it. This is especially true apparently with regard to Federal Government activities. And the study quite startlingly points that out.
A lot of things that people think have happened and would like to think have happened just haven't. The man on the street I am sure believes that a great deal more of our national resources are going for welfare today, and yet the study shows 10 years ago it was about 1712 percent, and now it is 20 percent.
So I think one of the important things here is the real question of how, when we identify a needed thing to do, do we get it done, and done when it is timely. It goes to the questions you have raised, Mr. Chairman, about technological assessment, for example, how in fact even when we know we have the skills to do something and know we have a problem, can we move quickly enough so as, at least, not to allow the problem to get worse over the time period during which we are making the decisions necessary to commit the resources.
I would offer this as probably one of the clearest results of this study that has the broadest implications, not only for R. & D., but for the goals and objectives of our Federal Government generally.
Mr. DADDARIO. At least insofar as R. & D. is concerned, the port of what you have said is that the organizational structure in a sense prevents us from moving quickly.
Mr. LEDERMAN. In some instances, yes. I think, even though there may not be a rationale for saying why create a new organization when we already have the skill, the fact of the matter is that very often that gets the job done sooner, witness the NASA situation. We seem to think that a new program will get launched better, with a different kind of dedication, even if it is the same people, if they are within a new organizational entity.
Now this may not have any basis in logic, but it may have a great deal of basis in the psychological relationships of people and organizational entities that they are involved with.
Mr. DADDARIO. We did have the organizational capability to put together the space program. The decision to do it somewhere else rather than the military.
Dr. HARRIS. Right.
Mr. LEDERMAN. There seems to be an element of enthusiasm that goes with the creation of of a new entity.
Mr. DADDARIO. We need not drag this on, but this was prior to that, the determination that it be done in NASA.
Mr. LEDERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. DADDARIO. If the military had had a program of that size for that particular purpose, I would guess they would have generated that amount of enthusiasm. But we did have an organization able to meet that objective, and it was the determination of the goal that I think would be most important.
Mr. LEDERMAN. Certainly.
Mr. DADDARIO. On the other hand, many of these other goals involved many political decisions and traditional problems. Yet, they can be overcome, providing the proper intent and purpose is put behind it.
Dr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonders if I might be permitted one supplemental statement? I don't want to interrupt your train of thought.
Mr. DADDARIO. Until the bells begin ringing, we have some time.
Dr. HARRIS. All right. I was in Seoul, Korea, a week ago during the time of the moonshot. I arrived before the launch and was there during the moonshot.
I saw the launch on a friend's TV set in Korea. I stood with 60,000 to 100,000 Koreans on the top of Yongsan Hill in the rain to watch some of the events during the flight.
Mr. DADDARIO. 60,000 to 100,000 ? Dr. HARRIS. 60,000 to 100,000 stood in the rain watching a 30-by-30 TV screen, each of us with our umbrellas. I saw the quiet but real enthusiasm of the crowd. Later I watched the moonwalk, itself, in the laboratories of the Korean Institute for Science and Technology, which is a joint Republic of Korea United States Government program established to bring science and technology muie effectively to bear on the economic development of Korea.
That evening Ambassador Porter had a reception for a National Academy of Sciences team looking at technical assistance in Korea, to which the representatives of KIST (Korean Institute for Science and Technology) were invited, I among them.
Ambassador Porter, I observed, received the compliments of every single Korean, and their very enthusiastic comments about the accomplishments of the United States. Having seen this and knowing the involvement of your committee in this program, I wanted to have an opportunity to tell you in a personal way how much the fact that the Americans were first on the moon had meant to the Koreans.
Mr. DADDARIO. Well, we are certainly appreciative of your telling us about that experience, Dr. Harris. It is one that I am sure that every member of this committee would have been pleased to share with you, to see that kind of enthusiasm about a program of the United States in such a place.
We thank both of you for your testimony.
Mr. Brown has already indicated that there is much in what you have said which needs to be analyzed further. It certainly puts before us many provocative ideas, as well as somewhat disturbing figures and statistics which must be looked at very carefully.
So we will need to take advantage of you both-
This committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock in the same room, when we will have Dr. Ivan Bennett, former Deputy Director of OST, and Dr. James Shannon, former Director of NIH.
(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, July 30, 1969.)