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the mechanism whereby we can establish the goal and the standards and then through coordination of existing facilities, where it is laboratories or existing institutions or organizations or what not, we can establish that goal.
Dr. WALKER. I think power goes where the money goes and it would depend upon how the money was appropriated.
Mr. Brown. Well, the money will be appropriated where there is a sense that the problem exists, but we really have not achieved a way of surfacing the problems, bringing them to the top level of consideration in the fashion that we should, in many of these areas which are just beginning to come about.
Let me ask you one philosophical question. You don't even need to answer it if you don't want to. But you used in your testimony in a number of cases for example, that the task of engineering and technology, is using the product of science. On the first page, you say for the comfort, convenience, and progress of modern man. Well, I understand comfort and convenience, but I don't understand progress. I am just wondering if you are using “progress” to mean comfort and convenience or if you have an understanding of what "progress" means.
Dr. WALKER. I am afraid I do. There are other meanings, but I was talking about comfort and livability of this planet and so on.
Mr. Brown. There is a real problem that we are coming to. Under the present procedures of our system-I am using "system” in the broadest possible terms—in a hundred years we are going to have about 27 billion people on this planet. Most of them are going to be very, very poor people and it is going to be a highly polluted planet. This isn't progress, as far as I am concerned.
I am kind of wondering how we are going to insure the comfort and convenience of these 27 billion people, or whether we even ought to have that many people. The role of technology has been to make this possible. I am kind of wondering whether or not we have a very important problem in redefining goals here to a degree.
Dr. Long. If I could just reinforce that. Almost every major university is finding itself under one rubric or not, taking on the job of studying what one might call the science of society. Thinking of President Walker, we happen to call our program "progress in science and technology,” but in effect are reflecting the realization which is surely with us that in the process of doing various good things, science and technology have shown us that over and over again they bring us some unhappy byproducts, unfortunate byproducts, byproducts that cause us trouble, the acid mine wastes being a very concrete and specific illustration.
It is true that we do need intellectually to pay a good deal more attention to the implications of science and technology, to the undesirable effects of science and technology. We need some kind of way to analyze this broad system.
I at least would be quite prepared to use this as an argument in support of more Federal central consideration of the problem, just because one needs a look at the side effects, the long-range effects as well as the near-time consequences.
Mr. DADDARIO. If I might interrupt for one moment, Mr. Brown. It is important, I think, that this be done, Dr. Long. The National
Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering will in the next week or so present some studies they have been working on in both of these areas, as both you and Dr. Walker are familiar.
We would hope it would lead to the development of this type of a capability in the country. But as we analyze Mr. Brown's question about population growth, if in fact as we begin dealing with population growth and if we come to an understanding that the population growth ought to be somewhat depressed and if we would develop a stable level of population throughout the world and in this country in particular, it doesn't need to be studied from the standpoint of the effect it will have on our own technological development. Wouldn't this in itself develop into a chaotic situation from the standpoint of the way in which we have grown and we would have to know in what direction it would be leading us?
So as we analyze the one problem, we create a whole series of others, do we not?
Dr. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. DADDARIO. All of which ought to be taken into consideration as we begin tampering with it.
Dr. Long. Yes.
Mr. Brown. Well, there was another point in your testimony which bears on Dr. Walker's testimony, the very cogent point that you made, there is no profit in some of the things that the public really needs, and the inverse of this is true, that there is a good deal of profit in some things the public doesn't need.
Dr. WALKER. That is right.
Mr. Brown. The profit, for example, in the cement industry is a profit in the dust.
Dr. WALKER. Yes.
Mr. Brown. I mean, the exact amount it would cost to control that dust is probably pretty close to the profit that they are making.
Dr. WALKER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brown. So you can say that they are generating dust to make their profit and we don't need that dust, but nobody has said so up to now. This poses some very important problems in connection with the dynamics of how our economic system works. Somehow or another these problems have to be surfaced at the highest possible level so they can be considered. I would agree, putting these kinds of problems into a central department does not surface the problems necessarily.
It may hinder the surfacing of them, but it nevertheless has to be done in some fashion.
General SCHRIEVER. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on this? Mr. DADDARIO. Of course.
General SCHRIEVER. Because again I think this brings out the point I made, the necessity for really effective advance planning in which you do identify objectives and goals. This, I think, is really a major shortcoming in many of our newer agencies that have been established over the past few years. .
I might set your mind at ease a little bit on the cement dust. I am on the board of directors of American Cement and we have just approved the building of a new cement plant in Detroit that will have precipitators on it. That plant will not be spewing out dust.
Mr. DADDARIO. General Schriever, does that mean the profit is more than 5 cents a 100-pound bag?
General SCHRIEVER. Well, I am not saying. We didn't discuss this at the board meeting.
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Pettis.
Mr. PETTIS. Just to follow up on what Congressman Brown was talking about, I might observe that we did set a goal here a few years ago to put a man on the moon and establish priorities and we accomplished that. I also note in the press recently where out in my State of California one body of the legislature passed a resolution stating to the effect that there would be no more polluting automobiles after 1975.
Well, now, I don't know whether that will ever become law or not. But it seems as though the permissiveness that we have surrounding these problems isn't really getting us anywhere. Now, I am not advocating a centralized Federal mechanism to establish priorities and do something about them, but I am wondering if we aren't coming to the place pretty soon where we are going to have to be a little more firm and a little tougher in dealing with the problem.
I don't think we can just muddle along and hope that somebody is going to come up with easy answers without some kind of activity, like we have seen in other areas. Maybe you want to comment.
Dr. Long. Well, all I would say is—I agree with you, and half of the problem that we are dealing with here is, I suppose, the half of how does the system, in this case the Federal Government, get the knowledge that will permit it to make these decisions wisely, and I think that is where science, basic science, applied science, engineering studies contribute, and that is why in making these decisions you need that, you need to be assured that the flow of knowledge coming to you is the right kind and the right volume.
Mr. PETTIS. In other words, we can produce automobiles that don't produce the kind of pollution that we have, but who is to make the decision as to whether or not we should do this, or cement factories or whatever else.
Dr. WALKER. I think you gave the best example there is. We put a man on the moon. It is a great engineering triumph. I say engineering rather than science. But we just made up our minds we were going to do it, we put the money behind it and we did it.
Now, having done that, if we can't cure the smoke from cement plants, we are a funny race.
General SCHRIEVER. No question we can clear our air. There is no question about that. I was in St. Louis, East St. Louis, yesterday giving a commencement address at Parks College, and I went through those plants down there, Monsanto and a couple of others, and I will tell you, it is a crime.
But it takes political action to clean those plants up. You are going to have to take political action to do it, and it isn't going to be done with politics as usual. I don't know how long the political leaders in that area are going to keep messing around there with that problem before they pass some legislation which says, “Clean up those plants."
It can be done. There is a smog belt there that is worse than Los Angeles.
Mr. PETTIS. Impossible.
General SCHRIEVER. I am out there all the time, too, so I know. This was terrible. It is not the first time I have ever been there, in East St. Louis.
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Symington.
I remember a visit from General Schriever to St. Louis years ago. We had less smoke at that time. This hearing really seems almost an extension of your very first hearings, Mr. Chairman, on the role of science and technology in the urban crisis, where Mr. Doxiadis spoke and defined a city, as the Athenians did, as being for the happiness and safety of the people.
Clearly, the political decision itself must be the lubricant between the science and the technology. It has to somehow translate what the scientists are learning into technological advantages for the people.
The decision of the California Legislature that Mr. Pettis described is a sign of the desperation of the political world, that occasionally surfaces in an effort to just mathematically translate science into techno al advantage, which is impossible of course that would be putting too much burden on the producers of the automobiles and California purchasers of them.
This has to be a national decision. It can't be made in one locality at a given moment in time. The analogy to the moon landing is useful in another respect, and that is that NASA actually contracted out to certain companies. It didn't have to necessarily rely on its own laboratories as perhaps might have been suggested earlier, but contracted out to the laboratory facilities of private companies some of the technical aspects of the mission.
I am sure one of them might have been Monsanto in small way. Now, why couldn't some agency of Government contract with Monsanto simply to remove the pollution it is creating? That would be even a greater contribution,
I would think, or to some other concern or consortium of concerns. That is what I derive, Mr. Chairman, so far, from this discussion.
Mr. DADDARIO. Any comment on that?
Dr. Walker, on page 4 of your testimony, in the top paragraph there, you make several statements, that kind of leave me up in the air. One, if this country really means to solve some of its national problems, large sums of money—just the first part. “If the country.” Are you in doubt that the country really is trying to solve some of our national problems? I am sure it may seem that way.
Dr. WALKER. It does seem that way.
Mr. WINN. Are you personally in doubt that we are, or just in this field?
Dr. WALKER. I am talking just of this field. But when you see that solutions are within our grasp and we don't seem to get together and seize them
Mr. Winn. Well, then, what you are really talking about then is a series of priorities. Because we can't do everything at once. We don't
have that kind of money, although some people would like to do everything.
So then you get down to the other part of the statement, is that large sums of money would have to be supplied for technology and these sums might be supplied through a Department of Science and Technology. All right. What are you talking about when you say large sums of money? Can you give us an idea of what you think large sums of money mean for this endeavor ?
Ďr. WALKER. Well, I think I am talking in this point about the difference between what the National Science Foundation thinks is a large sum and what is really needed. You go to the National Science Foundation
Mr. WINN. Theirs is approximately $1 billion, right?
Dr. WALKER. Yes; $1 million as against $50,000. If you go to the National Science Foundation with an engineering problem, they think in terms of a $50,000 project, but in the case of this acid mine water thing, just to build the model was $2 million.
Mr. WINN. No. Did I misunderstand, from the NSF that they thought a good operation would be about $1 billion? Wasn't that the figure?
Mr. DADDARIO. We have had some testimony, yes, Mr. Winn, that the National Science Foundation within some concept of restructuring to develop new administrative techniques, that if it were to be strengthened to the tune of $1 billion, that it would be able to add a great deal to the way in which our science resources were in fact put together.
Mr. WINN. Yes.
Mr. WINN. That was my understanding. But you are talking about individual projects.
Dr. WALKER. Individual projects.
Mr. WINN. You think they underestimate costs or don't think big enough?
Dr. WALKER. Well, they just don't have that much money. When I knew the National Science Foundation, they had about $30 million a year for engineering research, engineering development, and that $30 million just won't do very much work.
Mr. WINN. Well, now, right along that same line, you say it might be supplied through a Department of Science and Technology. That means we might have either another Government bureaucracy or a bureau or a department. Again we might well be faced with the same problem that we have now, where we hear the Pentagon and State Department and NASA all being accused of being a little royalty within themselves and constantly trying to build themselves bigger and better missions so that the top echelon can be over more employees and thereby get fatter salaries.
You know that, you have heard that.
Mr. Winn. How are we going to sell the public on this type of thing? You know the public is right now in sort of a semitax rebellion-I think you will find all of us are getting that kind of mail—and definitely wanting tax reforms and thinking that that is going to take